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DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS
THE MAKING OF A GLOBAL CULTURE

PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 10TH INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

May 13–14, 2010

The Conference is held in accordance with the Decree of President of Russia V. V. Putin "On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov" № 587, dated from May 23, 2001

The conference, originally called "The Days of Science in St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences" is the 18th in number and the 10th in the status of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference

**St. Petersburg
2010**

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Scientific editor
A. S. Zapesotsky, Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference, academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation, Artist Emeritus of the Russian Federation

Editor of the English language edition
S. R. Abramov, English Chair of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philology), Professor

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Selected papers of participants of the 10th International Likhachov Scientific Conference are published in this collection; the Conference took place on the 13th–14th of May 2010 at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences under the Decree of President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin 'On perpetuating the memory of D. S. Likhachov'.

Among the contributors are prominent Russian and foreign scholars, academicians and corresponding members of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Education: L. I. Abalkin, O. T. Bogomolov, A. A. Guseynov, V. A. Lektorsky, V. L. Makarov, N. D. Nikandrov (President of the Academy of Education), Yu. S. Osipov (President of the Russian Academy of Sciences), V. S. Styopin, V. A. Tishkov, A. O. Chubarian, N. P. Shmelyov and others, executives of academic institutions and research centres, presidents of universities, famous statesmen, political and public figures, intellectuals: writer D. A. Granin, Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation A. A. Avdeyev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. V. Lavrov, Judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation N. S. Bondar, G. A. Hajiyev, Governor of St. Petersburg V. I. Matviyenko and many others.

This edition includes reports of ambassadors of different countries to Moscow and UNESCO, works of prominent historians, lawyers, economists from three dozens of countries embracing all parts of the world, from Canada to New Zealand and from Japan to Great Britain. Among foreign participants of the Conference were a French Slavicist R. Guerra, a German political analyst A. Rahr, a member of the European, Sweden and Norwegian academies R. Torstendahl, Ukrainian academicians P. Tolochko and Yu. Shemshuchenko and other world-famous experts.

Papers of the participants of the 10th International Likhachov Scientific Conference are devoted to acute issues of the modern age: ways of global culture formation, tendencies of the world economic development, globalization of education and labour relations, international law and modern mass media.

The role of the Conference was highly appreciated by President of the Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev who noted that its scientific results and 'recommendations will be in demand in practice and will promote the realization of perspective international projects in the humanitarian sphere'.

ББК 72

DECREE
OF PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
'ON PERPETUATING THE MEMORY
OF DMITRY SERGEYEVICH LIKHACHOV'

Given D. S. Likhachov's outstanding contribution to the development of the home science and culture I enact:

1. the Government of the Russian Federation should:

– establish two personal grants in honour of D. S. Likhachov at the rate of 400 roubles each for university students from the year 2001 and to define the procedure of conferring them;

– work out the project of D. S. Likhachov's gravestone on a competitive basis together with the Government of St. Petersburg;

– consider the issue of making a film devoted to D. S. Likhachov's life and activities.

2. the Government of St. Petersburg should:

– name one of the streets in St. Petersburg after D. S. Likhachov;

– consider the issue of placing a memorial plate on the building of the Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of Science (Pushkin's House);

– guarantee the work on setting up D. S. Likhachov's gravestone in prescribed manner.

3. According to the suggestion from the Russian Academy of Science the Likhachov Memorial Prizes of the Russian Academy of Science should be established for Russian and foreign scientists for their outstanding contribution to the research of literature and culture of ancient Russia, and the collected writings of the late Academician should be published.

4. **According to the suggestion from St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress the International Likhachov Scientific Conference should be annually held on the Day of the Slavonic Letters and Culture**.

VLADIMIR PUTIN
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, the Kremlin, May 23, 2001

GREETING OF PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION DMITRY MEDVEDEV TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

To the hosts, participants and guests of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference

Dear friends,

I should like to welcome you on the opening of the 9th International Likhachov Scientific Conference. I wish all the participants success and fruitful and prolific discussions.

Your reputable forum has always been a remarkable event, gathering the world intellectual community. Its brilliant discussions and reports on various topics, such as: the role of culture and humanities in people's contemporary life; partnership of civilizations and others arise great interest and deeply affect public life.

A remarkable event in the course of this year Conference has become introduction of a special youth programme 'Likhachov Forum for High School Students'. I have no doubt that establishing ethic and moral norms with the generations to come demands studying fundamental works and scientific heritage of academician Likhachov whose humanistic ideas have eternal context.

I should like to express my hope that the suggestions and recommendations elaborated within your conference will contribute practical activities and assist in long-term international humanitarian projects development.

I wish the participants and guests of the conference all the best.

President of the Russian Federation
D. A. MEDVEDEV
May 13, 2009

To the participants and guests of the X International Likhachov Scientific Conference

Dear Friends!

I am sincerely pleased to see you in Saint-Petersburg and to open the X Anniversary Likhachov Conference.

This forum traditionally brings representatives of scientific and arts communities, famous politicians, and experts from Russia and all over the world.

This year the Likhachov Conference is devoted to one of the today's key issues, establishment of global culture and preservation of national identity.

Today, with convergence and interpenetration of cultures it is important to preserve original traditions, languages, lifestyle, and spiritual and moral values of the folks as a basis of cultural diversity of the world in the time of globalization. I hope you enjoy interesting discussions and fruitful communication, and wish good luck and success to the senior pupils who are participating in the Competition 'Ideas of D.S. Likhachov and Modern Age'.

President of the Russian Federation
D. A. MEDVEDEV
May 12th, 2010

GREETINGS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN
TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

I should first like to welcome the participants of the International Scientific Conference "The world of culture of Academician D. S. Likhachov". The most prominent scientists and political leaders come together to discuss at this conference the most important issues of the scientific, moral and spiritual legacy of the remarkable Russian scientist D. S. Likhachov. I strongly believe that this tradition will be followed up in the future and the most distinguished successors will develop Likhachov's humanistic ideas and put them into practice while creating the Universal Home for all people of the 21st century.

I should like to express my hope that the Likhachov scientific conferences will be held in all regions of this country as well as in St. Petersburg, and we will feel part of this remarkable tradition.

I wish you a fruitful discussion and a good partnership that will bring many useful results.

V. Putin
President of the Russian Federation
May 21, 2001

✦ ✦ ✦

I should like to welcome the guests, participants, and the organization that is holding this remarkable event, the International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

The most influential and outstanding representatives of intellectual elite – scientists, artists, political figures – participate in this conference to keep up with the tradition. It affords me deep satisfaction to see this forum acquire an international standing. I note with pleasure that its agenda contains the most significant and topical issues of our time. This year you are discussing one of the fundamental problems – impact of education on humanistic process in the society.

The fact that this forum is organized regularly is a great tribute to the memory of D. S. Likhachov, an outstanding scientist, citizen and patriot. His spiritual legacy, scientific works dedicated to the problems of intellectual and moral development of younger generations, has great significance. I wish you a fruitful discussion.

V. Putin
President of the Russian Federation
May 20, 2004

✦ ✦ ✦

I should like to welcome the guests, participants, and the organization that is holding the 6th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

I note with satisfaction that for many years this forum has been carrying out a very noble and important mission of preserving, analyzing and popularizing Likhachov's scientific works. The International Likhachov Scientific Conference has become a very important forum where people can exchange ideas and discuss the topical issues of the present time. Likhachov's spiritual legacy is an integral part of our science, of the science all over the world. And we are proud to see Likhachov's 100th anniversary, this memorable event, being celebrated on a great scale in Russia and abroad. I wish a successful discussion to all the participants and guests of the conference.

V. Putin
President of the Russian Federation
May 25, 2006

✦ ✦ ✦

I want to extend my welcome to hosts, participants and guests of the 8th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Holding this scientific Forum has become a good and important tradition. It helps not only to realise the value of humanistic ideas of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, but also to understand topical issues of the modern world.

That is why the agenda of the Conference involves problems vital for everyone, like personality and society in a multicultural world; economics and law in the context of partnership of civilizations; mass media in the system of forming the worldview; higher education: problems of development in the context of globalization and others.

I am sure that a lively discussion closely reasoned and utterly transparent in its exposition and logic will contribute to the development of the humanities, steadfast and righteous moral norms.

I wish the hosts, participants and guests fruitful cooperation and all the best.

V. Putin
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation
May 22, 2008

✦ ✦ ✦

Dear Friends!

I am sincerely pleased to see you in Saint-Petersburg and open the X Anniversary International Likhachov Conference.

This reputable Forum is always notable for the substantial membership, comprehensive and effective work, and wide spectrum of issues to be discussed.

I am sure that the today's meeting devoted to the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations should be one more step forward in promoting interconfessional and international communication to bring people closer to each other. And, certainly, again we can see so many prominent people together, among which are scientists, public figures, intellectuals, representatives of arts community, everyone who shares notions and opinions of Dmitry S. Likhachov.

I wish you good luck and all the best!

V. Putin
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation
May 11th, 2010

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV
SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE
Information

The International Scientific Conference at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences first took place in May, 1993. It was timed to the Day of Slavonic Letters and Culture. It was initiated by academician Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov. Since then the conference has been held every year. After academician Likhachov had passed away this academic forum received the status of International Likhachov Scientific Conference from the government (by the Decree of President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin 'On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov' No. 587, May 23, 2001).

The co-founders of the Conference are the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Academy of Education, St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress (founders: J. I. Alferov, D. A. Granin, A. S. Zapesotsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, D. S. Likhachov, A. P. Petrov, M. B. Piotrowsky). Since 2007 the conference has enjoyed the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Traditionally, the most universal debatable challenges of the present time are put on the agenda of the conference: 'Education in terms of the new cultural type formation', 'Culture and global challenges of the world development', 'Humanitarian issues of the contemporary civilization' etc.

Every year greatest figures of Russian and foreign science, culture and art, public and political leaders take part in the conference. The following academicians of the Russian Academy of Sciences have taken part in the conference in recent years: L. I. Abalkin, A. G. Arbatov, N. P. Bekhtereva, O. T. Bogomolov, V. N. Bolshakov, Yu. S. Vasilyev, R. S. Grinberg, A. A. Guseynov, T. I. Zaslavskaya, A. A. Kokoshin, A. B. Kudelin, V. A. Lektorsky, I. I. Lukinov, D. S. Lvov, V. A. Martynov, N. N. Moiseyev, A. D. Neki-pelov, Yu. S. Osipov, A. M. Panchenko, N. Ya. Petrakov, V. F. Petrenko, E. I. Pivovar, M. B. Piotrowsky, N. A. Plateh, V. M. Polterovich, E. M. Primakov, B. V. Rauschenbach, Yu. A. Ryzhov, N. N. Skatov, A. V. Smirnov, V. S. Styopin, V. A. Tishkov, J. T. Toshchenko, V. A. Chereshnev, A. O. Chubarian, N. P. Shmelyov, V. L. Yanin and others. Academicians of the Russian Academy of Education who have taken part in the conference are the following: S. A. Amonashvili, V. I. Andreyev, G. M. Andreyeva, A. G. Asmolov, A. P. Beliayeva, M. N. Berulava, I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada, A. A. Bodalev, E. V. Bon-darevskaya, G. A. Bordovsky, V. P. Borisenkov, G. N. Volkov, Yu. S. Davydov, A. V. Darinsky, E. D. Dnep-rov, S. F. Yegorov, V. I. Zagvyazinskiy, I. A. Zimniaya, V. G. Kineliov, I. S. Kon, A. S. Kondratyev, V. G. Kostomarov, V. V. Krayevsky, A. A. Likhanov, G. V. Mukhamedzianova, V. S. Mukhina, V. A. Mias-nikov, N. D. Nikandrov, A. M. Novikov, O. A. Omarov, A. A. Orlov, Yu. V. Senko, A. V. Usova, Yu. U. Fokht-Babushkin, G. A. Yagodin, V. Mitter (Germany) and others. Such public and state figures as A. A. Akayev, A. E. Busygin, G. A. Hajiyev, S. L. Katanandov, S. V. Lavrov, E. I. Makarov, V. I. Matviyenko, V. V. Miklushevsky, K. O. Romodanovsky, A. L. Safonov, A. A. Sobchak, E. S. Stroyev, V. E. Churov, M. V. Shmakov, A. V. Yakovenko, V. A. Yakovlev have also participated in the conference. Among the figures of culture and art who have taken part in the conference are the following: M. K. Anikushin, A. A. Voznesensky, I. O. Gorbachov, D. A. Granin, N. M. Dudinskaya, Z. Ya. Korogodsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, A. P. Petrov, M. M. Plisetskaya, M. L. Rostropovich, E. A. Riazanov, G. V. Sviridov and others.

Since 2007 in the framework of the Conference there has been held Likhachov forum of senior high-school students of Russia, which gathers winners of the All-Russian Contest of creative projects entitled 'Dmitry Likhachov's Ideas and Modernity' from all over Russia and abroad.

Since 2008, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Diplomatic Programme of the conference 'International Dialogue of Cultures' has been implemented. Ambassadors of foreign states present their reports and give their opinions on acute challenges of present time.

Since 2010 the complex of Likhachov events has been supplemented with an All-Russian cultural-educational programme for senior high-school students entitled 'Likhachov Lessons in Petersburg'.

Four times, in 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2009, the hosts and participants were greeted by Presidents of the Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev and V. V. Putin, in 2008 by Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin.

Every year volumes of reports, participants' presentations, proceedings of workshop discussions and round tables are published. The copies of the volumes are present in all major libraries of Russia, the CIS countries, scientific and educational centres of many countries in the world. The Proceedings of the conference are also available on a special scientific website 'Likhachov Square' (at www.lihachev.ru).

CONTENTS

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES
AND PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS:
THE MAKING OF A GLOBAL CULTURE

D. A. Granin[1]

ON THE ISSUE OF THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES
AND PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS

I have an iron box at home where I keep different awards. When I put the German order into it there came an unimaginable uproar. The loudest noise was made by my veteran decorations. They wanted to throw the German away. I did not feel like taking part in the row and went away leaving them to sort it out for themselves. And they did. Time passed, the murmur subsided. There seems to be something that allows them to stay together now.

(from a talk with A. S. Zapesotsky
shortly before the 9th of May, 2010)

[1] Writer, Hero of the Socialist Labour, Honorary freeman of St. Petersburg, co-founder of St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress, member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Mr Granin is the author of books: *Iskateli* [Those Who Seek], *Idu na Grozu* [Going Inside a Storm], *Eta strannaya zhizn''* [This Strange Life], *Klavdiya Vilor* [Claudia Vilor], *Blokadnaya Kniga* [The Blockade Book] (in co-authorship with A. Adamovich), *Kartina* [The Picture], *Zubr* [Bison], *Begstvo* v *Rossiyu* [Escape to Russia], *Vechera c Petrom Velikim* [Evenings with Peter the Great], *Intelegendy* [Intelegends], *D.A. Granin — Universitietskiye vstrechi. 33 teksta* [D.A. Granin — University meetings. 33 texts], *Prichudy moyey pamyati* [Quirks of My Memory], Kak rabotat' geniyem [How to Work as a Genius] [collection], *Mesto dlya pamyatnika* [A Place for a Monument], *Skryty smysl* [A Hidden Meaning], *Vse bylo ne sovsem tak* [Everything was a little different] and others. Daniil Granin is decorated with the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Banner of Labour, the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st Class, the Order of Friendship of Peoples, the Order for Services to the Fatherland (Degree 3), Service Cross (the 1st Degree) – Officer's Cross (FRG), the Honorary Badge of the Order of St. Andrew and others. Laureate of State Prizes of the USSR and Russia, the Russian Federation President's award in the field of literature and art, St. Petersburg Government Prize in literature, art and architecture, Heine Award. Mr Granin is the Laureate of the International award for development and consolidation of humanitarian links in the countries of the Baltic region 'The Baltic Star'.

L. I. Abalkin[2]

GLOBALIZATION OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND CULTURE

The modern world is undergoing dramatic changes. One of the leading tendencies is economic, social and technological globalization. Its numerous aspects have already been and remain a subject of many debates and discussions. Some profound reasons are offered both by the globalists and the anti-globalists.

The symposium held by the Institute for World Economics and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 3009 proves the existence of these differences. V. Ino-zemtsev, Dr. Sc. in Economics, made a speech dedicated to the problem of globalization. However, the discussion that followed did not give the only answer. There is no consensus.

What is the reason for it? To answer the question I would like to draw a personal example connected with my early life experience. My fellow student who took a postgraduate course defended a dissertation in early 1960s. The professors' board asked him the following question: 'How positive or negative are the consequences of a technological and scientific revolution for the working class?' The epoch when this dissertation was defended shows the importance of the chosen subject.

At first my colleague's answer was not quite confident, which became the reason for further questioning. Then he remembered the methodology and was able to formulate his answer very accurately, almost according to Karl Marx's theory. A machine as an objective reality increases the volume of production, produces various goods satisfying the market and increases working efficiency. To protest against the machines means to blow against the wind. Such behaviour was common for the representatives of the luddite movement fighting against a machine as such.

However, a machine is not only an objective reality. Its exploitation is connected with its social and economic sphere of use. In conditions of that time it had a capitalist form: it was based on the labour of women and children, ruined their health and prolonged the working day. We can draw the following conclusion from this situation: there must be a struggle not with a machine but with the forms it is used. At that time the use was of the capitalist the character.

In the process of development of the civil society and the formation of the social state and mass labour movement these contradictions lessened. Some new laws were accepted, children's labour was prohibited and the duration of the working day became shorter. Such processes took place in the most developed countries, including Russia. Today speaking about a 'golden billion' of the citizens of the globe we can state that a capitalist way of machine exploitation has been abandoned.

Now we are coming back to the question stated at the top of the article. The main reason for antagonism between the globalists and anti-globalists is in their lack of methodological culture. They are unable to perceive the dual character of globalization: its objective basis and its socio-economic form. The latter is imperialistic in the majority of cases. This is a modern reality which cannot be ignored.

The majority, unfortunately, do not notice this fact. The mood of the society is based on the information offered by the mass media which try to find something fresh, attract the readers'

[2] Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Scientific Head of the Institute for Economics (the Russian Academy of Sciences) (Moscow), Editor-in-Chief of *Voprosy economiki* journal [Issues of Economics], Dr. Sc. (Economics), professor.

Author of more than 800 scholarly publications and 24 books, including: *Politicheskaya Ekonomiya i ekonomicheskaya politika* [Political Economy and Economic Politics], *Khozyaystvennyy mehanism razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* [Economic Mechanism of a Developed socialist society], *Zametki o rossiyskom predprinimatelstve* [Notes on Russian Entrepreneurship], *Konechni-ye narodnokhozyaystvenniye resultaty (Sushchnost', pokazateli, puti povysheni-ya)* [Economic Objectives (Nature, Indicators, Improving Practices)], *Novy Tip ekonomicheskogo myshleniya* [A New Type of Economic Thinking], *Rossiya: poisk samoopredeleniya* [Russia: Seeking Self-Determination].

Honorary President of the International foundation of Nikolai Kondratyev, Vice-President of Free Economic Society of Russia and International Union of Economists, Honorary professor of Tsin Hua University in Beijing, member of New York Academy of Sciences, Academies of Sciences of Byelorussia and Georgia, International Academy of Economics 'Eurasia'.

attention and flare up tensions. The mass media are not interested in people's life and social movements in the modern world. But the mass media are a primary power nowadays. As far as it concerns the scientific basis, it is a field for professional researches, although some contradictions still exist among them.

Here the questions of democracy and culture arise. There cannot be a single model of democracy functioning in various countries of the globe. An attempt to impose it, excercised by the USA with all its power, cannot be equally adequate for China and India, for Islamic countries.

Culture is not an isolated concept. On the contrary, it is intrinsically inherent in the social structure. Culture is a social form of life with its traditions, values and way of thinking.

In 2000 E. Batalov wrote in his article 'The Russian idea and an American dream': 'An American dream is fed by the spirit of national superiority, exclusiveness and messianic sensations. The Yankee believe that the USA is a "City on the Hill" and a guiding star with which other nations must orient their historical way which America has a moral right to correct whenever necessary.'

In comparison with globalization, culture is national in its nature. L. Gumilyov already revealed the primitive character of all of considerations of a unique global culture. He confidently proved that 'the existence of a humanitarian culture shared by all the nations is impossible'. 'It is a well-known fact that only a system which is complex enough can live and function successfully. A single humanitarian "culture" can only exist when ultimately simplified (which is achieved by ruining national cultures). The limit of systemic simplification is its death.'

The world of culture is multicoloured, which is its advantage. Getting to know other cultures enlarges an individual outlook on the world, it brings together different countries and becomes a reason for respect between the nations. It is a way to a broader view of the world.

I share Dmitry Likhachov's opinion who stated that culture 'makes population inhabiting a certain territory a unified nation. Religion, science, education, moral norms of civil behaviour and the state have always been included and must remain in the notion of culture.'

It accounts for the importance of searching the roots of spiritual uniqueness of Russia in its past, gone, but immortal, forgotten, but utterly significant.

In 2000 at the Moscow conference held by the Roman club Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan pointed out the problem of harmonizing globalization and culture. He remarked that 'the quicker we move towards universality, the stronger become the cultural distinctions. That's why one cannot see globalization as a leading world tendency, forgetting about the existence of cultural, religious and historical values inherited from the past. One has to take into consideration characteristic features of my or any other country which is a traditional way, and it will be applied by the scientists till the differences not only for the whole world, but also for a single person continue to exist.'

It is essential to mention that changes in culture have a more complex character than the ones in the sphere of technologies or even economy. Technology as well as economy are secondary to culture. This point of view is not shared by everybody. Still it is a natural conclusion from the historical progress of the society.

While analyzing this aspect of the problem we face not very optimistic memories. They are strengthened by serious faults of modern spirituality of Russians. Their culture and morals are not as high as in the past.

History proves that in the times of trouble, in the times of discord (as we see the present situation) some solutions were found to enable a cultural breakthrough. We do hope to find an appropriate solution nowadays.

V. Yu. Afiani[3]

STATUS AND ROLE OF ARCHIVES IN THE GLOBAL CULTURE

Archive is one of the ancient institutions of the human civilization, an inalienable attribute and a companion attending both secular and religious authorities. The oldest archives in human history date back to the late 4th-lst millennium BC. Mesopotamian and Middle Eastern archives of Nippur, Babylon, Borsippa, Sippar, Ur, Uruq, Lagash, Kanish, Assur and other manifest a deliberate and advanced tendency to keep juridical, magisterial, diplomatic, household and other records, correspondence, papers of kings and their governors, officials, military commanders, ambassadors and priests. Experts state that private archives of merchants could also be traced, but the dominant position belonged to royal and governmental archives. Strange as it may seem, there is little knowing about religious archives although it is a well-know fact that temples kept a number of papers including household and even reconnoitring ones.

The authorities and governments have had a sacred character for various peoples throughout millennia, this concept had lived to see the early 20th century in Russia, where the emperor was considered 'the anointed sovereign', while in Japan the concept of the emperor's divine origin, as of a descendant of Amaterasu, the sun goddess, had survived until 1945. Sacred reputation of the authorities veiled even their archives with mystery.

For centuries, only authorized recording officials and annalists could get free access to archives. Classified state archives that kept the most significant papers of state power highest bodies together with politically controversial papers were typical of the 19th century. Official archives are still keeping their secrets nowadays, in modern civilized countries.

In the Soviet Union all moves and records of the authorities, save for those broadcast to the public, were classified and top-classified. Partly, such measures had originated from the conspiratorial past of the clandestine activities, psychology of hostile environment, permanent struggle with foes, partly such measures were rooted in sacred traditions of the very national authorities despite their origin. Very often modern Russia is quite mechanically reproached for its closed nature. Although there are piles of documents that historians long to be revealed.

Free access to life-giving cultural values is a common right for everyone, and libraries and archives are in charge of providing conditions for us to enjoy this right. *D. S. Likhachov. Notes and Remarks*[4]

This problem is common for other European countries. For instance, Vatican's pre-war and Second World War archives have only recently been disclosed.[5] What secrets of the Catholic Church will they unveil to us this time? Government archives in democratic societies are still hardly subject to the declared open and public nature.

In contrast to libraries and museums, one can talk about congenial tradition of state archives (as well as private ones) to be of closed nature, including those of Europe and the USA.

But at the same time, since the ancient time, the archives have been keeping precious evidences of cross-cultural contacts. Ashurbanipal, the king of Assyria, collected, as it is recorded on one of clay tablets, 'for the rest of the time' dozens of thousands of historical, magical and scientific texts in various languages with the engraved historical data, astronomical observations and medical experiments, as well as legal acts, state treaties, artistic myths, religious songs, stories about the universe, including the well-known fragment about the Flood. His collection

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[3] Director of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Chair of Archaeography at the Historical Archive Institute of the Russian State University for the Humanities, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of *Istorichesky Arhiv* journal [Historical Archive], Candidate of Science (History). Author of a number of scholarly publications, including: 'Rossiyskaja Akademiya nauk = Russian Academy of Sciences: personal staff, 1724-2009': in 4 volumes. Volume 4, Apparat CK KPSS i kultura, 1958-1964: dokumenty [Administration of the CPSU Central Committee and culture, 1958-1964: documents], 'Apparat CK KPSS i kultura, 1953-1957: dokumenty' [Administration of the CPSU Central Committee and culture, 1953-1957: documents], 'Ideologicheskiye komissiyi CK KPSS: 1958-1964: dokumenty' [Ideological Commissions of the CPSU Central Committee: 1958-1964: documents], Russkaya provintsiya. Kultura 18-20 vekov [The Russian Provinces. Culture of the 18th-20th century] and others.

[4] From the *Notebooks of Various Years,* Leningrad, 1989, p. 303.

[5] *Bensi* Giovanni. Vatican opens classified archives. Historians to find out if Pope Pius XII was a collaborationist / 'The Independent Newspaper' (Nezavisimaya gazeta). 2003. February, 14.

might be called an archive-library, it kept for us rare treasures of ancient peoples' cultures. Invaluable documents remained there, but to what extent was this collection intended to be distributed and translated?

In the 20th century, involving the archives into modern social and cultural processes began to develop after the millennia of being closed. First, for regular historians. In the late 19th -early 20th centuries, before the revolution Russian leading historians and archivists struggled and dreamt that the archives would be opened for researchers and the science.

But, at last, since the 1930s the closed nature and the tendency to classify archives has prevailed, ft was only authorized representatives of punitive agencies who could get frecaccess to the archives. Nevertheless, the Soviet archives kept introducing their records to the society in forms of reference books, collection of papers or archive exhibitions, and this process gradually developed.

Three historical epochs in Russia witnessed declassification and large-scale publication of formerly top secret archive records: the October Revolution of 1917, liberalization of the 1950s following the death of J. Stalin, and the 1990s collapse of the Soviet Union. The background of those events lay within political reasons, that is criticism of the preceding political regime. In each epoch, especially in the 1990s, mass media were excessively involved in the campaign for publishing sensational papers, thus, archive records fell into the public domain. Although later, on getting through the phase of acute political confrontation, the situation quite naturally got stabilized and even a kind of 'counter-revolution' could be detected in respect to archives declassification. However, historians always managed to obtain most valuable historical sources, while the reputation of archives as treasuries of state secrets waned. Secret archives are statute-barred in the Russian Federation.

Open public nature of archives is determined mostly by free access to information search engines and available archive stock. It is obvious that traditional systems of information on the body and contents of archive records, such as guidebooks, reviews, reference books, are insufficient in the information epoch, as they are targeted at experts and are unavailable outside archives, and as they are published in a limited number of copies.

The history of archives, alongside with the history of the humankind, is turning down to a new page, the epoch of the Internet, global informational and cultural links. Experts argue if the global culture has emerged, what it is and if it is feasible at all.

Global culture is unlikely to prevail over national cultures. But it would be odd to deny long-established tendencies rooted in the most powerful world state, the USA, urge to promote its lifestyle, values and culture. American culture has succeeded a lot. The Internet has become a mighty tool to put these tendencies into life, including expansion of the English language, the basis of global culture. Without language proficiency an Internet user will fail to serf it to the full extent. Many people object to such expansion for both political and cultural reasons. This is another challenge to investigate. The question arises whether to treat global culture positively or a priori negatively?

It is not that a state or a culture strives to expand, globalization has internal reasons, rather economically than politically determined. Globalization is supplied by the indefatigable hunger for information about everything in the world.

The Internet can be called an essential constituent element of the global culture and the tool to create it, however there are other elements. Although, on second thought, the phenomena such as international fashion, pop culture and many others tend to flow into the Internet like streams and rivers to the ocean.

While experts are debating on benefits and drawbacks of the global culture, local globalization processes are in progress, which can hardly be considered in the negative. Following the example of libraries, many world archives open free Internet access. But it's only the top of the iceberg. Information technologies penetrate into all traditional methods of archivists' work, and many things have already become impossible without these technologies. That is not the future, that is the present day of archive-keeping.

Social and cultural institution of archiving with its traditionally conservative nature hasn't remained in the shade in quickly changing modern world. Archives are transforming from

treasuries of state secrets targeted at the current needs of the authoritative bodies to multifunctional public institutions. Among the most crucial functions of archives aimed at providing access to state records is the following: to meet the needs of the state, society and people providing them with historical, social and legal data.

After many centuries, manuscripts and paper documents have yielded to new forms. Audio-visual and digital records are becoming more overriding. The number of audio-visual and digital records keeps growing, new means to kept and transmit them appear: e-mail, the Internet, mobile phones, national info nets, intranets, workflow systems, and so on. Undoubtedly, the real process of paper documents yielding to digital ones turned out to be longer than it had been enthusiastically expected, but the process seems inevitable.

Archive-keeping business finds itself in a new situation. Changes can be detected not only in the methods to create, record and keep archive information, but in the forms and methods to present it to the users. These changes are common for all traditional centres of keeping and propagating retrospective data, that is museums and libraries. Advanced information technologies and the Internet gradually alter methods of archivists' work, together with archives themselves and our views of them. Many experts believe these technologies to provide an opportunity to deliver archive records to any user at any location in the nearest future.

Information-based approach depicts future archives more distinctly as centres to collect and record information in various storage media, to handle and present information to the users in many modes, including an on-line mode.

What will archive of the future look like? What should it be like?

Such information centres as museums and libraries perform similar functions, the only difference being in the source of information: documents, books or items. A recent discussion in the 'National Archives'journal (Otechestvennye arkhivy) covering the issue of the balance between archives, museums and libraries, their status in the modern society, explicated different views of the experts. It is obvious that each of these social institutions originating from the differentiation of human activities and from attempts to preserve historical information, especially of the 18th—19th centuries, has its own distinctive features. In the future the liabilities of these institutions are likely to become fuzzy, 'hybrid' forms (of libraries and museums keeping archives and archives collecting museum items; all of which arrange exhibitions). Nowadays such forms are already being created, their examples are multiple, the most famous being the Library of Congress in Washington, one of the largest book depositories in the world. Together with printed documents it keeps traditional records, audio-visual and digital ones.

Will such processes result in merging these institutions? The question is difficult to answer unambiguously, merging is unlikely to happen in the nearest future, but the tendency can already be traced.

Another tendency is sure to expand on a large scale, that is presenting information about archive records and the very records in a digital mode on the Internet. At present many sites provide on-line access to archive documents. All national archives and a large number of foreign ones have their own Internet sites. Some sites and portals accumulate data of several archives, such are the portal 'Archives of Russia' (Arkhivy Rossiyi); the site 'Archives of the Russian Academy of Sciences' (Arkhivy Rossiyskoy akademiyi nauk), and others. Archives present more and more growing amount of information on the Internet, digital guidebooks, other reference books, databases, including full-text ones, web-publications and exhibitions of archive documents...

All this, as well as libraries and museums information, is another element of global processes. Archive information access is getting unrestricted. Archive records are becoming a constituent element of global cultural processes, information exchange and dialogue of cultures. I think such phenomenon as global information and cultural exchange deserves appreciation regardless to a general evaluation of global culture in the present or future.

George Anastassopoulos[6]
NATION-STATES AND WORLD INSTITUTIONS:
COOPERATION AND THE MAKING OF A GLOBAL CULTURE

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The debate over the role of nation-states and world institutions in the making of a "global culture" is of remarkable contemporary significance.

In order to address the matter before us, I believe it is important that we begin by clarifying our vocabulary. This requires us to take a closer look at the concept of *"global culture",* which – for all intended purposes – can be split into its two components: *globalization* and *culture.*

Above and beyond the theoretical debates that divide the *"pro",* the *"anti* and the *"alter"* globalization movements, the notion of *"globalization"* describes a process fuelled by, and resulting in, increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, information, and culture[7]. As such, "globalization" is a process that generates an increase in the cross-border flow of several elements, among which we find culture.

Regarding the notion of *"culture",* I fully concur with the definition provided in the Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies adopted in 1982, which states that culture is *"the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs".* This Declaration reiterates that *"every culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values since each people's traditions and forms of expression are its most effective means of demonstrating its presence in the world'.*

Building on these definitions, the concept of *"global culture",* far from meaning a uniform and standardized set of values shared by the entire world, can also be regarded as a **"global culture of diversity",** that is a worldwide interconnected network of different cultures co-existing within Nations.

This understanding of "global culture" concurs with the vision of the *UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity,* which points out that the process of globalization, facilitated by the rapid development of information and communication technologies, although representing a challenge for cultural diversity, creates also the conditions for renewed dialogue among individuals and cultures. In other words, globalization does not necessarily imply the homogenization of cultures. It can also facilitate intercultural dialogue and cultural diversity.

Having explained how I understand the concept of *"global culture",* two fundamental questions come to mind:

– How have States and international organizations reacted to the emergence of this "globalized culture of diversity"? And

– What is their role in its emergence and development?

Regarding the first question, we observe a significant increase in the number of Member States forming the international community. Indeed, we have seen the number grow from 157 Member States of the United Nations in 1980 to 192 at present – 193 in the case of UNESCO. And on the assumption that it is "natural" for a nation to aspire to statehood, numerous political movements aiming at creating new States (in the Basque Country, Kurdistan, Quebec, etc) have also grown in importance.

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[6] Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Greece to UNESCO. Author of books: *The 1992 challenge, Horizontal Production. Double Thread for Community Law, Common Principles for a European Electoral System, Konstantinos Karamanlis: Myth and Truth, Introduction to European Studies, The Conflict on the System of Electing the Members of the European Parliament, The Debate on the System of Electing the Members of the European Parliament* and others.

[7] *Held,* David; *McGrew,* Anthony; *Goldblatt,* David; *Perraton,* Jonathan (1999). Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Polity Press and Stanford University Press.

Concomitantly, we have seen the number of active intergovernmental organizations gradually grow, from around 1000 in the early 1980s to almost 5000 in 2008[8].

These parallel trends can be attributed to the predominance of the nation-State model in contemporary thinking which has, on one hand, reinforced multilateral institutions and, on the other, precipitated the dissolution of "multi-national" states such as the former Yugoslavia, resulting in the emergence of several new states based on their nationhood.

The increase in the number of international organizations can also be explained by the need for states to compensate for their diminishing sphere of influence in a globalized world through the creation of global mechanisms of governance. Several experts would go so far to say that globalization generates problems of international governance and reduces the regulatory power of states[9]. I personally do not share this latter view.

As we see every day in UNESCO, challenges are indeed global and demand responses that only multilateral organizations are capable of providing.

Finally, another important impact of globalization has been the return of "global-cities"[10] such as New York, London, Tokyo and Singapore, whose role transcends the nation-state in which they happen to be located[11]. Thus, states are not only experiencing pressure to hand over power "upwards" to international organizations but also "downwards" to regional institutions and municipalities.

In answer to my second question regarding the role of states and international organizations in the emergence and development of a "global culture of diversity", I would like to list a few key examples that, to my mind, illustrate the contribution of these actors:

– The *Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies* adopted in 1982 that contains a set of principles that should govern cultural policies set the ground for a paradigm shift. This declaration notably states that *"every culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values"*[12] and that *"all cultures form part of the common heritage of mankind"*[13].

The *UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity,* adopted in November 2001, further elaborates on this vision by aiming both to preserve cultural diversity and to prevent segregation and fundamentalism. It defines cultural diversity as *"the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit ofpresent and future generations"*[14].

– The creation in 2005 of the Alliance of Civilizations, an initiative of the UN Secretary-General, aims to improve understanding and cooperative relations between nations and peoples across cultures and religions. UNESCO has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Alliance and has actively participated in the two international Fora organized in Madrid (January 2008) and Istanbul (April 2009). These Fora gathered political leaders, representatives of international and regional bodies, religious leaders, youth, and civil society groups, for open dialogue on reducing polarization between nations and launching joint initiatives to promote cross-cultural understanding globally. A 3rd Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations is due to take place on 27-29 May this year in Rio de Janeiro under the title "Bridging Cultures, Building Peace.

– More recently, the launching of the "2010 International Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures" by the United Nations which seeks to raise the awareness of the international community of the virtues of diversity and intercultural dialogue. Entrusted with the mandate to help build *"the defences ofpeace in the minds of men"* thanks to international cooperation in its field of competence, UNESCO is designated to play a leading role in the celebration of the Year within the United Nations system.

– Last, but not least, I must underscore the remarkable work done by national agencies and other international organizations such as the Council of Europe, ISESCO, OSCE, as well as all

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[8] The Yearbook of the International Organizations, vol. 5, 2009-2010
[9] Yoshikazu Sakamoto (1994, p. 19, 36) and Robert Cox (1996, p. 26-27)
[10] Saskia Sassen in *"The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo"* (1991)
[11] Choei et al (1996), Sassen (1991)
[12] Art. 1 Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies 1982
[13] Art. 4 Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies 1982
[14] Art. 1 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 2001

those actors involved in the important subject of intercultural dialogue , to promote cultural diversity.

Before I conclude, I would like to share with you a few last remarks that address the challenges ahead of us.

I do not believe in the existence of a unified "world culture". A diversity of cultures co-exist, meet, mix and evolve over time in our world in ways that prohibit any ahistorical understanding of culture. On this ground, I also question the growing use of the term "civilisation" that artificially unites around a single entity a multitude of values, belief systems, ways of being and traditions.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Knowing how we all struggle at a national level to measure and manage culture diversity within our borders, I ask myself how is it possible for us to even begin talking in concrete terms of an international agenda for "the Rapprochement of Cultures" or a policy of "Partnership of Civilizations". This may explain the difficulty we face today in operationalizng the Year. I sincerely ask myself what can we concretely do to bring "cultures" to dialogue? Is it appropriate for us to intervene in certain spiritual arenas that are beyond our sphere of influence?

I realize that this may sound provocative but I honestly feel compelled to ask "can we not do more than organize cultural events that juxtapose artistic traditions and demonstrate our goodwill to value each others artistic talents"? How can these cultural "conversations" between cultures lead to more meaningful transformations that foster lasting peace and a new *ethos* of dialogue?

I don't have the answers to these questions. I simply believe that we have set a tall order for ourselves that may require that we consider refocusing our political attention on some basic considerations such as: What are the values that bring us together? What does it concretely mean to dialogue at international and national levels? What do we expect from the exchange?

High Level Panels can help us list the principles that we all cherish but they cannot build the consensus that is needed to operationalize them. Long term stability requires us to consider without further ado the critical role culture plays in our personal and collective well-being and development. This implies defending with equal vigor the "global culture of diversity" as well universally shared values that guarantee our humanity.

By showing that all cultures are intertwined and feed into each other, the International Year will hopefully help us strengthen our resolve to fight for human rights and against new forms of racism and discrimination that build hatred and distrust in the minds of men and women.

Thank you for your attention.

A. A. Avdeyev[15]

THE CULTURE OF THE EARLY 21st CENTURY
AND ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE

Dear participants of the 10th Likhachov International Scientific Conference,

Let me share some considerations with you on the role of culture in the modern world.

In the last decades the importance of culture has increased greatly. Indications of that are multiple discussions on the preservation of cultural heritage and rapid development of cultural studies as a science as well as improvement of legislation on culture issues and many other things. It can be stated that the ideas expressed by Dmitry Likhachov are being implemented and developed.

We keep asking the same question of what culture can do and what its present state is. So, today we cannot but remember the fundamental ideas of such scholars who once lived in Russia or who emigrated as Pitirim Sorokin, whose works have been published all over the world. There is no need to expound his views in front of this audience. I would only recall his important idea of transition of culture when one system of values breaks up and gives way to another one emerging and developing. Another idea is that it is the state of culture rather than that of economy that causes most collisions, cataclysms in social and public life of the country. In my opinion, these views pronounced 70 years ago are as topical as ever before.

No matter what the state of culture may be, the humanity has approached such a position when most social challenges are impossible to solve without culture. Some 20th century scholars account the increasing role of culture for the decline of ideology. I consider that this statement, which is especially important to our country, requires some explanation.

The abolition of ideology dominant in the Soviet Union posed the most important task to the community: to find the means to ensure spiritual unity of people, the one scientifically known as cultural identity. In recent years the problem has become very relevant to the humanities. Identity is a person's need to feel part of the community. With the collapse of the Soviet empire, this need is particularly acute. Spiritual unity is a psychological factor rather than an economic one, and we used to pay very little attention to it before – but not now.

No matter what assessment be given of the abolished ideology, and no matter how different my assessment could be from that of those present, that ideology, nevertheless, used to act as a unifying force and at a certain stage enabled the state to survive under difficult historical conditions. Russian civilization with the help of ideology managed to unite dozens of ethnic groups on the supra-national basis. That was a unique historical situation, now long in the past.

The function of ideology as a supra-national basis of the unity was somewhat implicit in our Marxist-oriented science that, consequently, used economic factors to explain social phenomena. When ideology is abolished, a serious problem of social integration arises: the problem which is paramount for any community to survive. I do not call on to restore the former ideology, but I am bringing up the question that the functions previously carried out by ideology must be carried out by some other institution now.

This fact was emphasized by the sociological science long ago: any attempt to eliminate the social structure is doomed to failure if no alternative is provided for it to fulfil its important social functions. What alternative is it? I suppose that culture is steadily taking the place of ideology in ensuring solidarity of the society.

There ar»some significant consequences, though. If culture is responsible for unifying, the ideological elimination of differences for the sake of solidarity is no longer valid. Contemporary world is guided by the idea that culture is not one; there are many cultures, so now, for the sake of the unity, we must take into consideration ethnic, national, denominational and other features of

[15] Minister of culture of the Russian Federation.

Beginning from 1968 Mr Avdeyev worked in Foreign Service. Mr Avdeyev was an attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Algeria, the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in France, in different years – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Luxemburg, Bulgaria, France. He worked as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, first Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. Since 2008 Mr Avdeyev has been the Minister of culture of the Russian Federation.

the peoples inhabiting Russia. They make us see not only what is in common in Russian civilization, but what is different, too, the fact non-existent or non-relevant until recently. If the differences are not taken into account, there are grievances, conflicts, confrontation and, what is of particular concern, nationalistic moods, terrorism or extremism emerging on religious grounds.

Thus, acknowledging the role of culture in modern society, we are naturally approaching the key topic of our scientific conference, a dialogue. Modernity is the time, when cultural potential of each social group picks up pace: dialogue comes to be indispensable. Dialogue is a new framework for the interaction between nations and between civilizations; it is a means to reveal their cultural potential. It is particularly important to multinational Russia.

Of course, processes of democratization and liberalization, which are developing in Russia today, contribute to it. However, frankly speaking, one cannot assert that at the present stage culture has already demonstrated in full that it is able to fulfil these functions. Perhaps, our time is only the beginning of a difficult road along which we should move. By the way, this fact calls for another understanding of culture: culture includes a far wider range of phenomena than we thought until recently. Culture cannot be reduced to art only. Of course, we, practitioners and organizers of this process, appeal to people of the humanities to go on investigating this issue.

When we speak of enhancing the role of culture in modernity, of replacing ideology with it, of the need for a dialogue we should go beyond the time when the old political system of Russia collapsed at the end of the 20th century. Russia is an important link in the global cultural process; the emergence of Bolshevik ideology was largely due to the transition of mankind from a pre-industrial civilization to an industrial one. In Russia, this transition was delayed. The collapse of the traditional society led to turning public life in all its facets into a mass phenomenon. The unrest unprecedented in the history called forth the question of collective solidarity on the supranational and supra-personal basis.

The world is in the transition period today – transition to a post-industrial civilization. The problem of collective solidarity becomes topical for all nations and civilizations again. European and American 20th-century humanities raised acute problems of social identity, too, including the problem of globalization which prompted the greatest debates.

First and foremost, it is necessary to admit that globalization in the main is a necessary and natural historical process that started not today, nor yesterday. Some date it as far back as the conquest campaigns of Alexander the Great or early Christianity, or the formation of the Roman Empire or the discovery of America by Columbus. The process that we call globalization, however, is not new, but nowadays it is incredibly intense due to a hurricane of new information and communication technologies.

Globalization seeks to bring nations back to supra-national unity characteristic, as some fear, of a totalitarian regime, and it is viewed by many as a sort of danger. Advance of Western life standards, consumer goods and conditions of everyday life (international tourism being its major force and consumer) eliminates disparities in various externals of life that we call culture in the broadest sense of the word. Unification and diversity are, of course, the two colliding antipodes that oppose and threaten each other. Does globalization viewed like that really put culture in fatal jeopardy?

Everyday life is the most conservative keeper of cultural values, but it implies creativity as well. The creativity is embedded in a free choice of way of life: the way we furnish our homes, cook dinner, dress, buy clothes, etc. Freedom of choice is a definite and undeniable value of a democratic society, freedom also means a certain rejection of such traditions that people and communities consider nonviable. So, in the modem world, as I can judge by Russia's example, we are facing the situation when freedom of choice leads to the selection of Western life standards, pragmatic everyday values, which global market brings in through commercials, malls, hypermarkets, etc. Many foreign tourists who came to Russia in the hard '90s were eager to see the signs of the Soviet period, the place that was already growing exotic for tourists at that time. On the contrary, for locals, however, encounters with global rationality, prosperity and utilitarianism were like a jolt of fresh air that allowed them to feel part of one single civilization, a guarantee of mutual understanding.

I think, the main foothold of globalism is cultural ignorance or insusceptibility of people. A person susceptible to culture doubts the meaning of any phenomenon, including the one offered to him as the latest achievement of the Western civilization. Changes in the culture of everyday life if they freely occur in the society towards great utilitarianism are of no danger in themselves. Globalism may become a real threat if national humanitarian education, in which education in the sphere of arts should play a very important role, withers away. It is education that guarantees the society's ability to produce unique cultural values, to respect cultural traditions, to learn and preserve timeless values.

Bringing diverse cultures to the unified sphere of communication is a noble goal, we should pursue it in the globalization process. The modem period is aggravated by the fact that real globalization fails to meet that goal. What is the cause of such a failure? In my opinion, it is brought about by the lack of dialogue between civilizations. The lack of dialogue leads to conflicts.

Why do different nations have difficulty understanding or rather accepting each other? Of course, the question should be addressed to both modernity and history including ancient problem of barbarism and Hellenism, etc. The German historian Ernst Troeltsch wrote that great cultures of the West, Islam, China and India comprehend essentially themselves only when using contrast as a means of self-understanding: i.e. he argues that great cultures are mostly engaged in soliloquy.

At the beginning of the 20th century another famous German, Oswald Spengler, whose tractate sparked a lively discussion in Russia in the 1920s, also made an attempt to account for the fact that the global interaction of civilizations assumes the form of a monologue rather than a dialogue. We have almost forgotten, in the opinion of the contemporaries, that World War I started as a response to as yet another intense round of globalization as westernization. The turn of the 20th century seemed to herald the beginning of a very optimistic period, the realization of classic ideas of humanism and freedom, directly inherited by the West, as it believes. The world seemed united as never before. Don't we find ourselves in a similar situation today?

A number of scholars wrote that the 19th century was the time of transition which led the humankind to the threshold of a new and united world. Why did that process, with its noble objectives to unite, result in devastation and destruction? Could it have been caused by the fact that globalization took the form of a monologue rather than a dialogue which would have encouraged each civilization to retain its voice and freedom of expression? In fact, we should always be aware of the danger: monologue in international cultural policy is fraught with imperial guidelines that can engender conflicts.

We cannot help touching upon the issue of the connection between globalization and ideology of liberalism in its Western Europearnor American understanding: does this ideology contradict historic past of Russia? Actually, the question is whether the Russians are able or unable to build a liberal civil society and democratic values. I will only quote Russian philosopher Fyodor Stepun who said when forced to emigrate to Berlin in the mid '20s, 'There is nothing alien in the idea of democracy itself to the Russian spirit. Perhaps, on the contrary. Perhaps, it is in Russia that the idea of truly spiritual and deep democracy is rooted.'

However, if we leave political models and go back to cultural issues we in defiance of everything must do our hard work proceeding from the assumption that a nation's true self-expression can only be reached on the grounds of culture, and it is on the basis of culture only that the dialogue of different civilizations is possible. Any blocking the development of national cultures is bound to aggravate conflicts.

Activities of the people of culture and scholars pursue a noble mission to penetrate into the unique cultural worlds of each nation, to study and propagate them. We must make a breach in mental barriers that accompany the monologue of great cultures. It is the fact that should promote dialogue within globalization processes. That is the way to succeed in the great advance of the humankind to unity that has grown into a universal global process.

We, the people of culture, are well aware of that mission and that responsibility. Thank you.

O. T. Bogomolov[16]

INFLUENCE OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS ON POLITICAL THINKING

Today,any people begin to reflect on the influence of the global economic crisis on the cultural and spiritual heritage of the world civilization. Will the humankind wise up after being shattered by economic collapses? Are political leaders prepared to draw on the lessons of the most serious crisis since the post-war time? The point is not only in the revival of the global economies and finance. Leading ideological doctrines, state policies, public opinion, professionalism and conscientiousness of governmental officials, and aptness of democratic institutions will largely contribute to the process of overcoming the recession and avoiding its repetition. We cannot underestimate the exceptional role of science, education, morals of the society, creative potential and knowledge of the intellectual elite. What changes in the public life outside economy are brewing?

The increment of the humanitarian capital will be of utmost importance for people's well-being. In other words, every citizen's knowledge, skills, health, general and behavioural culture in every nation. No less important is raising people's trust in authorities, their confidence in a fair and viable social order, ensuring the integrity of the society and finally promoting active civil and patriotic stand of citizens. In other words, increasing social capital in the world.

I believe that some political figures and scholars under the influence of the crisis begin to contemplate strategic changes in these spheres. It is noteworthy that the new American administration has not simply carried out cleansing operations in the banks and insurance companies, including actual nationalization of some of them. It has not simply granted large credits to the sinking corporations or introduced tax alleviations and other measures to encourage buying. It has included some reforms in the socially relevant spheres into its anti-crisis programme. One of the first on the list of priorities is creating new jobs by the state, raising the status of education and health, improving pension system, promoting innovations, and raising moral responsibility of businesses. Barak Obama said the following among other things: 'We will give out to people jobs building schools, laboratories, libraries, so that our children could compete with any worker in the world.' While speaking at the National Academy of Science he stressed: 'Today we need science more than ever before. We need it for our well-being, for our security, health, our environment and quality of life.'

French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the intention of his government to borrow Ђ35 billion from private businesses to finance education and science. He explained this decision by the need to lead France and its young citizens to the highest levels of knowledge and competitiveness. Similar measures to support science and education are taken in China.

Unfortunately, Russian politicians are still heavily influenced by the inertness of liberal thinking. Budget deficit caused by the sharp decline in production and huge cash flows directed to save big banks and industries, pushes them to reduce government spending on academic science and culture. They back down on raising salaries of scholars, teachers, culture and medial workers.

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[16] Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Adviser to the Russian Academy of Sciences, Honorary Director of the Institute for International Economic and Political Research (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Head of Chair of World Economy at the State University of Management, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor.

Author of over 700 publications including the books *Reforms from American and Russian Scholars' Viewpoint* (Reformy glazami amerikanskikh i rossiyskikh uchonykh); *Reforms in the Mirror of International Comparisons* (Reformy v zerkale mezhdunarodnykh sravneniy); *My Chronicle of the Transition Period* (Moya letopis' perekhodnogo vremeni); *Thoughts Over the Erstwhile and Essential* (Razdum'ya o bylom i nasuschnom); *World Economy in the Globalization Period* (Mirovaya ekonomika v vek globalizatsiyi).

O. T. Bogomolov is Honorary President of the International Association for Economics; he was elected the member of the UNESCO's International Council on Social Sciences Executive Committee; Deputy of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia. At present, he manages the Interrelations of Economics and Society Research Project. Supervisor and editor of *Non-Economical Facets of Economics,* vol. 2, summing up the results of team studies.

This is hardly in keeping with the task of modernizing economy and public system on the basis of innovations.

Deregulation at the time of crisis, wishful thinking of the invisible arm of the market, have all the more blatantly demonstrated their flaws. Prominent Western and Russian economists have long been pointing out at them. Starting from John Keynes, they have been putting forward alternative ideas of how the capitalist economy can operate. Unfortunately, the mainstream of the economic thinking lies in a different area. It is that of liberal fundamentalism. Russian reformers, tipped off by foreign advisers, have accepted it.

Contemporary situation in the economies of leading Western nations, as well as anywhere else in the world, urges us to reconsider the existing views and concepts. 'Market fundamentalism without government interference of the last twenty years has dramatically failed the exam,' – states the report of the UNCTAD titled 'Global Economic Crisis: System Failures and Multilateral Remedies'[17] Even from the camp of confirmed liberals we hear voices expressing criticism. Indicative of this are publications of The Economist.

The October issue of 2008 was stark with irony over France's President and his retreat from the liberal doctrine featuring a caricature of Nicolas Sarkozy with a volume of Marx's Das Kapital. In fact, Nicolas Sarkozy admitted at the EU summit in October 2008 that ultraliberal capitalism had discredited itself; that th^world was in need of a market social model.[18] As early as in the next issue, the journal published a special report, 'When the fortune knits its brows', which admitted that changes in the capitalist build-up were possible.

The report runs: 'It is dangerous to predict the consequences of the recession when it is not over yet. It is, however, clear that even though there is no disaster in sight, the direction of the globalization is due to change. In the last two decades, its course was consistent with the growing influence of an Anglo-Saxon model of free-market capitalism. Global integration was by and large a triumph of the market over the state... Now the balance between them is shifted, and not only in the financial sphere.'[19] 'Wall-Street, – it continues – has found itself in the epicentre of the current crisis which led to the declining status of America and its intellectual prowess.'[20] The journal concludes that 'rather than a new capitalism, the world wants new multilateralism.'[21] To put it simply, this hard word camouflages the fact that besides liberal economy, there can be other economic models which assume an important regulating role of the state. In the January issue of 2010, the journal elaborates on this idea: 'The world is witnessing the rise of a new economic hybrid which can be termed as "the state capitalism".'[22] In this respect, the experience of Scandinavian countries is quite instructive, where social orientation of the market economy has been successful in effect for many years. Other European countries, for example, France, are changing their course to this direction.

Another author, well-known French economist and statesman Jacques Attali, should be mentioned, too. He writes in his new book The World Economic Crisis: What's Next?: 'The mankind has crawled into a depression of a planetary scale, probably the hardest one in the last eighty years.' This is both 'a social, ideological and political crisis, laying bare the futility of neo-liberal concepts, which are anti-democratic' 'Liberal ideology, – as Attali stresses, – is at a service of morsel of people, considering that at the end of 2008, as well as in previous years, many billions of dollars went to the bonuses of big bankers. While ideology has to represent the interest of the poorest people and generations of people to come... A small group of people, separated from producing wealth, robs without any control the biggest and the most important part of the wealth produced. And then, having robbed anything which can be robbed, they make people pay for their unheard-off profits, bonuses, perks and benefits of contracted taxpayers,

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[17] The Global Economic Crisis: System Failures and Multilateral Remedies. UN, New York, 2009, p. III.
[18] The Economist, 2008, October 4, p. 2.
[19] The Economist, October 11, 2008. A special report on the world economy, p. 6.
[20] Ibid, p. 33.
[21] Ibid.
[22] The Economist, 2010, January 23–29, p. 22.

consumers, employers and investors, pushing the state to look for huge sums to patch holes and giving for it just a few days.'[23]

It is not enough to explain the plight which befell people by inflating the finance-and-loan balloon, which blew up and engulfed other countries into the crisis. No doubt, the USA was to exemplify the drawbacks of the neo-liberal model of the market economy. The global crisis, however, has its roots not only in the USA. Many countries lacked the necessary market regulation, they revealed steady disproportion between money and commodity flows, the role of science, education, health, culture, morals was underestimated, social justice was despised.

There is some optimism in the fact that a new paradigm of the world financial system and collective measures to combat uncontrolled elemental processes and to ensure the stability of the global market began to form at the EU summit and the Big 20. Is it sufficient, considering that the USA and the EU have different opinions as to the future of the aging capitalism? One can suggest that the USA in the long run will opt for a partial correction of the existing system, while Europe will be seeking for a new paradigm of post-industrial development.

It is customary to judge about the bottom line of the economic recession and the signs of recovery by GDP indexes. The increment of GDP, however, does not go side by side with more jobs available, with demographic signs of birth and mortality rates, health of nation, pensions, higher quality of life for the bulk of the population, lower rates of inflation, advancement of culture, science, education, etc. It is these aspects of life that should be taken for indexes of a crisis or a revival of economy. This led the French president to commission a panel of economists under the Nobel Prize winners Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen to investigate the reliability of GDP as the core index while evaluating an economic situation and the results of anti-crisis measures taken by the government. Winding up the work, Stiglitz said: 'What we measure, influences what we do. If we have a wrong measurement, we will get wrong results... We should stop making an idol of GDP and understand its limitations... Many aspects of public life cannot be represented by GDP at all.' President Nicolas Sarkozy was even more positive: 'People believe that we are lying and giving them wrong figures. They have good reasons to think so.'[24]

We can observe that the global crisis makes the ruling circles reconsider a lot of things. Europe, China and a number of other countries start to think of a new model or paradigm of economic order. It is as much crucial for Russia. Of course, our reformers are not yet ready to admit publicly the weakness of the ultraliberal ideology. Critical feelings in Russia that has passed through all the 'goodies' of brutal capitalism, are stronger than elsewhere. It is only natural to expect that new approaches in the economic policy will easily pave way for themselves. The crisis is supposed to sober up the adherents of the neoliberal ideology and make them admit a serious crisis of culture and morals in the West as well as in Russia. I think that the dialogue between different civilizations and cultures could ease ways to overcome the crisis and find optimal patterns of the post-crisis development. In many countries modernization, both of economy and of the social order, is ripe, encouraging the re-evaluation of the concepts that have failed the test of time: economic development, culture, education and morals are now on the agenda.

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[23] *Attali Jacques*. La crise, et apres? P.: Fayard, 2009. (Translated into Russian.: Attali J., World Economic Crisis... What's Next? St. Petersburg: Piter, 2009, pp. 7,129).
[24] Financial Times, 2009, September 15.

N. S. Bondar[25]

CONSTITUTIONALITY AS A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PHENOMENON OF THE MODERN GLOBALIST WORLD

The modern epoch is characterized by constitutional transformations which mirror the profundity, controversial character, and sometimes national and historical tragedy of geopolitical changes of the modern world and particular countries. This fully applies to Russia and other nations which emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This can be seen in new political philosophy, in new constitutional ideology and, as a consequence, in completely new approaches to the perception and rationale of values of modern constitutionality in the globalist world.

1. Legal globalization as a result of partnership and/or confrontation of modern legal systems

Processes of globalization probably rank among the most significant and sensitive ones in both their positive and negative influence on the state and the evolution of contemporary constitutionality. At the same time, it is these globalization processes of modern times that personify objectivized and spiritual (as well as non-spiritual, as it often happens) result of the dialogue, interaction and confrontation of civilizational cultures, including legal culture of modern civilization. In this sense, legal culture from the standpoint of general mindset and cognition, is a process by which a person, society and civilization acquire the very basics of human existence through (and also on the ground of) the values of law, with the help (and under the conditions) of active (and interactive) national legal systems, as well as generally accepted principles and norms of contemporary international law.

In keeping with this, the encompassing, universal and culture-oriented character of globalization processes, assessed from the standpoint of legal mindset and legal culture, includes humanistic, philosophical and ideological, naturalistic (human contact with nature), moral and ethical, social and political, legal and many other aspects of its dimensions. Hence, it stands to reason that alongside of economic, political and other signs of globalization processes, their legal forms should be marked as well. It is an obvious fact that legal aspects of globalization are not confined to the influence of the respective processes of economic and political globalization on the legal systems of modern countries within the world community; it is important to take into account the fact that the notion of *'legal globalization'* is not the same as globalization in the legal field.

Legal globalization mirrors the modern dynamics of qualitative traits in the legal internationalization of the social reality. It focuses on the increment of the general and universal tendencies in legal and regulatory norms of a contemporary civilization. In light of these processes, it is important to stress, even without providing detailed grounds, that nowadays we should be much more concerned in the sustainability and development of national and cultural features of Russian statehood and its legal system than in implanting liberal values of the Western culture.[26] This, of course, in no way should lead to the face-off between national and universal democratic values of legal systems in the modern civilization.

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[25] Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Head of Chair of the Municipal Law and Management at the Southern Federal University, *LL.D,* professor, *Lawyer Emeritus* of the Russian Federation, *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation. Author of a number of publications, including: *Vlast' i svoboda na vesah konstitutsionnogo pravosudiya: zashchita prav cheloveka Konstitutsionnym Sudom Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi* [Power and Freedom on the Scales of Constitutional Justice: Human Rights Protection by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation], *Konstitutsionalizatsiya sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya rossiyskoy gosudarstvennosti (v kontekste resheniy Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi)* [Constitutionalization of Socio-Economic Development of the Russian State System (in the context of verdicts of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation)], *Mestnoye samoupravleniye i konstitutsionnoye pravosudiye: konstitualizatsiya munitsipalnoy demokratiyi v Rossiyi* [Local Government and Constitutional Justice: Constitutionalization of Municipal Democracy in Russia], *Konstitutsionnaya tsennost' izbiratielnyh prav grazhdan Rossiyi* [Constitutional Value of Election Rights of Citizens of Russia], *Konstitutsionno-sudiebnaya zashchita sotsialno-trudovyh prav s uchastiyem profsoyuzov* [Constitutional-Judicial Defence of Socio-Labour Rights with Trade Unions Taking Part] and others.

[26] In this regard, we must agree with the basic ideas of A.M. Velichko's *book The National Ideals of Russia and the West: Parallels of Legal Cultures.* St. Petersburg: Publishing House of Law Institute (St. Petersburg), 1999.

Legal globalization reflects, first of all, qualitative characteristics of internationalization, intervention, including mutual one, of contemporary leading legal systems and, on this basis, the increase of what is common in regulatory and legal life of the modern civilization. Penetration of precedent-related fundamentals into our national legal system (as well as into the continental legal system on the whole) has probably the most important and somewhat revolutionary significance for us. Suffice it to remember the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights that take a new meaning in terms of a judicial precedent for our law enforcement practice, and to remember legal nature of the decisions of regulatory constitutional bodies of continental European states as well.

Thus, processes of legal universalization need constitutional evaluation from the standpoint of national state-run and regulatory systems and, on the other hand, in the dialogue and interaction of national legal systems. Correspondingly, modern values of legal culture quite naturally cross the national borders of constitutional and legal systems, not only due to the global consequences but also in view of their nature and common democratic roots.

2. Constitutional values as a universal language of the dialogue of contemporary legal cultures

The basis of the global tendency to direct public relations in modern democratic states in the legal framework lies, first of all, in the process of legal modernization on the basis of general recognition and assertion of universal constitutional values. In its turn, the universality of constitutional values goes side by side with their transformation from political and ideological categories which assumed mythical qualities into active regulatory and legal imperatives of the due.

In this respect, it is important to realize the validity criteria and the guidelines underlying legal globalization and, accordingly, legal progress of democratic states, which means taking for an axiom of modern legal globalization that these processes must pursue *legalization of freedom, power and ownership* as fundamental elements of modern social, political and economic systems. Among them are the values of freedom and human rights, social justice and equality before law, legal social state, division of power, political, ideological and economic plurality, etc.

Not long ago, human rights were unanimously considered to be the basis of internationalization, convergence of legal systems, including the formation of a single legal space in Europe. Due to the value and integration function imminent in them, human rights have acquired supra-national or international character. Their recognition at the international level and by the international law practice yet enhanced universality and binding character of the requirements contained in them within the world community.

In modern world, quest for the balance between public values, on the one hand, and private values, on the other hand, is given top priority. In a formalized, regulatory and legal phrasing, this is a problem of coexistence of sovereign state power (I stress this feature of power, 'sovereign') with freedom that directly or indirectly permeates the whole system of constitutional regulation, that is 'present' in every constitutional institution and every provision and article of the Constitution. In this sense, finding a balance between authority and freedom constitutes the contents of the theory and practice of modern constitutionality.[27]

This accounts for the acuteness of the *problem of competing constitutional values* underlying the modern processes of globalization and legal progress. In part, neglect of multicultural nature of modern legal systems, their national and historical characteristics, can lead and has already led to political, ideological, economic and military legal expansion of the leading countries and blocs. At the basis of it is not the power of law, but th« right of force and, accordingly, the rejection of fundamental and constitutional ideas of democracy and state sovereignty.

Globalization directly influences constitutional systems of contemporary states, it determines new validity criteria of their development, modernization and protection. In modern world, modernization processes are an inalienable part of the universal tendency towards globalization, within which mutual intertwining, diffusion of internal and external conflicts and contradictions

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[27] See: *Bondar N. S.* Power and Freedom in the Balance of Constitutional Justice: The Protection of Human Rights by the Constitutional Court of Russia. M. : Yustitsinform, 2005.

takes place, while transformation of life of a certain society and state is determined by a system of universal development principles of the mankind. Legal factors of globalizing modernization, as it was noted, materialize most visibly in the increasing tendency toward combining Anglo-Saxon and Continental legal systems and their convergence.

Constitutionality as an important sphere where modern processes of legal globalization are realized, is at the same time a basis for a legal dialogue of civilizational cultures.

3. Constitutionality as a basis for a legal dialogue in the context of globalization

As is known, constitutionality is a complex political and legal category that assumes new qualitative characteristics in the context of the present-day legal globalization and discrepant democratic development of the Russian statehood. Its structure includes: *first,* a constitutional doctrine, a philosophic and legal theory of the development of the society and state, their relations with individuals; *second,* constitutionality is practice in itself, constitutional and legal ontology of the constitutional statehood manifesting its lawmaking, law-enforcement and, of course, judicial existence on a large scale; *third,* constitutionality includes a regulatory and legal component (the system of constitutional legislation with the Constitution as its main law) which is, above all, axiologically-oriented; finally and *fourth,* constitutionality is one of the forms of public conscience characterized by the integration of constitutional psychology and constitutional ideology that can form the basis for the development of a new type of constitutional and legal world-view (hopefully) in our society.

Understanding the essence of the Constitution as a document absorbing all kinds of social controversies and expressing a variative set of probable patterns of the development of the society, which is meant to assist (as a valid practical document) in solving such controversies, in selecting an optimum alternative of the civilizational development of the society and state, suggests that *the Constitution is intrinsically a source, a perfect outcome and an institutional basis for legal globalization.*

The constitutional doctrine of the statehood development and modernization in the context of the globalizing world is not an abstract or speculative structure; it has, as its ground, real constitutional relations and their formal legal expression whose integrity predetermines constitutionally feasible, regulatory determined patterns of the development of the society and state.

The analysis of regularities of the development of modern constitutionality indicates that economic, social and cultural relations get increasingly involved in the sphere of constitutional practices both through their direct constitutional and legal regulation and through constitutional monitoring in the field of market (economic), social and cultural legislation.

Whatever the constitutional approaches to understanding the nature of law, its correlation with economic, social and cultural spheres may be, it is evident that modern tendencies of massive regulatory legal approach to social and economic spheres, 'hyper-regulation' of corresponding relations need constitutional guidelines far more than before. Built in the system of constitutional coordinates, legal regulation of economic relations should comply with axiological criteria of modern constitutionality based on the recognition of universal constitutional values by everyone, such as freedom, human rights, social equity, equality of all before the law, social state governed by the rule of law, separation of powers, ideological and economic pluralism as the common heritage of the human civilization.

Such are the principal lines of systemic interrelations between globalization, progress of law and constitutionality of legal order that are expressed in internationalization of modern constitutionality, on the one hand, and in constitutionality of the processes of social reality, on the other hand.

4. Constitutional justice is an institutional 'language' of the dialogue between the contemporary national and legal cultures

Bodies of constitutional justice play a special role in the establishment of legal principles of cross-civilizational communication that form the basis of exact constitutional and legal coordinates in the international cooperation between the states and nations. What does it come to in practice?

It is about universality and intensification of influence of constitutional values on the branches and institutions of various legal systems, which significantly triggers their convergence through constitutionality of social and legal space, including the transnational perception of it.

By its nature, essential characteristics and their results, the activities of the agencies of constitutional justice as a universal institution for resolving social contradictions, are not confined to administering law. They are of a more complex character: being institutionally arranged, first of all, as a law-enforcement and juridical process, constitutional justice, and this is becoming more and more obvious for modern jurisprudence, they approach in their resultant legal characteristics regulatory and statutory judicial practice and lawmaking. This is a quasi-law-making body.

The nature of decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, their *regulatory character is expressed in their unity with the doctrinal meaning,* which in its turn significantly strengthens their potential to reveal, estimate and solve social and political controversies. Regulatory character and doctrinal one are not two independent characteristics of the Court decisions. They exist in their unity, and it produces a new integral quality of such acts: their regulatory and doctrinal nature.

In this lie the characteristics of constitutional justice as a factor of law-enforcement (constitutionality) of the cross-civilizational dialogue and partnership. Here lie the roots of *generation development through constitutional justice of the constitutional ideology,* which does not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Section 2, Article 13) stating that 'No ideology shall be established as a state or obligatory one.'

Juridical positions of the Constitutional Court are not only resultant conclusions with regard to the constitutionality of the examined act, but, first and foremost, interpretations of certain clauses of the law, the result of discovering constitutional meaning of the clauses in question within the competence of the Constitutional Court.

The analysis of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court activities as well as bodies of constitutional supervision in other countries proves that constitutional courts actively influence the processes involving implementation of universal democratic values of present days, resolution of social conflicts (including rather serious ones, those of civilizational character), assertion and development of legal standards for a comfortable coexistence and effective dialogue of different legal cultures.

In terms of *methodology,* to resolve definite issues, it is utterly important to take into account that *democratic values and principles of state and law must be in line with the national culture and traditions,* they must be applied on the basis of responsibility to the present generation and the ones to come (Preamble to the Constitution of the Russian Federation).

The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in its practice acts in keeping with the constitutional approaches to the formation of a democratic state and society, it acknowledges the need for taking into account social and cultural traits of national development as one of the principles of interpretation of constitutional guidelines which at the same time serves as a criterion for evaluating constitutionality of the examined regulatory and legal acts. Thus, according to the resolution of the Constitutional Court of Russia issued on November 17, 1998 (26-P), *due to the historically predetermined peculiarities of Russia as a federal state, its specific territorial organization and extremely uneven deployment of population in different areas of the Russian Federation,* in order not to threaten the fundamentals of the constitutional system of the state and its stability, the lawmaker could envisage in accordance with Article 55 (Section 3) of the Constitution a norm, establishing deviations from the single norm of representation, since the purpose of this decision is ensuring parliamentary representation of territorial units with scarce population.[28]

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[28] See: Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of November, 17, 1998 No. 26-P on the case of the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Federal Law 'On elections of deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation' // Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation. 1998. No. 48. Article 5969.

In another resolution on party issues the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that in present situation when the Russian society has not acquired stable experience of democratic existence and because of the serious challenges on the part of separatist, nationalist and terrorist forces, foundation of regional political parties could lead to violation of the state integrity and the unity of the state power system as the basis of the federal structure of Russia, so federal lawmakers have introduced a well-grounded ban on such a form of party organization.[29]

On the whole, the Constitutional Court of Russia believes that peculiarities of expression of constitutional goals and the correlation between constitutionally guaranteed values and national interests of the Russian Federation on every stage of the development of national statehood can serve as a basis for federal lawmakers to correct state and law mechanism including ensuring the unity of the state power system and separating subjects and functions between the state power bodies of Russia and those of the regions of the Russian Federation. For the Constitutional Court of Russia itself it means that its law positions developed through interpreting and commenting on various provisions of the Constitution of Russia can be amended, or changed so that the meaning of constitutional regulations, the letter of the law were defined accurately taking into account specific social and legal conditions of their realization including changes in the system of law regulation.[30]

It would be appropriate to mention that the guidelines of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation are correlated to a certain extent with the precedent practice of the European Court of Human Rights whose decisions have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that there are, for example, a great number of ways to organize electoral systems and ensure their functioning; there are a lot of differences *inter alia* in historic development, cultural peculiarities and political standpoint of European countries, which makes it possible for each negotiating party to form its own vision of democracy (Resolution of October 6, 2005,[31] of March 16, 2006,[32] of July 19, 2007[33]).

Thus, Russia's participation in the dialogue of constitutional and legal cultures, its cooperation with other civilizational carriers of modern constitutionality must be based on universal democratic values and principles and at the same time take into consideration social and cultural peculiarities of the multinational Russian state, so that such a cooperation and partnership could ensure the realization of national interests of Russia as a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

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[29] Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of February 1, 2005 No. 1-P on the case of the constitutionality of the second and third paragraphs of Section 2, Article 3 and Section 6 of Article 47 of the Federal Law 'On political parties' in connection with a complaint of social and political organization "The Baltic Republican Party' // Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation. 2005. No. 6. Article 491.

[30] See: Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of December 21, 2005 No. 13-P on the case of the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Federal Law 'On general principles of organization of legislative (representative) and executive bodies of the state power of the areas of Russia' in response to complaints of some citizens // Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation. 2006. No. 3. Article 336.

[31] See: Resolution of the European Court of Human Rights of October 6, 2005 on the case of 'Hirst vs. the United Kingdom'// KonsultantPlus.

[32] See: Resolution of the European Court of Human Rights of March 16, 2006 on the case of 'Zhdanok vs. Latvia' // KonsultantPlus.

[33] 6 See: Resolution of the European Court of Human Rights of July 19, 2007 on the case of 'Krasnov and Skuratov vs. the Russian Federation' // Newsletter of the European Court of Human Rights. Rossiyskoye izdaniye (Russian Edition). 2008. No. 4, pp. 115-132

K. N. Brutents[34]
THE RISE OF ASIA AND THE DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS

Characteristic feature of the contemporary social thoughtin this country (though I regard it as a world-wide phenomenon) was, I think, the underestimation of the influence of the civilizational factor on the internal as well as external scene, that is in the development of various countries and in the interrelations between them. Nowadays, the awareness of such a factor is growing considerably. This is stipulated not only by the logic of scientific cognition, but also by the reality that stimulates.

At present the international political and economic relations are undergoing dramatic changes. Those changes are characterized by a whole group of world powers (powers in Asia for the first place) entering the scene with a potential of global influence, a large-scale change in the balance of power on a continental as well as global levels, involving hundreds of millions of people in the making of history, a certain limitation of the international oligarchs' resources. In fact, one might say that a radical remodelling of the international relations has started, or at least, that we have entered or are about to enter a new epoch, or even more so – the dawn of a great geopolitical revolution.

The transformation of China and as well as India has transfigured Asia in itself. By the way, Napoleon's remark about the Celestial Empire seems to be not far from being true: 'There lies a giant there. Let him sleep. When he awakes, he will shake the world'. And indeed, China is rapidly becoming a world's power and has already come to be recognized as a locomotive of the world's economy.

All the abovementioned marks a fundamental change in the historic paradigm: Asia is returning into the focus of the world's history, and from now on Asia will determine its future without assistance. Thus is the hallmark of the new world order. In this context the stereotyped attitudes towards Asia are deadlock and destructive (and this is also true for Russia, unfortunately), when underestimating Asia's creative ability is combined with arrogance and negative propensity.

Meanwhile, the 21st century, broadly speaking, is the time when the West and the East meet anew. The collapse of colonial empires, the expulsion of colonizers meant a loss of contact (though not a complete one) between the East and the West. Nowadays they meet again, but this meeting is essentially different – not the meeting of the colonizers and the colonized, not that of the advancing West and the enslaved East, but of the advancing East and the West that is trying to maintain its privileged position. They are meeting in a dramatically changed situation, in the context of globalization.

The factors that bring about the complexity of this meeting are numerous: the persistent patterns of superiority and paternalism which are projected on the hegemonistic course of the USA that come along together with the other NATO countries; the West's aspiration for modernizing the East in its own likeness; civilizational differences and the Easterners' determination to pursue their national and civilizational identity; backwardness, destitution and xenophobic sentiments in the East and in the West; the rise of the political Islam and many other factors.

Nevertheless, the major role in Asia's position will belong to its interest in mutually beneficial cooperation, Asian countries' growing maturity in foreign policy and understanding of their responsibility for providing an adequate response to global challenges.

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[34] Vice-President of the Russian Association on Foreign Policy, Dr. Sc. (History), professor.

From 1961 Dr. Brutents worked in the administration of the CPSU Central Committee. From 1991 he was adviser to the USSR President M.S. Gorbachev. Author of publications on socio-political topics: *Osvobodivshiyesya strany: niekotoryye problemy i perspektivy* [Liberated Countries: Problems and Prospects], *Osvobodivshiyesya strany* v *70-ye gody* [Liberated Countries in the '70s], *O vneshnepoliticheskoy kontseptsiyi Rossiyi* v *Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskom regione* [On the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia in Asia-Pacific region], *Tridtsat' let na staroy ploshchadi* [Thirty Years on the Old Square], *Vnieshniaya politika Rossiyi: noviy etap?* [Russia's Foreign Policy: A New Stage?], *Nesbyvsheyesya. Neravnodushnyye zametki o perestroyke* [Unrealized. Anxious Notes on Pe-restroika], *Zakat amerikanskoy gegemoniyi* [The Decline of American Hegemony].

The principal historic issue here is whether the West will manage to develop its relations with the East on a new basis -with the idea of equal rights and respect for its peculiarity, with respectful attitude to its civilizational foundations, acknowledging the necessity for a cultural interaction, etc. The question of vital importance for the West itself is whether it can find such a basis, such *modus Vivendi.*

The rise of Asia once and for all knocks the bottom out of the Eurocentric and American conceptualism, meaning something like a *coup de grace* for them. But it should not be understood as a sufficient foundation for constructing Asia-centric philosophy, for the 'the 21st century is the century of Asia' prognosis, for 'a new, Asia-centred world order', etc. In other words, a reverse pseudoscientific gumboil is emerging. And among those who make the statements like these are such well-known political analysts as Jacque Attali, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and many others.

However, the time of such concepts and approaches is gone for ever. The world has become unprecedentedly diverse and its diversity will progress as new dramatis personae revive after the political anabiosis. The 21st century is going to be poli-centric, or, if you like, concentric. Any centrist theories of our planet's life and development clash with the integral character of the world's historic paradigm.

The achievements of Asian countries, as the West has begun to admit, have been greatly promoted by civilizational factors. Take China, for instance. Not long ago some asserted, as Max Weber did, that Confucianism was a barrier against modernization. But in actual fact, the Chinese 'Miracle' has been greatly inspired by a tremendous civilizational touch that naturally includes Confucianism, still a very powerful force with an influence on behavioural patterns and minds of the Chinese. What I mean here is profound labour ethics, diligence (as a prerequisite for survival), discipline and respect for seniors (which implies a certain attitude to the authorities, alongside with the principle of governance based on the established traditions, ethic norms and the presumption of the 'humanity'). Characteristic is that the centres opened in 78 countries and meant to 'explain' the present-day China, are called the Confucius Centres.

As is generally known, the influence of Confucianism spreads far beyond the boundaries of China. In general, the Asian civilizational code is significantly influenced by such components (a Confucian credo, one may say) as veneration for traditions, love of fellow men, call of duty, respect for seniors, obedience to social, family and group rules, veneration for such values as hierarchy, duty, consensus, submission of individuality to the interests of a group or a clan. To a great extent, the implementation of the modernization process has been based on this very civilizational code.

I do not mean, of course, that there are no collectivist elements in the Western culture, nor that there is no individualistic flavour in the Eastern culture. I mean here just the extent and intensity of these components.

Asia's new role that it is playing in the world will probably lead – and is already leading – to the growth of its cultural and civilizational influence. The expanded and consolidated Asia-centrist cultural identity is an inevitable companion to Asia's growth, and this will have far-reaching consequences.

The world, the West could probably benefit from adopting some values and experience of the Chinese and Indian civilizations that have already made valuable contributions to the treasury of the European civilization. Excessively commercialized, rationalistic, individualistic and spiritually weakening western societies would probably benefit if exposed to some aspects (modified and modernized) of the eastern culture. Asia and the East, borrowing the achievements of the West and amalgamating them with their own, are bound to make a unique contribution to the quest for some interim ideal. They are meant to prove that the society in the West is not the ultimate destination in the progress of human civilization.

Anyway, it has now become clear that the East (and I mean Eastern Asia for the first place, but this is also true for a wider range of developing countries) is undergoing the modernization on the ways far from the so-called westernization, without copying the institutions and the values of the West. On the contrary, it preserves and strengthens its own identity, which does not prevent Asia from using and borrowing the achievements of the West. As it turned out, contrary to the western

ideologists' statements, such a copycat process is not an indispensable key to entering the modernity.

Naturally, – and one should emphasize the point – what is meant here is not a one-sided process, but a dialogue of civilizations, a dialogue in which both parts 'hear' each other and mutually benefit from it.

A breakthrough in economy that took place in some countries of Asia has had social, cultural and psychological consequences which draw a wide response all over Asia The peoples' consciousness has been dramatically transfigured region-wide. Self-esteem has boosted considerably, and the idea of the priority of the West has mostly been overcome. It produced an echo, and in Asia they started to talk about the 'Asian' idea, the Asian self-consciousness, meaning that the rapidly developing economies are inseparably linked with them. However, the growing popularization and popularity of the 'Asian' idea and the Asian model work as a trigger for national self-consciousness of the peoples in the region, which has a potential to transform into nationalism. In conclusion I would like to emphasize the idea that the equal in rights and mutually beneficial dialogue of civilizations is the burning issue of the present day and the present epoch. And the establishment of a political foundation for equal relations and partnership between the East and the West is a crucial, determinant precondition for such a friendly dialogue.

A. E. Busygin[35]

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN THE MUSEUM ENVIRONMENT

Useful and efficacious dialogue of cultures is only possible if all the parties are interested in it and benefit from it.

It should be mentioned that the notion of the 'dialogue of cultures' is rather abstract. The dialogue of cultures implies various forms of interaction between different cultures, all sorts of events (exhibitions, tours, performances, scientific conferences and other activities – there is no need to enumerate all possible forms and events) with concrete people taking part in them. And the participants involved in the mentioned forms of the dialogue are above all professionals – museum and archives workers, librarians, culture figures, men of letters. They are not the only ones, though, who 'benefit' from such dialogues. These dialogues encourage further public conscience, debunk prejudices, shatter conventional patterns.

Museums play a significant role in the constantly developing dialogue of cultures. Serving as depositories of human memory, museums store numerous artefacts attesting to the diversity of cultures, with the cultural dialogue lasting from early ages to present day. That is where the everlasting value of museums lies. Museum workers are VIPs, who have taken upon themselves the mission of enriching their contemporaries with knowledge on the basis of material evidence of the progress of cultures and their interaction throughout the entire history of mankind.

The museum community has been repeatedly accused of conservatism. Actually, the so-called conservatism of museum workers is somewhat justified and understandable. The principal function of museums is to keep exhibits and collections. Their research and propagation functions are secondary to the repository one. Only what has been stored can be studied and popularized. The shelf life of exhibits ultimately goes into infinity. It stands to reason that nothing in this world lasts forever. It is the duty of museum workers that urges them to prolong the life of the

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[35] Deputy Minister of culture of the Russian Federation, Dr.Sc. (Economics), professor. Author of books: *Dialektika stanovlieniya intensivnogo tipa vosproizvodstva* [The Dialectics of Formation of Reproduction Intensive Type], *Intensifikatsiya i obobshchestvleniye proizvodstva* v *ekonomicheskoy sisteme sotsializma: zakonomemosti razvitiya i dialektika vzaimodieystviya* [Intensification and Socialization of Production in the Economic System of Socialism: Principles of Development and Dialectics of Interaction], *O roli kultury* v *razvitiyi sovremennogo rossiyskogo obshchestva* [On the Role of Culture in the Development of Modem Russian Society]; author of publications: *Gosudarstviennaya sluzhba: vzglyad iznutri* [Civil Service: A View from the Inside], *Munitsipalnaya reforma: v chom prichina nastorozhennogo k ney otnosheniya* [The Municipal Reform: What Causes Suspicious Attitudes to it] and others.

collections at most. That is why storage rules in museums are so strict, curators are so demanding to facilities in which museum objects are kept, to the temperature and humidity conditions. If a collection of any museum does not arouse great public interest at present, it does not mean that it will not be in the public eye a few decades or hundreds years later. Who knows? Museum work is everlasting, and that is the very reason why it may seem conservative. D.S. Likhachov said, 'One should work at the museum for years, preferably one's whole life.' With the emphasis on the eternity, museum work, however, is topical daily.

It is a pity that the understanding of that in our society leaves much to be desired. It can be exemplified by a recent circulation of an opinion of some federal agency's head in mass media who called upon closing the museums that are not much visited. Another example: already this year a member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation said that all object of a religious purpose in museums should be given back to the church. 'And we will employ museum workers somewhere else,' he added. Judging by these statements, ignorance maintains its positions. But this does not mean that ignorance should be put up with.

In the context of the dialogue of cultures let us dwell upon the problem of Orthodox icons in museums. In 2008, the exhibition 'An Orthodox Icon of Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus' was a great success in Russia (the State Tretyakov Gallery), in the Ukraine (Kiev-Pechorsk National Historical and Cultural Reserve) and in Belarus (the National Art Museum of Belarus). The primary objective of this project was to show peculiarities and affinity of fine arts of the three brotherly peoples with similar cultural background, common origin and one mentor, Byzantium. Our countries are bound by one and the same ancient history, Christian faith and the icon-painting tradition. But as they have been developing in different historical conditions, the Russian, the Ukrainian and the Belorus-sian icon-painting traditions evolved their own unique features and became an outstanding phenomenon in the culture of each country.

If it were not for museums with their collections of Orthodox icons, could this project have been implemented? Would it have been possible to compare Orthodox, yet so different icon-painting of the three countries? It should be noted that this project does not have only historical and educational significance. In his address published in the catalogue of the exhibitions, Patriarch Alexis II of Moscow and All Russia wrote, 'We are particularly happy to see how the traditions of icon painting are successfully reviving in our time. It is proved by the work of modern icon painters, artists, and restorers, many of whom are young people.' How can one learn to paint icons without studying different schools, trends, national peculiarities of iconography? Museums do provide such an opportunity.

We marvel at the diversity of schools of icon painting represented in the museums while looking at the icons belonging to the Moscow and Yaroslavl schools, icons from Novgorod and the Russian North, from the South of Russia! They are all created in the framework of one single Orthodox culture, but each school has its own unique features.

An American businessman Gordon Langton founded a private museum of Orthodox icons in a small American town of Kennedy near Boston. He purchased icons at auctions, bought some from modern icon painters in Russia. His museum canboast a large number of visitors in any season. The Americans are here to discover the treasures of Russian icon painting. Some large museums in Russia, for instance, the Russian Museum showed interest in implementing together with this museum a number of joint projects in the United States.

I cannot help mentioning the exhibition project 'Holy Russia. From The Beginning To The Time of Peter The Great', which is being held in the Louvre this spring under the exchange program between Russia and France. This project aims to show the French that 'the Russian culture has always been the culture of a European type, that it has combined all three distinctive features attributed to Christianity: personality as a starting point, perception of other cultures (universality), and the aspiration for freedom.'[36] At the same time, the exhibition demonstrates the Russian way of expressing the abovemen-tioned features.

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[36] See the article: 'The sources of European culture and Russian historical experience' // *Likhachov D.* Selected Works on Russian and World Culture. St. Petersburg, 2006, p. 366.

In 2008 thanks to the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts, the Russians were able to see Japanese 18th—19th century engravings, one of the most interesting aspects of the Japanese culture. This extensive exhibition displayed in the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts represents the collection of Japanese art, which is one of the oldest and largest in Russia. The main peculiarity of the museum's collection lies in the fact that the works of the Japanese graphic artists were acquired directly in Japan, but not at auctions at a later time. According to the Japanese expert Seiji Nagata '...the diversity of this collection is absolutely unique among foreign collections of our days'. Before the exhibition had opened, a two-volume catalogue was issued – an exceptional scientific and art publication. The foreword to the catalogue says, 'This catalogue of the museum's collection, like many catalogues of this type, is the result of many years', if not decades' work. We can say that the museum researcher Beata Voronova committed to Japanese graphic works has devoted her life to the catalogue...' I cannot but use this quote, as the economic bloc of Ministries of the Russian Government refuses the museums of the country their right to do research. As a result, funding has been cut (according to the Russian Ministry of Finance, the museums staff should not include scientific workers). It is sheer absurdity!

In the same year of 2008, another project was implemented and it acquainted Russian public with another distinctive phenomenon of the Japanese culture. It is the exhibition 'The Samurai. Treasures of the Military Aristocracy in Japan' at the State Historical and Cultural Museum-Preserve 'Moscow Kremlin'. Seventy-three works from the collections of the Tokyo National Museum were on display. Treasures particularly valued in Japan were brought to Moscow: one of the exhibits had the status of 'a national treasure', four other exhibits went under the name of 'particularly valuable cultural objects', two were labelled as 'particularly valuable objects of art'. This indicates the desire to develop cultural ties and cultural dialogue. Mr Teiichi Sato, Director General of the Tokyo National Museum wrote in the catalogue that Japan had already hosted several exhibitions featuring Russian arts and culture.

Russia has rich practical experience in arranging museum space for the dialogue of cultures, not only at large, national museums, but at relatively small ones, too.

One of the most interesting museums in this respect is the Ivanovo State Museum of History named after Dmitry Bury-lin.

Passion for collecting, love of old and rare things were the essential features that determined the life of the museum founder, Dmitry Burylin (1852-1924). His desire was to open a museum for public, for all visitors.

To enlarge his collection, Dmitry Burylin travelled to various cities and towns of Russia. He visited England, Austria,

Germany, Greece, Egypt, Italy, Poland, Turkey, France, Finland, Belgium, Switzerland. The most valuable part of the museum collection was the Oriental Department. It prided itself on a unique collection of Buddhist objects of worship, there had been nothing of the kind anywhere in pre-Revolu-tionary Russia. The Masonic collection was considered one of the best in Russia. It contained rare Masonic symbols of all countries, manuscripts, and ritual garments. By the way, since 1917 this collection has been part of the State Hermitage Museum.

Nowadays, the Burylin collection displays Russian armoury alongside with the samurai shields, the swords of medieval Russian soldiers and weaponry of Central Asian warriors. The museum provides a unique opportunity to compare the cultures of various peoples.

I cannot help mentioning yet another project, extremely important in terms of the dialogue of cultures. It involves simultaneous joint development of two museum-reserves, Volga Bulgars and Sviyazhsk, to grant them the status of a national reserve. Both unique objects are situated close to each other on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan. Bulgary used to be the capital of the state that existed in the 7th-10th centuries A.D. and had close ties with the Arab world at that time. The population of Bulgary practised Islam. Monuments of Islamic culture have survived to our time. In the nineteenth century, they were depicted by Ivan Shishkin in his landscapes. This is an exceptional location in the Volga region. As a traveller passes Kazan and goes upstream the Volga River, he can see the town of Sviyazhsk, located on the island. Built of logs near Yaroslavl, the town was dismantled, the logs were carried on ships downstream the Volga and within two

weeks log houses were assembled by the builders near Kazan. Founded 30 kilometres from Kazan up the stream of the Volga River, it served as a base for the Russian troops' attacks led by Ivan the Terrible on Kazan in the mid-16th century. Unique historical and cultural monuments of the 16th—17th centuries can still be found there. The idea of the simultaneous development of these two museum-reserves belongs to the government of the Republic of Tatarstan and deserves all-round support. The long history that followed the mid-sixteenth century has given evidence to mutual influence of the cultures of Russians and Tatars. The two museum-reserves, Bulgars and Sviyazhsk, as two original points marking a new phase in the development of the Muslim and Orthodox cultures in the Middle Volga region have been 'engaged in the dialogue' for many centuries.

If there were no local history museums in every region of the Russian Federation, cross-cultural dialogue would be much poorer. Moreover, I dare say that the absence of such museums would make the cross-cultural dialogue intermittent. It is the local museums and their displays that make this dialogue continuous. It is these museums that educate children and young people introducing them to the world of rich and diverse cultures of the world.

In Russia, with the diversity of its peoples, almost every regional museum can demonstrate the exhibits that tell a lot about the differences and interaction of various cultures. In the Volga region, these cultures include Russian, Tatar, Udmurt, Chuvash, Mari, Mordvin. In the Northern Caucasus, there is a great variety of cultures. It is difficult to list them all. No wonder the Caucasus was called the 'mountain of tongues'. The same refers to Siberia, the European North and the South of Russia. Ample food for thought on the subject of dialogue between cultures is given by the exhibitions of the State Ethnographic Museum in St. Petersburg.

It is impossible to imagine the modern dialogue of cultures without museums. In the museum environment, this dialogue is taking place uninterruptedly, efficiently and quite efficaciously.

Xinxin Chang[37]

BUILDING A MORE HARMONIOUS WORLD IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Abstract: Based on fundamental judgments of the current international situation and global developments, starting from China's internal development of economy and politics, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee with Hu Jintao as General Secretary has summarized the objects and principles of China's foreign policy and international strategy in the new concept of a "Harmonious World". To promote a harmonious world it is necessary for China to adhere to a path of peaceful development, and such a harmonious world is also a prerequisite for China's realization of peaceful development. But the harmonious world will not automatically come true by itself; it needs the joint efforts of people all over the world.

On April 22 of 2005, at the Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta, China's Chinese President Hu Jintao first put forward the proposal of "together building a Harmonious World". On September 15 in the same year, during the celebrations for the 60th anniversary of UN, President Hu systematically expounded the new concept of "building a Harmonious World with lasting peace and common prosperity"[38]. In the 17th National Congress of Chinese Communist Party, the proposal of "working together to promote building a Harmonious World with lasting peace and common prosperity by the people in each country" was written into the political report. Based on the fundamental judgments of the current international situation and global issues, and starting from China's internal economic and political developments, the Chinese Communist Party's

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[37] Professor of the Higher School for Social Development (the People's Republic of China), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy).

[38] See: *Hu Jintao: "*Keeping pace with the times, Carrying forward the cause into the future, Constructing the new strategic partnership between Asia and Africa", People's Daily, April. 23rd , 2005, 1st edition and *Hu Jintao:"* Try to establish a long-lasting peaceful and universally prosperous harmonious world", People's Daily, Sep. 16th, 2005, 1st edition.

Central Committee with Hu Jintao as general secretary has summarized the objective of China's foreign policy and international strategy in the new concept of a "Harmonious World".

Constructing Harmonious Society internally and promoting the building of a Harmonious World externally – the high unification of China's domestic and foreign affairs

The promotion of building a Harmonious World is the external extension of the Chinese domestic strategic task of constructing socialist harmonious society. A country's foreign policy is usually the extension of its domestic policy. Although not fully in lock-step with foreign affairs, domestic affairs generally have to remain consistent both in values and political logic with a country's foreign affairs.

China's concept of promoting the building of a harmonious world is just the logical extension of its domestic strategy The combination of constructing "Harmonious Society" internally and promoting the building of "Harmonious World" externally together makes up the national overall development strategy with the unification of domestic and foreign affairs in the new period.

A harmonious domestic society is also inter-related with promotion of building a harmonious international community. On the one hand, domestic harmony is China's basis for promoting a harmonious international community. Only by constructing an internally harmonious society and realizing economic prosperity and political stability can we promote the building of a harmonious world effectively.

On the other hand, the harmony of the international community can provide the external conditions for a country's harmonious development. Only under a harmonious international environment can we focus on the construction of a harmonious society through achieve sound and fast development. Since

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978, China has made economic development its focus, and China's economic development has acquired tremendous achievements over more than 30 years of struggle. But, overall speaking, China is still a developing country that has solved basic needs of subsistence for its people, and it must still focus on economic development, enhancing comprehensive national strength and improving people's material and cultural living standard.

In order to achieve the country's long-term strategic goals and for the construction of domestic harmonious society, China must strive for a peaceful and stable international environment. Only in a peaceful international environment, can a country realize all-round development of foreign economic relations, and make use of its own comparative advantages in the international economy to achieve the national economy's rapid growth.

As a responsible great power that is focused on economic development, improving people's material and cultural living standards, and building a harmonious society, China will remain committed to creating a peaceful international environment for itself.

The basic goal that "a Harmonious World" entails is the establishment of fair and reasonable new international political and economic order, and realizing enduring world peace and prosperity. About the definition of "Harmonious World", China State Council's Information office has pointed it out in the White Paper entitled "China's Path of Peaceful Development" published in December, 2005:

"China holds that the harmonious world should be a democratic world, harmonious world, fair world and inclusive world. "[b39]

China's Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui has also expounded on the concept: "The harmonious world which we advocate should be a peaceful, stable world. In this world, countries trust each other and get along well, and maintain the world's peace and security altogether through fair, effective security mechanism. The harmonious world which we advocate should be a democratic and fair world. In this world, each country owns equal sovereignty, the international relations take legal system and multilateralism as the foundation, the world's affairs settled through consultation by all countries. The harmonious world which we advocate should be a

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[39] The white Paper, entitled *China speaceful development road* published by State Council Information Office of China.

mutually beneficial and cooperative world[1]. In this world, economic globalization as well as the progress of science and technology, is conducive to the common development of the international community, especially to developing countries. The harmonious world which we advocate should be an open and inclusive world. In this world, different kinds of civilizations communicate and complement each other, different social systems and development models can realize mutual learning and common development."[40]

It is the necessary requirement of insisting the path of peaceful development to promote the building of a Harmonious World.

In the last century 80s, China's paramount leader Deng Xiaoping proposed promoting the establishment of a new international political and economic order. The new international political and economic order should reflect the common aspirations and interests of people throughout the world, argued Deng. The new international political and economic order should be based on The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter as well as other universally recognized norms of international relations.

On May 28, 2003, when making a speech in Institute of International Relations of Moscow entitled with "being good neighbor and sharing common development and prosperity for generations", Chinese President Hu Jintao elaborated the basic views on promoting the establishment of a fair and rational international political and economic order, that is:
– We should promote democratization of international relations.
– We should maintain and respect the diversity of the world.
– We should establish a new security concept based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.
– We should promote a balanced development of the global economy.
– We should respect and play the important role of the United Nations and its Security Council.

After the launch of reform and opening up in 1978, China integrated into the existing international mechanism gradually, participated in growing numbers of international economic organizations, kept up with the pace of the economic globalization rapidly, and became the beneficiary of a new round of economic globalization, and so we advocate to build the new international political and economic order through the way of reform, but not the violent means.

In the international community, China is a constructive collaborator, and we want to realize a new international political and economic order through positively participating in international affairs, participating in the formulation and revision of international rules and the construction of the international system, and gradually reforming the unreasonable and unjust components of the existing international system.

Since 1978, China has been taking the path of peaceful development and has declared solemnly to the world that it will continue to follow this path unswervingly. It has proved by its own practical actions that China is not a challenger to the existing order but a participant.

As a stakeholder of the international order, China will give full play to its constructive role as a responsible great power in the international affairs. Today, when we propose to promote building a "Harmonious World", it is essentially consistent with the promotion of establishing a fair and reasonable new international political and economic order. The promotion of building a harmonious world further reassures the international community that China will follow the path of peaceful development unswervingly. To the world, China's development is an opportunity and contribution, not a challenge, let alone a threat, and China has always been a constructive force to maintain world peace and promote common development.

Promoting the building of a Harmonious World accords with the fundamental interests of China and the common aspiration of people throughout the world.

Harmony is an important value in traditional Chinese culture, and it is also the common values of human society.

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[40] See China news agency : "Meaning of China's harmonious world which explained in details by Zhang Yesui,Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China", see http://www.china.org.cn/, April 3rd, 2006.

Historically, China has been a peaceful nation, and the tradition of Chinese political culture has the qualities of peace. In the history of China, most of the heroes are famous for defending against the aggression of foreigners, not for external expansion. In modern times, China suffered the aggression of imperialism and colonialism, and this painful experience has made Chinese people treasure independence, equality and freedom, and also hate any form of aggression and expansionism.

This historical tradition and the national psychology have had a deep influence on China's foreign policy. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, when describing the foreign policy of the new-born republic, Chairman Mao Zedong emphasized that China would never invade other country in the future.[41] Mao repeatedly promoted establishing diplomatic relations with other countries, based on the equality and mutual benefit, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. This thought formed into "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence". Later, Deng Xiaoping stressed that the socialism of china is the socialism of advocating peace.[42] As the leader of China, Deng declared solemnly at the UN that if China pursued hegemonism, the people of other countries should expose and oppose it, and subvert it together with the Chinese people.[43]

Deng's successor, Jiang Zemin also repeated many times that China has the experience of being invaded and oppressed for more than one hundred years, so China would not pose a threat to any other country.

Nowadays, the CCP Central Committee with Hu Jintao as General Secretary advocates promoting the building of a harmonious world. This new concept reflects the fundamental aims of Chinese diplomacy more vividly in this new era.

Promoting the building of a harmonious world is not only the wish of China but also the common wish of people all over the world. Nowadays, peace and development are still the two main themes of world affairs, and the trends of world multi-polarization and economic globalization continue to advance despite twists and turns. Factors encouraging peace, restricting war and containing hegemony are growing gradually.

With the trend towards multi-polarity, direct confrontation between the major powers becomes less likely and the practical cooperation increases, and the will of the international community to oppose the unilateral hegemony of the superpowers grows. Faced with the challenges of economic globalization, countries, particularly major powers, pay greater attention to strengthen international and regional cooperation, and countries around the world tend to rely more on international and regional economic cooperation to seek development The momentum of world integration continues to develop; and the interdependence of nations and the integration of interests is deepening.

All these trends offer a realistic basis to build a harmonious world. The harmonious world we advocate is in tune with today's global trends promoting peace, development and cooperation.

The building of a Harmonious World Requires Every Country's efforts and promotion

How to build a harmonious world? It won't come into being automatically, and depends on people's efforts and cooperation.

According to President Hu Jintao's speech at the United Nations in Sep. 2005 and the essence of his speech at the central meeting on foreign affairs in Aug. 2006, and the strategic deployment of the 17th National Congress of Communist Party of China, we should promote it in the following four ways:

In politics, we should concentrate on promoting mutual respect, expanding consensus and getting along with all other countries, upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. We should also promote the reform of the United Nations, maintaining the authority of the United Nations and its Charter, improving its efficiency and strengthening its ability to handle new threats and challenges.

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[41] *Mao Zedong:* On the Thought of Military strategy of Mao Zedong, Military Science Press, 1993, p. 220.
[42] *Deng Xiaoping:* Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume. 3, People's Publishing House, 1993, p 128.
[43] See: People's Daily, April 10th, 1974.

In addition, we need to advocate the adherence to international law and universally recognized rules of international relations, respecting all country's rights to choose their own social systems and development paths, fostering the democratization of international relations.

In the economy, we should commit ourselves to the deepening cooperation, common development and mutual benefit, promoting the achievements brought by economic globalization and scientific progress and seeking universal prosperity. Without common development and universal prosperity, it is hard for the whole world to enjoy peace. Economic globalization should benefit all countries, especially developing countries.

In culture, we must encourage civilizations to strengthen exchanges and interaction, deepening mutual understanding. The diversity of civilizations is an important source of human progress.

In security, we ought to concentrate on deepening mutual trust, strengthening dialogue and improving cooperation with every other country, upholding multilateralism and achieving common security.

We should abandon Cold War thinking, fostering a new concept of security based upon mutual trust and benefit, equality and cooperation. We should also establish a fair and effective collective security mechanism in order to avoid conflict and war.

Neighboring regions are the first important zones to our country's interests. Thus we should give more prominence to handling these neighboring areas and gradually turn those areas into a long-lasting and universally prosperous zone of harmony.[44]

When promoting the building of a harmonious world, we should also see that there still exist complex contradictions and acute conflicts in the international community. The features of those contradictions and conflicts are: the world order is still in an important period of transition to multi-polarity, and the struggle between uni- and multi-polarity remains profound. During the course of the deepening development of economic globalization, competition in some areas, such as energy, science and technology, markets and human resources is increasingly fierce. The North-South gap is widening, and the problem of uneven development is becoming increasingly stark.

The international strategic security situation is generally stable, but traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats are interwoven, and factors of instability and uncertainty threatening peace and development are increasing. Although multilateral mechanisms and international coordination have made great developments, Western developed countries remain dominant, defending and expanding their own vested interests.

Struggle revolves around who will be the leader of new international order and what kind of international order should be established remains profound and complex.

The existence of these complicated contradictions cannot be overcome purely through our subjective hopes, and so building a harmonious world will clearly be a daunting task. Building a harmonious world does not mean giving up struggle, but it requires communication and cooperation. As we promote the process of building a harmonious world, we must continue to strenuously oppose acts that threaten our sovereignty, security and developmental interests and that damage all other countries' common interests.

V. E. Chirkin[45]

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[44] See Hu Jintao: "Try to establish a long-lasting peaceful and universally prosperous harmonious world", People's Daily, Sep. 16th, 2005, 1st edition; Hu Jintao's lecture at the central meeting on foreign affairs in Aug.2006.

[45] Chief research associate of the section on comparative law of the Institute for State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences; *LL.D.,* Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation, Honoured Lawyer of the Russian Federation.

Author of more than 500 scholarly papers including the following books: *State Power in the Developing Countries* (Gosudarstvennaya vlast' v razviva-yuschikhsya stranakh); *Essentials of Comparative State Studies* (Osnovy srav-nitel'nogo gosudarstvovedeniya); *Legislative Power* (Zakonodatel'naya vlast'); *Head of State: Comparative Law Studies* (Glava gosudarstva. Sravnitel'no-pravovoye issledovaniye); author of textbooks and course

CONVERGENCE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS AND INCOMPATIBILITY OF CERTAIN INSTITUTIONS IN THE DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS

Both the terms – convergence and civilization – are regarded as highly controversial by scholars. In this paper the term convergence will imply a possibility for various legal systems regulating public relations to get to close quarters, as well as an available extent for legal systems to adopt law institutions of another system. Opinions vary on the concept of civilization, their types and number in the history of mankind and at present. The Department of Social Science of the Russian Academy of Sciences held a conference to debate on over 250 definitions of the term 'civilization' and, at the same time, speeches only concentrated on the two types of existing civilizations, i.e. traditional and technocratic. The famous English historian A. Toynbee used to number 19 (later, he consolidated them to 13) civilizations that had ever existed[46], while modera French constitutionalists J. Jicquel and J.-E Jicquel only write about one type of world civilization, an industrial one, that has according to them become universal, they also call it 'the Western civilization'.[47] Some scholars believe that civilization can be presented by just one country, and name Russia for example.[48]

There is no need to formulate yet another definition of civilization in speculating on legal systems. Just note that in the word 'civilization' bears no rating meaning (like good or bad, civilized or uncivilized peoples). Deliberating the issue of legal systems, we regard the civilization as a particular entity, as a way to arrange mode of life in large human communities or groups, whether we like it or not. Civilization is a lifestyle of people(s), structured in a system and based on identical principles (including various types of social norms, legal included), on views that are or ought to be regarded as irrefutable. Civilizations are not a static phenomenon, they do develop, so the scope of, say, Chinese, African or Russian civilizations varies with place and time. Modern China and Imperial China are quite different things.

A civilizational approach to various legal systems of the world is richer than the formational one suggested by Marxism, as it allows to treat phenomena from various sides, but a formational way to consider legal systems should not be cast aside. It might more limited, but it better reveals the core of the subject. There is no denying that the history of humankind witnessed the slaveholding and feudal systems (though not in all countries), as well as now existing modern capitalism and totalitarian socialism.[49] Formational legal systems correlated with them. However, one can distinguish between social systems by other factors. Anglo-Saxon capitalist legal system in the UK, the US, Australia and others differs from the continental Roman-Germanic one, while the legal system of Muslim fundamentalist countries (for instance, in Saudi Arabia or Oman) differs from the one in the 'advanced' Muslim countries like Egypt or Syria.

If we are to distinguish basic, principal legal systems taking both civilizational and formational features into account, then, in my opinion, such systems are related to three leading civilizations ofcthe modern world: Muslim, totalitarian socialist and capitalist (ranging from Christian social capitalism in the developed countries to capitalism of other nature elsewhere). The remnants of other civilizations (for example, the traditional African Micronesian) do not have any considerable impact on the progress of the mankind, though common law (tribal law) keeps playing a significant role in everyday life of these countries as well as in top echelons of power (according to common law, traditional kingdoms and kings still exist, for instance, Bu-ganda or

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books, including: *Constitutional Law of Russia* (Konstitutsionnoye pravo Rossiyi), *State and Municipal Administration* (Gosydarstvennoye i mynitsipal'noye upravleniye) and others.

Member of the editorial board of the journals: 'Proceedings of the Institute for State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences' (Trudy Instituta gosudarstva i prava Rossiyskoy akademiyi nauk); 'State and Law' (Gosudarstvo i pravo).

[46] *Toynbee A.* Postizheniye istoriyi [Understanding History], M., 1991, P. 731.

[47] *Gicquel J., Gicquel J.-E.* Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, 21-e ed. P. 2007, p. 29.

[48] *Lukasheva Y. A.* Chelovek, pravo, tsvilizatsiyi: normativno-tsennostnoye izmereniye [Man, Law, Civilizations: Norms and Values], M., 2009. P. 213.

[49] The concept and classification of social and economic formations, as the name implies, were related, first and foremost, to economic characteristics. Other sides were ignored, or diminished (except social, class relations of the issues of class power).

Ashanti kingdoms in Uganda and Ghana. Although their 'kings', as a rule, live abroad and rarely visit their realms, the tribesmen traditionally obey them).

Muslim civilization dating back to 1500 years is the least amended in Muslim fundamentalist monarchies through the centuries. Population of some dozens Muslim states (of more that 200 world states) as well as of other closely-related countries (for instance, India) is estimated at about 1.2 billion people. As already mentioned above, modernized 'advanced' Muslim states considerably differ from the Muslim fundamentalist states, but main laws are based on some common legal postulates in the both types.

Both groups of Muslim countries admit the necessity of a basic constitutional law. In Muslim fundamentalist countries the main nizams ('man-made' laws) were octroyered (bestowed) by monarchs (introduced in Kuwait in 1962; in Saudi Arabia in 1992; in Oman in 1996 etc.)[50]; but it is the Koran, as is stated in some principal nizams, that serves as a constitution there, i.e. prophet Muhammad's maxims recorded from memory of the descending generations. The Koran is claimed to include genuine 'divine' laws (qanuns), while nizams are only man-made norms. The Sunnah, Muhammad's hagiogra-phy, also is a significant source of norms.

Interpretation of these two sources (especially the Koran) enabled the Muslim lawyers to lay the foundation of the Muslim law in its various dissents (Shafiites; Khanbalites; Zeidites and others, named after the authors of the first old books) by the 11th century. In Muslim fundamentalist countries there are few nizams, man-made laws, they still remain essentially doctrinal systems. In 'advanced' Muslim countries, republic is a form of state rule, the Parliament or Plebiscite adopted constitutions, there are law codes and abundance of legislative acts. Nevertheless, some principal legal regulations are common for the both groups of Muslim states. The Koran is the main legal act. Constitutions of 'advanced' Muslim countries state that the main source of law is the Shariah[51] and the official religion is Islam. Legal system should correspond them both. In fact, one cannot but notice a certain influence of Western constitutional postulates even on royal nizams, but it is totally denied in the countries concerned, and such facts are claimed to be a mere coincidence. Constitutional basis of Muslim community is treated as a unique one.

In Muslim civilization the constituent element of the society is not an individual person (as is in capitalist civilization existing in the most developed countries in the form of social capitalism), nor is it a collective group based on common social interests and on their priority over the individual interests (as in totalitarian socialist civilizations), but it is a specific community of 'mu'mins', the ummah. It unites members on the grounds of common belief, Islam. One of the typical features of Muslim legal system is the inseparable integrity of norms of religion, law and morality, obligatory for all mu'mins derived from the Koran (though the law itself, *fiqh,* is acknowledged by some experts). All other beliefs and postulates are rejected by the doctrine, it may go as far as the sacred war against the 'kuffar' (the unfaithful) in medieval Islam (nowadays these Koranic maxims are being interpreted in a different way).

The concept of ummah's integrity results in the obligation of zakat (5% surplus wealth tax in favour of the poor and the needy) and prohibition of riba, usury interests in loans. These regulations can now be found in the main nizams of Muslim fundamentalist countries (for example, in Article 21 of the Main Nizam in Saudi Arabia in 1991)[52]. Ummah is arranged in the form of a state, a Muslim caliphate. That's why *de juro* (though not always *de facto)* state property dominates over private property. That's why in Muslim fundamentalist countries there are no foreign oil companies, as it belongs to the state (ummah) that sells it. Foreign companies

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[50] In some countries the main nizams are called constitutions. They are always adopted by monarchs after consulting with Ash-Shura, a council appointed by the monarch from authoritative figures (males) of the Muslim community, the ummah. A few years ago two women were present in Ash-Shura of Oman for a while, they are no longer there. At Ash-Shura's unanimous opinion the monarch has to adopt their decision, even if his own opinion is different.

[51] The concept of shariah (the path to follow) differs doctrinally from legal norms proper (fiqh). The latter is a component of shariah, while it is the two 'sacred' books, the Koran and Sunnah, that contain the fundamentals of shariah.

[52] The Basic Law of Government // Highlight of Development in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh, *sine anno.*

can only service the production fields. The Main Nizam of Saudi Arabia of 1992, and similar acts of other Muslim fundamentalist countries, unlike former European norms, proclaim the state property sacred rather than the private one.

Man is passive in Muslim law, he is guided by Allah. It is assumed that the laws aren't created by men, Allah inspires them. Though Muslim countries adopted human rights charters, and constitutions comprise special articles, the core of Muslim constitutional law is obligations of a Muslim in respect of Allah and ummah rather than rights. These obligations, including religious ones, must be strictly obeyed, otherwise the punishment is imposed (in Muslim fundamentalist countries the religious vice squad, mutawwa, track the exact performance of daily religious ceremonies).

In Muslim civilization people are not equal. There exist noble tribes alongside with others, everyone of their origin has a certain share in oil production, but sheikhs receive much more. Men and women are not equal either. Polygamy is legal (a Muslim can have up to 4 wives, as well as other women). In cases of adultery a wife may be slain with impunity, while a husband may not. In cases of inheritance a woman can only get a half of what a man would receive, testimonies of two women witnesses are equal to one man witness, etc. In 'advanced' Muslim countries constitutions state the equality of men and women, but with a proviso 'equality according to shariah', but shariah excludes the equality. Crude oil production and other hard work are performed mostly by foreign contract labourers, who live separately and under special regulations.

Constitutional basis of a political system in Muslim fundamentalist countries is set in accordance with the caliphate principle. Parliaments are substituted by the Ash-Shura principle. All kinds of elections, i.e. to representative bodies, are rejected as the institution that might spoil the ummah's integrity, though, for instance, both elected President and Parliament do exist in Iran, and presidential elections of 2009 demonstrated a very sharp campaign.[53] In Muslim fundamentalist countries political parties and trade unions are banned (they are considered to destroy the ummah integrity). Monarch is theoretically supposed to be elected (such was the original tradition of a caliphate). He is elected following the bayah procedure from the royal ruling family (Al Sabah in Kuwait, Al Thani in Qatar etc.) The choice of the monarch is made at the family council together with the ulema, the scholars, arbiters of the Koran. The history showed that not only son could be elected as the monarch, but brother and nephew as well.

In 'advanced' Muslin countries there do exist parties, public associations, parliament, but the central figure to play the principal role is the President (in Algeria, Egypt, Syria etc.) who leads the parliamentary party of unchallenged majority. President can be re-elected for unlimited number of times. In some countries the same president has been elected for the 5th time (Egypt), or sometimes the late president is succeeded by his son, prior trained for it (Syria).

The population of the five remaining totalitarian socialist countries (Vietnam, China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Cuba, Laos) totals 1.4 billion people (China alone numbering 1.3 billion). Modern situation in these countries differs a bit from Marx and Engels's theory of socialism or Lenin and the Bolsheviks' position (namely, the issues of property, of 'exploiters', partly of ideology), but the principles of Marxism and Leninism are still believed to be the basis of the state regime and the actual law. The level of totalitarianism varies (for example, the situations in China and DPRK are very different), but constitutions of these countries and legal doctrine still result from totalitarian socialism postulates: the leading role belongs to only one party, the Communist party (other parties are allowed to operate, but the leading role is vested to one party by the constitutional law;[54] socialist ownership of the means of production prevails; ergatocracy is performed by authoritative bodies arranged in council forms (some constitutions, however, formulate nowadays the principle of people's power); the principle

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[53] One should note that in Iran it is not the President who is regarded as the head of the society, but the *faqih* (the leader), one of the persons having the title of ayatollah, the religious leader.

[54] Some countries allow to have other parties, and they did exist (it is believed that of all the remaining totalitarian socialist countries only China has more than one party), but they couldn't be oppositional, had to be allied to the Communist party, acknowledge its leading role formalized in constitutions.

of power division (as branches of state powers) and local authoritative bodies are denied. Some constitutions retained the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat' up to the 2000s (DPRK), while others formulate it as 'democratic dictatorship of the people' (but, anyway, it is dictatorship). Inequality of classes is officially confirmed by the constitution (the leading class is proletariat, the led one is peasantry); principles of total directive planning and distribution by labour flourish ('from each according to his ability, to each according to his labour'); one obligatory ideology, Marxism-Leninism, dominates (with some national peculiar features, ideas of Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping in China, or Juche in DPRK that are transcribed in constitutions). Opposition, 'anti-socialist' propagation and campaigning are banned by criminal law and are penalized. Public associations are allowed to operate, but they act in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism and are subordinate to the leading role of the party, natural rights of man are not acknowledged.

In the totalitarian socialist civilization the principal deep-rooted concept is the priority of the society, the collective and the state over the personality. I'd like to refer here to I. V. Stalin's notable words from his Kremlin celebration speech of 1945 devoted to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, who called a man a just a 'small cog' in the wheels of the party-and-state machine. The man's status depends on his belonging to a certain social class or stratum. Citizens are divided into labouring and non-labouring ('exploiters'), the latter were not granted suffrage and some other political rights in totalitarian socialist countries (not only in Russia). At present some social and economic rights in constitutions of totalitarian socialist countries are formulated differently. There are citizens' right and labourers' rights. The workers and the peasantry also differ in rights. Up to a certain period the peasantry in the USSR were deprived of passports and, hence, freedom of movement and travel. In modern China this difference results in the city dwellers' advantage over the peasantry at representative bodies elections at the ratio of 5:1. Exploiters' and some others' access to the leading Communist party was restricted, though nowadays entrepreneurs can be affiliated to this party in China, there even are businessmen who hold leading positions in the local party bodies.

Law in totalitarian socialist countries has for a long time relied upon the principle of private property ban. At present private property is allowed in a number of countries, in China it has become widespread (there even are large private property owners, dollar multimillionaires), but the attitude towards it is still negative. The constitutions state that socialist sector (mode) plays the leading role, the supreme form of property is the state socialist property, it can enjoy advanced remedies of legal protection (forms of property are unequal). However, some constitutions formulate the principle of socialist market economy.

The capitalist civilization (about 3 billion people) resulted from the elimination of feudal vassalage, but social profile elements were finally acquired during the domestic changes and people's (especially the labourers') struggle for social rights. It isn't by chance that the first constitutional articles on social function of the private property and individual social and economic human rights appeared in the dramatic course of revolutionary events in Mexico and Germany in 1917 and 1919, while an advanced social legal system in capitalist countries was built after the Second World War (in 1945), in the period of considerable rise in democratic movement in the world after Nazism had been defeated.

Constitutions in capitalist countries appear to be based on quite different foundations when compared with Muslim or totalitarian socialist countries. Individualistic approach to man prevails in this type of civilization. An individual is a cell of the society, he has priority over the society and the state. His independence is based on private property and essential natural rights (right for life, freedom, security of person, etc.) Legal regulation is relied on and legislative system is provided by legal equality of people despite race, nationality, gender (though even in the UK women only got the suffrage in 1919, in France in 1946, in Switzerland in 1971), despite any other physical or personal characteristics. Modern law in the capitalist civilization is not limited to legal equality or recognition of personal and political rights. Social and economic rights (right for labour, freedom of labour, paid leave, enacted minimum wage and 'consumer goods basket' (cost of living), a certain level of free public education, state retirement benefits etc.) are acknowledged and provided for to a certain extent.

Individual private property (or that of a group of individuals), freedom to possess and dispose of it plays the primary role in the capitalist civilization, even in its social type. It admits of a person's economic and other activities. A state (a social state) has to provide only basic needs of a person (cost of living, a certain level of free public education and medical care, state retirement and unemployment benefits, the infrastructure: communication system, transport routes) and to perform other 'common causes', but a man has to provide for and take care of his family himself. That's why, in particular, the doctrine of a universal welfare state did not root in it, as it led to man's dependency, excessive expectations from the benefactor state. Man's activities presuppose free competition in all areas: economy, politics, ideology.

These are the grounds for the following constitutional principles: freedom of economic activities, market freedom, multiparty system, political competition, ideological variety, etc. The social state isn't passive, it isn't the 'night-watchman' of the 19th century (though at that time it wasn't just a watchman), the state socially supports the man, it serves as a social regulator, performs social arbitrary functions, but not as an instrument to reform the society on the new grounds from the top down. The state activities have to correspond to evolutionary laws of the society; have to correct the deficiencies of such an evolution (in particular, debauchery of the free-market environment), to provide legal rights and personal interests.

Legal system of social capitalism involves other principles: freedom of associations; division of powers; dominance of elections to determine figures and parties to rule the state during the service term; democratic social, legal, secular state, local authoritative bodies; civil servants' responsibility and reporting, including the head of the state; democratic political regime. However, social capitalism still remains capitalism. Its legal system bears disadvantages typical for this type of civilization. The primary target of the development is pursuit of profits, while the will of a dominating social stratum and of the party to have won the elections is supposed to be the will of the whole society. The state, first and foremost, protects the interests of economically, politically and ideologically dominating strata. The social capitalist state can correct the drawbacks of its approaches, but cannot withdraw them.

The outline of legal systems of the three major civilizations proves that they tend to contingence. The contingence is has the formal and the substantive nature. Its first aspect is changes in the form of law. Constitutions have been accepted as the main legal act of all countries (as mentioned above, in the 20th century they were adopted even in Muslim fundamentalist countries). Modern constitutions have common features in their inner structure: they set, in a varying degree, a legal basis for a social and state organism, individual status (norms of such a type can be traced even in Muslim nizams), social characteristics. All this distinguishes them from former instrumental constitutions of the 18th-19th centuries. Original traditional norms (including legal practices, judicial precedents, law of equity in Anglo-Saxon legislation, especially well-developed in the UK) are substituted by codes of law and other abundant legislative acts (there are no codes in the UK, but the USA has an incomplete Penal Code), 'advanced' Muslim countries adopt their codes of law, it can even be witnessed in Muslim fundamentalist countries in a few isolated instances. To a certain extent, the doctrinal sources are superseded by legal acts (Koranic exegesis by medieval mufassirs (lawyers); it often happens that a new up-to-date commentary is given as in the case of 'jihad against the kuffar (the unfaithful)'). 'Advanced' Muslim countries no longer have Islamic courts that administrate severe mutilation as a penalty, though they are sometimes revived (in the north of African Nigeria, in the insurgent Chechnya). The form of law, arranging law enforcement bodies, legal procedures are getting more commonly grounded, and the interdependence can be witnessed, no matter how it might be denied with the words about a mere coincidence.

Contingence of legal systems is also progressing in their content. At present contingence of legal systems cannot be realized on the grounds of backtracking to old terms, on the contrary, it demands social progress. Creating a genuinely democratic, social, legal, secular state is a guideline and a goal to achieve, formalized in the main legal codes, constitutions.

Elements of democratization are typical of all countries, they can be detected and formalized in constitutions and some other acts dealing with human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international standards. Several Muslim fundamentalist countries organized

parliaments, and the Kuwaiti can enjoy female suffrage (though no woman has been elected yet).[55] The first elections to in part appointed and in part elected authoritative bodies were held in some cities of Saudi Arabia in 2005. As for the fact that some categories of 'exploiters' were deprived of suffrage in totalitarian socialist countries, it is no longer the case. There are some other elements of democratization, but they are difficult to detect, however, or are only of formal nature.

Nowadays almost all countries possess certain elements of a social state (zakat in Muslim countries, state retirement benefits, health care, norms of constitutions concerning the social function of private property, social partnership, social justice, more specific legal norms on minimum wages and cost of living, etc.) But the real minimum monthly wages or consumer goods basket, i.e. actual performance of the norms social justice give good reasons to believe that it will take a long way to reach a genuine social state (even during the crisis Russian billionaires boosted their profit 1.5-2 times, scandalously high bonuses are paid again in the USA).

The doctrine of a legal state externalizes itself through adopting eligible legal acts that withdraw lacunae and disadvantages in legal regulation; through setting norms of state as well as responsibility of its authoritative bodies and the right for a person to appeal to the courts against their activities. However, to have a perfect legal state, still more measures should be taken, while some countries see a gap between the doctrine of a legal state and the real life. Many developed and other countries are secular states, and Muslim and totalitarian socialist countries make attempts towards the same status, but neither of them can be called secular states.

Considering a certain convergence in legal systems of various countries, one cannot but notice them having legal norms and institutions that cannot be converged, as they are antagonistic in nature and exclude each other. This contradiction is only possible to reconcile by eliminating or substituting one of the legal systems.

In the field of legal economic regulation such antagonistic institutions are as follows: regulated market economy with indicative planning *vs.* a totally free market; equality of all forms of property *vs.* supreme position of one form (socialist property in totalitarian socialist countries, public property of um-mah in Muslim countries); private property immunity and absoluteness *vs.* a possibility to legally restrict it in favour of the state and public interests; absolute freedom of private property on natural resources *vs.* restrictions of this freedom in favour of public interests; marked role of one economic mode *vs.* equal legal regulation of various modes and their competition, which doesn't exclude state support of some industries if required, etc.

In the field of political relations, incompatible regulations are the following: political diversity *vs.* political rating and exceptional position of a certain social stratum, association, individual; ban on political parties and associations *vs.* their free legal establishment; a superior (leading) role of one party formalized in the constitution *vs.* equality of parties and public associations and their competition; rejecting elections and plebiscite as ways to put the people's will into life and substituting them with consultative bodies *vs.* acknowledging their dominating role, at least in the nearest future,[56] etc.

In the field of regulation of social relations: leading role of one class or stratum, its exceptional position *vs.* equality of legal position for all social strata; equal chances for everyone *de juro* only *vs.* real providing everyone with the cost of living and targeted social support (state support) of disadvantaged persons and strata; the global product distribution mainly according to the capital *vs.* multifaceted principles of the global product distribution mainly according to the labour, etc.

In the field of spiritual life: obligatory state ideology *vs.* diversity of ideologies; absolute freedom for all intellectual forms *vs.* state support of cutting edge forms of artistic creativity and ban on destructive forms entrenching on society interests, life, freedom and human rights, such a ban can be performed only by adopting certain legislative acts and establishing public councils under the most authoritative mass media, etc.

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[55] In Yemen, under a similar situation in 2009, women established their own parliament, Ash-Shura.

[56] Perhaps, in the future super-informational society some other ways to identify the will of each person may be found and, resulting from it, ways to identify common will taking into account interests of various strata and individuals.

In the field of regulation of an individual's legal position: equality of all citizens *vs.* inequality of some groups (women, 'exploiters', etc.); acknowledging and providing basic constitutional right for citizens on the level of international standards *vs.* limited acknowledgement (for example, concerning social rights etc.).

We have certainly mentioned not all the tendencies of convergence of legal systems and not all antagonistic social institutions preventing it. Besides, only principal issues of public law have been considered, without touching other fields. This matter is quite voluminous and requires a complex and multi-faceted consideration.

A. O. Chubarian[57]

FROM A NATIONAL HISTORY TO THE WORLD HISTORY

Recently the concept of a 'global history' has become wide-spread. A special session of the International Committee of Historical Sciences was dedicated to it. A considerable number of journals, monographs and papers are being published.

In connection with it, new definitions of international history and global culture are forming. It is worth mentioning that the international history is understood not as a sum of certain national histories, but as an independent sphere of the research that reflects 'globalism' of the historical process and 'totality' of the world culture. These tendencies are being analyzed in the light of the general process of globalization.

The evolution of connections between 'national histories' and the world history is of significant interest. The development of the concept of a national history began in the 19th century, when the process of strengthening of nation-state systems took place in Europe. These processes acquired a new stimulus for development after a successful decolonization, when dozens of African and Asian states emerged on the international arena.

The idea of a national history got an additional significant stimulus after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the former Soviet republics turned into independent states, and thus the formation of national histories became almost the most important tasks of the elites of these countries. For the last 20 years historians, political scientists and cultural anthropologists of these states together with the representatives of political elites have been sparing no effort to form and account for the concept of a national identity and a national history.

The consequence of the factors mentioned above is the issue of a 'national identity' which has recently become one of the most popular theories in many countries. The issue of a 'national identity" is being debated at many scientific conferences. It is the attention drawn to the problem of a 'national identity' that has additionally stimulated the growth of interest in the research in the field of national histories.

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[57] Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for World History (the Russian Academy of Sciences), President of the State Academic University for the Humanities, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. He is the author of more than 300 scientific publications including 11 monographs: *Mirnoye sosushchestvovaniye. Teoriya i praktika* [Peaceful Coexistence: Theory and Practice], *Brestskiy min 1918 g.* [The Brest Peace of 1918], *Yevropeyskaya ideya* v *istoriyi. Vzglyad iz Moskvy* [The European Idea in History, 19th-20th centuries. A View from Moscow], *Jstohya XX veka. (Novye melody issledovaniya)* [History of the 20th Century: New Methods of Study], *Istoki tsiv-ilizatsiyi* [Sources of Civilization], *Zapadnaya Yevropa i SShA* [Western Europe and the USA] and others. A. O. Chubarian is managing editor of periodicals *Yevropejskiy al'manah* [The European Anthology], *Rossiya i Baltiya* [Russia and the Baltic States], *Tsivilizatsiyi* [Civilizations], *International Social Sciences* journal, *Cold War* History international journal. He is Editor-in-Chief of the journal of the International Association of Institutes of the CIS countries History *Istoricheskoye prostranstvo. Problemy istoriyi stran SNG* [Historical Space. Issues of the History of the CIS Countries], Member of editorial board of *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya* journal [Modem and Contemporary History]. He is President of the Russian Society of Archive Historians. Chairman of the National Committee of Russian Historians. President of the International Association of Institutes for History of the CIS Countries. Foreign member of Royal Norwegian Academy. Member of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation for Science, Technology and Education.

These factors lead to the growth of a cultural identity and autonomy. One of the examples is a situation in the frame of the European Union. Once the fathers-founders of the Union used to dream of a united state and other tendencies that could unite nations. The success of a European integration during last years seems to prove this trend. But the member-states of the European Union do not appear to intend to reject their national cultural autonomy and identity at all. We are witnessing the opposite situation of a rapid development and growth of popularity of national cultures in all the languages, including the language itself, history, literature, arts and so on.

Summing up, we should conclude that such parallel processes as universalization, attention to the global history and understanding of the world (including its history) in its entirety and globalization of culture are taking place in the whole world as well as in science (in historical research, in cultural anthropology, in political science and some other fields). These processes go along with the search for a national identity and a significantly grown interest in a national history. The development of these trends is likely to lead to the synthesis of the national and the international; it is very important for national histories and special features of national culture not to be contrary to the tendencies of globalization and universality. It is in this connection that we mention the growth of interest in the problems of dialogue of cultures and civilizations, cross-cultural communication, understanding of a national history and culture as an organic part of the world history and culture.

Armand Clesse[58]
THE CON-FUSION OF CULTURES

The present is characterized not so much by a clash of civilizations or cultures, but by a con-fusion[59] of cultures[60]. What appears today as a clash between the Western world and Islam is likely to fade away into one single civilizational model. The real threat is the loss of cultural diversity, the emergence of a single, dull, and diluted type of civilization, a merger of attitudes towards life, of thinking about life and of vital consciousness.

This con-fision is preceded by a waning, an erosion, a degeneration of thinking and of feeling, a general emotional and intellectual emasculation.

It is the triumph of pragmatism, of a vulgar utilitarianism and primitive hedonism, of a perverted eudemonism where everything noble and sublime is despised. It is the time of ochlocracy, the time of de-essentification, the time of a headless nihilism.

This con-fusion of cultures breeds confusion in the minds.

The present model of society that may become the universal one is a highly egotistic and solipsistic one, referring exclusively to the self.

In the Western world the vanishing of religion may have furthered this solipsism. Of course, there is the engagement by a few, often through organizations concerned for example by the decay of the natural environment, by the abuse of human rights, by the increase of poverty and misery in large and perhaps ever larger parts of the world. There are the social movements, there is Greenpeace, there is Amnesty International, there are even some pacifists left though their numbers are rapidly dwindling, there are animal rights activists. But even most of these seemingly generous and altruistic movements care only about "us", "our (near) future". They are in a sense materialistic in their inspiration, not moved by a higher ethos. Moreover, their engagement for the "good cause" lacks comprehensiveness: it is either the environment, or human rights, or nuclear disarmament, or animals.

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[58] Director of Luxemburg Institute for European and International Studies, Ph.D. Author and editor of a number of scholarly papers on issues of European and international politics, including: *Russia-EURelations: New Challenges and Opportunities, The Vitality of Russia, The Vitality of China and the Chinese, Beyond East-West Confrontation: Searching for a New Security Structure in Europe, The Vitality of Japan: Sources of National Strength and Weakness, The Euro as a Stabilizer in the International Economic System, Europa auf dem Weg zur Weltordnung?*
[59] The term "con-fusion" is used here in its erstwhile etymological sense of a merger or confluence.
[60] One may also use the term of concrescence or concretio, syncretism or syncrisis.

Then there are the pseudo-progressive movements, for example those who ask for free abortion in the name of the self-determination of the woman. They put the well-being of a born woman ahead of the existential rights of the unborn she carries in her womb.

What has been taking place is a de-spiritualization of man and society in the wake of the waning of religious feelings.[61]

What seems clear is that the search for a functional equivalent of religion seems to be an endeavor doomed to remain fruitless. On the contrary, there prevails an increasing feeling of emptiness, of nothingness.

The message of existentialism was: "everything is absurd, but nevertheless I engage myself in favor of certain causes such as prohibition of torture, abolition of capital punishment or the fight against neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism". The tacit motto now seems to be: ago quia absurdum est.[62]

What we have been watching is the emergence of a so-called democratic culture, a culture for all characterized by an anti-elitist bias and even an anti-male bias, the implicit criterion seeming to be: culture must be accessible to everybody and respond to everybody's taste and preferences, easy to ingest, easy to masticate, easy to digest and easy to excrete.

This general loosening and softening engenders a loss of intrinsical quality, the reign of a shameless mediocrity. Self-appointed experts such as journalists assess and largely determine the quality of a cultural achievement. This mediocrity has become prevalent in all realms of art – in literature, in painting, in music. Traditional "high art" is not (yet) discarded but often looked at with scorn. There has been a loss of aura with the emergence of an infinitely reproducible art.[63]

Culture has become an integral part of the capitalist mode of production and its addiction to changing fashions. The market and its mood determine the quality. This emerging universal culture or civilization is shallow, insipid and androgynous. The degenerated surrogate Western culture in its American, and perhaps soon post-American, phase is to become the culture of the world.

In a sense art has been trivialized, traditional standards have been lost. The value of a piece of art is artificially created; the price has become a criterion itself. The price is set through smart marketing and public relations stratagems. Such a way of proceeding cannot but lead to extremely trivial products. There is a certain popularization, proletarization and even infantili-zation of culture. The generally "vulgar taste" of wealthy, es-thetically hardly educated people, above all from the world of finance is determining the rules of that market.[64] A banal photography may reach the price of a van Gogh painting. A certain artistic product is promoted to a certain status, and nobody has the courage to shout that the emperor is naked. This leads, of course, to the at least relative devaluation of "traditional art".

In the eyes of the proponents of "soft culture", of the uni-culturalists who, paradoxically, call themselves sometimes mutlticulturalists there are a few remaining obstacles and enemies: the traditional "elitist" man, people and peoples with strong cultural roots and beliefs and ready to fight for them, Muslims above all but also for example Hindus.

Despite some pockets of resistance the soft culture pandemic is rapidly spreading and is already flooding most of Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

It seems almost trivial to argue that a trivial society can engender only trivial feelings, trivial thoughts and, ultimately, a trivial culture. Great art may emanate from extreme jubilation or extreme affliction, anxiety, despair and moral distress, from great spiritual or ethical ruptures and breakdown (see Spanish Civil War). It may emerge in the midst of extreme national or societal decay (see Austria-Hungary at the turn of the century). It may be kindled by revolt against great

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[61] I will not discuss here the intriguing question what does come first: (diminishing) religious practice or (diminishing) religious feeling.

[62] I act because it is absurd. See credo quia absurdum est.

[63] See: *Walter Benjamin.* Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, 1936 (shorter version in French, 1963 / German edition)

[64] One could call this the Andy Warhol syndrom.

injustice or what is perceived as undeserved misfortune. It may stem from an excess of vitality or deprivation of vitality. It can be about mourning former glory or anticipating coming one.

It can result from disgust, from moral and intellectual exhaustion, taedium vitae, but also from emotional and spiritual overexcitement. It can stem from a rejection of existing norms and behavior or it can be triggered by a quest for new paths.

Great art has been produced by men living in the cozy anti-chambers of kings as well as by outsiders and desperados trying to survive in the most dire conditions.

What ultimately produces high culture and great art may remain a largely elusive question. Is for example an aristocratic society, as seems the case, more prone to produce great artists than a democratic one?

Is the present mediocrity perhaps a passing phenomenon, and where could "great culture" come from?

What has been the role of the political system in the emergence of culture in the past? Was it the sense of beauty, of harmony in Egypt, in Greece, in the Italy of the Rinascimento, the lifestyle in city states such as Florence, Venice, Genoa, Rotterdam, Brugge?

What role did religious fervor play, a sense of the divine, the search»for God and redemption, the striving for hypsos, the sublime, the will to achieve immortality – not just in the building of cathedrals, but also in much of the painting, in most of the music (and not just when it comes to Bach)? Artistic creation has been fed by a sense of beauty as well as by exaltedness and metaphysical fears.

What does explain the extreme poverty of so-called socialist art? The socialist artist had to produce art for the masses, art that would please the workers, the ordinary man and which thus had to be simple, easy to grasp. Totalitarian art, as one could watch in Nazi Germany suits the taste of the ruthless but churlish rulers and leads in general to the production of kitsch.

Perhaps capitalism as well as socialism are enemies of high culture, the United States as well as the Soviet Union or communist China.

Other foes of a high culture are certainly egalitarianism with its distrust of genius, or feminism with its hatred of "male dominated" art.

High culture has emanated from feelings of awe, of pu-dor, verecundia, erubescentia, a sense of the sacred, of purity, of elevation, a longing for elevation and perfection, the desire to come as close as possible, through the act of creation, to the ens perfectissimum.

The price Western society – and soon probably global society – has to pay for the unbridled freedom of mores, for total openness, a lack of norms and values ("anything goes"), for intellectual, psychological and physical promiscuity, is the exhaustion of creative faculties and a general impotence, an inability to elevate oneself beyond banality, obscenity.

Today's culture, evolving as it does in a plebianized society, is an adulterated one, obsessed by the ugly and the sordid, begotten by a shameless society, in which women have lost or given up their traditional role as custodians of shame and chasteness and thus as civilizers.

The con-fusion of cultures will inevitably spell the end of culture in the sense of high culture. In fact, its end has already been brought about. What we refer to today in all realms of art is in fact "low culture", a boneless and gutless amalgam. High culture may, however, survive as a reminiscence, a vestige -slowly eroding or being destroyed on purpose or by neglect such as did American troops in Iraq.

V. M. Davydov[65]

[65] Director of the Institute for Latin American Studies (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Dr. Sc. (Economics), professor, member of the Bureau of the Social Sciences Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Author of more than 180 scientific publications, among which are the following books: *Ispcmiya: trayektoriya modernizatsiyi na iskhode dvadtsatogo veka = Espaha* (Spain: A Pathway to Modernization in the late 20th Century = Espafia); *Fenomenfinansovoy globalizatsiyi. Universalnyyeprotsessy i reaktsiya latinoamericanskih stran* (The Phenomenon of Financial Globalization: Universal Processes and Response of Latin American Countries);

THE ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS AS A HISTORICAL IMPERATIVE

It is generally admitted that our time is transitional in its nature. It is linked to the advancement from an industrial society to a post-industrial one, from the fifth to the sixth technological mode, to globalization as a dominant of the world development, from bipolar and quasi-unipolar world structure to multi-polar system of the global society. It stands to reason that the issue of transition to a new paradigm of economic development, to a different economic policy has been raised in the present-day situation of the world economic recession that stands out of the row of ordinary cyclic changes.

In other interpretations, and with serious grounds for that, transition is associated with the formation of prerequisites of the dominance of integral and globally universal civilization. We can concur with the fruitfully developed ideas of B. Kuzyk and Yu. Yakovets[66], in a number of circumstances. First, in the fact that the prospect of such a transition has already emerged, but its historical distance goes far beyond the coming decades and even several generations. Second, in the fact that the understanding of inevitable projection into the future of the so-called 'local' civilizations, large sections of the world community self-reproducing on the basis of certain social and cultural relationship, which use religions of the world as a backbone, and bearing special genetic code of the civilized macro-society.

Then, we should take into consideration that universaliza-tion does not equal to unification of planetary space which is not introduced by globalization. So far we observe the contrary all over. The economic and social well-being gap between countries and nations belonging to different 'local' civilizations is growing wider. Here lies one of the objective grounds for the intensification of international migration flows. Alas, at present we cannot find the factors that would actually be able to withstand the growing gap and respectively, the effect of alienation ~ attraction of migrating masses.

We witness the trend of enhanced self-identification alongside with economic and technological globalization, though we do not have sufficient theoretic studies in modern discrepant practice. In many cases local civilization society displays the instinct of self-preservation. Perhaps, this should serve as some kind of a historical warning. One should not expect that local civilization identity will be rapidly absorbed by globalization. It has its own mechanisms of reproduction, of which modern science may not be aware so far. Once again, we are convinced of the enormous inertia force of civilization determination of the development.

Meanwhile, it is clear that the intensification of migration flows, accompanying and to some extent expressing globalization (if only this!) poses the issue of alien-civilization influence on a large scale. History has given us plenty of examples, though, that the interaction of civilizations has two sides. One means serious (and often destructive) costs of alien-civilization invasion. The other is productivity of inter-civilizational interaction.

We can state today that the process of 'Westernization' which started, probably, in the age of great geographic discoveries, is drawing to an end, and we can see signs of its replacement (though not very evident yet) by some kind of 'Eastern-ization'. On the other hand, the effect of assimilating 'melting pot' is not valid any longer. In the course of a large-scale cross-border migration ethnically alien civilizational penetration creates 'a critical mass' that ensures the self-production of cultural identity. Such a phenomenon can be observed in the USA which is gradually transforming into a bilingual society. It is manifested in several Western European countries. The concept of a 'frontier' civilization used by Russian scientists (Y. Shemyakin, B.

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[66] See: *Kuzyk B., Yakovets Y* Tsivilizatsiyi: teoriya, istoriya, dialog, budushcheye. (Civilizations: Theory, History, Dialogue, Future). M., 2006. Vol. 1.

Koval, S. Semyonov)[67] to determine a historical peculiarity of Russia, Spain and Latin America is acquiring some additional meaning today. The 'frontier' quality comes to characterize previously homogeneous mono-civilization of the Western societies. The concept of multicultur-alism ceases to be an academic abstraction and becomes the critical feature of social life in various aspects of the modern world.

The 'frontier' quality of a society is enhanced not only by intensification of international migration. Regeneration of formerly oppressed and marginal autochthonic ethnic groups also adds to the fact. It can be vividly exemplified by a current situation in the 'American Indian zone' of Latin America.[68]

The latest Bolivian constitution changed the official title of the country to another one, namely 'the multinational state of Bolivia'. It is not ajuridical formality, but a serious historical symptom. Since the second half of the last century the demographic dynamics of American Indian ethnic group has surpassed that of the white Creole population and even that of the mongrel groups. Qualitative revival followed by spiritual one and hence an active participation of American Indians in politics, the revival called 'Indian Renaissance' is taking place in Bolivia, perhaps in the most obvious form, and in other Latin American countries with great percentage of autochthonic population. Indigenization from the 'top', indigenization of patronage and protection characteristic of the last century is being replaced by indigenization from the 'bottom' which has a rebellious nature, is politically organized and can take the most radical forms.

Modern indigenization of today is linked to alter-global movements and opposed to 'Westernization'. On the other hand, it rather often (for instance, in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador) postulates and realizes comeback to the traditions of indigenous communal existence, in particular, regarding judiciary practice, relations between people and nature, property, and, finally, family ethics. All this causes considerable risks and real conflicts.

Transition of another kind is also fraught with a number of risks. To what extent is our striving and positive expectation of multi-polar world free from idealistic views? We may not fully realize that in spite of objectively conditioned redistribution of forces and powers on the world arena, upward and downward dynamics (more so tinted with civilization inflexion) is capable of causing not only serious complications but disastrous events as well. All that may happen provided the world community does not learn to work out adequate mechanisms to counteract transition risks, duly defuse the time-bombs of looming collisions.

I do not think that remedies to cure discovered or possible maladies of the transition period can be found at present. Such remedies are developed by life itself, by practice of international communication. I also believe that the initiative of the Spanish government supported by the Turkish government and adopted by the United Nations Organization as one of the guidelines of their activity can be considered a timely and appropriate solution.

We are speaking here of the 'Alliance of Civilizations' project that was presented at the previous Likhachov Scientific Conference by Ambassador of Spain to Russia Juan Marc Pujol and former President of Portugal, at present High Representative of the UNO Secretary General Jorge Sampaio.[69] 'Co-authorship' of Spain and Turkey in this case is symbolic because both countries represent borderline civilizations, and therefore are more sensitive to the problem of overcoming the division cross-civilizational lines. The project of the Alliance of Civilizations has led to a wide international response, and it is quite natural. In fact, it goes in line with vital demands of the time, especially in the crucial stage of modern history. Based on humanistic ideology that is able to attract protagonists of various 'local' civilizations, it calls for action, assuming that public and private factors will take the most active part in it and will jointly influence the most sensitive areas. Education, youth, migration and the media issues are the fields

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[67] See: *Shemyakin Y.* Evropa i Latinskaya Amerika. Vzaimodeistviye tsivilizatsiy v kontekste vsemirnoy istoriyi (Europe and Latin America. Interaction of Civilizations in the Context of the World History). M., 2001.

[68] See: *Davydov V.* Tsivilographiya i tsivilizatsionnaya identifikatsiya Latino-Karibskoy Ameriki (Civilography and Civilization Identification of Latin-Caribbean America). M., 2006.

[69] See: Dialog kultur i partniorstvo tsivilizatsiy. IX Mezhdunarodnye Likhachovskiye chteniya (Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations. The 9th Internationa) Likhachov Scientific Conference). May 14–15, 2009. St. Petersburg, 2009.

of action for the Alliance. In other words, these are core measures and practices to form public consciousness of a new type resting upon tolerance and cooperation.

Let's hope that the third forum of the Alliance, to be held in Brazil almost simultaneously with the Likhachov Scientific Conference, will give an extra impetus to a powerful international movement which goes in keeping with the ideology and practices of the Alliance. Brazil, which appears as a 'cosmic race', as a symbol of symbiosis of cultures and religious tolerance in the heart of world history, offers fertile ground for a new stage of struggle for the transformation of the Alliance of Civilizations into reliable international reality.

The forum of the Alliance is symbolically preceded by another one, the second summit of the BRIC countries [a grouping acronym that refers to the related economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China] convened on Brazilian soil, too. The BRIC format has opened the prospect of a fruitful interaction between the four rising centres of the world economy and international politics. It is not only the problem of major economic, resource and demographic potential of the four giants. The problem is that each of them represents a powerful civilization able to exert a decisive influence on the world's destinies. The joint authority of the BRIC countries and an example of inter-civilizational interaction on this type is meant to contribute considerably (and perhaps crucially) to counteracting risks of the transition. We witness BRIC, one of those new international structures that are developing mechanisms for future global governance to guarantee sustainable development of the global community.

M. C. Delyagin[70]

CRISES OF GLOBAL MONOPOLISM AND THE PLANETARY ROLE OF THE HUMANITY: COMMON ESCAPE?

The abyss of the global financial crisis is underestimated due to disregard of its fundamental reason – the exhaustion of the model of global development caused by the destruction of the Soviet Union. After the victory in the Cold War, global corporations of the West selfishly redrew the map of the world in accordance with their own interests and deprived (to prevent competition) more than half of the world population of the op-portunity€or normal development.

By the scale, extent and destructivity for the assimilated societies, and, most important, its significance for the developed countries, *the opening up of new territories of the post-Socialist space can only be compared to the second Spanish and Portuguese conquest of Latin America.*

The first conquest looted the civilizations in Central and Latin America and thus prompted the formation of classical capitalist society in the developed Western countries.

The second conquest of the late '80s provided globalization with technological, intellectual and financial resources as ruthlessly plundered from the post-Socialist and undeveloped world *while developed countries grew into a global community of another quality* on the basis of information technologies rather than the industrial ones.

This exploitation was aggravated with the brainwashing of the robbed part of the world population (by the global advertising industry) and imposed on them the notions of normalcy and, moreover, necessity of the highest standards of Western consumerism. *Growing understanding in the underdeveloped world (including the former Soviet states) of the inaccessibility of these standards to their societies, engendered the phenomenon of a national treachery by the liberal reformers. Aware of their inability to develop their societies according to the accepted 'rules of*

[70] Director of the Institute for the Globalization Problems, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Full Class 2 Counsellor of State.

Author of more than 800 publications and 12 books, among which are the following: *Economy of Defaults* (Ekonomika neplatezhei), *Ideology of the Renaissance* (Ideologiya vozrozhdeniya), *The World Financial Crisis: A General Theory of Globalization* (Mirovoy finansovy krizis. Obschaya teoriya globalizatsiyi), *Russia after Putin* (Rossiya posle Putina), *The Drive of the Humankind'* (Draiv chelovechestva).

Full member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences.

play', they focused their efforts on the level of personal enrichment within the standards of the global advertisement in the attempts to enter the circle of 'global nomads '.

Exacerbation of the conflict by the end of the '90s significantly worsened global tension, problems of terrorism, and heightened migration which is literally washing away the modern Western civilization.

However, the developed societies have much faster felt the devastating repercussions of selfishness of the global corporations.

Deprived of the opportunity to develop, a huge part of the disadvantaged world population restrained the market for the developed countries, which led to *the overproduction crisis* and limited their export, primarily that of information and management technologies, *high-hume,* but not *high-tech,* and, secondly, that of traditional goods. *An additional factor adding to the crisis is a relative shrinking of consumption not only in the third world countries but in the developed nations as well. This was brought about by the impoverishment of the 'middle class' in the developed countries due to the progress of information technologies (largely caused by the destruction of the socialist countries which supplied the necessary resources for this progress).*

Global corporations mechanically responded to the first wave of the global crisis of overproduction and began to 'pump' the demand by increasing loans. It was not the global corporations but national governments of the countries they are stationed, and international financial organizations who started the crediting.

It is in the course of the implementation of this strategy that global corporations finally got isolated from their governments by the mid-'90s of the 20th century. The reason for the isolation was plain: the corporations were reluctant to take the responsibility for overly risky loans, even if issued in their interests, and to identify themselves with those who provided the loans, even under their pressure.

Stimulating sales through crediting the undeveloped world led to the debt crisis in 1997–99, which recoiled upon the USA in 2000-01. The USA pulled itself (and the world economy, the core of which it is) out of the starting depression by implementing two key strategies.

The first strategy is the *'export of instability'. It is primarily aimed at blowing up the competitors (or their periphery), which makes their capital and brains (as well as capital and brains of the undeveloped countries which had planned to escape to the USA before the crisis burst out) flee to a 'safe harbour '– the United States.*

The main thing here, however, is that the growth of instability justifies the increase in arms expenditure in the USA itself, instead of economy and technology stimulating the market ('military Keynesianism' of Reagan). Carried out against the Euro zone in Yugoslavia in 1999 and later, and then in Afghanistan in 2001, this strategy wore itself out in Iraq as far back as in 2003.

The other strategy to support the U.S. economy is 'pumping' the market of non-payable mortgage loans. It created the financial bubble which began to 'creep at the seams' back in the summer of 2006, but the diverse, multi-level and flexible financial infrastructure of the USA did not lead to an instant collapse, but to a long agony, which only ceased to be latent in September, 2008.

Both the strategies aimed at boosting the world economy and temporary 'freezing' the global crisis of overproduction had fully depleted their resources by 2008.

Today, developed countries are no longer trying to increase their competitiveness, but to shove the world back into the waning 1990s and 2000s, when in fact a new colonialism emerged disguised as the idea of globalization.

Inability of the USA to sacrifice even a small part of their current interests for the sake of resolving their own strategic problems and their truly deadly selfishness leaves no possibility for the global financial architecture to change reasonably.

This not only makes the global development spontaneous and, hence, accompanied by unjustified imbalances and devastations. Terminating the American intellectual leadership (for the supremacy of intellect is devalued by a dead-end system of interests), this impossibility pushes new key players to the limelight of the global development – not only the European Union but also China, thus calling a halt to *Pax Americana.*

The integration of humankind once again, as in the early twentieth century, seems to have exceeded the possibilities of its control systems, and humankind has been forced to reduce its depth, restoring manageability through primitivizing the development processes.

In practice, it may turn into *the transition from globalization to regionalization:* rapid growth of macro-areas severely competing with one another on an overall scale.

Probably, a temporary balance will be achieved with the restoration of bi-polar political system (standoff between the USA and China with the European Union, Japan, India and, possibly, Russia serving as a joint balance-beam) and multicurrency economic system. Each currency zone will have its own reserve currency (dollar, euro, yuan) and they will compete with one another.

However, the fundamental problem of modern development is neither self-centredness of the USA, nor lack of liquidity, nor the crisis of bad debts, nor even the loss of control of owners over their top managers, but *non-existent source of growth of the USA* and the entire world economy alongside. Even the recovery of the U.S. financial system is unlikely to ease the crisis of overproduction of global monopolies and to create a new »conomic engine to replace the broken ones. This means that the current crisis of the world economy may result in lengthy and severe depression rather than recovery.

The fundamental reason for another world recession, the ultimate cause of the crisis of overproduction is the global decay of global corporations.

Their monopolism is aggravated by the changing nature of the technological process itself: advance of efficient 'meta-technologies', so that those market players who use them are unable to compete with their developers.

Development of sophisticated technologies leads to the fact that *money is losing its meaning.* Easily alienable money has almost ceased to be a symbol of success and a tool of achieving it. This function has been devolved to technologies which are ever harder to alienate and which merge with their developers and users, while significance of social technologies aimed at management and especially at shaping consciousness is growing steadily.

In spite of all this, the chances are, however, that the way *to overcome stagnation of global monopolies* is similar to that of ordinary monopolies – *by changing their technological basis,* so that new and more efficient technologies should abolish outdated social relations and, in particular, overcome monopolism.

Since global monopolies feel it, their main efforts are to slow down the technological process capable of undermining their dominance.

This process is hampered though by a number of objective reasons: by economization and stripping management of an ideological bias, by focus on profit instead of on ultimate goals. But *profitability of investments into technological innovations of up-to-date quality is dubious,* as an investor never knows in advance whether the money spent will pay, and if it does, when and how much.

Nevertheless, confidence in prevailing technologies inevitably growing simpler and cheaper is based on the impossibility of long-term and large-scale impediment of technological progress and on the blatant technological, economic, social and political dead-end into which the world was brought by the rotting yet dominating global monopolies.

Social impact of a 'technological breakthrough', by which the mankind is to overcome stagnation of global monopolies will be aggravated by changes in the interaction between man and nature, reflected in the growing overall system risks.

Standard explanations of the mortgage crisis in the USA highlight natural avarice of black marketers as well as the objective demand of American economy in inflating a fraudulent 'financial bubble' to induce its further economic growth. Besides, increasing volume of mortgage (including, and especially, the non-repayable one) was a disguised means to render social assistance, necessary in the conditions of rapid degradation (or to put it simply, ruin) of the American 'middle class'.

These explanations are correct, but they are of macroeco-nomic nature, as they account for the social demand in such a blatant disorder. Meanwhile, there was also investors' demand alongside with the social demand, but observers choose not to pay attention to this cause of the crisis, which lies on the micro-level, on the level of individual economic entities.

But multi-tier 'repacking of risks' that resulted in the loss of control on the part of regulating bodies over liabilities circulating within markets, was used to fulfil a most important economic function, that of insuring the investors' risks.

Along that way, great progress has been made: due to multi-tier system of derivatives, the risks of those investing into the first-rate bonds of the American corporation were considerably – up to 10 times – lower than the risks of the corporation itself. It guaranteed them profitability and provided them with impetuous development of derivatives (alongside with macr-oeconomic function).

American economy being the basis for the world one, the USA and the entire world faced the effect of *the law of preservation of risks,* according to which *the general amount of risks in a large system remains almost constant.* As a result, reducing individual risks of a significant number of systemic elements *inevitably leads* to shifting those risks to a higher level and respectively *to growing overall system risks. In particular, minimizing individual risks increases overall system risks to such an extent that, as a rule, causes the system s disruption.*

That is exactly what happened to the American financial system and what is happening to the entire humanity. We are witnessing the systemic decline of well-being which attests that the traditional model of interaction between the planetary nature complex and the mankind as its part has worn itself out. *Depletion of the old model means the beginning of a transition to a model of a different interaction,* which is so far vague, but which may require considerable changes in our usual lifestyle.

We cannot rule out the threat that the mankind, unable to cope with the growing system risks, may destroy itself. That will mean a significant simplification of the humanity's internal organization, de-socialization on the planetary level, not only within the boundaries of particular societies.

Piotr Dutkiewicz[71],
Jan Dutkiewicz[72]

IN SEARCH OF THE RELEVANCE OF THE "CIVILIZATION DEBATE" (ABSTRACT)

This presentation will address the issue of a search for a policy-relevant "interface" between the seemingly opposite positions of a "clash of civilization" versus "dialogue among civilization" in the form of common ground that would serve as "civilizationally agreed models for institutionalized political actions" or in short as "civilizational bridges" as a basis for meaningful partnerships. It is also an addendum to the debate on how to try to de-politicize and de-ideologize the current debate. This latter part is a prerequisite for better understanding of opportunities and limitations for peaceful coexistence in the inevitably more chaotic international environment of the emerging multi-polar world system. In other words, it is a search for acceptable (both theoretically and politically) common space for a new wave of the debate that might escape being either too ideological or too detached from tangible applicability.

Our presentation will build on Boris Kapustin's – a well known Russian political philosopher – thesis that:

"The 'dialogue among civilizations', which claims to be *the* alternative of the 'clash of civilizations', fully accepts the logic of 'naturalization' typical of its 'opponent'. The 'dialogue' admits that the 'clash of civilizations' is *the* major threat to the well being of humankind. Such a 'clash' is described as bearing an 'existential' rather than a functional character *(pace* Huntington's dismissal of institutions). A theoretical similarity between the two allegedly rival approaches is

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[71] Director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian research at Carleton University (Canada), professor. Author of books *Problems of Local Development of Poland* (1989), *NATO Looks East* (1998) and publications: *Challenges of Democratization: Prospects of Political Transformation in Eastern Europe* (in co-authorship), *The New Role of Canada in Relations with Russia* (in co-authorship) and others.
[72] Professor of Victoria University (Wellington, New Zealand).

further bolstered up by their Equal incapacity to explain the logic of the 'clash of civilizations'. Huntington fails to demonstrate why and how 'cultural differences' would culminate in 'clashes'. This leaves the central thesis of his book about the 'clashes of civilizations' as the crux of international policy hanging in the air. The 'dialogue' reciprocates this by pointing to such mysterious things as the 'fear of diversity' or the 'perception that diversity is a threat' as the (only) causes of the 'cultural' conflicts. More 'tangible' contradictions, such as those represented by the cleavages between East and West, North and South, etc. are pronounced no better than 'assumed dichotomies.'

Unfounded 'fears of diversity' and its misperceptions as a threat are believed to be curable and the 'dialogue' is presented as a correct medication to treat such maladies."[73]

The first step: to be able to talk with each other – not to mention be partners (at the "civilizational level") – we must first establish the basic *preconditions* for constructing "civilizationally agreed models for institutionalized political actions" or in short a "civilizational bridges." It seems that three considerations may help this idea to take off. First, that dialogue may happen only among equals – thus civilizations (and those who live within them) shall be treated as "equals" (as starting from such categories as "oppressed" and "dominated" on one hand and "developed" or "advanced" on the other will frame the debate from the start in purely political categories). Second, accepting that sometimes the optimal result of the process may be to agree to disagree. As Mark Kingwell has noted, "[n]ot only does it allow a minimal cohesion, staying off the anarchy of war between all and everyone, but the conditions of rational disagreement actually indicate a significant upgrade in human intelligence." Thirdly, recognition of our global, human vulnerability as a potential glue for common actions. A shared sense human vulnerability creates a sense of community, a sense of global collectivity where group interest shall be – if not eliminated – then mutated; it might happen not because of the notion of civility or a value of ethical pluralism but fear of future survival, both as "civilizations," however defined, and indeed as humanity as we know it.

The second step would be to reveal the unity and diversity of meanings of basic categories of inter-civilization interaction and potential partnership. Four come to mind: *Space, Justice, Nature, Governance.* The main idea here is to shift discourse on civilization from areas such as religion, economics or society (which are usually framed in "cultural categories" related to key values and thus related to culturally rooted differences) to the mutual recognition *of globally shared notions of concern.* In other words to replace one frame of the discourse (dialogue-clash) with another one that de-emphasizes history, de-europenizes, de-modernizes the discourse and attempts to create a basic *universality of meanings (thus universalizing concerns).* The point is to reveal what different civilizations "have in mind" when using these notions. *Space* has different meaning for different people but it embraces such notions as coexistence, alliances, communication, borders, belonging, identity and others. The diverse meanings of justice can reveal collective desire, fear and aspirations domestically and internationally. A debate on *Nature* will add to our civilizational understanding of human- animal relations, global bio-politics and bio-economics. Finally, a search for meanings of governance (as seen from different civilization perspectives) will potentially give us a sense whether and how we are able to globally manage space, ecology and people within a diversity of structural and institutional options.

The third step is to look at how – and if – the core "meanings" can be universalized; what will be left as "common" civilizational ground – a space that belongs to all of us? In the current debate of "dialogue of civilizations," which is to a certain extent a western-led process, we are preoccupied with the domestication of "others" and a reduction of violence; within the new framework the main purpose is to attempt to reveal the nature of an "inter-civilization" core.

The fourth and last step will belong to the global community of NGOs, governments and policy makers as we shall ask: if we know the shared meanings of fundamental notions how can we make the world more "civilized"? How do we enhance "civility"? Politics and power will take over from there.

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[73] Boris Kapustin, Some Political Meanings of 'Civilization', Diogenes 2009; 56; 151

Walter B. Giger[74]

THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS: THE MAKING OF A GLOBAL CULTURE

Distinguished Chairman,
Ladies and gentlemen,
First of all I would like to express my appreciation for the opportunity to take part in the 10th Likhachov Conference. If we consider the theme of today's session – Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations: The Making of Global Culture – we will bring certain names and events to our memory.

The 'global village' idea and the 09/11 terrorist attack in New York World Trade Center, F. Fukuyama's book on 'the end of history' and S. P. Huntington's widely discussed book on 'the clash of civilizations' are tied up in one knot.

Introduction

I dare not add yet another definition of culture to the variety of those already in use, but it seems vital and crucial to set a terminus a quo to base and build my ideas on. In regards to it, I'd like first to explain my point of view on globalization and its impact on international foreign policy while indicating successful prerequisites for the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations to follow. At the end of my report I'd like to cite a definite example of Switzerland's foreign policy and by means of it show how the country adapts to the new world order.

On the definition of culture

I treat culture and civilization as a body of knowledge as well as of values and religious ideas that influence a person's life, conduct and environment together with all structures of the society (state, legal system, etc.) Culture is the basis for self-identity, it both unites (giving the sense of community) and disunites (there existing other cultures). As a rule, culture has a group nature that has been evolving for decades, centuries and millennia. Let me cite here the evolution of language or religion as an instance. Culture keeps evolving, adapting to new conditions, and a social group adopts it as a beneficial model of behaviour to solve various challenges, mostly the problems of mutual co-existence. Such a way of treating culture seems especially weighty, as culture for me is rather a living body than an abstract thing, it manifests itself in everyday conduct of individuals and the society as a whole helping to solve urgent problems of life.

On the issue of globalization

Globalization as a tangled knot of various life spheres (such as politics, economy, ecology, communications) is growing more and more wide spread and intensive throughout the world. It has to be taken for granted, whether we will it or not. Globalization causes fears and hopes. I'll tackle upon it later in my report. But the first and most important thing to mention is the fact that global challenges of the present time, on the one hand, are the causes of globalization, and on the other hand, are its effects. It is especially noticeable in the environment. None of the countries, even those as large as Russia, can solve the environmental problems by itself. Another good instance is economy. Being a representative of the country that earns every other frank of the national income due to cooperation with foreign partners, I have the right to declare that our today's prosperity grew, first and foremost, out of international economic cooperation. Interconnection of various national economies is of great value for Russia as well. What would happen to your country but for the opportunity to sell oil, gas and natural resources abroad; with no access to foreign technologies and financial capital? The level of prosperity is rooted in taking

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[74] Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Switzerland to the Russian Federation, Dr Giger has been in the Foreign Service since 1974. He served as an Ambassador of Switzerland to a number of African countries and countries of South-Asian region such as Turkey and Azerbaijan.

comparative advantages, in constant give-and-take. But it also involves a sense of responsibility and awareness that hardships and troubles of other countries concern us no less. That's why my third example is peace and world security. The challenge of keeping peace and security has become global. None of the countries can provide it only by itself. So, the classical non-interference policy in the form of neutrality that has determined Switzerland's foreign policy for some time no longer guarantees peace and security for our country. What we need is an active policy targeted at keeping peace and security. That's why Switzerland has become a member of the UN and is pursuing an active peacekeeping policy.

First conclusion

As my first conclusion, I'd like to point out that there are global challenges to be only solved on a global level. But to carry it out, we need common values. Without global values there will be no chance to work out relationship paterns for global challenges to be solved successfully and on mutual grounds. If we fail to create a common basis or to cultivate it deliberately, the power will be won by the strongest. Just think of Pax Romana (the Roman World). But our cultural basis is not global as various groups have their own peculiar features. Many of them are afraid of having to lose their cultural identity. They are very wary of having to accept and assimilate foreign cultural patterns that do not suit their everyday life.

Let me cite Switzerland as an example. As you may know, the overwhelming majority of the Swiss population voted to ban the construction of new minarets in the country. This new constitutional provision does not prevent professing Islam and constructing mosques, it only lobbies against the minaret constructions. All this is happening in the country that is noted for its tolerance and openness, where the issues of constructions were solved by the local authoritative bodies. The Swiss Government together with the Parliament appealed to the people of the country to reject this motion, as they account for this surprising vote as fuelled by people's fears of an alien system of values. Foreigners living in Switzerland total in over 20 per cent, it resulted in foreign system of values penetrating into the country, which is treated by the population as a threat for the national identity. The majority takes minarets as a symbol of this threat. That's why the Swiss Government can make no scruple to state that the vote is not anti-Islamic, it just shows discontent and insecurity of the population facing globalization that they treat as a threat.

Strategy to follow

Acute conflicts arise between the developing globalization and the urge to keep the national identity, national and regional cultures, as keeping it is a prerequisite for universal prosperity and sense of cultural identity. Complying with it will require a double-way strategy. At the international level we need the dialogue of cultures to establish the partnership of civilizations. But it might appear only possible after enhancing trust to the culture on the national level. There is no creating the national basis without confidence in the national values, without awareness that the evolution of the global culture in the form of a global system of values fails to threat national identity. Only confidence in national culture will enable us to conduct a successful dialogue with others in order to come to a mutual understanding and find a way to solve common challenges. It is then that we might put an end to conflicts and find common grounds for various points of view without totally altering our own opinion.

Policy of dialogue

You are certain to expect me, in my position of an ambassador, to offer a strategy to enhance international relations. In 2000 the Swiss Government put in to the Parliament a report on foreign policy that distinctly stated the position of the dialogue of cultures. I'd like to quote three sentences of this report that had been published a year before the 09/11 disaster: 'Nationalities and regions are coming closer in political, economical, ecological and social spheres. To solve the challenges that sweep away the borders we need a policy of cooperation that can aptly take interests of various regions, cultures and religions into account. Switzerland, as the country targeted at foreign relations, displays its interest to mutual understanding of nations'.

Nowadays international policy often lacks dialogue. Unilateral decisions are taken, unilateral talks are held with established parties standing off, all important aspects and prospects aren't taken into account.

The only alternative of the dialogue is renunciation of talks and ignoring established authoritative parties. Thus, it rather obstructs than stimulates solution of problems. Dialogue is based on principles of respect and mutual understanding, it provides possibilities to treat problems and issues to arise as a perceptual unity. This guarantees more fruitful work and mature solutions of the problems. It is not easy to carry out dialogue. It takes long and requires high standards, it is also sometimes unpredictable.

A certain example of Switzerland's foreign policy

I'd like to give only one example, namely Swiss peacekeeping policy, to show how the Swiss Government is trying to affect the partnership of civilizations in a positive way. For many decades an integrate feature of the Swiss foreign policy has been participation in peacekeeping activities. Throughout its history, Switzerland has always been beneficial in this issue and it can share its experience. The country has been fairly cognizant in the issues of federalism, democracy, election system, tolerance towards minorities and respect to its history. Switzerland does not pursue any ulterior objects and never attempts to put any pressure on decision-making in international peaceful settlements. That is why it is considered to be a neutral intermediary to be trusted. To put it in other words, it is a typical soft power.

A traditional tool in Switzerland's foreign policy is to protect interests of others. I am proud that Russia gives credence to Switzerland in this sphere. Intensive contacts between Russia and Switzerland are likely to have encouraged Russia's appeal to Switzerland to present its interests in Tbilisi after rupturing diplomatic relations with Georgia in October 2008. Provided Georgia concurs, which was confirmed shortly afterwards, Switzerland expressed its readiness. Later, Georgia also petitioned Switzerland for presenting its interests in Russia. This

case demonstrates how interests of Russian and Georgian sides were presented consequently on the embassy premises in Tbilisi and Moscow under the patronage of Switzerland. Switzerland is always eager to assist in solving political challenges.

Switzerland is also trying to find a positive solution to settle an old conflict in the Southern Caucasus. At the requests of Armenia and Turkey Switzerland served as an intermediary to arbitrage the conflict between these two states; it supported the negotiations that for the first time witnessed positive changes promoting the reconciliation of the parties.

Conclusion

Throughout the history of Switzerland its ability to conduct a dialogue has been considered crucial for uniting cantons and other parts of the country, for creating an integrated nation and a political system. There is no figuring Switzerland without its ability to conduct a dialogue, to overcome linguistic and other borders, it won't be able to operate at all. In our country's foreign policy we try to apply the most successful methods and hope to contribute to the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations.

R. S. Grinberg[75]

[75] Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for Economics (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Dr. Sc. (Economics), professor. Professor of Moscow School of Economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Author of more than 250 publications including books: *Ekonomicheskaya sotsiodinamika: Rossiya: pravila i realnost'* [Economic Socio-Dynamics: Russia: Rules and Reality], *Gosudarstviennaya podderzhka malogo predprinimatelstva* v *stranah Tsentralnoy i Vostochnoy Ev-ropy* [State Support of Micro-entrepreneurship in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe], *Otsenka sotsio-ekonomicheskih posledstviy prisoyedineniya Rossiyi k Vsemirnoy torgovoy organizatsiyi* [Analysis of Socio-Dynamic Consequences of Russia's joining the World Trade Organization], *Sredi riskov i shan-sov* [Among Risks and Opportunities] and

THE CRISIS OVER? GLOBALIZATION GOING ON...

Globalization of the world economy has almost erased the boarders between individual states, having considerably increased the opportunities for international division of labour, capital movement, industrial cooperation, merger and takeover. We do live in one 'global village'. It is not a mere metaphor. Nowadays any person living in any country can easily participate in the international industrial and agricultural relations on any continent, either offering or applying for the services of marketing, advertising, PR, selling, production, hedging, transportation or paying for any product.

However, a strong financial and economic crisis which began in the USA from the catastrophe in the sphere of mortgage lending, rapidly spread to the EU countries, post-Soviet states and the rest of the world. The crisis, having covered the whole globe, outlined bright as well as dark sides of the globalization, and, what is primarily important, clearly emphasized its social and economic paradoxes, which became quite obvious in the time of wealth and relative prosperity.

Paradoxes

Some 20-30 years ago it seemed that with the end of the Cold War and the defeat of real socialism the citizens of the post-Soviet states would enter the era of prosperity based on the principals of pluralistic democracy, civil society and social market economy. One thought that sooner or later the rest five billion citizens of the Earth would reach the level of the 'golden billion'. It was considered at that time that from the moment on the whole world would be built according to one single model – the principles of liberal democracy as all other ideologies, including communism, had failed.

It was the time when a famous American political analyst Francis Fukuyama stated 'the end of history' in his sensational article, meaning that world history as a result of the fight of various ideologies had been over. Alas! These considerations were not to become true.

By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century it has become clear that globalization is a much more complicated, many-sided and controversial process than one could have thought. Even in such prospering countries as, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany, where almost an optimum model of the state and social existence seemed to have been found. This model was to defend the country against potential conflicts and problems and to create practically the classless society with high living standards. However, the whole situation turned out to be significantly more complicated when the Federal Republic of Germany faced the situation of a difficult choice.

It was a sudden situation threatening prosperity which was reached not without hard work and seemed so profound. The feeling of anxiety difficult to overcome was progressing. Gradually it was getting obvious that the solution to new problems could only be found in abandoning the existing social and individual standards of well-being.

Actually, these events can be described as social and economic paradoxes. Does not the following situation contain a paradox in itself? The life of retired citizens in developed societies is long and wealthy. The pensioners enjoy it and tend to prolong it. The society and the state support this desire creating the necessary living conditions. The amount of pensions is very close to the salary previously earned. At the same time the society faces the decrease of the birth rate, which is also influenced by a new model of living with its strong points – a high standard of living, individual independence and so on. It is difficult to apply for these prosperities with growing children in the family. It also means that a tax burden on the working citizens in the developed countries is incessantly decreasing, becomes overwhelming and gradually leads the system of pensioners provision of presently prosperous countries to bankruptcy. The social state has to correct its policy. Some possible and proposed methods are known: increase of retirement age limit, decrease of pensions, private pension plans an so on, but it is important to say that all of

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these prospects put an end to a prosperous communal life which implies the destruction of the social world.

Will intellectual, political, organizational, and, first of all, economic recourses be found to prevent the waves of social instability and shock? So far the answer has not been found. We cannot but see that Russia swiftly starts facing the same problems, although nowadays it occupies a lower level of development in compmrison with the Western countries.

Paradox One. Everywhere in developed countries there is a certain deficit of the working labour due to the birth rate and population decrease, as well as native population aging. This problem would be many times as sharp if it were not for working labour from other regions of the world. Immigration is a way out for economy of developed countries as it prevents the industrial reduction. It is also a happy chance for the population of poor developing countries with a high rate of unemployment, where poverty is a common feature for the whole society. This work in developed countries gives a financial support not only to the immigrants but also to their numerous relatives who get money orders. These money orders often play the role of a profound financial assistance in the economy of poor countries. Nowadays Russia experiences the same situation when the Georgian, Tajik, Azerbaijani labourers working here transfer money to their native countries.

However, the majority of immigrants are ill-adapted to culture and various traditions of the country which has accepted them. They work much, but do not have a necessary qualification and have to occupy second-rate and badly paid positions, which naturally leads to lower salaries in comparison with those of the native population of these states. Often immigrants begin to experience social vulnerability and consider their financial situation inadequate. From time to time social turbulence overwhelms this group of population. It is especially true for the second generation of immigrants: they perceive migration problems (both real and imaginary) more dramatically than their parents, they also more often organize disturbances or show dissatisfaction in many other ways. At the same time dissatisfaction is experienced by representatives of the native population as well. This social group feels danger for an accustomed way of social living, for a political and economic life of the country, it feels the threat of a cultural erosion and finds the state social support of the immigrants unjustified. The society as a whole faces a deep discord, which leads to the social split. The stated situation can become a ground for unpredictable conflicts.

Thus we conclude that the globalization of the labour market increases the opportunities for the migration of labour force, which is not only objectively necessary, but is also useful for the countries involved. Along with that it becomes a source of social instability in the states characterized by a high level of social stability. There is no need to remind of the growing importance of the described problem in Russia.

Paradox Two. Widening and deepening their economic relations, nation-states gradually reduce the obstacles that complicate the transition of goods, services, finance and people. We must mention that some developing states managed not only to mobilize their domestic resources but also to attract foreign investments, which provided a high tempo of their economic growth. However, poverty is still very common for the largest part of the globe's population (it is a well-known fact that presently more than a billion of world's population live below the level of poverty), and the difference in the living standards between the developed countries and the rest of the world is not only diminishing, but in the majority of cases progressing. The contradiction between the ability of the globalization to form new opportunities for the economic growth and the impossibility of it for many undeveloped countries is quite clear today. It became obvious that openness of national economy where necessary institutions and governmental activity are unavailable only aggravates backwardness of the economic structure.

Paradox Three (among other significant social and economic paradoxes) can be called 'the boomerang effect'. The reason it appeared is connected with the technological standards of modern industry which are formed in the developed countries. In the process of globalization it involves a growing number of states with a different level of development. Thanks to modern technologies and means of communication less developed countries learned to produce modern goods and services of a better quality, with fewer expenditures on the labour payment and social

support and so on. The initiative of developed states to place labour-intensive and ecologically dangerous industrial sectors on some other territories gave a start to a severe competition between the developed states and the less developed countries. But it was the developed states that stood up and continue to stand up for the opening of the borders and practical implementation of 'four famous freedoms' – the freedom of goods, services, finance and people transition.

The unavoidable paradox is that with the fading of the barriers the developing countries become competitors for the world of a 'golden billion', successfully conquering the international markets. Some ten years ago it was hard to image high quality footwear produced in China. Nowadays Chinese quality shoes can easily compete with the production of the leading firms – international footwear brands. During the last two years the import of shoes from China and Vietnam to Western and Central Europe increased at 700 per cent. The result of it was the fact that almost 100 thousand people involved in footwear industry in Western Europe lost their work.

One could suggest that the developed countries should increase the growth of industrial technologies meanwhile which would give an opportunity to regain the lost market positions. However, the tempo of the transfer to new technologies turned out to be slower in comparison with the tempo of international market penetration of the developing states. Alongside with it the returning of the lost market positions of the developed countries, if it were implemented due to the spread of new technologies or for some other reasons, would give an impetus to a new crisis connected with the reproduction of the same products of the similar quality. In this case the developing states would lose their favourable positions.

Here arises the problem of a complicated choice: to reduce or completely cease the existing losses the developed countries should either decrease their production expenses by cutting down the wages, making the vacations lower and initiating draconian saving on social services, for example, at the cost of free or beneficial medical care, or block the process of globalization, applying for protectionism which some time ago was anathematized by the given developed countries. In the pre-cri-sis time the world already stood on the brink of implementation of the second way of the probable development: the developed countries would close the borders for services and goods for any reasons including the senseless ones. Of courser, the consumers of these countries had to suffer, but the producers would prosper, at least for some time.

As far as Russian economy is concerned, its position in the world is a specific one. The main source of Russian income comes from selling energy supplies and resources that are in high demand in many countries. The external economic problems of our country are mainly connected with another *paradox,* which is quite clearly expressed. A Russian consumer uses imported goods in an accustomed way as there is no domestic industry. The Russian government almost does not protect Russian internal market, Russian produces. Today on the agenda there is a complex task to develop a perspective policy that would stimulate domestic production without creating isolationism that would block out the modernization of the Russian economy. Another important task is to find outlets for high quality technological goods which we are to learn to produce.

Russia is to use the opportunities to restore its scientific and technological potential, resuscitate and develop new highly technological branches of industry and diversify its economy. However, we do not have much time to set the priorities because if present uncertainty continues to exist our country will inevitably lose its scientific and technical potential in five or six years. In this case we will have to start right from the beginning. After all, the way of revival and development is the only true and safe way to acquire the status of one of the leading countries on the international arena and confidently prove it.

The World Crisis

Here I would like to say a few words about the global financial crisis. Recently the society believed the recipe for economic prosperity to be quite simple: there must be some limited governmental regulations and bans, the bureaucratic system must not dominate, the state must not interfere with economy, the market will provide everything and solve all the problems. The state was to play the part of a 'night watchman'.

However, the global financial crisis quickly woke the society from the euphoria and height vertigo of market success. Even the USA which has always been a stronghold of liberal economy

actively began to use the methods similar to the Soviet ones: America made governmental investments into economy and nationalized bankrupt or close to bankruptcy banks and corporations. It is very important to remind here that a significant role belongs to psychology – 'the crowd feeling' in the market processes. Ludwig Erhard outlined that 50 per cent of economy is psychology. This is exactly what we are facing now. The common negative tendency of the last 10 years is unprecedented extravagance (according to French philosopher-moralist Pierre-Claude-Victor Boiste 'extravagance is the death of wealth'), this is a situation when the whole world was living above its means. It gave place to another herd feeling -despondent stinginess. It is very important to emphasize that anti-crisis measures and programmes are running behind the schedule especially in the sphere of a 'real sector' of economic systems of different countries. However, it must be said that the governments managed to prevent the collapse of bank systems (in Russia, too) choosing the way of a 'mild nationalization' -by means of increasing liquidity and governmental entry into the capital of commercial banks.

The most precious lesson of the global crisis which was well learned by the international society is the realization of necessity to create effective supra-national mechanisms to regulate the world economy. This accounts for the transformation of G-Eight into G-Twenty. The extended membership of Group declared its responsibility for managing international economic processes.

One has to emphasize again that Karl Max's thoughts about the danger of breaking between the financial sector and the production of goods proved to be true today. Probably, it must be not the methods and ways of perspective governmental influence on economy but the principles according to which these methods are used: when, where, with what purpose these methods are applied and who uses them.

As for Russia, some time ago we could observe the situation of national pride when the country considered it an advantage to have economy totally integrated into the international market. During the first several months of a present crisis, though, voices started to be heard arguing that our links with the world economy are not that deep and we are not going to suffer from the crisis much. The reality showed that the global crisis heavily hurt Russian economy. Its particular vulnerability is accounted for by the fact that Russia has not so far survived the crisis of a system transformation. Despite a short history of Russian capitalism, it was aggravated not only by the mistakes of reforms policy in the period of 'storm and attack' of the '90s, but also by the mistakes of financial circles of Russia in the period of successful development in 1999-2008, which was caused by high international prices on hydrocarbon raw materials. Altogether it led to a present feeling of vulnerability.

The present crisis is an imported 'product' for Russia, which victim it is, as well as other countries. The growing impairment of world economy stimulated a sharp decline of external demand on raw materials and metals exported by Russia which led to the reduction of potential currency earnings. Unfortunately, the basis of Russian economy is so far export of natural resources. It means that global economic crises will continuously influence it, as well as the economy of Newly Independent States which strongly depend on Russia.

The main lesson of recent 'succulent' years for Russia is the following: the government did not use a favourable state of affairs, when the money earned on selling oil and gas could have been spent to modernize economy and implement infrastructure projects. The country opened to the rest of the world too quickly. It could also have solved the problem of galloping inflation in Russia. Nowadays it is impossible to deny that the main reason for a high tempo of price growth is not monetary; it is rooted in the structural imperfection of Russian economy. A healthy economy with a strong infrastructure, a broad offer of goods and successful competence reacts at the growth of buyer concentration by the production increase. While Russian economy increases the growth of prices. The problem is that in Russia there are very few producers of goods and services and there is no effective antimonopoly service. As a result, on the one hand Russian economy of recent years is characterized by a primitive structure, on the other hand, high rates of inflation continue to exist.

Today the Russian government struggling with the crisis is on the right path. But what awaits us in the future? Unfortunately, the main aim of economic policy for twenty years has only been the suppression of inflation. But we haven't achieved positive results in this sphere. On the way to

get rid of inflation one must create a healthy economy: to modernize industry, to develop the infrastructure, to make investments into industry. In this case the economy will react not by galloping inflation (this is the situation we are observing today), but by the growth of production.

However, we must remind ourselves that the word 'crisis' written in Chinese consists of two characters: one of them means 'danger', while the other is 'a favourable opportunity'. Crisis is a cleansing of the old and 'a favourable opportunity' to begin anew. The Russian government must simply model a right economic perspective of the country, create a developed infrastructure, diversify the national economy and develop high technologies.

The global financial crisis obviously demonstrated the collapse of the idea of an unrestricted economic liberalism. It can and must become its main lesson. Actually, the crisis is the consequence of domination in the world (and at the beginning of the '90s – in Russian) economic policy of the ideology of a 'free market' – neoliberalism, the main idea of which is that the state activity must be reduced in favour of self-regulation.

Today we again have to state that one cannot do without a powerful regular state activity in modern economy. We must also avoid its ultimate opposition: the combination of exaggerated unification with fallacious protectionism. Russia has already experienced the similar situation. The way out of the crisis demands the formation of a new economic model, and, in particular, the model of the governmental regulation. In this model social justice must be not an antithesis, but a necessary condition of the effective economy.

In spite of obvious difficulties, globalization as an objective demand of time will continue its progress followed by various problems and a growing number of complications. Here some backwardness can also take place. In this case some deep corrections of this natural process must be implemented. Today this uncontrollable process is developing according to the outdated neoliberal guidelines. Thus, systematic governmental activity and international coordination of national economic routes seem to have no alternatives.

René Guerra[76]

THE RUSSIAN PARNASSUS AND MONTPARNASSE

Following'the October coup d'etat and the end of the Civil War, Russian culture of the Silver Age found itself thrown out of Russia. Starting from 1924, Paris became a *de facto* capital of the emigre Russia. Thus two great cultures, Russian and French, were destined to coexist on the French soil. This immediately gives rise to a number of questions regarding their interaction, intermingling, intercommunication as well as mutual understanding and the contribution of the Russian people to the French culture...

Russian intellectuals of the Diaspora, those writers and artists of an older generation who found themselves in an alien linguistic environment, torn from their native land, showed real feats of survival trying to preserve cultural traditions, the purity of their mother tongue, the spirit and values of Russian culture trampled at home by the Bolsheviks. For each of them was carrying Russia with themselves, their own Russia and their devotion to it. Everything, however, has its reverse side: those exiles kept their Russianness intact, they did not for a moment forget Russia and were agonized by the misfortunes which befell on it, yet they felt aliens in France.

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[76] Head of Russian Language and Literature Chair at the University of Nice (France), Dr. Sc. (Philology)

Specialist in Slavic literature, publisher, art collector and researcher, President of the Association for the Preservation of the Russian Cultural Heritage in France.

Laureate of Tsarskoye Selo Artistic Award (St. Petersburg, 2009); Laureate of Delvig Literary Award (Moscow, 2010).

Author of more than 200 academic and journalistic works on the culture of post-October Russian emigre community, among which are the following: *The Younger Generation of Russian Emigre Writers* (Mladsheye pokoleniye pisateley russkogo zarubezhya); *They Carried Russia With Them...: Russian emigre writers in France in the 1920s – 1970s* (Russkiye emigranty-pisateli i khudozhniki vo Frantsiyi: 1920-1970); *Pity for the Russian People* (Zhal' Russkiy narod); *Bio-bibliography of B.K. Zaitsev* (Biobibliografiya B. K. Zaitseva) and others.

Like Marc Chagall, many of those emigre artists and writers could reiterate that far away from their native land they felt more affinity to it. This is what Boris Zaitsev admitted in his autobiographical essay, 'The years spent away from Russia, turned out to be particularly linked to it in terms of writing. With the smallest exceptions, everything that I wrote here, grew out of Russia, and is permeated with Russia.'[77] The same is true with Bunin, Kuprin, Shmelyov, Remizov, Hippius and Teffi...

Emigre writers of an older generation felt an urge to travel around their 'inner' Russia. In all their works written in exile, the reader feels an incessant dialogue with Russia, which is 'absent', yet invisibly 'present'. They were in a constant quest for the lost Russia.

In the very first issue of 'The Latest News',[78] an emigrant newspaper published in Paris, we can find a satirical article by N. Teffi which starts from a joke about a Russian general who goes to 'la place de la Concorde', looks around perplexedly and says, 'This is all great, just great, but... *que faire... que* just *faire?* Everything is great in this wonderful city, but what should we do? How can we live amidst this beauty without money, without any prospects for the future?' This catch phrase, if we can believe Don Aminado (a famous satirist), became a refrain of the emigrants' life. It is caustic and precise, yet it expresses the heart of the dead-end situation into which Russian emigrants were driven; this phrase expresses a helpless and futile attempt to include Russian mentality into an alien context. The funny phrase hides the agony of exile which resulted from the separation from the native land, from home, from the loss of everything so dear. The agony is also a result of being excluded and isolated from the reality. Two more prophetic lines about Russia, also written by Don Aminado, should be mentioned in this connection: 'You were and you will be / But we will no longer be.'

The Russian emigrant milieu in Paris was initially chaotic, unstable, free from the burden of a daily routine. By the late '20s, however, emigrants came through the adaptation period and got over the shock of being torn from their motherland. The majority of them resolved their household problems, they found financial sources to support themselves and to a certain extent managed to settle down. What were their aspirations? To integrate into the French society? No. To return? Where? To the Soviet Russia? No. Russia for them became 'the city of Kitezh'. So it turned out that Russian intellectuals came to venerate France which gave them refuge; they accepted and adopted her customs. While adaptation was all there, there was no assimilation: they essentially remained Russians in their heart of hearts, linked to their native land by numerous invisible ties. All people of creative metier came through the agony of leaving their motherland, they felt deeply nostalgic for a faraway Russia, longed for St. Petersburg and Moscow.

It has to be admitted that being nostalgic can be called a Russian illness of the 20th century. Nostalgia for Russia, the destiny of Russian exiles in Paris, was bitter and open, while nostalgia for Paris in Soviet Russia, the destiny of the repressed, was bitter and hidden (for Falk, Altaian, Sterenberg, Redko, Glushchenko).

Parisian context in the works of the older generation -Bunin, Zaitsev, Kuprin, Remizov and, of course, Teffi – is of great interest in this respect. Here is a quote from 'Galya Gan-skaya', a short story from the 'Dark Alleys' cycle[79] by Ivan Bunin (1940), 'The artist and the former sailor were sitting on the terrace of a cafe in Paris. It was April and the artist was enchanted by how beautiful Paris was in spring and how charming Parisian women were in their early spring outfit.'Another quote from his short story 'In a Familiar Street' (1944): 'On a Paris night I was walking along the boulevard in the twilight of thick greenery lit by the lamps with metallic glimmering... It was amazing that I had had it once, too! Moscow, Presn-ya, solitary streets deep in snow, a small wooden merchant's house and me, a student, some former me whose existence is hard to imagine now.' Walking around Paris, the character recalls Moscow and his youth. Here is a passage from *A House in Passi,* a novel by Zaitsev,[80] 'Elegantly grey Paris whirls ina continuous cycle – in an endless stream of passers-by, in a gliding wave of cars, in the smell of dampness, petrol fume,

[77] *Zaitsev B. K.* O Sebye ['About Myself], 'Vozrozdeniye' ['Revival']. No. 70, P. 24–29 ; Paris, October 1957.

[78] 'Posledniye Novosti' ['The Latest News']. No. 1, Paris, April 27, 1920.

[79] *Bunin 1. A.* Tyomnye Alleyi ['The Dark Alleys'], published by O. Zelyuk, Paris, 1946.

[80] *Zaitsev B.* 'AHouse in Passi, P. 33,213, publ. by Parabola, Berlin, 1935.

ladies' perfume.' To continue, 'A dark August night in Paris. The Eifel Tower stopped flickering long ago. Lights are reflected on pink clouds...' B. Zaitsev in his diary 'The Days' (1939) writes, 'It is in this Paris that we have lived and are living, not at home. Paris is beautiful, much of its beauty and grace belongs to many, all should protect Notre-Dame, the Louvre, and many other things... This is a global city – it cannot be denied. Moscow was ours, though, the Kremlin was ours and similarly was any drayman scratching his head, as well as the graves of the founders of the Russian land in the Kremlin's Cathedral. There is nothing to be done, we are not at home.'[81]

As for the 'younger' generation compared to the 'older' one, it could not help being influenced by modern European culture in Paris where the very air was permeated with it. It certainly enriched their inner world and stimulated the development of 'The Parisian note'. The phrase was coined by Boris Poplavsky. In fact it was not a literary school with a definite programme like symbolism or acmeism. The 'Note' was felt in the air itself, in the atmosphere of the '30s, it was a kind of a true sound, drive for clarity, simplicity, denial of all formal effects and tricks, and at the same time sobriety, even scepticism void of all sorts of deceit, symbolism, metaphysics. A key figure for the poets of 'The Parisian note' was the modern man with his inner state, his attitude to various events and spiritual needs. That was the reason why poems by B. Poplavsky, L. Chervinskaya, B. Zakovich, A. Steiger, I. Chinnov left an impression of something really new, heart-breaking and inimitably personal.

Those new voices undoubtedly echoed Marcel Proust's works. Here a question arises if Ivan Bunin was influenced by the author of the novel *A la recherche du temps perdu* ('In Search of the Lost Time'). The writer denied it, but the fact of the denial itself gives some food for thought. Bun-in's reference to Proust sounding like an apology gives rise to doubt, doesn't it? On the other hand, in modern European literature there were such writers of a new type as James Joyce, the author of the well-known novel *Ulysses*. Yet, a number of less famous writers shadowed by these giants influenced Russian emigre writers to a certain degree, too; especially those belonging to the 'younger' generation which was restlessly looking for new trends. In this context, we should mention Edmond Jaloux, the founder of the 'magic realism' who was known for 'his search of anything that is bizarre, lyric and even fantastic in reality – such elements that make every-day life open to poetic, surreal and even symbolic transformations' ('Nou-velle Litteraire', November 7, 1931). We cannot deny Georges Bernanos' influence, the author *of Journal d'un cure de campagne* ('The Diary of a Village Priest') or Francois Mauriac and his novel *Genitrix* and many others. We will not claim that Russian emigre writers were seriously influenced by these European authors, but they were certainly read. A number of notes made by B. Poplavsky and S. Charchoune in the books by French writers in my library proves the fact. Thus, emigre writers were well aware that they could enrich Russian literature with a French cultural experience.

The younger generation was brought to the limelight when a literary and arts magazine *'Tchisla'* ('Numbers') started to be published (Paris, 1930-1934). It became a mouthpiece of their triumphal self-assertion. The philosopher and essayist Georgy Fedotov called the first issue of the magazine *'Tchisla'* 'a significant event in literature'. According to N. Teffi, *'Tchisla'* became 'a citadel of the young literature'. Besides literature, *'Tchisla* 'focused on arts, sculpture, music, dance, modern trends in Western arts, ballet, paintings by famous French artists. Works by the Russian artists of the 'Parisian school' were published there: M. Chagall, K. Tereshkovich, N. Goncharova, M. Larionov, M. Blum...

'Tchisla' owed its existence first of all to N. Otsup, a representative of St. Petersburg and the 'Guild of Poets', editor, publisher and administrator. The writer Yu. Felzen was the first secretary of the editorial board, then the poet and prose writer E. Bakunin took over the position. Lack of finance resulted in irregular publication of the magazine, originally planned to be published quarterly. *'Tchisla'* united almost all Russian elite and published poems by G. Adamovich, G. Ivanov, B. Poplavsky, B. Bozhnev, I. Odoyevtseva, M. Tsve-tayeva, Yu. Terapino, G. Rayevsky, V. Smolensky, A. Ginger, A. Ladinsky, V. Mamchenko, L. Chervinskaya, B. Zakovich, V. Dryakhlov, Yu. Ivask, I. Chinnov, Yu. Sofiyev, N. Otsup; and prose works by Z. Gippius, M.

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[81] *Zaitsev B.* 'Days', P. 19, publ. by YMCA-Press—Russian Way, Moscow; Paris,1995.

Ageyev, V. Varshavsky, G. Gazdanov, G. Ivanov, B. Poplavsky, Yu. Felzen, S. Charchoune, V. Yanovsky and others.

Actually, the ten issues of 'Tchisla 'looked more like books. The issues were thick, coupled and devoted not only to literature. They featured varied and ample material. In line with the traditions of famous publications of the 'Silver Age', such as 'Apollo' or 'The Golden Fleece', this Parisian emigrant magazine was notable for its graceful design, high quality print and layout, refinement, Al paper. A small number of paginated issues were printed on Dutch paper and even on the imperial Japanese paper! (Which could be unthinkable today!..)

As mentioned above, the publication of the first volume of 'Tchisla'was 'prime time' of the younger generation. Though the formal editor of 'Tchisla 'was Nikolai Otsup, its actual offstage owners were G. Adamovich, G. Ivanov and Z. Gippius -brilliant emigrant St. Petersburg on brilliant Montparnasse. In many respects, the magazine was influenced by anthroposophy supporters (theosophist I. Mantsiarli was its co-editor), but after the fourth volume was published they left the magazine board.

The 1000-copy circulation of 'Tchisla' attracted quite a number of readers. It is natural that disagreements and score settling took place. It is worth remembering G. Adamovich's 'attacks' on M. Tsvetayeva, the 'warefare' between G. Ivanov and V. Xodasevich, and others. Any magazine, though, is intended to publish various viewpoints and principles making its pages a battlefield of opinions! The magazine was expensive and courageous at the same time, so it was able to 'survive' in that difficult situation.

One of the magazine's main objectives was, of course, a dialogue with the West – the dialogue of cultures in order to drag Russians out of emigrant 'ghetto', of the state of loneliness. The leading idea of the publication was the following: we are children of a great country, great culture and should be equal in our dialogue with French and European cultures. In the framework of the dialogue an attempt, perhaps the only one, was made to found a French-Russian literary society.[82] The young poet and journalist V. Vogt and some other representatives of avant-garde French literature were its originators.

Most emigre writers could speak and read French and certainly were greatly influenced by the French literature of that time, especially B. Poplavsky, G. Gazdanov, Yu. Felzen, S. Charchoune, V. Varshavsky, N. Berberova, I. Odoyevtseva, G. Peskov. Even Bunin, Remizov, Zaitsev, Gazdanov, Charchoune used bilingual play of words. Bilingualism was a phenomenon characteristic of the Diaspora. It is nothing more than a play with another country's tongue, which encourages a foreigner who lives abroad to discover new possibilities of his native language and to enrich it with the borrowed one. Thus, that resulted in the blending of both the languages and the realities themselves. As literary critic M. Slonim argued, a foreign language influenced many young emigre writers living in an alien linguistic environment, for instance, the way they structured their phrases, which he observed in the works by V. Sirin, G. Gazdanov, S. Charchoune and others.[83] Yu. Felzen authored the phrase, 'Once a Frenchman said that one cannot write ignoring Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. These days such words ought to be said about Marcel Proust.'[84] Some authors, such as V. Weid-le, G. Adamovich, M. Tsvetayeva, Y. Annenkov, P. Suvchinsky, B. Shletser, G. Lozinsky, A. Levinson, N. Gorodetskaya, Z. Shakhovskaya wrote in French as freely and easily as in Russian, so they were published in Parisian newspapers and prestigious 'thick' magazines.

According to the leading idea of 'Tchisla', representatives of the young generation – writers, poets, and painters – were to look ahead and admire, venerate and learn from modern Western literature and fine arts which were worth it. That was an appeal to learn not only from the French artists as Serge Charchoune, Serge Polyakov, Nicholas de Stael, Kostya Tereshko-vich used to do... They communicated with one another and with Western painters and writers as well, mostly the French ones. It is for the first time that an emigrant magazine invited French artists and critics to contribute – thus the dialogue started. The gap was spanned.

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[82] *Weidle V.* 'French-Russian Meetings'. Russian Literary Almanac', Paris, 1981. P. 397–400.
[83] *Slonim M.* Notes on Emigrant Literature. Volya Rossiyi, vol. XII, Prague, 1931.
[84] *Felzen Y.* Scattered Thoughts // Almanac 'Krug', Vol. 2, p.129, Berlin–Paris, 1937.

French critics who published their articles on modern Western art said that the founders and editorial staff of *'Tchisla '*were the 'lost children' of the Russian art who were looking for points of contact with their Western colleagues.

Russian representatives of the 'Parisian school' arrived in Western countries as established artists and became famous abroad partially thanks to *'Tchisla'.* They are Serge Charchoune, Marc Chagall, Nicholas de Stael, considered in the West by many to be one of the best painters of the twentieth century; Leopold Survage (Stürzwage), a Russified Finn. It is appropriate to mention here Serge Polyakov, who was playing the guitar in the Romany cabaret and was painting his lambent pictures, too; and the remarkable painter, earl Andrey Lanskoy, Mikhail Andreyenko, Konstantin Tereshkovich, Natalia Gon-charova, Mikhail Larionov, Vassily Kandinsky, Charm Soutine, Ossip Zadkine, Alexander Archipenko, Hanna Orlova, Ivan Puni (Jean Pougny) and others. Over ten top artists in Western painting are of the Russian origin. All these great Frenchmen were Russian, remained Russian, thought in Russian, they met and enjoyed themselves in the 'Café du Dôme', 'Le Rotonde', 'La Coupole', 'Le Select', 'La Closerie des Lilas' on Montpar-nasse and were friends.

These masters should be thankful to *'Tchisla'* not only because they had a chance to publish beautiful reproductions of their works, write articles about their creative work, but because the magazine helped organize their exhibitions. I will name only a few whose works were published and who were written about in *'Tchisla'*: Mikhail Larionov, Natalia Gon-charova, Marc Chagall, Chai'm Soutine, Ossip Zadkine, are Serge Charchoune, Andrey Lanskoy, Konstantin Tereshkovich, Leo Zak, Philippe Gosiasson, Abraham Mintchine, Boris Poplavsky, Robert Pikelny, Alexander Yakovlev...

Almost all artists of 'The Art World' of the first (A. Benois, K. Somov, L. Bakst, K. Korovin, M. Dobuzhinsky, I. Bilibin, D. Stelletsky, N. Roerich, N. Kalmakov, S. Chekhonin, N. Goncharova) and second generations (B. Grigoryev, A. Yakovlev, V. Shukhayev, Yu. Annenkov, D. Bushen) found themselves in Paris. Due to the glorious pre-war 'Russian Seasons' and thanks to their mastery, experience, refined taste, inventive talent, understanding of the style of the age and skilful stage design and costumes they deservedly took their position in theatrical and musical Paris. Besides those from 'The Art World', such stage designers worked there as of P. Chelishchev, A. Shervashidze, S. Sudeikin, R. Erte (Tyrtov), L. Zak, E. Berman, Ph. Gosiasson, B. Bilinsky, N. Isayev, V. Zhedrinsky, G. Shiltyan, A. Zinovyev, S. Lissim, M. Andreyenko, G. Pozhedayev, N. Millioti...

Dozens of Russian emigre painters were engaged not only in stage design but also in book design and were illustrating Russian and French books and book covers. They contributed to the most well-known French publishing houses. Moscow bibliophile Mikhail Seslavinsky has recently published an excellent monograph[85] devoted to Russian painters who illustrated books in the first half of the 20th century, a worthy monument of brilliant skill of these masters.

Paris turned out to be not only a place of exodus for the Russian emigre artists but also an arena of their world fame. When young, they craved for Paris and came to love it as their dream that had come true. It was not Paris alone, though, that attracted them. One of numerous examples of it is the exhibition 'Russian painters in Brittany' opened in the city of Kemper in 2006, which displayed paintings by Yu. Annenkov, A. Benois, B. Grigoryev, K. Kuznetsov, Z. Serebryakova and others.[86] An exhibition 'Russian painters in Provence' might have been organized then as well. The timing was perfect for the topical exhibition 'Parizhachi' devoted to Paris depicted by such Russian painters of the first half of the 20th century as A. Benois, M. Dobuzhinsky, K. Somov, K. Korovin, Yu. Annenkov, I. Puni, G. Lukomsky, A. Lanskoy, S. Charchoune, M. Andreyenko, L. Zak, Y. Cherkesov, S. Ivanov, A. Serebryakov... That exhibition became a real revelation for the many.

The language of art is known to require no translation. That was the reason why emigre artists were more fortunate than writers to establish creative links, though to tell the truth, not without some efforts on their part. They managed to integrate into the life of Western arts and what is

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[85] *Seslavinsky M.* Rendezvous. M., 2009.
[86] 'Peintres Russes en Bretagne', ed. Palantines, Musee departemental breton – Quimper, 2006.

more to develop new trends in fine arts. Suffice it to mention V. Kandinsky, O. Zadkine, N. de Stael, S. Delaunay, L. Survage. The fact was certainly promoted by their arrival in Paris long before the revolution and World War I, which helped them fit the art pattern of pre-war Paris.

Paris art life is unimaginable without Russian painters and writers who won their way and achieved victorious success. Had there been no emigration, there would have been neither Bunin, nor Tsvetayeva, nor Shmelyov, nor Zaitsev, nor Remizov, nor G. Ivanov, nor Xodasevich, nor Adamovich, nor Nabokov, nor Gazdanov, nor Poplavsky, nor Berdyaev, nor Bulgakov, nor Karsavin, nor Lossky, nor Kandinsky, nor Chagall, nor Lanskoy, nor de Stael, nor Charchoune, nor Polyakov... The list can be endless.

Triumphant comeback of great expats' cultural inheritance to Russia that started in the late '80s of the 20th century was natural, yet striking in its scale. Decades of oblivion and disregard are behind, and now books are being published, paintings displayed, articles, papers, monographs written, theses defended, international conferences held. Who could have thought of such a glorious victory under a totalitarian regime!

Poet and critic Yuri Ivask once wrote, 'Emigration is always a tragedy. Outcasts are doomed to long and grieve for their motherland. Emigration is not always a failure, however; creative work, creative success is possible in the alien land, too."[87] This tragic page of the Russian history of the 20th century was destined to become a great success of its victims and eventually of the whole Russian culture. The most telling evidence of it is the worldwide recognition of the Russian elite, national pride of both France and Russia. Their entire life and creative work proved that they had made a difficult but the right choice at that time.

A. A. Guseynov[88]

HOW IS THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY OF PEOPLE POSSIBLE?

1. The process of globalization revealed a fundamental controversy that yields to no satisfactory solution so far. It is that successfully growing transformation of the mankind into an integrated whole in terms of finance, economy and technology goes alongside with accelerated and deepening expansion of its divergence in terms of morals and culture. Progress of production potential of people has reached a planetary level and made it possible to manage natural foundations of human existence. At the same time, due to some devilish dialectics, it brought about growing isolation of cultures, outburst of ethnic and national identities and conflicts, a quest for 'roots', for medieval and even pagan traditions.

2. This historical paradox is commonly accounted for by the fact that isolation of cultures is a natural defensive reaction to a particular form of globalization, which in fact is Western hegemony imposing its values. A cogent example and evidence of this kind of response is believed to be the revolution directed against the Shah in Iran and headed by Ayatollah Khomeini. Interpretation like that, though, is too obvious to be correct. First, Western countries (Great Britain, Belgium and others) witness processes of cultural and uppermost ethnical and

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[87] *Ivask Yu.* In the West: An Anthology of Russian Poetry Abroad, P. 5, Publ. house after Chekhov. New York, 1953.

[88] Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for Philosophy (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Head of Chair of Ethics at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), professor, doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Author of more than 400 publications including: *Sotsialnaya priroda nravstvennosti* [Social Nature of Morality], *Zolotoye pravilo nravstvennosti* [The golden Rule of Ethics], *Velikiye moralisty* [The Great Moralists], *Yazyk i sovest'* [Language and Conscience], *Filosofiya, moral', politika* [Philosophy, Ethics, Politics], *Antichnaya etika* [the Ethics of Antiquity]. Managing editor of the yearly *Eticheskaya mysl* [Ethical Thought], editor of a series 'Biblioteka eticheskoy mysli' [The Library of Ethical Thought], editor of *Social Sciences* journal (the English edition), member of the editorial board of journals: *Filosof-skiye nauki* [Philosophical Sciences], *Voprosy filosofiyi* [Issues of Philosophy], Vice-President of the Russian Philosophical Society. Laureate of Russia's State Award in the field of science and technology.

national anarchism. Second, there are some of non-Western countries that have joined global financial, economic and technological network and at the same time retained their spiritual and cultural identity (the most conspicuous and typical example of them being Japan). Third, economic and technological achievements of the Western countries are closely connected with a certain system of values. Access to them inevitably leads and cannot but lead to simultaneous adoption of some elements of Western culture, such as targeting at success, efficient orderliness of business behaviour, legally secured contractual obligations. That is the reason why the developing countries whose aim is to overcome their economic and technological backwardness should not adhere to the hostile position toward Western culture and ways of life.

3. On the one hand, in order to prevent transformation of globalization into Westernization and, on the other hand, to exclude open obstruction of globalization on the part of cultural isolation, the concept of the dialogue of cultures (or civilizations) is proposed. There is no doubt that dialogue is the most productive form of relationship between different cultures. It can better ensure their mutual respect and mutual enrichment. The dialogue, however, does not eliminate the differences between cultures. It even makes them more distinct. An indispensable condition for the dialogue of cultures, whatever cultures they might be, is the existence of their commonly shared space. But this is only one of the conditions.

Another condition is that the cultures entering the dialogue are not reduced to each other. Each of them is equal to itself. Dialogue of cultures is not an argument out of which one mutual truth is to be born. One of its indubitable functions and effects is that its parties get to realize and grip their distinctions from one another. On the whole, modern man strives for individualism: he is more likely to appreciate what differs him from other people than what unites with them. Dialogue of cultures, in particular the dialogue of ethnic and religious cultures, does not necessarily lead to their further differentiation. Nor does it lead to their fusion, synthesis; nor can it lead to them forming a global culture.

4. One may think that the global culture in its logical pursuit to dominate the world is possible as more or less forcible imposing of one system of cultural values, say, Western ones, on the entire mankind. But that would contradict the idea of dominance itself, as its legitimacy implies that those who dominate are aware of their supremacy over the dominated, and so maintain and develop their distinction from the latter.

5. In a word, culture, as well as a nation and a state, is a kind of a phenomenon that cannot exist solely. Global community of people, if possible at all, may only exist as super-cultural and cross-cultural community. It transcends cultures with their civilizational, religious, and national manifestation. Speaking in terms of culture studies, it can be said that the global community of people or, more precisely, a universal framework which unites humanity as a whole, is possible as super-culture.

6. Why then a global super-culture, and not a global culture? To answer the question, we should clearly define the subject we are talking about. This subject is the prospects of a cross-cultural process, or specifically, the question whether these prospects will bring to such a unity of people and nations in which they will identify themselves as representatives of the entire mankind and will harmonize their relations resting upon the acknowledgement of the fact. The most important thing is to answer the question: How will that hypothetical global community relate to the currently existing cultural diversity; will it be the culture of the same type and quality, since culture has been commonly viewed as the basis for uniting people within local communities (nations, denominations, etc.) and is there any risk that it might dissolve their historically developed diversity? The term 'global culture' correctly embraces the possibility to bring the humanity closer to the practical comprehension of its common genetic essence, but at the same time it produces an illusion that this could happen in the form of transition from a diverse number of civilizational, religious and national cultures to a singular culture. The term 'global super-culture' is preferable as it both retains the idea of globalization and emphasizes that global practical moral unity of the mankind develops beyond the existing cultures without overriding them or obliterating their differences.

While designing a nature of relations between the global culture and local ones it is appropriate to refer to the following analogy. At the dawn of human history men grouped by blood and

kindred. In the course of time, the mankind moved to a different principle of organization of communal life, namely by state and territory, so social connections instead of familial ties became fundamental for uniting people into the collective organisms, and nations instead of tribal clans became generic units of the society. Neither familial ties, however, as a way to group individuals in basic units, nor family as such a unit have disappeared because the spiritual outlook and social practices are far beyond blood and kinship boundaries. Up to this day family values remain basic and most important in the system of human preferences. People have learned to combine and connect diversity of family existence and unity of the national existence. Moreover, the latter is impossible without the former. By analogy, it is possible to assume that global super-culture will not be unification of national and other local cultures, but a new and qualitatively different superstructure over them.

7. I will make an attempt to outline the global super-culture in its relation to behaviour, social morals, i.e. as a global super-ethnos.

The global community is not only a somewhat remote prospect. It is being formed today; actually it already exists in an embryonic state. It does exist in the form of powerful transnational corporations with their decisive role in the sphere of finance and economy; of overall information systems; of a great number of various international humanitarian agencies, political organizations, etc. What is called the process of globalization is the real advancement towards the global community: it involves hundreds of millions of people. The process of globalization^nfiuences all aspects of life. It is not limited to its material aspect (finance, economy, technology and others), but it affects mental sphere as well, the area of people's relations. It is not only about the ideology of globalization, as for example, propaganda of human rights concept. The fact is, that universal technologies themselves comprise certain logic of behaviour of individuals and relations between people drawn into them. They objectively set and formulate a universal (global) patterns of behaviour which could be called an ethos of a globally arranged society.

Those who make and maintain modern airplanes, pipelines, who work in banks, build skyscrapers, and so on behave in their business environment generally in the same way, regardless of their nationality, confession, or culture. In such conditions patterns of behaviour are set by the business itself, it is objective, does not depend on an individual's inner world, their emotional state or personal qualities. Of course, culturally conditioned psychological and moral differences between individuals matter with regard to their readiness to be engaged in modern high-tech industries, and delicately organized activities which demand strict performance. As long as they are engaged in them, their behaviour remains the same. It is determined by their ability to control their actions and conform them to external objective schemes of activities. Such an ability, one may think, is one of the components of a global ethos which is developed together with, beyond and through national, religious and other kinds of human ethos.

8. As said above, the dialogue of cultures does not lead out of cultures, nor eliminates differences between them. At the same time, it is in the process of the cultural dialogue that super-culture as a prototype of a global community of people in embryo is formed. The dialogue of cultures cannot be viewed as a mere convergence, encounter, and interaction of various cultures. Uppermost, it represents the process of their interaction itself, something that makes such an interaction possible – a special humanitarian space between the cultures, being their continuation and at the same time not belonging to any of them, being in a certain sense a neutral 'territory' in its relation to each one.

In a general sense, any interaction of people belonging to different cultures could be regarded as such a space. An example of it could be marriages between people of different denominations, ethnicities, especially those in which spouses and their children retain and cultivate confessional and linguistic differences; as well as sojourn in another culture (studying at a foreign university, immigration to another country, etc.) From the point of view of the cross-cultural dialogue, however, such cases are not specific – people of different denominations do not necessarily get married, universities can do without foreign students, as well as nations without immigrants. In other words, notions of marriage, university and state do not presuppose multi-cultural background of those who form these types of communities. Practical interaction between people of various cultures can certainly have a form of a dialogue in these types, too, but not necessarily;

they can acquire a conflicting character as well, but more often they do develop towards assimilation and change of cultural identity.

Communication grounds where people of different cultures meet and which are meant for people of different cultures, can only exist in the form of their arranged interaction, and such grounds are quite telling for understanding the specific character of the dialogue of cultures. International airports, supermarkets, international teams for various international projects, international travel agencies and alike are examples of such grounds. The way people exist (behave, communicate) on such arenas (as opposed to the way they appear in monocultur-al environment) deserves a special culture-philosophic study. A careful observer, though, can immediately see a number of characteristic features at a glance.

The first thing that strikes one is that people regardless of their ethnic, confessional or other cultural identity feel confident and behave as fully aware of the legitimacy of their belonging there.

Furthermore, people do not tend to demonstrate their cultural peculiarity on such grounds, do not emphasize it and generally ignore that aspect of a personality. For instance, passengers do not feel discriminated in international airports in spite of the fact that they have to address the airport staff in English or an English-like language instead of their native tongue. The rationality of people's conduct relevant in a certain situation means that they keep their cultural identity, their gods and their customs to themselves. The way they speak and act is guided by a definite goal they have pursued to get here and they have chosen corresponding means carefully selected for that.

Finally, one more peculiarity of people's communication on international grounds is that it is characterized by high and even accentuated degree of politeness and urbanity. Here people behave differently as compared to how they do in their own (native) cultural environment, more alert, more uptight, with a certain amount of interest to each other, but trying to keep at a distance and be markedly deferential.

Thus, people's behaviour in the forms that may be viewed as an embryonic stage of a global ethos (super-ethos) differing from their behaviour within their local (national, confessional and other) communities is characterized by the fact that it is objectivised to a highest extent (it is ^particularly assigned to external, visible, meaningful and controlled schemes of activities) and rationally arranged. It eliminates individual, emotional, and religious background, anything that goes back to traditions and established habits. An individual reveals himself, first of all, as a subject of goal-oriented and rational activity, in Max Weber's terms. If we stick to Mikhail Bakhtin's categorial paradigm, we may say that an individual is one in his behaviour (representing a specimen of a universal species of *homo sapiens),* but not alone, and in this sense one can really speak of a standardized behaviour. The prospects would be frightening if global super-ethos overruled national, religious and other kinds of ethos which make the picture of social mores and interpersonal relations so diverse. Unification as a superstructure over the variety of ethoses, as a common ' shelter' safeguarding from possible collisions due to culturally different types of behaviour can be regarded as common good.

G. A. Hajiyev[89]

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[89] Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, *LL.D.,* professor, *Lawyer Emeritus* of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 160 scholarly publications, including books: *PredprinimateV – nalogoplatelsh-chik – gosudarstvo: pravovyye pozitsiyi Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi* [Entrepreneur – Taxpayer – State: Legal Views of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation], *Konsitutsionnyye printsypy rynochnoy eko-nomiki: razvitiye osnov grazhdanskogo prava v resheniyah Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi* [Constitutional Principles of Market Economy: Development of Bases of Civil Law in Verdicts of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation], *Kommentariy kpostanovlieniyam Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi* [Commentary to Resolutions made by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation], *Konslitutsionnaya ekonomika* [Constitutional Economics] and others. Mr Hajiyev is a member of Civil Legislation Improvement

SILKEN FETTERS: JUDGEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERCOURSE OF LEGAL CULTURES IN EUROPE

1. Academician A. A. Guseynov in his speech on 'Tolerance and the Dialogue of Cultures' at the 9th International Likha-chov Conference of 2009 touched upon the degree to which tolerance, that stimulates the pluralism of the world outlook, correlates with the concept of human rights, that is claimed to be a universally transnational and cross-culturally humanitarian project. He argues that there is a certain tension, even a contradiction, when human rights are understood as a dogmatic set of values of the exclusively Western origin. In reality, they are nowhere to be found in such a 'stripped' state, not even in the West. And, according to Guseynov, this fact can only mean that understanding and consummation of human rights is different in every culture, country or epoch. Human rights *per se* can be found in philosophical treatises and declarations. What we witness in the reality is the attempts to realize the concept.

2. Europe speaks more than fifty languages. Each country has its own legal system. At first sight, it doesn't seem to be an insuperable hindrance for an intercourse of different legal cultures. But the first stumbling block is the translation of legal terms. Translated equivalents of legal terms might not always be valid, because sometimes the verbal content fails to express the variety of ideas embodied in them. Both the Russian Constitution and the Basic Law of the FRG declare a welfare social state. However, the 'welfare social state' concept is dramatically different in Russia, with its socialist past, and in Germany, that never came in touch with socialism. That is why constitutional law experts keep saying that words in the constitutional texts, though being a constituent part of the real text, present a certain mystery; and like parables in sacred books, they have their mystic quality. Such terms only seem to be invariable, and in such a context, being a part of a constitution, metaphysical. In fact, in the society (among the lawyers for the first place) there grow assumptions, ideas or even detailed doctrines and concepts about the meaning of such legal terms as, for example, the legal state, economic freedom or human dignity. According to academician Guseynov's apt remark, such assumptions are dramatically diverse in different countries and legal cultures.

Notions of the constitutional terms tend to change as their official interpretation takes place. This provides necessary conditions for the dialectical progress of Constitution with its pseudo-metaphysical surface. Notions of constitutional principles are quite flexible. However, these principles are not as fickle and changeable as a weathercock. As a psychiatrist would say, there are fixed ideas in law. One of these is that law should be the stability factor through the principle of legal certainty. That is why the stable notions for constitutional terms should be provided through verification of their valid nature.

3. Thus, various legal terms may show a diverse interpretation for justice, reason, permission etc. Legal terms *per se* do not eliminate duties or prohibitions. Usually, their notions are shaped by the so called legal culture.

Patrick Glenn in his *Legal Traditions of the World: A Sustainable Diversity of Law* analyzes seven different concepts of the tradition – the Thomistic, Talmudic, Islamic, Common law, Continental law, Hindu and Asian legal traditions.

Europe has acquired a melting pot – the European Court of Human Rights – where different concepts of the tradition fuse together. Forty six European countries that ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms have to follow European values sustained by the Statute of the Council of Europe. And resolutions of the European Court of Human Rights are amazing 'silken fetters' that guarantee partnership of diverse legal cultures.

Meanwhile, the European Court of Human Rights has to face clashes of legal traditions. Cultural differences between the countries lead to different understanding of boundaries of the human freedom. Such differences may not necessarily clash with the European values. But sometimes a certain ironing is needed, and this may result in some really distressing social response. The diversity in legal traditions within Europe has not only triggered a variety of interpretations for the same legal norms, but also influenced the values of the Europeans who live

Council under President of the Russian Federation. Chair of editorial board of the 'Comparative Constitutional Review' journal.

in Lisbon, Paris or Vladivostok. The fundamental issues that stipulate an established way of life (the role of the family and religion within the society, freedom of expression, etc.) are profoundly different. The hijab stories or caricatures of the prophets serve as a visual proof of that.

4. The last thing to explain is why the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are 'silken fetters'. The matter of fact is that the Court has established a highly flexible and pragmatic 'discretion' doctrine. The doctrine protects a country's national features, a broad discretion of a national legislator and also historic factors and lifestyle peculiarities. The 'discretion of national legislator' doctrine makes it possible to find a compromise between the European values that come from the common judicial melting pot and the value judgements of a particular country.

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M. M. Joshi[90]
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**DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS:
THE MAKING OF GLOBAL CULTURE**
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"Globalization" is an attractive word; for it evokes in us a noble sentiment of "one earth" and of humankind as one race born of one common "Mother Earth". It raises in us a dream of ideal of human unity and universal fraternity. But when we closely examine the current phenomenon of globalization we find that the globality is the globality of market forces with cut throat competition, of increasing disparities both among nations and within the nations and of the hegemony of dominant and rich nations. There is no manifestation of global consciousness in which unity and oneness predominate. The widespread terrorism and religious fundamentalism pose serious challenges to the very existence of the cultural diversities. The market forces, instead of harmonizing the conflicts, further deepen the schisms and propagate the cult of violence as opposed to the culture of dialogue, reason and thought.

In some of my earlier lectures I have argued that the world cannot be called as truly globalized if it is global in terms of trade and commerce, science and technology while the cultures and civilizations are in perpetual conflict. For a truly global world trade acd commerce, science and technology, cultures and civilizations and environment should remain in harmony. I take this opportunity to reiterate it. If mankind has to survive then the idea that there is an inherent and perpetual clash of civilizations, which is central to the responses of nations and communities in dealing with each other, must be rejected. A world order based on "clash of civilizations" will never allow the resolution of conflicts. For enduring world peace and harmony we need a new paradigm and a new world order based on a free and frank dialogue among civilizations conducive for the making of a global culture.

Globalization, as we all know, has economic roots and socio-political consequences, but it also affects the culture. While globalization tends to bind the economies, people and communities generally tend to maintain their distinct cultural identities. Thus there arises a conflict between economic integration and cultural separatism. For creating a global culture we must discuss the interaction between globalization and culture and its consequences. Also whether or not under the present state and direction of globalization it is possible to have a global culture in its real sense.

First, about globalization. In the early 1990s globalization was greeted by many countries – both developed and developing. It was widely circulated and also expected that globalization will very soon bring prosperity to all. But by December 1999, a major protest took place in Seattle. This was a surprise and shock to the advocates of free and open markets. Then followed protests in Europe, United States and also in several developing countries. These protesting groups rejected the argument that, ultimately globalization would make everybody economically better off. Joseph Stiglitz in his seminal work 'Globalization And Its Discontents' has given a detailed account of what globalization has done to the developing countries. He writes, "Globalization

today is not working. It is not working for many of the world's poor. It is not working for much of the environment. It is not working for the stability of the global economy".

The World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization (2001) established by International Labour Organization says, "The current process of globalization in generating unbalanced outcomes, both between and among countries. In Africa the percentage of the population living in abject poverty has gone up from 42 percent to 47 percent. Recently the Latin America and Russia have also voiced their disappointment about globalization. Markets were opened but globalization did not deliver especially to the poor."

James D. Wolfensohn, as president of the World Bank Group in his speech to the Board of Governors in September 2003, lamented that the world was out of balance. For this the fundamental forces shaping the world and causing this imbalance must be addressed. Wolfensohn further argued that in this world of six billion people one billion own 80 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) while another billion struggle to survive on less than a dollar a day. This is a world out of balance.

What are the implications of this imbalance? There may be growth but a very large number of people are denied any benefit of growth. They may be worse off. Trickle-down economics, which promises that with growth benefits will percolate down, has been shown to be wrong. According to the World Commission on the social dimensions of Globalization fifty-nine percent of the world's people were living in countries with growing inequality. Even in most of the developed countries the rich were getting richer while the poor were often not even holding their own.

The one billion richest of the world's population live in several countries, some of them live in the developing world as well. This one billion shares similar attitudes, visions and life values. In a sense globalization tends to produce two cultures, one of the 'haves' and the other of the 'havenots'. The impact of globalization on culture gives rise to several other issues. Some of them are as under:

- Increasing poverty of billions of people denies them the opportunities for making any meaningful contribution to the march of civilization and cultural advancement.

- Globalization has serious political consequences. Market forces are inimical to democracy. The huge expenses required for funding the elections, the rising influence of criminal economy, the compromise by political leaders with corruption are all indications of market dominating the democratic process. This will ultimately lead to the establishment of market dictatorship. As Jacques Attali has discussed a lumpen market without any institutional deterrent will replace democracy.

- Economic system pressed upon the developing countries in the process of globalization has in many cases resulted in grave injuries to their economy and even culture. It, in many cases, has largely been responsible for the Americanization of their culture, economy, life values and other Socio-political institutions. Globalization thus threatens the cultural pluralism and tends to impose value systems purely determined by market forces.

- Globalization leads to migration and in many cases has resulted in producing cultural faultlines between host country and the migrants.

Now about culture. What is culture? Culture can be defined as the total pattern of behaviour of a society reflected in speech, action, value system, practices, and the way it defines its relationship among its members, environment and other societies. Culture and the world view of a society are deeply interrelated and constantly interact. In defining the world view religion and philosophy plays a prominent role. And civilization ordinarily means the state of civic society, how it is organized, governed, educated and how does it infuse knowledge in all aspects of life. It is an evolved state of society engaged in continuous improvement of the quality of human life. It is culture which provides the value system to the society and thus shapes the intersoci-etal relationships. Culture and religion thus play a major role in shaping the human behaviour and progress of a society.

Culture is a dynamic entity. It evolves and continuously interacts with all aspects of life. Culture has been and is even now used to maintain cohesion and ensure an orderly march of civilization to seek even higher goals. Goals material, intellectual and spiritual. But sadly enough,

history is replete with incidents where politicians, religious leaders and intellectuals on various occasions have used culture and religion to justify barbarism and warfare. Cultural conflicts sometimes erupt in to prolonged wars. There are many examples where ethnic animosities alongwith religious differences have created warlike situations. In such cases democracy and development both receive serious setbacks. Cultures evolve and their impact on contemporary societies play an important role in shaping their politics and economy. For example, Islamic culture explains why democracy could not take root in several Islamic countries while in India democratic politics has been enshrined in its Constitution and is working successfully.

There is yet another category of conflicts in which culture indirectly plays a defining role. The Cold War was itself a conflict, though not purely cultural, but had cultural overtones.

It was portrayed as a conflict between the "communist culture" and the "capitalist culture". Over the ages mankind has witnessed examples where the so-called "superior cultures" have tried to eliminate what they considered as "inferior cultures".

It was argued by many scholars that the post Cold-War era would witness a new techno-economic world order where major conflicts whether political, cultural or ideological will be eliminated in the international political arena. It was also argued that in a unipolar world the competing powers would be transformed in to cooperative partners. Sadly, it did not happen. The growing international trade and communication did not resolve the conflicts and tensions rather heightened them. Globalization has unwittingly, though, has generated the tyranny of terrorism.

While discussing the role of several countries to cultural globalization K. Syamalamma and P. Krishnamohan Reddy in World Affairs, Winter 2009, www.worldaffairsjournal.com argue that central to many sociological interpretations of globalization is the notion of culture. It means that globalization means the development of something like a "global culture". In its earlier shape globalization was the result of the colonization of the large parts of the world by Western powers. The expansion of colonialism brought about the economic and technological unification of large parts of the globe. This was the beginning of establishing of a global society mostly influenced by the European ideas. The cultural impact was felt in the change of life styles, language, mannerisms, use of various domestic appliances and technologies. However, this change was slow and was confined to a small section of the population. But now, with a rapidly advancing communication and information technologies, the fast growing commercial and social intercourse brings a much faster change in various aspects of social and cultural lives of a much large number the people. Some of the sociologists perceive that in the process a "global consciousness" is emerging. This does not mean a uniform centralized and homogeneous culture worldwide which in any case is not sustainable. A global consciousness should lead to a situation where different societies share their cultural experiences, enrich each other and may serve as a cultural mosaic, and become a symbol of 'unity in diversity', K. Syamalamma and P. Krishnamohan Reddy (ibid) further argue that "Cultural globalization should be seen as the continual development of multiple modernities on a global scale. Transculturalisation should develop so that different cultures can be true to their own indigenous strengths and not be swept in to a similar pattern of only one type of transformation."

Many people associate democracy, pluralism and tolerance with so-called Western cultures. But just two and one-half centuries ago democratic ideas pertained to only a small group of philosophers and had no influence on real state policy in feudal and monarchical Europe. The well-known political scientist and economist Amartya Sen, in his article 'Democracy as a Universal Value' (February 1999), has described the laws of Indian Emperor Ashoka written in the third century B.C. Those laws depict the Emperor as the supporter of tolerance, pluralism and protection of minority rights. This is one of the hall marks of the Indie civilization and culture.

Transculturalisation can only take shape through the partnership of civilizations and dialogue among cultures. But this can only happen when we recognize culture as the very foundation of civilizations and also accept that the global cultural diversity as a prerequisite for establishing a dialogue among cultures. We have also to understand that the cultural diversity which we observe today has been the result of the interaction between different civilizations brought about by the migrations taking place over the millennia. As Alphonso Lingis from Pennsylvania state University has argued that "Mohen-do-daro, Memphis and Thebes, Mahabalipuram, Angkor,

Djenne Djeno in the Sahel, Teotihuacan, Cuzco – all the centres of great cultures had been cosmopolitan cities, with markets full of foreign merchants, but also with whole quarters of settled foreigners. What we have come to know as distinctive and dominant civilizations – Egyptian, Persian, Chinese, Roman and Mongolian – were the result of drawing toward themselves resources, artifacts, inventions and concepts from the most diverse ethnic areas and culture. Anyone visiting Angkor Wat is struck to see altars on which Hindu deities dance around altars with seated Buddhas; friezes depicting everyday life so obviously carved by sculptors who had come from or gone to Borobudur." It may be further recognized that the Brahminic priests and court rituals were imported into the court at Sukhothai and especially Ayutthaya in fifteenth century Siam, without bringing in the caste system to that Buddhist kingdom. Hindu priests and court ritual were imported into Bali in the fourteenth century, without bringing in reincarnation across species. This was always through a dialogue of cultures and not through war. The Indie civilization thus serves as an example where the cooperative partnership of civilizations resulted in assimilating and evolving a cultural pattern shared and experienced by different civilizations spread over a vast land mass.

Indian experience of peaceful co-existence of different religions over the millennia is rooted in the basic concept that diversity is inherent in the scheme of creation. It may be recognized that in modern physics according to a theorem propounded by J.S. Bell, the Universe is a stupendous hologram where each part is interconnected with the rest of the Universe in an intimate an immediate way. A hologram is one where whole of a picture is reflected in each part of the picture. Arguing further David Bohm, one of the most profound philosophical minds involved in the interpretation of scientific theories, says that separate parts of the Universe are not separate parts, the parts are to be seen in immediate connection in which their dynamical relationship depends upon the whole system. Thus one is led to new notion of unbroken wholeness. This world view gives rise to the new notion of the wholeness of not only the human society but also of humankind and nature, environment and the Cosmos. In this view Fragmentation of cities, religions, nations political systems, conflicts, violence, wars, fratricide etc. are not the reality. They are the results of a fragmentary approach and are the creations of a mind not rooted in wholeness. In other words life and its problems can not be understood and solved in parts, one has to take them and find solutions in totality.

The ancient Indian wisdom has contemplated that diversity is the manifestation of the same cosmic entity in different forms. The Hindu view of life seeks unity and diversity and believes in an inclusive approach. This can be one of the starting points of the dialogue among cultures.

Globalization today emphasizes on "world as one market" but this concept is divisive, exclusivist, fragmentary and has not solved any of the conflicts, rather heightened them. The better alternative, as envisaged by the ancient Indian sages, would be 'world as a family'. This is inclusive, holistic and tends to reduce the conflicts. This view may be another point on which the dialogue can be founded.

Another feature of the Indie civilizational values has been to recognize that 'Truth or reality is one but the wise men describe it in different ways'. This is central for any dialogue aimed at resolving the conflicts. Such a view means that one should listen to the other point of view and try to understand the merit behind it. This is a democratic and secular approach arising out of the holistic world view.

In my view, if the dialogue is based on these three basic tenets of holistic thinking, then it can lead towards establishing a peaceful, non-violent and non-exploitative world order, harmonizing the best traditions of national cultures, assimilating the experiences of different civilizations, preserving the environment and above all assuring a system where the dignity of the individual is respected.

I. T. Kasavin[91]

CIVILIZATIONAL VALUES: IN SEARCH OF THE RATIONAL CHOICE AREA

Modern technological civilization needs an adequate solution to a great number of global problems of ecology, demography, poverty, terrorism and others. According to V.S. Styopin, there are two possible scenarios in search of the solution. The first is based on the dominant values of the modernity, or the priorities: the priority of technological progress over ecology, scientific rationality over tradition, personality over society, formal law over personality, maximization of production and consumption over resources, and alike. Such a solution is bound to lead to an even greater aggravation of the problems of anthropogenic civilization and, in the end, to the disaster.

The second scenario implies a dramatic change of value priorities. It is necessary to analyze its conditions, variants and possible consequences, which in general can serve as a prerequisite for a comparison of the two types of value discourse in science, on the one hand, and in theology, on the other hand. In my speech I will dwell upon the conditions for such a comparison and the interactions of these types of discourse.

Can we imagine some sort of an independent environment where elements of cultures can be selected for the construction of new culture systems? Is there anywhere such an intercultur-al environment similar to the neutral language of observation, which was the subject of thought for the Vienna Circle *[Wiener Kreis]* and which could be used for a comparison of different cultures and a rational cultural choice? In reality, one can only think about two places where cultural meanings play a real and active role: they are one's own culture and a foreign culture's environment. Their difference is evident: we live in the former, while the latter is just a conceptual and emotional construction. The culture we belong to makes our knowledge culturally dependent and thereby inadequate. According to A. Schütz[92], objective and scientific approach is only possible in the study of a foreign culture. A stranger is regarded as the only personality who is able to analyze and adequately understand any cultural system.

If we intend to make a conscious and rational attempt in the direction of cultural synthesis, we have to go out beyond the scope of all local cultural commitments and act as though we were absolutely neutral to any norms, ideals and values. However, this is absolutely impossible as such a strategy instantly demonstrates its certain cultural load, i.e. adherence to the ideals of scientific objectivity borrowed from the *Weltanschauung* paradigm of classical science.

At the same time, our understanding of our own culture is no less the type of a construction than an image of a foreign culture. The image of our own culture is heavily loaded with spontaneous life impressions which are usually utterly local and are nothing more than mere fragments of a given culture. At the same time, very few cultures in the modern globalizing world act as totally alien to each another. As the famous German proverb goes, 'We are all strangers, almost everywhere'. We perceive different cultures through the mass media, travelling, personal communication; we live almost everywhere.

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[91] A corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Head of the section of social epistemology of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, editor-in-chief of the 'Epistemology and Philosophy of Science' scientific journal.

Author of more than 290 scholarly papers including the following books: *Epistemology Captured by Anarchy* (Teoriya poznaniya v plenu anarkhiyi, 1987), *Rationality in Perception and Practice* (RatsionaTnost' v poznaniyi i praktike, 1989, with co-authors), *Perception in the World of Tradition* (Poznaniye v mire traditsiyi, 1990), *Ansatze zu der sozialen Erkenntnistheorie,* 1997, *Migration. Creativity. Text: Challenges of Non-Classical Epistemology* (Migratsiya. Kreativnost'. Tekst. Problemy neklassicheskoy teoriyi poznaniya, 2000), *Analysis of Everyday Life* (Analiz povsednevnosti, 2004, with coauthors), *Text. Discourse. Context: Introduction into the Social Epistemology of Language)* (Tekst. Diskurs. Kontekst. Vvedenie v sotsialuyu epistemologiyu yazyka, 2008).

Founder and editor-in-chief of the 'Epistemology and Philosophy of Science' scientific journal (Epistemologiya i filosonya nauki) of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences (since 2005); editor-in-chief of the *Encyclopaedia of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science* (2009).

[92] *Schütz, A.* The Stranger // Collected Papers II. Studies in Social Theory. Edited by A. Brodersen. Dordrecht, 1962-1966.

Thus, in an attempt to understand various culture determinants that form prerequisites for a rational discourse on culture, we can distinguish between at least three different layers.

The first is the layer of specific life impressions, native language study, long-term relations with people (parents, relatives, classmates, teachers, objects of a home place and an environment). Here we note practical, unconscious, emotional acquisition of culture.

At the second layer (travelling, communication with foreigners, foreign language study) a person acquires the knowledge of the reality of another culture, where habitual solutions to common problems are very limitedly applicable. Words here have unusual meanings, relationships between the people look strange, the social environment seems unpredictable. It is the layer of problematization of common sense and commonplace reality, it gives an opportunity to broaden one's cultural knowledge or even shape a vision of a strange culture full of una-wareness and even fear. A cognitive attitude appears first at this very layer due to a distance from of the immediate cultural background. The situation in general strengthens one's critical and rational abilities, while an emotional set limits mutual understanding between different cultures.

However, a truly cognitive approach becomes really possible only at the third layer, i.e. at the layer of scientific and philosophical study of culture. Here different cultures are studied as equal parts of 'the third world' according to the terminology of Karl Popper[93]. This sphere of objective knowledge available and valuable for every mature personality demonstrates pluralism of culture universale. Rational dialogue between cultures goes on in this very cross-cultural sphere of reality.

A philosopher plays a special role in the dialogue on values that takes place between science and theology. The objective of philosophy is to reflect upon the universale of culture. Universale are the centre of the *Weltanschauung*. Reflection implies distance. Critical approach of a humanitarian scientist lies at the crossroads of cultures. Philosopher's standpoint is at the junction of cultural times, at the turn of centuries. This particularly implies equally neutral attitude to value fundamentals of both science and theology, neither of them being able to set global world-view guidelines for the future civilization.

Ideology and mass consciousness form social values, shape their system, being at the same time disinterested in their critical analysis. The ideological strategy consists in finding justification for one's own values and denying the allogenic ones. It is the philosopher who goes beyond any system of values in an attempt to keep political and value impartiality. He is the last to create value meanings as he is *a priori* well aware of their vagueness and inconsistency. Of course, as an empiric individual at the first and second layers of cultural dynamics, he can prefer and even formulate certain value senses rejecting the others. He can use an accrual method or a method of the paradigm shift. But according to L. Wittgenstein the true mission of a philosopher is not knowledge, but activity.

The philosopher knows for sure that he doesn't know anything for sure; the future remains unpredictable, and the results of human activities differ from the goals. The only attitude to the dialogue he can responsibly adhere to is the creation of conditions for a dialogue by demonstrating the narrow-mindedness of all the parties involved and thus ensuring consensus. Impartiality ensures distance. The philosopher may try to implement the critically analyzed values into a broader context of an intellectual or high culture. At the same time, the distance enables him to see the horizon, although this telescopic vision prevents one from distinguishing the details. Balancing between these two intentions and constantly switching from one to another, the philosopher acts according to the principle of complementarity for asymptotic approaching to general value fundamentals.

N. A. Khrenov[94]

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[93] *Popper K.* Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford, 1972.

[94] Deputy Director of the State Institute for Art Criticism (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), professor. Mr Khrenov is the author of over 400 scholarly publications, including books: *Obrazy velikogo razryva. Kino* v *kontekste smeny*

FROM IMPERIAL MONOLOGUE TO DIALOGUE IN ITS CIVILIZED CONCEPTION

Over the last several decades in our humanitarian literature the concept is used which with good reason can be called a key. This concept is "dialogue". Recently the field of its use extremely expanded.

The beginning of reference to this concept in our country is connected with philology and, more definitely, with the name of M. Bakhtin.

Although, as we know, a significant contribution to the debate was made by M. Buber, V. Bibler and others, Bakhtin made a remarkable and outstanding interpretation of Dostoevsky's novels. Such an interpretation, of which even the representatives of the world-famous native "formal" school proved to be incapable, whose works preempted so fashionable since the mid twentieth century (including in our country), and now gone to past structuralism and the importance of which became generally recognized. Today, when this concept expanded so widely, nobody is already interested in its background, social and historical context, demand in it. But it seems that we should come back to it to clarify some fundamental live issues.

Let's note the following fact. First, the need for this concept arose in the first half of the twentieth century and, more precisely, in the twenties of the twentieth century. Secondly, the need for this concept arose in one of the spheres of human science, namely in philology. Although in this case the fact that Bakhtin was not only a philologist, but a philosopher should be borne in mind. It's not about specialization, it's about the fact that in its subject – the novel by F. Dostoevsky, he found his prastructure, his pratext, referring to the ancient genre of philosophy – dialogue, opened by ancient philosophers. Later not even structuralists already but poststructuralists, more precisely Yu. Kristeva will refer to this presence in each text of earlier texts, known in the history of culture as intertext. This fact will dramatically separate formalism as a methodology and Bakhtin's formalism . To some extent, Bakhtin overcame the limitations of the "formal" school representatives' method, making meaningful the elements which formalists did not notice. In this case the question is the importance of the creation and effect of the work of genetic approach and social context during.

In connection with this let's state the first thesis. Finding in the text, which represents the late period in history, elements, indicating the actualization of its ancient origins, the question of dialogue evolving at the level of individuation (the term of Nietzsche and Karl Jung), M. Bakhtin displays at the level of collective consciousness. Here the issue relating to the origin of the dialogue in general, including also philosophical dialogue as it is known from the ancient philosophy turned out to be live. Philosophizing of the ancient, as is known, occurred in the squares, ie publicly. It involved a lot of people who became participant of this action. The literal translation of the word "speak" in Greek means "ploschadstvovat'" (to be on the square). A square is not only a market and a temple, but also a theater. Philosophy is born on the square. Regarding the philosophizing of Socrates O. Freidenberg said that he states the philosophy in question-answer form, preempting the dialogues of Plato and continuing dramatic and show-like line of verbal agons (1). As for Plato, the researcher argues that a philosophical argument he creates by means of ancient folk drama, with the help of the ancient dramatic traditions.

But it's not just that. Philosophy, like many other things, for example, ancient tragedy is born in the ritual and at the time of origin is a sacred act. For us it is important that the dialogue is born in opposition to, or, as it was called by the ancient, in dramatic agony. O. Freidenberg writes that from the time of its origin, the word is connected with the struggle and is pronounced in the agonistic form (2). The same can be said about the emerging philosophical speech. In later history the dialogue in its philosophical forms lost both sacred meaning of the ritual and forms of its

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kill 'turnyh tsiklov [Images of the Great Gap. Cinema in the Context of Cultural Cycles Succession], *Sotsial'no-psihohgicheskiye aspekty vzaimodeystviya iskusstva i publiki* [Socio-Psychological Aspects of Interaction between the Art and the Audience], *Publika* v *istoriyi kul 'tury. Fenomen publiki* v *rakurse psi-hologiyi mass* [Audience in the History of Culture. The Phenomenon of Audience in the Context of Mass Psychology], *Solsial'nayapsihologiya iskusstva: perehodnaya epoha* [Social Psychology of Art: The Age of Transition], and others.

collective expression, thereby repeating the logic of all subsequent culture development. This way passed both literature and philosophy.

However when we are now extremely broaden the meaning of the word "dialogue" and use it in relation to the processes of interaction between the great cultures and civilizations, ie derive its use from special, individualized forms connected with individual humanitarian spheres, then there arises the need to identify the primary meaning of the dialogue associated with its understanding as an agon, and with collective forms of its functioning. The important thing is here also is the fact that a dialogue is a kind of an agon, that is a kind of competition and, therefore, it has theatrical, dramatic nature and, in general, nature of a game, and the fact that at the time of its initiation and formation is related to the psychology of the masses. These archetypic traits we will try to identify in the late varieties of a dialogue – the agon at the level of interaction between cultures and civilizations.

The general interest of the twentieth century to the antiquity, which demonstrates modernism in art in a variety of its manifestations, brought the dialogue back to the early archaic forms of functioning. This was aided by an exceptional historical situation, which takes place in the early twentieth century. It is not irrelevant to remind that the aesthetics of the twentieth century overcomes late samples of reading of cultural phenomena. At the root of such a reading is Aristotle who initiates reading of the ancient tragedy, that largely determined the entire following reflection on art. Aristotle's version of poetics as the earliest version is a sample of all the later history of poetics, including, formalist and structuralist poetics. However, in the twentieth century, an interest in the early, archaic origins of literature and general culture emerged. Early attempt to move beyond the Aristotelian theory was a reflection of O. Freidenberg. The proposed by her approach (and she continued to develop a methodology of N. Marr) was the rehabilitation of those archaic and, more precisely, mythological forms that did not interest Aristotle. But, in fact, O. Freidenberg only returns to the tradition of the ancient culture reading, started by Friedrich Nietzsche, who rejected in the seventies of the XIX century vinkelmanovsky interpretation of antiquity, associated with the identification of the classical period of ancient culture with this culture as a whole. It was Friedrich Nietzsche, who showed that the ancient tragedy will be incomprehensible, if not to take into account the importance of the archaic period in the history of antiquity and to abstract from the collective, ie mythological element. The fact that the ancient called catharsis as a mechanism for influencing the public, requires also return of an individual, finding individual Self in the ancient culture, to the mythological element (the ancient myth in the age of prosperity of tragedy remains only in the forms of tragedy, that is, in aesthetic forms), and subsequent rehabilitation of individuation.

We do not remember Nietzsche as a representative of the "philosophy of life" by chance, who has felt not only superficiality of educating rationalist approaches, but the significance of Dionysian, irrational element, wholly manifested in the history of the twentieth century, mass movements and mass psychology. It was revealed in the twentieth century in the hypertrophic form that in the previous century only arose. In the cities religious beliefs are being destroyed, traditional ties are being violated, solidarity of social groups and possible in the cities of the XIX century dialogic communication diappears(3). Taking the problematics, opened by G. Lebon, S. Moscovici writes: "Separated people are abandoned in loneliness with their needs: in the jungle of cities, in the desert of plants, in drab of offices. These innumerable atoms, these particles of the multitude are collected in the shaky and flammable mixture. They form a sort of gas, which is ready to explode in the vacuum of society, deprived of their authority and values – the gas, the explosive power of which increases with the volume and suppresses everything by itself. " (4) In fact, the introductions of masses of societies in the twentieth century is the social context of the functioning of preserved by the culture dialogical forms, or rather, their summarization in the culture, which corresponds to the idea of J. Huizingy of degeneration of the spirit of the game in the twentieth century. The functioning of dialogic forms follows the logic of the functioning of cultures in general. Cultivated by "Guttenberg galaxy" individuation brings dialogue to its individualized forms. Meanwhile, the deployment of social and mass movements of the twentieth century blocks this process of later culture, ie individuation.

Later, in the sixties of the twentieth century, this blocking process of individuation is stated by M. Maklyuen, but the explanation of this he will reduce to the consequences of the emergence of such a powerful communicative tool as television. In this case, it's difficult not to agree with M. Maklyuen. In general, the process is stated by him correctly, but the origin of this process is associated with the revolt of the masses ", which happened in the history closer to the twentieth century. We use the word "closer" because all that will be typical for the twentieth century, already in XIX century G. Lebon will state, reflecting on a difficult movement to free the Frenchmen from the end of the XVIII century. (5). The first thinkers working in the paradigm of mass psychology, noted already all the mail principals, that seems, will determine the extraordinary irrelevance of the subject of our attention in the twentieth century – the dialogue. Mass enforcement of everything and anything that will be stated in the twentieth century by J. Ortega-y-Gasset, will lead to actualization of theories of the man of masses who rejected much of what was created before the culture of the twentieth century. This radical shift will be a reaction to the processes, the diagnosis to which will be put by V. Morris in XIX century (6). These processes are the result of started already from Renaissance separation of art from life and the masses. We will be interested only in disappearance of that personal principle in the mass, which was already found and analyzed by G. Lebon. It is this loss of individual origin that will generate glorified and praised to high heaven by futurists and general artistic vanguard negativism and nihilism of the mass to any consideration, assumption of other viewpoints and opinions. Nonconformism as the basis of the dialogue will be the first enemy of the mass. And that's why nothing is more alien to the mass than dialogue. The problem here is that with the abolition of the dialogue not only the importance of personal, but the game principle disappears. But, as J. Huizinga demonstrated, the disappearance of the culture of the game means a dying of culture in general.

This conclusion would be more understandable if we following Z. Freud well realize that the mass is prone to worship a strong leader with his fanatical belief in the existence of a single truth, a bearer of which the leader finds himself (7). While working on his famous tractate on mass psychology, G. Lebon will not be able to see this pattern generated by him in the history of revolutions, civil and world wars in the twentieth century, but he will already feel it to the full extent. And most importantly, the history of the twentieth century will confirm his observation and conclusion.

Let us return to our original thesis. It would seem that the importance of the dialogue will be a live issue only for the second half of the twentieth century, what kind of is witnessed by popularity of Mikhail Bakhtin's ideas, not understood at the time of their occurrence. But in reality for this time it is only the arising possibility of rehabilitation and institutionalization of dialogue in various fields. In fact, the need for the concept, which at this time becomes a key concept, appears in the first half of the twentieth century, ie at a time when intolerance to nonconformism develops at the state level, calling for life both the "Gulag Archipelago", and the world wars. This psychology can not but influences the art, which mobilizes and calls for the creation of an enemy image. So, speaking in 1935 on the All-Union meeting of creative filmmakers, film director Alexander Dovzhenko called to creation defense themes in the cinema. "I will not reveal here no military secret if I say that after a few years we can have a war. There will be a huge world war to which we must be...You need to prepare our weapons to fight"(8).

Intolerance of nonconformism Bakhtin was fully able to experience on himself. Now the story of misunderstanding and resentment of his works, their criticism is described in a special monograph (9). The problem of noninterlocutorism emerged in the twentieth century society is stated at the state forms, ap-peares in the history of the twentieth century in the hypertrophic etatism, the reason of which H. Ortega-y-Gasset once again captures in the psychology of man of masses. This psychological complex, which owns the mass and is related to intolerance of nonconformism, turnes out to be at the heart of state ideology. It also consolidates in the actualization of the phenomenon of the enemy as the back side of overcoming in breaking up and again re-emerging empires of social anomie and revolt, as this social anomie was always marked by Russian historians. Without the phenomenon of the enemy it's impossible to achieve solidarity in a mass society. But when the phenomenon of an enemy becomes actual in the exterminatory

world wars, than the war itself, in which J. Huizinga still found the game factor, completely excludes the game(10). Stating the fact that modern wars are losing their cultural and, thus, game function, J. Huizinga defines that you can only say about the war as a function of culture in case if it is conducted according to certain rules, ie when its members recognize each other as equal, but not seek to destroy each other, because they do not regard their opponents as human beings (11). But in fact this feature was characteristic of the ancient Greeks, who did not conduct a war with "barbarians", if only they did not attack first. The Wars of the Greeks mostly internal, ie between the individual cities – states, and the reason for the war has never been the desire of territorial expansion at the expense of neighbors. The war was waged by the rules, considering that respect for the opponent, and, therefore, preserved in itself all the active and defining element of the game.

By releasing the djinn, ie mass at the scene of history, the twentieth century appears not dialogical, but solely monological, as evidenced by the military disaster. Prevailing in the early twentieth century magnanimity on the unity of nations and gathering momentum globalization (although at that time this concept was not yet fashionable), developing as Westernization, in the situation of extreme mass enforcement did not correspond to reality. Naturally, that this enforcement was a psychological background of revival of imperial ambitions and the military build-up *mf* opposing states. But even if world wars stopped, then this temporary truce is designated as "cold war".

In Russia the effect of the ideas of Bakhtin occurs during fracture of the Bolshevik empire, when dismantling of phantom enemy begins. The beginning of this period is associated with the so-called "thaw". Thus, the need to use the concept of "dialogue" occurs when the monologue as a form of interaction between states does not exhaust meaning of this interaction any more. The societies begin to humanize.

In what new situation interactions are existing in the world peoples? Hypertrophy of the state power and interaction of States on the basis of the monologue, when such interaction is transformed into a military clash seemed to go in the past. The issues of interaction at the level states switch to the level of cultures and civilizations. The world enters the level of history, when the state or empire, that presents itself as the only subject of history, gives way, of course, not yet to a person, as existentialists believed, but to cultures and civilizations. Although the focus on personality, too, took place, bearing witness about the motion of society from the Empire to the discovery of the importance of culture. But, as J. Huizinga prooved, formation and functioning of culture developes in the forms of the game. Therefore, the transition to a new phase for which rehabilitation of culture will be characteristic, means also the revival of the spirit of the game that will not be slow to show itself in the rise of Art. At the same time a new qualitatively different period of history begins. In the human sciences there is cultu-rological reflection emerges. Culturology begins to claim for leadership in this system sciences when in the world history comes disappointment in the forms of interaction at the level of monologue and when a need for other forms of interaction begins to be felt.

However, in order to let such forms to emerge and assert themselves, it was necessary to transform also forms of the internal life of peoples. In the forms of social life of the people the other links should be opened. It was necessary that the peoples at least within separate subcultures or elites went beyond the collective sphere, to the level of individuation. During the history of the Bolshevik empire, which begins from the thaw, just such a transformation happened. In this era in Russia the people begins to feel itself not only as a state, but as a special culture. But again to see themselves as a distinct culture, it is necessary to rediscover not only the individual, but at the same time moral, game, national and confessional beginning. This fact, for instance, makes itself felt in the art forms. In an era of thaw works of art emerge, allowing a person to realize his identity. This possibility is given by such works as "Matry-onin dvor" by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "Andrei Rublev" by A.Tarkovsky, "Last Bow" by V. Astaf'eva etc. In this case, another key concept in the concept of Bakhtin should be remembered, namely, the concept of carnival. As is known, Bakhtin shows the dialogical nature of carnival. Carnivalization linked with comic elements, but, more precisely, with the ancient, ambivalent forms of laughter, which D.S.Likhachev gave a certain tribute, addressing the laughter in Ancient Rus' (12).

Bolshevik empire excluded laughing. In ancient cultures consciousness of the people meant the carnival, and, consequently, the game element. But the complacent empire in its Bolshevik form did not allow this element. Meanwhile, the era of thaw became the starting point of rehabilitation both carnival, and laughter. In this sense, the publication of Mikhail Bulgakov's novel "The Master and Margarita" is very demon-strational. Huge resonance of the novel in the sixties is associated with the rehabilitation of laughter in the era of fracture of the empire. This is one of the most significant signs defrosting, emerging from the underground culture. It is in only an atmosphere of understanding of the man himself as not only as loyal subjects of the empire, but the representative and bearer of culture in Russia, the need to overcome the intolerance of society towards nonconformity began to be felt. It turns out that solidarity within the society is achieved not only with the help of the ancient complex of the enemy, but also at the level of cultural traditions. It is this circumstance, ie modification of collective identity, for which to belong to a culture gets special significance, and becomes the starting point of culturogical reflection and the emergence of science about culture, the first idea of which emerged in Russia in the era of the Silver Age (13). The beginning of opening of artistic and cultural heritage of this era is just beginning in the era of a thaw.

Properly speaking, apparently, that's why on the new phase of national history new concepts were required in order to indicate the emergence of new meanings. In an era of discovery of culture and awareness of its importance in a situation of fracture such essential concept turns out to be the concept of a dialogue. In this situation, it became clear that rejected by society at the previous phase of the history "nonconformity" of Bakhtin was demanded. It was his theory contributed to the fact that society, in any case, his creative minority in the new stage has felt the need to institutionalize the specific meaning of human existence. However, the thaw period as period of rehabilitation of culture was still very fragile and unstable. In addition, the rehabilitation of individuation as challenging the intolerance of nonconformity turn out to be a loss of solidarity and the reality of social anomie. This created fear and contributed to the revival of nostalgia for the empire, as it was during the Stalin era. The psychology of the masses played it's negative role. We should consider the role of the masses, just started in the era of thaw again to feel themselves as the peoples and nations, in the following bureaucratization and rehabilitation of Stalinism. It was decisive in what will be called "stagnation." Thus, during the period of rehabilitation culture in Russia the psychology of the masses was not completely overcome. It still made itself felt.

However the history of using the concept of "dialogue" in a broader sense does not end there. Toward the end of the twentieth century, when humanity again feels the reality of the unfolding of globalization as a consequence of the realized importance of culture and cultures that allow communication, eliminating the phenomenon of the enemy, a need emerges to bring the dialogue beyond the cultures while not detracting from its value. It turns out that the ratio of dialogue and culture does not exhaust all possible plots of history. In some situations, the dialogue as a means of structural functioning of culture can turn round in other sides. And the culture itself can function not only as a goal, but as a tool. As History shows, its use by the state or of the Bolshevik empire in that quality led to its destruction. But actually in the era of thaw, in a situation of weakness of almost abolished by the Bolsheviks Orthodox church it is culture that becomes opposition to the State, since it is the foundation and ethnicity, and national and religious identity. But at the end of the twentieth century a situation is created where the leadership of the culture in the history has to be sacrificed for the sake of establishing a dialogue between civilizations. Actually, it is not even about "sacrifice" of culture, but about the special, hitherto considered latent its function – to promote the establishment and maintenance of civilizational identity.

Toward the end of the twentieth century mankind enters a phase of history, when its internal and external forms of social life, ethnic groups, nations and peoples are beginning to be built in accordance with the principle of civilization Every nation exists as a special civilization or as consistent part of civilization. The latter option is particularly true of Russia. Civilization as the structure, functioning in a special, specific to her time, puts a special stamp on self-sentiment of each people, on self-conception and about other peoples. In the history the civilizational aspect begins to be realized late. The first thinkers who set this problem up before Arnold Toynbee were

Danilevsky N, V. Soloviev, and Spengler, acknowledging, as we know, in the formulation of such questions superiority of N. Danilevsky. Renaissance of the empires in the twentieth century, particularly the Bolshevik and the National Socialist (German) empires, that became possible on the basis of processes of mass enforcement of the societies and the urbanization process, forced out of consciousness not only a question about a dialogue, but also building of people life at the level of civilization, which means also the issue of civilizational identity of each people. The era of thaw, when there is a partial return of the mass to the people and the nation, was only a milestone on the path to understanding of the importance of civilizational factors in the history. In this case, we use the concept of "civilization" not in the sense that is put by O. Spengler. As you know, under the civilization he meant only that period in the Faustian culture, for which the "revolt of the masses" was the only one of its important features.

When talking about Russia, it is important to take into account not only the fact that it's a single culture, but also the fact that it is a special civilization, which brings together more than a hundred ethnic groups, nations and, importantly, included in this part of the civilization by consistent part of cultures. Self-consciousness of ethnic groups and nations, transformed by the empire into the masses, could not develop in the direction of civilization. To come to this, it the culture of the nations within empire should first be rehabilitated. At that point in history when Russia, uniting these nations and cultures, was an empire, these individual nations have accumulated a lot of problems. During the period of history when fracture of empire was developing, and human solidarity was provided by the culture, these nations and peoples got the opportunity of their intense spiritual development, greater self-reliance and self-actualization. This, however, brought some difficulties and contradictions, such as an outbreak of nationalism. By the way, it was also relevant to the Russians also. Thus, in his work about "Russian idea" A. Janov gives a lot of examples concerning the revival in Russia already in the era thaw of neosla-vophylism (14). This is not surprising, because in Russia disappointment began not only of Bolshevism but in the modern as a worldview, ie in educating tradition that dates back to the age of Enlightenment. Rehabilitation of national origin what DS Likhachev had to deal with (15), indicates a return to the cultural opposition, which determined much in the history of the twentieth century, and with it, and for the rehabilitation of the worldview that emerged in conjunction with romanticism. Starting with the era of thaw in Russian culture neoromanti-cism develops, including, the development of the science of culture. The emerging science about the culture in Russia will develop on the base of the tradition of Romanticism (16), that indicates also insensibility of national variant of culturology that besides of the insensitivity of the national variant of cultural studies to the positivist methodology.

However, there comes a time when the internal relations among peoples should be constructed at the level of civilization, uniting many cultures. Then again, the dialogue is indispensable here, as not dispensable is the game, comic elements. In the era of challenging of the phenomenon of the enemy and cultivation of historical tradition the principle of Dialog becomes defining also in the relationship between different civilizations. While monologue disappears in the relations between civilizations, the game principle starts to actualize. This fact, for example, makes the problem of the revival of festive culture to be of current interest (17). In connection with the updating of festive culture the question arises of the revival of ancient forms of laughter which can alleviate tensions, eliminate the antagonism between social groups, ethnic groups and even civilizations. A. Radcliffe-Brown wrote that "any serious hostility is prevented by playful antagonism of teasing each other's people" (18).

Although the history has always been a history of different civilizations and the relationship between them, however, today mankind exists on the stage of history, when it's aspect becomes pressing subject of reflection. Again, as in the internal relations between nations within a single civilization, in the relations among civilizations extreme variants arise associated with realization by each of them their unique place in history and opposition of themselves to other civilizations. It becomes a matter of apprehension in the well-known work by S. Huntington (19). The popularity of the ideas of Samuel Huntington is explained by the fact that he was the first to feel the live nerve of history at its present stage, associated with the emerged need of awareness by each people of its civilizational identity, to which he dedicated his next book (20).

With this in mind, it is possible to claim that the issue of dialogue, understood as a norm of mutual understanding between civilizations, will interest us for a long time. The success of the ideal historical project – the project of globalization, i.e. unity already in a planetary sense, will depend on the way we will realize and comprehend it. Trying to show the importance of the game, and, consequently, the artistic element in the relationship between civilizations, we, nevertheless, are all well aware that the attitudes of some live civilizations seem to exclude game element. This is related to the Islamic peoples. What, for example, in Western culture appears as the game, turns to be a ritual in Islam. Much in the culture continues to be perceived as sacred. These peoples are often in confrontation with other civilizations for the sake of maintaining of the sacred values.

Besides, it is also impossible to forget about the problem, noting the significance of which in the destruction of the dialogic relationship we started, namely, about the relapses of mass enforcement that post-industrial civilizations clearly did not yet completely eradicated. There is every reason for that. In particular, such a base in Russia continues to be the psychology associated with nostalgia for the empire. We have already noted actualization of that psychology in the era of thaw, which ran into the barrier in the form of imperial complex. Propagating at that time social anomie generated fear of the collapse of the empire. The liberalization of society has been suspended. Today, a small value of liberal parties in Russia, until recently extremely active, indicates a new shutting down of liberal values. Growing at the beginning of the XXI century in Russia nostalgia for the empire, which can be judged by observing the attempts to rehabilitate the figure of Stalin once again, of course, excludes the dialogue. But, as argued leader liberalism Yegor Gaidar, the nostalgia for the empire can take a devastating forms (21). As an example, Yegor Gaidar refers to the psychology of the Germans after the First World War and the collapse of the Reich. In his view, the determining motive of it was just a nostalgic motive. He took such shape that in many respects it was one of the reasons for the revival of the empire and the emergence of the Second World War.

However, for humanity, even greater danger than nostalgia for empire in Russia, as recognized even by the Americans themselves, is danger of possible rebirth of America from an exemplary of democratic society into the empire such as the Roman Empire. This trend becomes particularly evident in the reign of George W. Bush. Especially demonstrating in terms of analysis of degeneration of America's empire is the observation of Charles Johnson (22). Rehabilitation of the imperial complex in different states is a real danger to peace and blocking of the globalization processes. After all, the reality of globalization today has a latent function – it is deployed as Americanization. In other words, globalization is developing as expansion of values of American civilization to all peoples and nations. It is this fact that poses a hazard to functioning of local cultures.

In a situation when America is degenerating into an empire, it becomes a problem. Meanwhile, it is just in this expansion of values to the whole world lies the meaning in history of the imperial complex in all of its manifestations. In this case, it is difficult to separate the globalization process from the imperial. When one civilization is able to implement its orientation in the minds of other peoples and civilizations, there is a favorable basis for rewriting history in accordance with such orientations. Once such a falsification of history, including his own, the Bolsheviks allowed themselves. I would not like to have proof that this is happening to America. But it is precisely this fact that indicates a new distribution of monological thinking already in the civilized form of its manifestation. That is why the world today, more than ever, needs to confront the imperial ambitions and the oppositional contrast to these ambitions. The culture (and cultures) can serve as this way of confrontation, indeed, it's in the culture where gets development that unique (national and mental), which in moving towards globalization of humanity must be preserved. That is why the role of dialogue, including the one, that's in the processes of interaction between civilizations, will continue to be meaningful.

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Margot Klestil-Löffler[95]

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND CIVILIZATIONS

Introduction

I'm glad to have an opportunity to present my report here at the 10th International Likhachov Conference in my capacity as a new Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Austria to the Russian Federation.

I was invited to speak on the dialogue of cultures and civilizations. St. Petersburg is the best place for it, as none of the cities in the world has originated from such a dialogue to the extent this city has. One can easily guess how various cultural trends have affected the city in the course of its history by the changes of its name: the Dutch Sankt Peterborough; the German Sankt-Petersburg, the Slavonic Petrograd; the Soviet Leningrad; at that, some authors also use such names as Northern Venice, ancient Petropolis.

Judging from changing and, quite often, complex mutual history, Russia and Austria have a common centuries-long tradition of contacts with various cultures within the country. For a long time both states have been absorbing cultural trends of the East and the West in order to keep afloat peaceful and mutually beneficial compromise for conflicting cultural trends concerned.

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[95] Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Austria to the Russian Federation, Dr. Sc. (Philology).

It is this aspect of our mutual history that shows that the dialogue of cultures and civilizations lies far beyond the relations between Islam and Christianity. Of course, the challenge mentioned urges to be solved and it doesn't only root in various religious opinions, but the agenda of the new dimension in the intercultural dialogue turns out to be much broader in the early 21st century.

Speaking about dialogue, we have to understand what this term means in a certain thematic context. We can't treat the term 'dialogue' in its intercultural context as doctrinal proselyt-ization. Its core essence is that equal partners in mutual respect try to identify their differences and find the common grounds to build fruitful cultural cooperation on.

Speaking about dialogue of cultures and civilizations, we mean diverse and unique treasures of civilization and world culture that unite the humankind in its common history, we also mean a chance to interchange and to broaden horizons that will enable all civilizations to lead a peaceful and cooperative life.

Having formulated the practice of intercultural exchange in a rich history of Russia and Austria as a starting point for further speculations, we have to realize that the frames of dialogue of cultures and civilizations have dramatically changed in the 21 st century.

Austria's experience

Austria has a long-dated experience how cultural cooperation helps to overcome and easily cross the cultural borders.

Diplomats, among them Austrian ones, are highly in-de-mand in this aspect. Nowadays successful foreign policy pays much more attention to the dialogue of cultures than ever before, dealing with serious discussions of cultural diversities, issues of common life of people of various cultural, ethnic, religious background. Cross-cultural competence, readiness to dialogue and partnership have to become our basic value, if we demand mutual responsibility. This is the only way to preach universal values of freedom, equal rights to cooperate, solidarity for people more convincingly than religious fanaticism and totalitarian ideologies would do.

The challenge of diversity, especially in home policy, should be faced openly and honestly. We can see that cohabitation of people of different background gives rise to fears and great uncertainty. For instance, in Vienne nowadays the number of people born abroad, for whom German isn't their mother tongue, equals to the number of such people 100 years ago. Today we are very proud of the then creative climate in the 'Vienne of 1900'. We want to encourage artistic processes that result from intensive cooperation and mobility, to detect them. Diversity of traditions, knowledge and experience can assist in solving global challenges.

We want to use cultural institutions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs abroad as transit centres and places to communicate and exchange innovative and creative ideas. Cultural Forum under the Embassy of Austria in Moscow contributes to it a lot. In 2009 in Russia about 50 projects in the fields of music, exhibitions, literature, cinema, theatre and dancing were carried out together with Russians institutions. In the field of science a noteworthy event is the cooperation of historians of both countries that could be institutionalized thanks to the Austrian-Russian Commission of Historians organized in 2008.

Globalization as a trigger of cultural cooperation
Technological advancement, economy, overcoming global crisis.

At present the world states and societies are tightly interconnected as never before in the history of the humankind.

Freedom of travel results from advancements of the world air carriers. Opportunities to communicate and exchange information via the Internet, world economy, breakthrough of English as lingua franca (at least in the fields of economics and natural sciences), growing internationalization in the spheres of education and labour have drawn cultures closer to each other.

These phenomena that can generally serve as elements of globalization provide us with totally different conditions and challenges. Due to enhancing of economical and state cooperation the challenges turn out to gain the global context: current economic recession and necessity to overcome the after-effects of climate change can serve the brightest examples of it.

We speak of the challenges that can only be solved by fruitful cooperation of the world community.

To solve them in the future we might need more than a superficial treatment of symptoms. What we need is a profound dialogue of world cultures in order to understand our co-existence in terms of culture and history, as well as to treat other cultures' heritage, values, ideas and features more delicately.

In this respect, we have to pay attention to a certain phenomenon, namely growing globalization of aesthetic sense, especially among the youth. It can be demonstrated by fashion and art trends, by the world-known music bands and film characters. This growth is manifested in global understanding of culture. But we have to distinguish between the refined culture and show business that depends on customers' demands. The latter is always 'down-to-earth' in its cultural context, but provides us with prospects to study the cultural context it originated from.

The challenge is rather in beneficial exchange of diverse cultures and civilizations than in erasing cultural differences.

I consider it very important to preserve and keep diversity wherever possible.

Another aspect follows from the above-said: large migration from the south to the north and from the east to the west, as well as modern internationalized labour that is advancing in large multinational cities and still more growing in the regions where different civilizations face each other. At present time, all civilizations are determined by pluralistic cultural impacts and are targeted at common cooperative life.

The problem that European countries call 'the problem with foreigners' is the one arising when the growing number of alien-cultured minorities face the local culture of the country they migrated to. Our societies face many challenges resulting from this phenomenon.

Cultural borders have long been presenting themselves within societies rather than between countries.

At the same time, these challenges give us a unique chance to learn from each other thanks to a direct contact of various cultural circles and personal contacts on respectful terms held in order to live in peace and cooperation without rejecting our own cultures. Thus civilizations can hold everyday small-scaled dialogues and build bridges that will enhance large-scaled relations.

Internationalization of labour. The role of education and guidance

Globalization of economy and sciences in advanced industrial countries appears to be able to provide the youth with chances for professional career only if they have their own international professional experience and awareness of other cultures. We can say that the present-day youth has no other alternative but learn the diversity of life. This generation that has got accustomed to communication with various cultures since their childhood makes a crucial factor to stimulate the international dialogue of cultures.

However, we should take into account that on the global scale the minorities use such opportunities much more often, and that the conflicts of cultural intolerance arise when a positive experience of communication with other cultures breaks against the lack of financing. We have to appeal that prospering states should take responsibility to invest into education in order to promote studies of other cultures^

Large-scale conflicts, especially religious ones, are often rooted in traditional conflicts. But they are also closely linked with economical problems and with close-minded stereotypes. Such a tunnelled vision can only be overcome by education and awareness of other cultures.

That's why education plays a primary role. Long-term dialogue of cultures is only possible if we can teach the youth to respect other cultures.

Dialogue between social institutions and within the society and the role of mass media

Dialogue between social institutions and their delegates is insufficient for the dialogue of cultures. The society itself should have profound knowledge about the dialogue of cultures.

I'd like to say a few words about the role of mass media. At present time they are constituent elements and mediators of cultural environments. In dialogue of cultures and civilizations mass media play the key role, they have to be aware of their responsibility.

In the world determined by the free market the majority of mass media, naturally, are private enterprises that follow the market rules. On the one hand, those mass media that can selltheir product will survive, but, on the other hand, they will affect the public opinion. It makes it necessary for mass media to realize that their ethical duty is to cover the issues of cultural environment responsibly, to feel their common responsibility in the dialogue of cultures and civilizations.

Europe as an example of successful coexistence of various cultures

Uniqueness of Austria (as well as uniqueness of Russia) has resulted from the fact that throughout its history the country has served the crossroads of multiple cultural impacts. Alongside with it, modern history of Europe, namely the history of the European Union, infuses us with hope that the dialogue of cultures is the real way for peaceful coexistence.

Conclusion

Due to outstanding progress of transport and communications people in the 21 st century are in closer cooperation than ever before. It provides us with a chance to hold dialogue of various cultures and civilizations on the scale unheard-of before in the history of the humankind. We have to use this chance and overcome a great number of obstacles on the way to global cultural understanding. To some extent, we are living now in a global civilization. Because of large migration during the last decades we have to realize that cultural borders have long been presenting themselves inside the states and societies rather than between the countries. It shouldn't be treated as a threat, as it bears a solution to the problem, namely, respectful dialogue between cultures and positive learning from each other. Involving large parts of the society, especially the youth, as well as mass media plays the crucial role in a prospective dialogue of cultures.

In the global world the dialogue of cultures and civilizations aimed at creating security and trust above cultural and national borders more important than ever before. It depends on how much our generation is involved in it in order to build the framework that can provide the youth with education and tools to create a common life based on tolerance and mutual understanding.

Thank you for your attention.

N. V. Kolotova[96]

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN DIFFERENT CIVILIZATIONS: CONSTITUTION STANDARDS

Nowadays social and economic rights are almost universally acknowledged as a subject to be constitutionally regulated. However, the attitude towards them still varies in different countries, thus influencing the scope and approach to their securing in constitutions. In the course of the 20th century these rights became a constitutional indicator of a social welfare state, and their inclusion into constitutions manifests the aspiration of the countries to follow this path of development. One cannot judge the country's 'social welfareness' by only the presence or absence of socio-economic rights in the constitution. For example, Norway with its traditionally high

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[96] Acting chief scientific member of the Institute for State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, *LL.B.* She specializes in human rights, studies the issues of social and economic rights. She has about 300 publications, among which are the following: chapters in the course book for higher educational establishments *Human Rights* (Prava cheloveka) and in the course book for secondary school Law (Pravo); chapters in co-authored monographs *Human Rights as a Factor for Stable Development Strategy* (Prava cheloveka как faktor strategiyi ustoychivogo razvitiya); *Human Rights and Globalization Processes of the Modern World* (Prava cheloveka i protsessy globalizatsiyi v sovremennom mire); articles 'Social Targets of Human Rights Studies' (Sotsial'naya napravlermost' issledovaniy v oblasti prav cheloveka); 'Ways to Protect Social Human Rights' (Sposoby zaschity sotsial'nykh prav cheloveka); 'Patterns of Protection of Socio-Economic Rights' (Modeli zaschity sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh prav), etc.

standards of life abides by the Constitution adopted in the 19th century which contains practically no social rights.

In many cases the analysis of constitutions leads one to recognize the special legal character of socio-economic rights in comparison with personal and political rights that have a natural legal origin and a character of the subjective rights protected by court. However, in a number of constitutions (including that of the Russian Federation) it is not accepted to draw any differences or to rank groups of the common system of human rights. This determines the attitude towards socio-economic rights as to the rights totally similar to the rights of the l[sl] generation.

Methods and forms of regulation of socio-economic rights differ according to *the civilizational type of a state* which can even be observed in constitution standards.

European countries that belong to a Romano-Germanic legal system traditionally set forth the largest catalogues of social and economic rights in their constitutions. In the Constitution of Portugal (1976) a subject of constitutional regulation is widely outlined in the chapters devoted to economical (articles 58-62) and social rights and responsibilities (articles 63-72), rights and responsibilities in the sphere of culture (articles 73-79). The Spanish Constitution (1978) is often regarded as one of the world's most progressive in the sphere of socio-economic regulation.[97] The corresponding norms are listed in Article 7 'Economy and Finance' and Chapter 3 'The Guidelines of Social and Economic Policy'.

The European countries that were politically formed *after the collapse of the socialist system* pay special attention to the regulation of socio-economic rights. The constitutional experience of the countries with totalitarian socialism was closely connected with the establishment of socio-economic rights that were regarded as a decisive argument in favour of a socialist society. Thus, new constitutions adopted in these countries at the end of the 20th century were aimed at implementation of international legal norms and standards in this sphere, and at the same time at preservation of a high level of labour and social rights protection typical for the socialist legislation.

In some countries of a Romano-Germanic legal system socio-economic rights are formulated implicitly, *through the determination of the country's main social aims.* The Constitution of Ireland declaring the main principles of social policy in Article 45 states directly that observance of these principles is an exclusive right of the Parliament not cognizable to any court. Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution (1978) 'On Guidelines of Social and Economic Policy' lists responsibilities of the state power bodies in the sphere of securing social rights of the citizens. Article 2 of the Maltese Constitution (1964), which prescribes the standards of a worthy life, is also named 'Declaration of Principles'. In Article 21 it is directly stated that 'Guidelines are not rights', i.e. they are not court orders but the basic principles obligatory for the government.

Even when socio-economic rights are definitely fixed, they may be formulated as desires, intentions and aims which the state should pursue along with the development of its economic strength. Even the constitutional declaration of certain social rights, e.g. medical or housing entitlement, does not always mean they are considered to be subjective rights of the citizens. For example, right to health protection does not presuppose free medical care in case of illness, which is provided in limited cases only, as it is declared in Article 32 of the Italian Constitution guaranteeing free medical treatment for the poor only. The constitutions of some countries use the terms 'social charity' or social care (Holland, Austria, Denmark) instead of the social security entitlement.[98]

In other European countries socio-economic rights are the subject of direct constitutional regulation. The Constitutions of Albania, Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Turkey, Croatia and the Czech Republic contain special amendments devoted to economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms. They are the countries we mean while writing about 'new formations of

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[97] *Osavelyuk A.* M The Constitutional Right in the Foreign Countries (p. 402). Moscow, UNITY-Diana Publishing House, 2010.

[98] Constitutional Right in Foreign Countries (p. 138) / Ed. by M. V. Baglay, Yu. I. Leybo, L. M. Entin. Moscow, Norm Publishing House, 2009.

economic, social and cultural rights and new perception of state role connected with the responsibility to guarantee these rights'.[99]

In *Anglo-Saxon countries* socio-economic rights are not completely established as constitutional ones. The constitutional status of socio-economic rights in the USA is not acknowledged yet. The American authors use the term 'positive' rights, implementation of which does not imply their constitutional securing. Another common term is 'acquired rights', i.e. acquired with labour and exchange but not innate. These rights are defined as rights according to statutory legislation or rights by law. If necessary, the matters of judicial protection of socio-economic rights are resolved by the USA Supreme Court addressing the clause on 'equal protection of law' and on 'appropriate legal procedure' from the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution.[100]

In Great Britain socio-economic rights are also ranked among the statutory legislation rights and are not regulated on the constitutional level. British legislation professes a number of such rights and freedoms subdividing them into the rights attributive to workers and those of employees. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) also ignores socioeconomic rights although Canada has joined the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Only the Charter's Paragraph 2 of Article 15 gives an interpretation of securing socio-economic rights, according to which guarantees of equality do not cover pro-poor programs and programs for the population exposed to discrimination. The Parliament has even declined the amendment concerning guarantees of the right of property. The Canadian courts defend these cases using the definitions from the Charter of Rights, for example, the principles of human dignity, equality and prohibition of discrimination in the sphere of social security.[101]

In the constitutions of *Islamic states* some socio-economic rights are also declared. Not all of them regulate these matters as explicitly as the Constitution of Turkey (1982), where a separate chapter is devoted to 'Social and Economic Rights and Responsibilities'. Even a theocratic Constitution of Saudi Arabia (1992) guarantees social security, education, medical care and favourable environment entitlements. The statures of socio-economic rights are formulated in the Constitutions of the Sultanate of Oman (1996), Afghanistan (2004), Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran and some other countries.

The majority of Islamic constitutions contain regulations of socio-economic rights which are rather abstract and vague, but their declaration correlates with a factual system of values in a society formed by the Muslim faith. For example, Article 17 of the Main Law of Saudi Arabia explicitly describes a social function of property according to Shariah. Socio-economic rights as well as other rights should be abided by in the same manner as they are set in the Quran and other sources of the Islamic law. That is why in Islamic countries the following obligatory entitlements are outlined: right to education; property right as the right to security of property obtained with labour; right to work freely mastering any type of activity and profession for securing an honest life; right to social security. Guarantees of social security right include both social assistance for the poor provided by state authorities, and the responsibility of rich Muslims to support the poor country-fellows by paying zakat – a poor-due tax.[102] Thus, 'at modern constitutional legislation level human rights and freedoms in many Islamic countries are limited by the Shariah'.[103]

Latin American countries have their own peculiarities in the constitutional regulation of socio-economic rights. Latin American countries noticeably differ in their socio-economic

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[99] Different Constitutions on Top Values of a State: a Russian approach (p. 27). Workshop materials of a scientific seminar. Issue 4. M, 2007.

[100] *Safonov V. N.* The Constitution of the USA and Socio-Economic Rights of the Population, (P. 15-16; 23). Moscow, 2007.

[101] See: *Bastrash M.* Socio-economic Rights and Rights of the First Nations of Canada. Constitutional Justice in Action: Experience of Russia and Canada / Collection of Decrees of Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Court of Canada, (p. 208-213). A. Kononov, M. Bastrash. Moscow, New Justice Publishing House, 2008.

[102] See: *Muhammad Sadik Muhammad Yusuf.* Human Rights in Islam, (P. 65–104). SPb., 2008.

[103] *Syukiyaynen L. R.* Islamic View of Freedom and Equality: Statutory Expression and Religious-Ethical Scope. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Universalism and Diversity of Experiences. (P. 82). M., 2009.

development; however all of them demonstrate absolute respect to international institutes and human rights at the constitutional level.[104] It is no coincidence that the current Constitution of Mexico (1917) was one of the first to formulate socioeconomic rights in detail. In the Constitution of the Dominican Republic freedom of labour, education and property right are stated as 'undeniable rights'.

Today constitutions of Latin American countries regulate a large number of social and economic rights setting forth in the laws such details as are specified in other countries in codes of laws and separate laws. The Constitution of Brazil (1988) is a vivid example of such a detailed elaboration in the sphere of social and economic relations. For example, Article 7 listing the workers' rights contains 34 paragraphs, including paragraph 6 titled 'Irreducibility of salary or wage', or paragraph 8 guaranteeing the full compensation of the thirteenth salary or the old-age pension. Thus, Article 8 is worked out in detail and it declares freedom of professional or trade union associations (11 paragraphs), as well as other Articles of the Constitution.

The countries of the Eastern civilization provide constitutional regulation of socio-economic rights that mainly depends on the type of socio-political system of the country. As a rule, in the constitutions of socialist countries the guarantees of social rights are set forth but at the same time the inequitable regulation of different types of property is assigned. For example, Article 12 of the Constitution of China declares that socialist public property is 'sacrosanct'.

Citing China as an example one understands that the concept of human rights as 'part of the borrowed spiritual culture of the West' is interpreted in the Eastern civilizations according to the national, historical, economic and socio-cultural features of the country. Human rights are looked upon 'through the prism of collective centralism', and socio-economic rights are regarded as group and positive rights.[105] The Constitution of China (1982) sets forth a wide range of socio-economic rights subdividing them into the rights of citizens and the rights of workers: every citizen is entitled to work, but only workers are entitled to leisure and education. But the real situation with the protection of socio-economic rights is far from the onedeclared. The experts believe that 'the economic miracle' of China is based on the absence of the three fundamental principles that are intrinsic to any developed, socio-balanced economic system: 'In China there are no pension benefits, no state medical care, and no obligatory secondary education'.[106] Besides that, 'Chinese mentality' is often an obstacle for the realization of work rights, as it sets prevalence of responsibilities over rights; it extends paternalistic ideas over hierarchical relations at enterprises, where the junior are expected to respect the senior.[107]

The Constitution of Japan (1947) with its different structure and contents, despite being rather short sets forth a wide range of fights and freedoms. Both the citizens of the country and foreigners may enjoy their rights. But in this case the Japanese legal culture influences the extent to which these constitutional regulations are implemented; it is characterized by the domination of the traditional values of agreement and harmony. An employee criticizing an employer in public or claiming to defend his rights is considered to break the harmony and amity at work and thus is believed to deserve blame and even punishment. Thus, judicial practice and legal doctrine in Japan keep to the established order that these guarantees aim only at the protection of people from

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[104] See: Power of Right vs. Right of Power: International Security (Latin American Perspective). Edited by B.F. Martynov. Moscow, 2004.

[105] See: *Titarenko M. L.* China: Progress in the Development of Political System. On the Sinicized Concept of Human Rights; Borodich V. D. On Politics Assessment in the Sphere of Human Rights in Modem China. Universalism of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Diversity of Experiences, P. 70-73, 196-197. M., 2009.

[106] *Tomchin G. A.* Why Is Russia Not China? The Conflict of the 21st Century. Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations: The 8th International Likhachov Scientific Conference. SPb., 2008. (p. 280).

[107] *Zang E.* Personal Freedoms in the Sphere of Labour Relations and Their Implementation in the Modern World (Review of the Materials of the International Seminar on Comparative Social Right). State and Rights. 2009, Issue 1. (P. 102).

arbitrary treatment of the state and are not applicable in case of personal claims including individual relations at workplace.[108]

An overall analysis of social and economic rights in the constitutions of different countries leads one to the conclusion that their incorporation in constitutional acts was implemented to a different extent. The majority of the constitutions contain concise wordings thus allowing current legislation to regulate them in general. As Article 23 of the Constitution of Belgium runs, 'a law, a decree, or a norm guarantee economic, social and cultural rights and define the conditions of their implementation taking into account corresponding liabilities'. Thus, the procedure of implementation of constitutionally set socio-economic rights is defined by the relevant laws, and this is repeatedly stated in the constitutions. However, there exist constitutional acts where socio-economic rights are set forth with the help of norms that may formally be related to the level of the current legislation (the constitutions of Latin American countries, post-socialist countries, and partly the constitutions of Portugal and Spain).

One can say that in general the world community has reached consensus in acknowledging the value of socio-economic rights and the need to secure these rights in current constitutions. Broadly speaking, they are not only far from being of 'minor' importance, but together with civil and political rights present a unified complex of human rights and human legal status based on the interdependence and protection of all rights.

I. Yu. Kotenko[109]

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRADITIONAL VALUES: WAYS OF REUNION

Introduction

The following presentation is based on the research into the aspects of discrepancies between international law of human rights and traditional values. The issue to discuss is how the internationally elaborated norms of human rights protection should be dealt with within certain historical and cultural background. The aspects of the high rates of human rights violations and the ways of its improvements can be viewed and solved through the reunion of the ethics, morals and traditions that exist in a country and those which are elaborated within "modern" human rights and basic freedoms protection concept. In order to achieve universality in protection of rights and freedoms the local traditions and values should not only be taken into account, but also can be relied on while looking for ways of implementation of "alien" international norms.

Modernization and the renaissance of traditional values in modern world

In the beginning of the 20[.h] century the authors of modernization theory[110] used to claim that modernization and technical development would lead to declined reliance of societies on the traditions and moral values. Technical development claimed to stay uniquely western until the traditionally organized societies not abandoned their traditionalism for the sake of development. Non-western civilizations were offered to assimilate "morally superior and technologically developed" western culture as a substitute for their abandoned traditions and values.

However, this did not prove to become the reality. Now, in the very beginning of the 21st century we are witnesses of the "renaissance" of the religious and traditional values discourse. And one of the important issues to discuss here is that of reconciliation of the values of newly

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[108] *IvamuraM.* Personal Freedoms in the Sphere of the Labour Relations and Their Implementation in the Modem World (Review of the Materials of the International Seminar on Comparative Social Right). State and Rights. 2009, Issue 1. (P. 106).

[109] Chief assistant to the Director of the Netherland School for Human Rights Research, *LL.M.*

[110] Karl Marx, 1973. Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. New Yoyrk: Vintage Books, cit. *II Inglehart R., Bayker W. E.* Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values, Am. Sociological Review, 2000, Vol.62, p. 19.

developed modernized societies and those of societies which are still based on the traditional cultural organization approach.

The process of promoting and strengthening of "western" concept of human rights and basic freedoms faces usually the challenge of resistance of the "non-western" civilization to adopt the values being in discrepancy with local morals, traditions and practices. The reasons of such resistance may have different grounds (economical, political, religious, and cultural). Thus, the states which demonstrate an unstable rule of law and human rights protection happen to claim their own original cultural background which does not allowed them to adopt so easily the values offered together with the human rights and basic freedoms "packages" (as we often see on the examples of the states where Muslim religion prevails with regard to the women's rights, for ex.).

Among other reasons named in support of impossibility to implement and strengthen the "western" human rights and basic freedoms there are political reasons (fear of political and economical expansion), discrepancies between the "western" values and local traditions and practices, discrepancies between morals established in the religious values and those which are promoted by the human rights supporters, fear of loosing the uniqueness, originality of the country, etc. The norms protecting human rights thoroughly elaborated at the international level and provided in international law rules and norms often appear at the regional level only for the politics' sake, but not in order to improve the current high rate of violations in this area.

The latest revival of the traditions and cultural values in the modern world allows to find the way of adopting the universal human rights and freedoms values through the local religious and cultural traditions. Reunion of the values and human rights would help to promote the ideas provided both in international human rights mechanisms and religious and moral calls for universal human well-being.

Cultural identity can also be used to promote the interest of the group and in the process may strengthen cultural diversity[111]. Thus there is no doubt expressed in latest research[112] that despite obvious movement to the globalization and unification of lifestyles, the cultural diversity is an important factor threatened by globalization. And the list of societal cultural dimensions and characteristics can be presented and used for the purpose of looking deeply into the differences and see whether these differences can serve as basis for improving well-being in the societies reluctant to the spread of 'western values' and 'international human rights'.

Here we would like to see whether there is a way to reunite the cultural approaches to human rights and freedoms and to establish the freedom of the personality despite the different cultural and historical background of the states who are to adapt these values.

Western and Non-Western approaches to Human Rights

Despite the fact that the failure to implement, promote and strengthen the protection of human rights is often attributed to a reluctance of local culture, religion to adopt the "alien" values, there are examples when local culture, traditions and practices (for ex. religious) promote ideas and concepts similar to those included in modern human rights concept.

Religion itself is the way to achieve the human well-being through established within it norms and duties of the people. Furthermore any religion also argues for the universality of its ethical norms and rules. Universality which claims the human rights concept as an essential condition for its promotion and protection is also based on the concept of universality of religious norms and rules.

Although the notion of human rights does not stem from a religious basis the religion, morals and ethics can be a fertile ground for cultivating concepts related to human well-being and freedom.

The human rights concept based on the values of freedoms, equity and human well-being elaborated within European enlightenment and strengthened in the international law mechanisms have features very similar to all basic religions.

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[111] *Bernstein M.* Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement. Am. J. of Sociology. 1997. 103. P. 531-65.
[112] *Ingtehart R., Bayker W. E.*, ibid, p. 22.

The freedoms and rights, elaborated within the international legal system of human rights protection, were not necessarily based only on the achievements of western scientists and philosophers. Jewish, Christian, Muslim religious tradition includes the discussion related to tolerance, freedom, rights for life, etc. Thus, it is not completely right to argue that the western based human rights are the base for the promotion of uniquely "western" values and traditions.

Looking into the messages of the main world religions one can easily find there a number of counterparts with the human rights concepts. A number of writers in religious ethics have attempted to show, not only that traditional religious values are compatible with a strong commitment to human rights, but also that the world's religious communities themselves possess resources for human flourishing which either anticipate or correct modern understandings of human rights and responsibilities. The religious ethics which during more than a millennium call for the human rights well-being, is trying to offer the ways of its achievement. The outlines of the human rights and call for the freedom, tolerance can be met in Islam:

"True Islam also advocates human rights. The conception of human rights in Islam is outlined by Allamah Abu a-Ala Mawdudi as follows: every human being has (1) the right to life, (2) the right to the safety of life, (3) respect for the chastity of women, (4) the rights to a basic standard of life, (5) individual's right to freedom, (6) the right to justice, (7) "equality" of human beings and (8) the right to cooperate and not to cooperate with rules. "[113]

In Christianity, the message is not different.[114] Human rights is portrayed as a call for respecting the dignity even of those who intend to humiliate you, call for essence of tolerance and accommodating the views of others even when these views are confrontational. In Sermon on the Mount Jesus Christ called for tolerance and respect of the views different with views of the majority:

"Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy.

"But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you;

[45]That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.

[46]For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans the same?

[47]And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? do not even the publicans so?

[48]Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect. "[115]

Even when the language of rights is not fully embraced, as for example in several contributions relating to East Asia, a strong emphasis is still placed on the universal importance of respectfulness toward others of compassion for human well-being[116].

However, seeing the support or relativist position on the ground of opposite views on the rights and freedoms of western modern societies and those related on traditional and religious norms, the problem is to find a way of reunion of the moral and ethical grounds of well-being support and the modern human rights concept.

Difficulty of implementation, universality of human rights

The relativist position promoting the origin of the traditional, historical and cultural background is often considered as an excuse from the universal implementation, promotion and strengthening of the human rights and basic freedoms provided in the international legal mechanisms.

The fear of the "western" values together with the "western" philosophy and economic policy expansion often leads to the reluctance or the refusal of traditionally based societies to follow the

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[113] Allamah Abu al-A la Mawdudi "Human rights in Islam", Al Tawhid Journal, 1996, Vol.4, N. 3.

[114] Bas de Gaay Fortman, M. A. Maohamed Salih "the Life and Times of Religion and Human Rights", in Walter E. A. van Beek et al. (eds) Meeting Culture: Essays in Honour of Arie de Ruijter, Maastricht: shaker, 2003, p. 92.

[115] Matthew 5:43-48

[116] *Clayton John*, "Universal Human Rights and Traditional Religious Values", Society, Vol. 41, Is. 2 (January 1, 2004), p. 36.

ideas elaborated within the human rights concept. Universality of human rights as a basic principle of the concept is being refused by the supporters of the relativist position as being in discrepancy with local traditions, values and practices.

However, the universality of the human rights shall not necessarily be understood as the universal implementation of the human rights elaborated at the international level without taking into account the cultural, religious, traditional and ethical norms existed in a certain country.

The human rights concept which seeks to achieve the universal well-being of every human creature has a lot in common with world religions and traditions. And the question is whether within every culture there is a challenge to achieve the well-being of the possessors of this culture, it is possible to find a way to reunion the human rights concept and this traditional based approach. The challenge is to find "receptors" in local culture or» which the human rights can rely and locked in the process of implementation.

The challenge of the researcher is to find among the traditional values those traditional values those which can embrace easily the ideas promoted by human rights supporters.

Traditions and values which can serve as a base for implementation
Religion

In the experience of most Western European and North Atlantic societies, the development of pluralism, democracy and tolerance has been marked by a retreat of religion from the public arena, its privatization and the general growth of secularization as the defining context of public life.

The very particular form of this process – secularization retreats religion from the public domain – reduced its claims on the public sphere. However, in accordance with the certain research conducted on the topic of the influence of the modernization process on the traditional societies, the researchers admit that the traditional religious values often play a crucial part with the human rights development, protection and implementation processes.

Thus, John Clayton[117], in his research draws the attention to the aspect of reconciliation and cooperation between rights and freedoms elaborated at the international level and basically relying on the European (Western) values and historical achievements, and traditional (here: religious) aspects of culture on which the human well-being mostly based in traditional societies. Within religious values discourse one can find positive human rights within the traditional values, "rooted deep in a pre-modern past that would have lacked the linguistic and conceptual apparatus of modern human rights concepts".

Family values

The freedoms and rights elaborated in the international human rights mechanisms are deemed to provide the legal protection to the interests connected to the family values. Traditional societies based on the religious norms, morals and ethics consider the family as a corner stone of the society. Thus, the importance of the family, respect of parents (regardless of how they behave), love and care for the children (parents must do their best for their children even if their own well-being suffers), idealization of the large family in traditional society, high fertility rates may be used as receptors on which the human rights protectionist may ground the issues related to the abortion possibilities, euthanasia, (traditional) gender roles and sexual behavior norms, attitude to children, acceptance or rejection of homosexuality

Fatherland (national pride)

Within the specific features of countries with family- and traditions- oriented values there is also a high level of national pride, more respect for the authority, trust to the highest levels of the authority. Third generation of human rights related to the environmental, socio-economic issues may be related and locked on this aspects.

Conclusion

During the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, the U.S. secretary of state warned against allowing cultural relativism to become the last refuge of repression. But

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[117] *Clayton John*, ibid, p. 36–41.

some delegates listening to Warren Christopher on that occasion may have harbored their own worry that such insistence on universality could easily become the last refuge of imperialism.

However, the supporters of the relativist approach complain that the West in general or the United States in particular uses its preferred priorities in human rights as a means of imposing its own political ideology and economic policy on the rest of the world.

That is true that the discrepancies between traditional and modern "human rights approach" to the universal well-being achievement is not an excuse for the authorities which are not willing to implement internationally elaborated mechanisms adopted at the regional level.

The approach discussed here is seeking for the reconciliation of the universalism and relativism in order to achieve the universal well-being on the base of reunion of human rights conception and traditional morals and ethic of the state.

V. P. Kozlov[118]

PAN-EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL IN NIKOLAI KARAMZIN'S CONCEPT OF HISTORY

In 2016, three jubilees will be celebrated by a lucky coincidence. All of them are connected with Nikolai Karamzin whose works were in the focus of Dmitry Likhachov's attention. The first is the 250th anniversary of the writer, poet, political essayist and historian, the second jubilee marks 215 years of *his Letters of a Russian Traveller*, the third is 200 years after the first six volumes of his History *of the Russian State* came out of print, which was to become the first national history of Russia, yet, unfortunately, an unfinished one. These two books by Ka-ramzin are not just the most important milestones of his work. Letters opened Europe for Russians, its culture and mores at the moment when Russia was at the critical turn within the European history. *History* opened for Europeans the long and recent past of Russia, the country whose people had defeated Napoleon and thus dramatically changed the political situation in Europe. These two circumstances give us a chance to review Karamzin, the writer and historian, and his pondering over the fate of Russia which again is on the crossroads of its history.

There is no need to prove that Karamzin is a truly national writer and historian. Through thousands of links, his literary and historiography work and his essays are related to Russia where he grew as a personality and thinker, where he spent his most fruitful years. Only by the end of his life, deeply shattered by the December and January events in 1825 and 1826, he who did not change his political and moral views and yet as if tired of the maladies which affected not him alone but his Fatherland, decided to look at its newest history as once he did in his youth from afar, from the sunny shores of the Mediterranean. The author of the article entitled 'On Love of the Native Land and on People's Pride', a kind of political and moral manifesto of the Citizen of the Fatherland, decided to become an 'emigrant', the fact that demonstrated the emerging phenomenon in the historical fates of Russian intelligentsia.

Still Karamzin for his fellow countrymen, both contemporaries and generations to come, has been a representative of a pan-European culture. As early as in his youth, he got acquainted with the ideas of the Enlightenment in Europe; in his mature years he easily and naturally entered the

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[118] Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor of the Russian State University for the Humanities (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (History). Author of over 300 scholarly publications, including monographs: Kolumby ros-siyskih drevnostey [Columbus of Russian Antiquities], Kruzhok A.I. Musina-Pushkina i 'Slovo o Polku Igoreve[1] [A.I. Musin-Pushkin's Group and 'The Lay of Igor's Warfare'], Istonya gosudarstva Rossiyskogo N.M. Karamzina v otsen-kax sovremennikov ['The History of the Russian State' by N.M. Karamzin Analyzed by His Contemporaries], Tayny falsifikatsiyi [Mysteries of Falsification], Rossiyskaya arheogrqfiya I S – nachala 19 vekov [Russian Ar-chaeography of the 18th – early 19th Centuries], Rossiyskoye arhivnoye delo [Russian Archive-Keeping], Obmamitaya, no torzhestvuyushchaya Klio [Deceived but Triumphant Cleo], Osnovy teoreticheskoy i phkladnoy arheografiyi [Elements of Theoretical and Applied Archaeography], He is the Laureate of Russia's State Award in the field of science and technology.

intellectual elite of Russia being an authority for his contemporaries and exemplifying a thinker educated in a European fashion.

This vision of Karamzin is void of contradictions. For Russians, he could look a Westerner, remaining a deeply national writer, historian and thinker; for a European reader he undoubtedly was a representative of Russian intelligentsia, who perceived a lot of achievements of the Western culture and who was not at all at odds with its past and present.

Once his *History* was published, it was almost simultaneously translated into Polish, French, German, English and Italian, a completely unique phenomenon for Russian literature. For the Russian people, it marked the beginning of self-cognition of their historical past (historical treatises by V. Tatishchev, M. Shcherbatov, Catherine II and others only attracted experts because of their obsolete language); for European readers it meant acquaintance with the Russian history. One can say that Karamzin performed his duty as a citizen and a human by having told in a truly artistic narrative supported by contemporary historical and critical ideas about the histories of peoples and the state occupying one-seventh part of the planet.

This cultural role of Karamzin as a historian undoubtedly deserves quite an independent study. Having mentioned this, in this paper I will try to outline the elements of national thinking that Karamzin voluntarily or involuntarily expressed in his concept of history, the ones which, in my opinion, were not in the possession of Russian people at the age only when they heard the victorious cannons of Suvorov, Kamenskikh, Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky, Kutuzov, at the age when Russia seemed to Western Europe to be a distant and dangerous neighbour, strong and unhampered in its unswerving stride towards power.

In the never-ending argument of Russians over the question 'What is Russia?' which for some reason was to give an answer to the causes of Russia's achievements and, particularly, plights, Karamzin sided with those who as early as in the 18th century, following Peter I's reforms and in rejection of cynically humble Byzantine chastity, declared that 'Russia is Europe'. For Karamzin, to admit this was not only to recognize the reality that could easily be contested. The question 'What is Russia' had a far deeper meaning. It helped him as a historian to cogitate contemporary civilization. By the time he started to work on his History, Karamzin departed from his earlier hesitations between the two concepts of the humanity's past. He resolutely assumed the one which had its roots in the works by Voltaire, Condorcet and Herder. The one, as is known, that postulated the idea of continuity of human progress. Historical advancement, according to it, was directed towards the future and a more perfect state of the mankind. Hence are optimistic aspirations with regard to the unity of human evolution, from ignorance to the fraternity of educated and cultured nations. It is no coincidence that after the defeat of Napoleon, Karamzin wrote a long poem 'The Liberation of Europe and the Glory of Alexander Г' in which he proclaimed, 'Nations are brothers! There is no malice.' In this poem, the historian outlined his vision of Russia's present and future in the progress of modern civilization. In the victory of Russian people over Napoleon he saw a remarkable force of Providence (the idea of providential-ism was borrowed from the historian Bossuet) which had selected Russian people not only to punish the usurper but to be a participant and even a successor of European nations in the making of the contemporary civilization.

However, choosing a nation of people as a 'sign' or a 'unit' of history, inevitably lead to the issues of 'national spirit' and 'nationality' and their role in the world progress. 'Being similar to other European nations,' Karamzin wrote in 1818, 'we differ from them in some capabilities, customs and skills. That is why despite the fact that it is sometimes not easy to tell a Russian from a Brit, we will always tell the Russians from the British: in multitude the national is revealed.'

To combine the ideas of progress with the notions of the value of 'the national' – primarily, traditions and customs -was not at all easy; that is why Karamzin came up with the idea of the universality of culture. 'The path of education and cultural indoctrination,' he wrote, 'is one and the same for all nations; they all follow this path one after another. Foreigners were smarter than Russians, consequently the latter had to learn from the former...'

Karamzin attempted to apply these general methodological principles to his concept of Russia's historical evolution in order to determine pan-European and national phenomena in its

history. I will take a liberty to briefly outline Karamzin's main views of the historical evolution of European states and nations and of Russia's place in the process.

The Russian state, according to Karamzin, had entered 'the common system' of states which had emerged 'on the ruins of the Roman Empire'. A hundred years later (late 9th – late 10th centuries AD) 'the European Russia was no less than it is now; i.e. during a century it came from the cradle to a might of rare quality' and became 'the most educated nation', with even more prospects of greatness and might. While Europe, as Karamzin put it, was an arena for feudal tyranny and oppression, for weaknesses of monarchs, audacity of barons, superstitions, slavery and ignorance, Russia was 'on a par in its power and civil education with the leading European nations <...> having the same character, laws, customs, and codes', being under the beneficial influence of Greece, the only nation which had not been destroyed by the barbarians of the ancient state.

From the second half of the 11th century, however, everything changed, as Karamzin saw it. While Europe was building up its state power due to the Crusades, speeding up commerce and education, Russia was plunging into a mess, similar to that of the split German nations. This brought tears and blood to what used to be a powerful state, and eventually led to Russia's 'lagging behind Western nations in the sense of building up a single state' in the 13th century.

The consequence of this disunity was the Mongolian Golden Horde yoke. It severed Russia from the system of European nations. While the latter were on the road to progress, mitigating mores, developing science and arts, Russia was to take every pain in order not to disappear at all. Excluded during the three centuries from European politics, Russia was plunging into ignorance. The Tatar-Mongol yoke, Karamzin wrote, humiliated Russians morally, teaching them 'the vile intricacies of slavery'. Morally suppressed national spirit, he concluded, is not capable of a great cause, the result of which is indifference and silence of people, 'an evil seed in them'. This 'moral humiliation of the people', the first in their history Karamzin directly linked to the second one, the 24-year tyranny of Ivan the Terrible. From this he drew a line of cause and effect to the third 'moral humiliation as a consequence of tyranny, which occurred in the early 17th century during the Revolt. However, Karamzin believed that while lagging behind Europe, Russia survived the yoke 'with rather a European than

Asian character'. Europe could hardly recognize its eastern neighbour, and not because Europeans failed to comprehend it. Europe had changed itself, while Russia remained the same as it had been three hundred years before. Thanks to the policies of Muscovite princes who steadily and successfully built up autocratic rule, the nation was on the way to revival between Europe and Asia, being a 'mixture of ancient oriental mores brought to Europe by the Slavs and brought to date by our long-term bonds with the Mongols. These mores as well as Christianity were borrowed from the Byzantine Empire and from some Germans introduced to them by the Varangians.' According to Karamzin, this mixture is 'people's property' of Russians.

Karamzin called Ivan III the real creator of Russia's revival. Under his rule, the country found itself again within the common system of European states. From that time on Russia and Europe were quite naturally on the way of rapprochement: 'without assaults and violence', the Russian people as if 'unwillingly' borrowed from Europe all that was to their benefit.

Peter I's reforms, according to Karamzin, once and for all, made Russia a European state. Giving credit to Peter I, the historian, however, vigorously blames the first Russian Emperor for having eradicated the 'old spirit of Russian people' which constitutes the moral power of any nation. Karamzin considered this as the fourth 'moral humiliation' of his nation fraught with danger for its future because one of the most important Russian virtues, conciliarism, was eroded.

Thus, according to Karamzin, Russia of his day was a European nation, it used nearly always to be a European nation. Having a specifically 'Russian physiognomy', the Russian people were on the way to progress together with the other European nations. Peter I gave an even greater impetus to this movement, yet he destroyed a lot in the national spirit of Russians. Castigating him for this, Karamzin, however, understood that what had been done could not be undone. 'Complaints are of no use,' he had to admit. Russia had to move in the direction in which Peter I pushed it.

However, Karamzin's enlightened intellect and erudition, his knowledge of a historian versed in the fates of the empires of the past, inevitably led him to project these fates onto the present and future of his country. To make this projection optimistic instead of pessimistic, the historian discovers the first main difference of Russia's historical path from histories of other nations and states. He argues that the Russian Empire was built 'without violence and without evil employed by the other zealots of Christianity in Europe and America, but only by the examples of the best'. Karamzin thought that by postulating the argument about the 'peaceful' formation of the Russian Empire, he resolved the problem which is sooner or later posed before each empire. He viewed the Russian state as an organic compound of different peoples whose fates were historically predetermined by a thousand-year-old past. He tried to support this peculiarity of Russia by the postulate about the prevalence of human interests over the interests of the state characteristic of the Enlightenment philosophy. 'Do the world powers arise singly to astonish us with their colossal might and their resonant fall? Do they only exist to show how one power destroys another, and after a few centuries it turns into a vast graveyard which becomes foundations for yet another power which, in its turn, will inevitably fall? No! Both our lives and lives of the empires are to promote great abilities of a human soul, here everything is for the soul, everything is for the mind and feelings; everything is immortal in their success! This idea, among coffins and rot, brings us consolation, some great consolation. Uplifted in its greatness, bathing in victories, may Russia shine with all the gifts of the immortal mind; may it multiply the riches of sciences and literature; may Russia's glory be the glory of the humankind...'

Having proclaimed the 'peaceful' character of the empire's formation, Karamzin saw no problem in calling Russian all the nations constituting this empire. These nations might have different gods but they had one single God's vicar on Earth – the autocratic monarch. In this connection Karamzin tried to outline yet another chief difference of Russian history from the Western one. Taking for granted the boundaries of Russia, Karamzin, in line with Montesquieu's L'Esprit des Lois and its Russian version, Catherine II's Nakaz (Instruction) addressed to the Ulozhennaya Commission, declares that monarchy, or to be more exact autocracy, is the form of rule necessary for the Russian state. He thinks that autocracy is important for Russia as an unlimited power of one person, not even hereditary. 'Russia is not England,' he wrote in 1818 to P. A. Vyazemsky, 'not even the Kingdom of Poland; Russia has its own fate with regard to state power, it is great and respectable... Autocracy is its soul, its life as well as the republican rule was inherent in the life of Rome.'

The historian's vision of autocracy is not that of tyranny breeding slavery of some people and abuse on part of others. Autocracy is an enlightened power which is above all political forces, this power punishes and grants mercy in the name of the state's good, it equalizes all interests which exist in the society on its way to progress. Convinced in the correctness of his political idea regarding autocracy as a natural organization of Russian statehood, the idea directed first and foremost at Russia's present and future, Karamzin applies it to the past of the country as well.

The beginning of the Russian history, he wrote, is a remarkable and unprecedented example in the world history when the Slavs voluntarily ceded their popular rule in favour of autocracy. This event was to predetermine all Russian state system to come, which, according to Karamzin, was finally formed in the 15th century. 'Two tsars, Ivan and Vasily, were able to determine the fate of our rule for centuries to come and make autocracy a sort of necessary attribute of Russia, the only state code, the only foundation for its integrity, might and prosperity.'

In the functional system of Russian autocracy Karamzin singles out as the most important aspect its joint interaction with people, the latter being one of the political forces which predetermine the fates of the state. In accordance with his views of the world, he tries to discern those traits of 'national identity' which differ his fellow countrymen from Europeans. He is optimistic about some differences, e.g. cultural level, confident that these differences can be overcome. He calls others eternal, and classifies them as not just 'national', but as political virtues. Russian tolerance belongs to the latter. Calling this virtue a 'remarkable phenomenon and even surprising', the historian is prone to explain it by lack of education of the Russian people, their inborn piety and religious tolerance. According to Karamzin, Russian tolerance is not only

subservience and humility, but also some peculiar 'feedback' between people and authority which acts in the interests of the state.

Into this functional system of Russian autocracy Karamzin attempted to include the church, the Orthodox Church, first and foremost. Church in Russia, according to Karamzin, had never strived to subjugate secular power, it functioned in the wake of the policy of princes and tsars and 'being unchanged in its primeval character', mitigated mores, quenched passions, brought up virtues. 'In Western countries of Europe,' the historian wrote, 'spiritual authorities annexed secular power because they had to deal with people who were half-savages, who had <...> adopted Christianity yet failed to find accord between this religion and their civil laws, who could not draw a natural border between those two powers, while Greek church shone in brilliance in the sophisticatedly constructed state where clergy could not seize the rights which were alien to them.'

Today, from the heights of modern knowledge about Russia's past, it is easy to see where Karamzin was mistaken while trying to show the differences of Russian history from the history of Western Europe. In the annals of the world history there was neither exceptionally peaceful invitation of the Varangians nor a 'peaceful' integration of minor nations into an empire. Russian autocracy as a political organization was originally a symbol of force, but not power, of fear, but not law. The idea of patriarchal and 'fatherly' power of the state embodied in the autocracy was quite unlikely to withstand seriously the despotic power of bureaucracy, which was planted into Russian soil by Peter I's reforms and gave way to metastasizing tumour of the purely Russian red tape, amazingly persistent despite repeated surgeries.

Karamzin was making a historical myth of Russia. He himself as the creator of this myth is also a representative of Russian intelligentsia at the turn of two centuries and a historical personage who in his works showed the ideas pertinent to a certain part of Russian society about Russia's and Europe's past. After Karamzin, the elements of this myth created by him were not mothballed in an old coffer of a Russian grandma.

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V. B. Kuvaldin[119]

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NATION-STATES AS DEMIURGES OF WORLD INSTITUTIONS

The 20th century passed under the sign of the search for global institutions adequate to the forming and transforming global world. The initiators of creating the fundamentally new models of the organization of the world space were nation-states, especially the biggest and the strongest of them.

Creating world institutions, nation-states are jealous of their sovereignty. For them the global forms of the world order mean continuation, sophistication and enrichment of sovereignty, but not a renunciation of it. World institutions are supposed to realize the collective will of countries-members, but not to substitute for them with their subjectivity. At present the idea of the 'world government' lies in the sphere of science fiction, but not in practical politics.

At the dawn of the 20th century the dominating form of supra-national organization was a colonial empire. A dozen of European states (plus Japan) had control over the main part of the world. In the world politics the first fiddle was played by former participants of 'the European concert of states', which by that time had broken up into two opposing blocks. (Western) Europe ruled the destinies of the world.

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[119] Head of Chair of Social and Humanitarian Studies at Moscow School of Economics of Lomonosov Moscow State University, professor of Moscow State Institute for International Relations (University) of the MFA of Russia, Dr. Sc. (History). Author of over 50 scholarly papers, including: *Intelligentsiya v poslevoyennoy Italiyi* [Intelligentsia in Post-War Italy], *Amerikanskiy kapitalizm i intelligentsiya: istoriko-sotsiologicheskiy ocherk* [American Capitalism and Intelligentsia: Historical and Sociological Essay], *Globalny mir: ekonomika, politika, mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* [The Global World: Economics, Politics and International Relations], and others. Member of the Executive committee of Gorbachev Foundation.

After the First World War, as part of the Versailles Treaty, the first serious attempt was made to create a truly universal international organization in the form of the League of Nations. It did not prove to be really successful, in particular, due to the fact that at the moment of the birth of the League of Nations some most important states of the planet (the USA, Russia, Germany) were left in the basket. The Great Crisis and the Great Depression triggered national selfishness paralyzing the tendency to the search for collective decisions. After the Second World War the split-off, bloodstained and exhausted Western Europe had to yield the yellow jersey to two periphery products of the European civilization – the USA and the USSR.

It is common knowledge that the bases of global institutions were laid at the end of the Second World War when the issue of the principles of the post-war world organization was on the agenda. It was then that the Bretton Woods institutions came into the world – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). At the same time there was created a unique tool for regulating the entire system of international relations, such as the Organization of the United Nations (UN). Some time later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of the modern World Trade Organization (WTO), was signed.

But in the conditions of the 'Cold war' which had flared up, none of these institutions became – nor could it become – a really global one. The IMF, WB and GATT were 'privatized' by the Western block that was acting under the aegis of the USA, the UN was half-paralyzed by the split and hostility between the states that had won the Second World War and initiated this organization. The world community, split in its ideological and political foundations, rejected any construction that laid claims to a universal significance. The question was put in a different way: who would have the upper hand?

Meanwhile after the recession of the interwar period the process of globalization was going on and gaining in strength without a corresponding institutional background. The problem of manageability of the world development was gradually assuming a more and more dramatic character, which, in particular, the works of the Rome Club proved. Global problems were multiplying and escalating, but there was no real access to global solutions. The only thing people managed to do was just limit the missile-nuclear arms race for it not to be completely beyond control.

As in the years of the 'Cold war' – as is said by the definition – no new world (global) institutions could be created, the institutional construction was taking different ways. There appeared a number of supra-national institutions but none of them claimed to have a global status. Their tasks were much more modest: (1) they attended to the opposing politico-military blocks – the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA), to a considerable degree the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the European Union (EU); (2) they were gropung 'a third way' in the world politics (Non-Aligned Movement); (3) they synthesized the interests of states of the corresponding regions – the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The 'G-7', created in this period to overcome the acute system crisis of the capitalist world of the '70s, which was most vividly expressed in 'stagflation', was a purely western institution, despite Japan's participation. With Russia joining it, it turned into the 'G-8', but it has not yet become a world institution and is unlikely to become it in the foreseeable future. In this regard it is enough to mention that two key states are not parts of it, two developing super-powers of the 21st century – China and India.

It is quite clear why world institutions could not form in the conditions of the severe opposition of the 'Cold war'. It is a little more difficult to account for what hindered their appearance during the two decades following its end, up to the global economic crisis of the end of the current decade. But the key is not so far to seek: this was what the only surviving superpower, the United States of America, wanted. The USA were quite right in thinking that any global institutions in one way or another would tie their hands and restrict their freedom of manoeuvre. This is why in the sphere of world economics they laid stress on the so-called 'Washington Consensus', agreement of positions within the 'triangle' comfortable to them – the Treasury Department of the US, the IMF and the WB. And in the sphere of world politics they

also preferred to act within the western club of states, resorting to the assistance of the UN only when it was impossible to evade it.

The developing relative weakening of the US positions is gradually putting an end to such practices of the world affairs management. The burden of the global hegemony is getting too heavy to lift even for such a powerful state as the USA. The former world creditor No. 1, which has become the world debtor No. 1, whether they like it or not, have to defer to the position of other states. The military potential of the United States, unparalleled on the planet, turns out to be restrict-ly useful for solving most important problems of the global world, evidence of it are their ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. The complication of the processes of interaction in the conditions of the global world requires corresponding institutional forms and practices.

The deepest world economic crisis of the last half a century, which we are just beginning to get out of, may give a new impulse to global institutions development. The first sign has appeared in the form of 'G-20'. Though only 10 per cent of countries of the planet are represented in the 'G20', they account for over 90 per cent of the world output. Another most important characteristics of the 'G-20' which makes it different from previous global institutions is an unprecedented wide representation of developing countries which were referred to as the so-called 'third world' before and were not treated very well on the level of world politics.

Certainly, one swallow doesn't make a spring, but its appearance is momentous in itself. As before it for over than half a century, institutional construction on the global level was completely bogged down. And geo-economical and geo-political South had never taken part in it at all. It is clear that we are dealing with a different world. It is impossible to imagine creation of modern institutions of global processes management not only without China and India, but also without such countries as Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and South Africa.

World institutions are assuming a qualitatively new character not only due to the dramatic expansion of the circle of key players, intensification of their interaction on a wider range of problems. For the last two centuries the construction of the global world was the deal of one, the European (Western) civilization in its different roles and images. Today all other civilizational complexes represented by their most powerful members are joining in one way or another. It means that the problems of values, identities, mentality and mutual translation of aims and ideas of different civilizations into a generally accepted 'language' come to the foreground of the world politics.

In other words, the global world requires not only effective world-wide governing institutions, but a global culture, a universal language of values using which representatives of different civilizations can communicate and understand one another correctly. Otherwise, we will be like the builders of the Tower of Babel.

In the same way as it was before, the main carriers of global impulses are the most powerful states of the planet in their complicated interrelations where cooperation and rivalry are intertwined. This is why the dialectic interaction between national, regional and global principles was and is the central nerve knot of the world politics.

At the same time, the appearance of a full cultural constituent in the global construction requires fundamental supplementing the development of international relations with a wide cooperation of societies, creating an everlasting framework of human connections and relations on the level of 'grass roots'. The global world cannot be a purely political construction; it needs a steady basis in the form of the 'mega-society', a new human community over the borders and barriers. The global culture is to bound to become its binding mortar.

N. I. Lapin[120]

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[120] A corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Department of Axiology and Philosophical Anthropology of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Centre

UNIVERSAL VALUES AND THE DIVERSITY OF HUMAN LEBENSWELT

The United Nations Organization declared 2010 the International Year for the Harmonization of Cultures. Such harmonization is possible if there are values common to all existing cultures, i.e. universal values. If it is so, it is necessary to define them explicitly and to aim at consensus in regard to their content.

On the other hand, the harmonization of cultures still has its limits, as every culture tends to be self-protective and is embodied in an innumerable diversity of experience of socio-cultural communities and societies, of human *Lebenswelt [world of lived experience]*. The basis for this diversity rests in specific combinations of ethno-cultural, religious, social, political, economical, professional, corporate, gender-based, generational and other values circulating in *Lebenswelt.*

We have to clarify how universal values and specific structures of values of human *Lebenswelt* are related to each other. In this paper I will try to outline an approach to the study of this interrelationship.

Universal values as a cultural invariant of basic values

In order to reach consensus on the structure and subject-matter of universal values we first have to specify what values *are.* Related literature study and my own research let the author conclude that values are generalized goals and means to achieve them that serve as fundamental norms. They ensure the integration of a society helping individuals choose socially approved conduct in meaningful situations. Each value and their total have twofold basis: both in an individual and in the society.

In human consciousness the scope of values forms a hierarchic structure. The top level, which is most stable, is compiled from terminal values, or values-goals consisting of generalized notions of desired social relations. Below them are instrumental values, or values-means, i.e. human qualities required for achieving terminal values, which are subject to change.

Basic values (20 to 30 total) are distinguished from object-oriented values (which amount to hundreds). Basic values are ultimately generalized human goals (ideals) and equally generalized means of achieving them. They are associated with basic human needs: vital, socializing, interactional, sense-of-life generating. Two cultural types of basic values are distinguished: traditional and post-traditional (modern, liberal). At the same time there exist culture-independent basic values typical of any culture; they present universal, or overall human values.

The table below shows an minimal model of basic values which was adoj*ed to monitor changes of values in the populace of transforming Russia and which was empirically tested in five waves of all-Russia monitoring 'Values and Interests of the Russian Populace'. We can somewhat specify the structure of selected values and their allocation in the table's cells. Following M. Weber, for example, we can regard the value of labour (work) as post-traditional. Please note that we interpret sociability as an ability to communicate which is based on an-thropo-communicative need of mutual understanding.

Minimal model of basic values of the Russian populace

	Traditional	Universal	Post-traditional
Terminal	Tradition Family	Order Prosperity Work	Individual's life Liberty

for Socio-cultural Changes of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor of Sociology at the State University for Administration.

Author of more than 300 scientific publications, among which are: *Ways of Russia: Socio-Cultural Changes* (Puti Rossiyi: sotsiokulturaye transformatsiyi), *Empirical Sociology in Western Europe* (Empiricheskaya sotsiologiya v Zapadnoy Evrope), *The Theory and Practice of Innovation* (Teoriya i praktika innovatiki) and others.

President-Organizer (1989-90) and Honorary member of the Russian Society of Sociologists.

Member of the editorial boards of the journals: 'The World of Russia. Sociology. Ethnology' (Mir Rossiyi. Sotsiologiya. Etnologiya), 'Man. Culture. Personality' (Chelovek. Kul'tura. Lichnost'), 'Man and Culture' (Chelovek i kultura).

Laureate of the USSR State Prize in science and technology. Medal 'For the Contribution to Science' named after P.A. Sorokin.

Instrumental	Sacrifice Self-willingness	Sociability Morals Authoritativeness	Independence Initiative

A specific structure of the populace's values is formed in every society which reflects its ethnical and historical peculiarities. The given model is based on Russian monitoring data. These data, which have been recording the dynamics of values since 1990, show that for the last two decades there was a growth of influence of post-traditional and universal values in the minds of Russians, and the adjacency of their vectors. Traditional values evolve simultaneously having less support. In general, there formed a tolerant symbiosis of different types of values.

How did this symbiosis become possible? Is it characteristic of axiological chaos or is it based on a specific type of rationality?

Mutual understanding between the people as a function of human Lebenswelt and a prerequisite to a tolerant symbiosis of values

In general, the evolution of basic values of Russia's contemporary population happens spontaneously, without any ideological dictation on anybody's part. Wide-scale interviews with respondents at their homes used in monitoring 'Values and Interests of Russian Populace' record this evolution at the level of common consciousness circulating in people's *Lebenswelt.*

As mentioned above, the structure of values forms a meaningful base for mutual understanding between the people. It is formed at the junction of two flows of values: on the one hand, the society at large, with its institutes and organizations convey to regional societies values which are characterized by formal rationality (according to M. Weber); on the other hand, primary settlement communities and human *Lebenswelt* evolving there fill socio-cultural environment of regions and the society in general with values that have substantial rationality (according to Ferdinand Tonnies). The two types of rationalities collide – the formal-purposeful and the substantial. This collision became particularly acute in the transforming Russian society which was characterized by a high uncertainty of transformation vectors and multiple risks in the majority of its spheres during 'the roaring nineties'.

Under such conditions the task to provide mutual understanding between the members of the society became particularly acute and difficult. Its burden fell mainly on people's *Lebenswelt* which main function is to secure mutual understanding for people living in primary settlement communities. This mutual understanding is an essential prerequisite for effective communication and interaction between the people (Jilrgen Habermas). The task was solved due to the tolerance intrinsic to the Russians: in this case it served as the means of practical rationalization of relation to conflict flows of values. Opulence of the 'concept sphere' of the Russian language (D. Likhachov) as a language of cross-national communication in Russia always ensures mutual understanding between the Russians.

A unique consensus of various Russians towards culturally heterogeneous values arose on this ground: practical rationality motivated *Aufhebung [elimination]* (after Hegel) of a formally conflict-generating interrelation of values, i.e. the perception of this interrelation as some synthesis, in fact, as tolerant symbiosis. This symbiosis became almost a rational answer of people's *Lebenswelt* to the axiological challenge of a heavily contentious society and resulted in the required interrelations of the majority of citizens of towns and villages, regions and the whole of the society.

In contemporary Russia settlement communities are represented as municipalities. The socio-cultural mission of administrative bodies of these municipalities should involve the preservation of the population's *Lebenswelt,* and thus support people's solidarity, their activities (cultural, civil, economical), and trustworthiness of the authorities. But in the majority of municipalities the administration realizes this mission only too vaguely, although it does perform it in part and spontaneously. As a result, the *Lebenswelt* of settlement communities is subject to the increasing pressure from the formalized institutions and organizations, it is distorted and comes to the point of collapse.

However, according to Habermas, primary territorial communities defend their *Lebenswelt* everywhere, otherwise people's mutual understanding and common activities would become impossible. But is such the reality in Russia?

Cultural asymmetry of the society and the mission of state structures

In contemporary Russia the power and resources of federal authorities prevail over those of territorial political subdivisions. This prevalence is growing and dominates over the structures of regional communities. According to the federal statistics, from 2001 to 2006 the total number of workers of territorial bodies of federal executive bodies increased almost 1.8 times and outnumbered 600 000, that is three times as much as the number of workers of executive bodies of the political subdivisions of the Russian Federation. As an actual fact, the administrative-municipal reform of 2003-08 increased financial and administrative dependence of municipalities on state bodies. The threat of the collapse of people's *Lebenswelt* has increased.

In his studies of modern western societies J. Coleman came to the conclusion that there dominate macro-social structures over the primary communities and thus represent asymmetrical societies. This is more than true with the Russian society and its regions which have also become asymmetrical communities. Are there any boundaries and limits of this asymmetry?

The necessity of diversity for the development of cultures, societies and individuals is commonly accepted. Therefore, there must be a boundary of asymmetry. The mission of state authorities (regional and federal including their territorial bodies) consists in keeping reasonable boundaries of interrelation asymmetry of macro-social institutions and organizations, on the one hand, and of regional structures and *Lebenswelt* of the settlement communities, on the other hand. It is necessary to resist the growing of this asymmetry into the total suppression of regional structures and the destruction of populace's *Lebenswelt.* The paramount meaning of this mission of the state bodies is to sustain and elevate fundamental, anthropo-com-municative human need of mutual understanding.

Forming the conditions for the realization of this need is an essential prerequisite to participation of the Russian state and society in general in the global dialogue of cultures and cultural harmonization. Mutual understanding is not only a need but a universal value that should become firmly established at all levels of the global community and in every society in particular. Depreciation of this need at the primary level of the populace's *Lebenswelt* threatens both democracy and state security, draws it back from the global dialogue and harmonization of cultures.

S. V. Lavrov[121]

**THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND PARTNERSHIP
OF CIVILIZATIONS: THE MAKING OF A GLOBAL CULTURE**

The relevance of the subject of the regular International Likhachov scientific conference raises no doubts. The world financial crisis and economic recession have clearly demonstrated not only the fallacy of the whole post-war financial and economic system and its inadequacy to modern realities, but also the lack of alternatives to the consolidation of efforts of each and every responsible member of the world community in search of effective answers to common global challenges and threats. Among them is overcoming the consequences of the recession, opposition

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[121] Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, member of Security Council of the Russian Federation, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation. Since 1972 Mr Lavrov has been working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Russia. In 1994-2004 he was permanent Russian envoy to the UN and Russian envoy to the Security Council of the UN. Author of a number of scholarly papers, including: *Popytka zaglyanut' v poslevoyennoye budushcheye* [An Attempt to Look into Post-War Future], *Neskol 'ко shtrihov к mezhdunarodnomu portretu Moskvy* [A Few Touches to the International Portrait of Moscow], *Rossiya i Indiya: Vzaimovygodnoye sotrudnichestvo i strategicheskoye partnerstvo* [Russia and India: Mutually Beneficial Cooperation and Strategic Partnership], *Mir vpoiskah novogo ravnovesiya* [The World Seeking a New Balance] and others.

to the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the war on terrorism, combating the organized crime, drug trafficking and piracy. The world is facing the necessity of finding cooperative solutions to such widespread problems as poverty, epidemics, climate change, and the after-effects of natural disasters. The positive and congregative agenda which is beginning to find ground in the international relations determines the crucial importance of their harmonization on the basis of cross-cultural and economic cohesion and interpenetration.

In the 21st century we live in a multi-faced world including not only more than two hundred sovereign states but also a number of local civilizations – the complex combinations of ethnical groups and nations united by common shared systems of civilizational values and historical destinies. Taken in conjunction with one another they constitute the global civilization which is going through a critical transitional period in its development.

As the bipolar 'vector' of the cold-war era is passing into oblivion, the cultural and civilizational diversity of the modern world is gaining ground and making an increasing impact on the processes of the formation of the up-to-date, fair and effective polycentric system of the global management. It calls for team work in a broad and respectable league of states in search of common basis for international cooperation. Consequently, the inter-civilizational agreement, the co-existence of cultures and religious beliefs, the recognition of the plurality of development patterns and of equal rights of different value systems is becoming imperative. In other words, globalization demands a choice of tolerance and civilizational compatibility, of deide-ologization of international relations.

At the same time, in the process of establishing the multipolar world order, risks of cross-civilizational split are rising and the potentiality of ethno-confessional conflicts is growing. One of the main reasons for this is the spread of globalization processes beyond the area of the Western civilization, which has led to the fact that value criteria and development patterns have become a subject to competition that has acquired a cross-civilizational dimension. At that, one can hardly accept the idea that the seeds of conflict are sown in the intensified competition of cultures and civilizations. The world has never been homogeneous or unified. The cause is in the rather lengthy parting of the West with the illusion of its eternal global domination.

The fact that the multi-polar world is now in the making has been recognized by an overwhelming majority of countries. It is becoming more and more apparent that in the 21st century the interdependence of states has greatly increased, and thus their security and prosperity are inseparable. None of the contemporary international problems can be solved by violence. These are objective prerequisites for a true democratization of international relations through strengthening legal bases and forming the multilateral approach to solving the global problems. All these factors predetermine the key significance of the formation of harmony of interests and values for the partnership of civilizations. The most evident factor of this rapprochement is the dialogue of civilizations in the cultural sphere.

The year of 2010 has been declared by the United Nations to be an international year for the harmonization of cultures. It reflects the fact that the world community is becoming increasingly aware of the role of culture in the modern fast-changing world. The balanced cross-cultural dialogue is not only an effective instrument of ironing out the disagreements which arise between states, but also one of the main preconditions for the steady national development, providing the due level of security and supporting each state's welfare.

Contribution to promoting the international cultural and humanitarian cooperation as a means of establishing a cross-civilizational dialogue, reaching agreement and providing mutual understanding between the peoples is among the main tasks of the Russian diplomacy that are set forth in the Conception of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation approved by President D.A. Medvedev.

Tolerance is the guarantee of a successful cross-civilizational communication. It is one of the main criteria of a person's, a society's or a state's adherence to the values of democracy, of steady development and of co-existence of peoples in concord with one another under the conditions of mutual respect for faiths and customs that differ from their own beliefs.

This approach has literally been gained through suffering from an intricate Russian history. If multinational and multi-confessional Russia had failed to achieve concord between

representatives of the numerous religious and ethnic groups, of cultural and religious traditions, we would have failed to constitute a major and effective state. The constant creation of cross-civilizational agreement on the basis of tolerance was a necessary condition for the progress and even the existence of Russia. It accounts for a special role which our country can play in the task of connecting all states' interests despite their cultural and civilizational differences, which is a key factor of solving acute problems of the present day.

Russia supports all the international initiatives that promote closer relations between civilizations and that are aimed at integrating the moral component in the common format of the modern international relations. I am convinced that each and every state is capable of making its positive contribution to this important process. We initiatively work on this range of topics in the line with the UN, the Alliance of Civilizations, the UNESCO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other specialized international structures and forums.

We do our work on the basis of the corresponding National plan and ceoperate with the Alliance of Civilizations organized under the aegis of the UN Secretary General. The key regulations of the National plan are concordant with the main directives of the work of the Alliance – education, youth policy, mass media and migration; however, they also include issues of a cross-cultural and inter-confessional dialogue. The plan is being realized step by step. We have every intention of continuing to use fully the considerable potential of the civil society, including non-governmental organizations, expert and academic groups.

Russian delegations participated in the second Forum of the Alliance in April 2009 in Istanbul, in the meeting of ministers in September last year in New York during the 64th session of the UN General Assembly, in the meeting of coordinators of participants of the Group of friends of the Alliance in November in Rabat (Morocco). The third Forum is due to take place in May this year in Rio-de-Janeiro. We regard its holding in Brazil as a sign of giving the Alliance the format more of a global nature, of eliminating the previously adopted dichotomy between the West and the Islamic world.

We support the UNESCO's efforts in the area of cross-cultural and inter-confessional dialogue as well as efforts aimed at fighting xenophobia, racial and religious intolerance. The meeting of the Executive committee of the European Coalition of cities against racism was held in St. Petersburg last May, the Coalition uniting more than a hundred cities including two Russian ones, St. Petersburg and Derbent. In December in Moscow there was established an association of 'The Cities of Russia for Civil Solidarity and Interethnic Concord' the main task of which is to promote the consolidation of efforts of city councils aimed at prevention of displays of xenophobia and intolerance. 30 Russian cities joined it. The main events as part of the World Day of Philosophy occurred in November in Moscow and St. Petersburg under the slogan of 'Philosophy in the Dialogue of Cultures'.

The International year for the harmonization of cultures will be marked in our country by a number of events – festivals of music, arts and theatre of the peoples of Russia, the CIS and the Baltic states, international conferences and exhibitions. Among them are the Ninth Youth Delphic games of Russia and the Seventh Youth Delphic games of the CIS, the 4th Forum of interpreters, writers and publishers of the CIS and the Baltic countries, the 5th Forum of academic and artistic intelligentsia of the CIS countries.

We continue to promote the initiative of Patriarch Cyril of Moscow and All Russia to form a High Panel dealing with inter-confessional dialogue under the supervision of the UNESCO's Director General, which enjoys the support of the representatives of the world's major religions.

Director General I. Bokova is planning to set up a High Panel on Peace and Dialogue of Cultures under her supervision where intellectuals and culturati, businessmen and mass-media, public and religious figures from different countries of the world have been invited to participate.

The range of topics of the cross-civilizational dialogue is becoming more significant on the agenda of the OSCE. We permanently take part in the discussions organized in the course

of events held by the Bureau for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE; we keep in touch with three personal representatives of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE counteracting with different forms of intolerance. Adherence to the respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms including the rights of national minorities is confirmed in the

Declaration adopted on the initiative of Russia and of our partners in the CSTO and Serbia during the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the CSTO in Athens in December 2009 while celebrating the 65th anniversary of the end of the Second World War; this Declaration also points out the danger of establishing the atmosphere of hate, discrimination and intolerance based on ethnic, racial and religious grounds.

Russia has supported the intention of Kazakhstan as the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE to set the topic of encouraging cross-cultural and inter-confessional dialogue as one of the most important objectives of their chairmanship in the current year. We intend to take a most active part in the High Conference of the OSCE on tolerance and non-discrimination (As-tana, 29-30 June).

While promoting our priorities in the cross-civilizational dialogue we actively use the considerable potential of the Council of Europe. On our initiative under the aegis of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe annual conferences on the religious aspect of cross-cultural dialogue are held. The regular third conference is to take place on the of September 13-14 this year in Ohrid (FYR Macedonia); its subject is of currently acute importance: 'The role of mass media in encouraging the cross-cultural dialogue, tolerance and mutual understanding: the freedom of mass media and respect for cultural and religious diversity'. The question of the impact of moral and ethic ideas on the formation of legal regulations seems to be a prospective direction for a discussion in this format. We also intend to promote the idea of the Council of Europe holding events on the range of topics connected with the up-to-date understanding of the European identity.

One of the most important directions of work of the Russian diplomacy on the topics of cross-civilizational concord is establishing interaction with the Islamic world – both on the mutual basis and in the line of the Organization of the Islamic Conference including the Islamic Organization on Education, Science and Culture. Last year a permanent representation of Russia started its work in the OIC in Jeddah. The work of the Strategic Vision Group 'Russia – the Islamic world' set up on our initiative is going on; during the fifth meeting of the Group in December 2009 in Kuwait plans in the field of the cooperative translating and publishing work, of interacting with mass media, of encouraging dialogue between Christian Orthodoxy and Islam were adopted.

The civil society is supposed to play an important role in establishing cross-civilizational dialogue, mutual understanding and trust. Its representatives are not only to rebuff the ideology of the split of the world, but to fight against those who profess it. A more important current task is to work out a positive agenda for the cross-civilizational interaction, to show the common nature of the tasks which all states and peoples are facing, and the prospect of formation of the common global-civilization culture based on the preservation of the diversity and the cooperative augmentation of cultural and spiritual riches of the humanity.

A considerable contribution into the extension of contacts in this field is made by 'Dialogue of Civilizations', the international NGO World Public Forum created on the initiative of Russian non-governmental organizations. The seventh session of the forum was held in October 2009 on the island of Rhodes; the meeting was dedicated to the search of conceptual basis for retaining the structural integrity of the world community in the modern conditions and to the prospects of the development in the post-crisis world.

Russia is devoted to the assertion of supreme values common for all civilizations – human rights for life and freedom, for protection against discrimination based on ethnic grounds; Russia opposes all attempts to sacrifice these values to policy based on bloc thinking and double standards. The problems of today cannot be solved disregarding morality, disregarding the universal solidarity. The search for a common moral background that has always existed in the world's major religions, is extremely important for the development of the cross-civilizational dialogue, for building up the criteria of providing a person's and a state's rights and responsibilities.

In these conditions, there is a noticeable need of a religious factor in international affairs becoming more and more apparent. It is easier to look for solutions to acute problems if it is possible to rely on similar spiritual and moral values of world religions. This is why it is so important for politicians and diplomats to encourage the creation of favourable conditions for

further development of a cross-confessional dialogue that helps to find common grounds particularly in reconciling conflicts which have a religious component.

Today, when the joint efforts of the world community are aimed at overcoming the global recession and at searching for new bases for steady social development, it is necessary to be able to use the advantages of globalization and at the same time to prevent any destructive consequences of the unifying globalism.

The UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity adopted in 2001 points out that the process of globalization stimulated by a rapid development of information and computer technologies though being a challenge for cultural diversity at the same time creates conditions for a new dialogue between cultures and civilizations. As a source of innovation and creativity, the cultural diversity is a global commons and must be recognized and consolidated for the sake of the current and future generations. The UNESCO calls for giving effect to cultural pluralism, as being inseparably connected with democracy, it forms a favourable milieu for cultural exchange and for the flourishing of creative abilities which nourish the vital forces of the society.

At the beginning of the 21st century two tendencies gained prominence threatening the cultural diversity and hindering the dialogue of cultures. On the one hand, the modern information technologies and, above all, the Internet are a powerful means of advancing cultural and civilizational values of the West. Due to the lack of comparable instruments for the spread of values of other cultures and civilizations, there is a threat of the depletion of the cultural and informational diversity of the world, of exhaustion of the spiritual sphere of the humanity. On the other hand, the extremes of national and civilizational self-assertion, especially those of superiority, the absolutization of a particularity, the attempts to stand above or apart from the world cultural progress do hinder the establishment of the global culture as well. Such trends could be clearly seen on the area of the former 'socialist camp' in the 1990s; it was then when the Russian language as a language of international and inter-civilizational communication in a number of countries of the CIS and Eastern Europe became a hostage to political speculations and claims. Some attempts can be seen in certain countries today to use the national and cultural factor to disconnect peoples.

Our common task is to lead to the optimal relationship between the unique identity of cultures and civilizations and promote their openness to the dialogue and mutual enrichment.

Russia will henceforth in every possible way promote the advancement of all-round cross-cultural and inter-civilizational dialogue. I am convinced that it is bound to become a real contribution to the efforts devoted to forming a polycentric democratic world order, where there will be no superiority complexes of civilizational or any other ground, where every state, whether it be big or small, will live in peace, security and mutual understanding with its neighbours, will feel an equal and respectable member of the world community, thus providing its citizens with an all-range wide access to all treasures of the world culture.

V. A. Lektorsky[122]
GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY

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[122] Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Chairman of the International Editorial Board of the 'Issues of Philosophy' journal (Voprosy filosofiyi), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor.

Author of books: *Subject, Object, Understanding* (Subyekt, obyekt, pozna*myey); Classical and Non-Classical Epistemology* (Epistemologiya klassicheskaya i neklassicheskaya); *Transformations of Rationality in Modern Culture* (Trans-formatsiyi ratsional'nosti v sovremennoy kulture); *Philosophy in the Context of Culture* (Filosofiya v kontekste kultury), and others. Many of his works have been translated and published in the USA, the UK, Germany, France, Finland, South Korea and other countries.

Member of the International Institute for Philosophy (Paris, France), a foreign member of the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, the USA), a corresponding member of the International Academy of Philosophy of Science (Brussels), professor *honoris causa* of the Institute for Philosophy of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing, China), an honorary member of Kazakhstan National Academy of Sciences.

Different cultures with their specific systems of values, notions of the human dignity, the place of man in the world and in the society have always been to some extent contiguous. Nevertheless until recently they were able to exist somewhat isolated from each other. Modern globalization implies the impossibility of any isolation whatever. The simple idea of tolerance in the interactions of cultures (expressed in the notion of multiculturalism) does not operate properly as every culture is expansive in its nature trying to impose its purports on others. The only way to escape a total clash of cultures (the threat being quite real) is to start a dialogue between them. But the latter task is extremely hard as a dialogue presupposes mutual understanding which is impossible without some similarity of values and positions, not to speak of a mutual acceptance of common ways to hold a rational discussion.

Meanwhile, nowadays it is becoming increasingly apparent how dramatic is the difference of value perceptions peculiar to various cultures. I will illustrate the idea with a topical problem of human rights.

One has to admit that the notion of human rights formed within the frame of a singular civilization, namely the West-European, as the result of a certain evolving practical experience. But this fact can be differently interpreted.

One can assume that although it was in the historically European environment that those rights were formulated, they still express the man's very nature. The latter can be recognized as either originating in the highest spiritual sphere, or springing from common biological human nature (the idea of the natural *right, jus naturale)*.

Another notion is based on the assumption that human rights are the result of progress of a certain civilization in a certain area and thus they are not equally binding for all other regions of the world. This idea has quite a number of supporters.

The third viewpoint assumes that law emerged historically in a certain environment, within a certain culture but has acquired a universal character nowadays. Thus the future of the man in the world is impossible without these rights.

But then a question arises about how to regard specific human rights, for example those that correlate the rights an individual and those of the society, or the correlation of rights and responsibilities, as different cultures understand these correlations differently.

That is why a present discussion on understanding human rights is a debate about different views of man, his self-sustain-ability, freedom and dignity. This debate is unavoidable. But it is vital for it to be held as a dialogue and not as imposing of one value system on another (through economic or political pressure, or with the help of information technologies).

Meanwhile a dispute on understanding the human nature is getting hotter nowadays not only due to a new stage in the interaction of cultures. In the times of globalization, new information, communication and biological technologies the mankind faces new challenges when not only different understanding of man and his values in various cultures but the very existence of culture and man is at stake.

The borders of man's freedom are changing as modern civilization is so complicated and is becoming much more complicated that there arises the essential need of a strict social control over the man's activities. The borderline between private and public life is gradually disappearing.

To prove it, one can list a large number of examples, starting with modern experiments on constructing human physical-ity and psychics and concluding with a problem that owing to a growing complexity of social life, increase of risks, threats of terrorism there will emerge the need to control human movements (a man's location, relocation, etc.), and this can be presented to the public as carried out in their interests, so that people can willingly accept such control.

In other words, it is all about the future of man, about a possible threat of transforming the man into the 'after-human'.

But in this respect it becomes apparent that however do the existing cultures differ in their understanding of man, of his rights and responsibilities, of the nature of his freedom and his place in the world, they all proceed from the need to protect the man's dignity, freedom (as is presupposed by a responsible attitude) and justice. Without it there is no man and no culture. Facing the global threat of 'the loss of humanness' different cultures have to search for common

values together, in a dialogue. For this is the only way of their self-preservation. Not a single culture is able to resist modern technological challenges alone.

A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov[123]

THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Any dialogue is a form of communication, certain rules and a code of conduct. All these typical features of dialogue are manifested in law. Dialogue of world cultures is a way to put international relations into life, it vents itself in certain rules and reveals specific cultural codes of conduct of the parties involved in the dialogue.

Dialogue of cultures, as any dialogue, is based on some foundations that can be differently treated by the contemporaries, but in the course of time are esteemed in more temperate colours by the descendants. Consequently, legal regulation in its evolution is based on different values, too.

In regard to legal regulation of international relations in their general context, a long way has been passed from *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (the law of war and peace) as described by Hugo Grotius to the law of Peace and Peaceful Coexistence that formed the basis of the UN constituent charter.

Dialogue of cultures that serves as a mode of international relations is manifested on two levels, it is a dialogue of culture agents, people, and a dialogue of culture exponents, states.

In the international law, the dialogue of people is presented through private property relations and personal non-property relations. Originating in one state and being regulated by its laws, they demand recognition by other states that have their own laws. The difference in laws results from the difference in cultures of states and peoples.

In the course of human history people have produced collaborative mechanisms for legal systems to regulate these relations. The key element of this mechanism is private international law and international civil process that are targeted at providing both recognition of legitimacy of relations arising in foreign countries and judicial remedy for the parties concerned.

Certain spheres of legal regulation, for instance, legal status of non-citizens, their procedural rights in court demonstrate effective interaction of legal systems. The principle of providing a foreigner with national norms dominates in this sphere. The spheres of commercial relations or intellectual activities, namely copyright recognition and protection, can also be positively estimated.

Alongside with it, in regard to other fields of legal regulation, it would be a mistake to consider them perfect, despite their long history. Suffice it to consider the sphere of family relations. It is here that cultural diversity is manifested in full. At the same time, the practice shows that the issues of interaction between legal systems and state efforts to create mutually acceptable unified regulation terms are the acutest here. As far as the Russian practice is concerned, we can register Conflicts of mixed marriages, problems of parental rights and duties, problems of adoption.

Analyzing the problems in this sphere of legal regulation, we should point out that they appear not only in the context of 'the dialogue of mutually distant cultures', but in the cultures where mixed marriages are a common phenomenon, too.

European practice is worthy of note here. Legal regulation has not become universal after the Hague Conferences drew out several conventions on family and marriage law. Perhaps, the way to solve the problems in this sphere of dialogue of cultures should rather be sought in law

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[123] Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for State and Law (the Russian Academy of Sciences), *LL.D.,* professor. Author of a number of scholarly publications, including: *Kiiezhdunar-odnaya peredacha tekhnologiy: pravovoye regulirovaniye* [International Transmission of Technologies: Legal Regulation], *Pravovyye problemy sovershenst-vovaniya khoziaystvennogo mekhanizma v SSSR* [Legal Problems of Economic Mechanism Improvement in the USSR], *Mezhdunarodnoye chastnoye pravo: sovremennyye problemy* [International Private Law: Modern Problems], *Mezhdunarodnoye chastnoye pravo: sovremennaya praktlka* [International Private Law: Modem Practice], *Mezhdunarodnyy grazhdanskiy protsess: sovremennyye problemy* [International Civil Procedure: Modem Problems], and others.

enforcement practice, where judicial discretion plays the crucial role in attempts to find a compromise, than in formulation and adoption of statutory rules and orders.

Dialogue of states as entities of international public law is a multi-aspect phenomenon. It covers various spheres of their cooperation. However, modern international law as a mode of international dialogue of cultures has a unified approach: international law is a result of coordinated declaration of intents of the states concerned. It is only due to coordinated declarationof intents of various states that universally received principles of international law were able to be formulated after the Second World War, they formed the basis of the post-war world order. So far these principles have been the basis to develop international relations and international law.

International legal protection of human rights is of a special concern in international legal regulation that promotes dialogue of cultures. History witnesses that the UN member states, despite their unanimous recognition of basic principles of international law, including the principle of respect for human rights, exercise this principle differently in their national laws, to say nothing of the law-enforcement practice. It would be a mistake to think that the differences are a deliberate violation on the part of some states or standard model of others.

Quite often 'standard model' characteristics are ascribed to European civilization and its legal institutions in the sphere of human rights. Undoubtedly, giving credit to its humanistic nature, we can't but admit that it is only a segment in the world cultural diversity. The modern world faces another peak in the evolution of old civilizations that form the majority of the world population. Under these terms, an inter-regional dialogue seems to be more realistic than attempts and efforts to establish the unified world legal regulation.

Y. A. Lukasheva[124]

THE DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS: INTEGRATION OF CULTURES AND ITS LIMITS

> There is no question as acute both for understanding and for life nowadays as the question of culture and civilization, and the differences between them and their interrelations. This is the question of our future destiny. And there is nothing to worry a man more than his destiny.
> N. Berdyaev

1. The contemporary world is developing under the influence of two processes, globalization and self-affirmation of civilizations. Sometimes these processes smoothly flow to balance each other like two powerful currents; at times they cross abruptly to result in such mighty turbulent flows that might lead (and often do lead) to social turmoil and places the mankind on the verge of extinction. These are natural effects of the theory of non-equivalence of civilizations, the theory of superiority of the European culture, theories of catching-up civilizations whose primary target is to follow the paths of the European civilizational development, unconditionally taking its

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[124] A corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Human Rights Division at the Institute for State and Law (the Russian Academy of Sciences), *LL.D.,* professor, an honorary lawyer of Russia.

Author of more than 200 scholarly papers including the following: *General Theory of Human Rights* (Obschaya teoriya prav cheloveka), the course book *Human Rights* (Prava cheloveka), *Human Rights as Strategy Factor of Steady Progress* (Prava cheloveka как faktor strategiyi ustoychivogo razvitiya); *Human Rights: Outcomes of the century, tendencies, prospects* (Prava cheloveka: itogi veka, tendentsiyi, perspectivy); *Human Rights and Globalization Processes of the Modem World* (Prava cheloveka i protsessy globalizatsiyi sovremennogo mira); *Man, Law, Civilizations: Norms and Values Outlook* (Chelovek, pravo, tsivilizatsiyi: normativno-tsennostnoye izmereniye).

Laureat of the juristic award 'Femida' (2007).

values for granted. In the last decades the Eurocentric world view has been overcome due to a civilizational approach that breaks unvaried stereotyped ideas of the world order, of its unipolar and unidimentional evolution; that reveals unique and original lifestyles of peoples belonging to various ethnic, social and cultural origins and striving to preserve their national identity. At the same time such an approach enables one to see universal benefits that provide favourable conditions for an interaction of civilizations, their dialogue thus encouraging respect to and advancing better comprehension of other nations' systems of life and ways of its regulation.

2. The humanistic meaning of the civilizational approach consists in it eliminating the issue of the hierarchy of civilizations, their ranging in succession or grading them as advanced and backward. It appears critical in a globalizing world, for the dialogue of civilizations should be based on the principles of equality, partnership and mutual benefit and should not tolerate pressure from the more powerful cultures or imposing alien standards, models and values on civilizations that are unprepared to such innovations.

3. Forcibly imposed allogenic values or foreign cultural models thoughtlessly adopted will poorly root themselves in the alien soil, shatter established social relations, confuse people, bring in chaos and destroy the normal course of events. The 20th century witnessed devastating attempts of the USA and the USSR to intrude into traditional African communities with their formulas of state reforms. More powerful civilizations keep pressing on underdeveloped communities at the present-day stage of the world evolution. A hidden side of globalization is the developed nations' attempt to level religious, cultural, moral and ethical basis of civilization, to ignore national interests, norms and traditions, to restrict the sovereignty of states, bring all civilizational structures to the Eurocentric model.

Suffice it to remind of S. Huntington's profound idea that 'the West is a weird, fragile, unique formation that should never have a universal status. The Western way of evolution has never been and will never be a common way for the 95 per cent of the earth's population. The West in unique and not universal.'[125]

The society concerned should be prepared to adopt new cultural values. The process of cooperation and mutual loaning is constantly progressing in the modern world, but it can't be pushed forward or forcibly accelerated, because it promotes the 'split' of culture (after A. Toynbee), the clash and collapse of civilizations, as we could see from history.

4. For a successful cooperation of civilizations and their fruitful dialogue it is essential to constitute the backbone of the 'civilization': legally-based social and cultural system of regulation that involves religion or religiously-based moral and ethical doctrines, law, moral norms, politics, forms of sovereignty, traditions, customs, rules of conduct and social etiquette. System of norms is a universal self-regulating feature of any community, formation, civilization. The elements of social normative system influence people's consciousness, behaviour, activities, as well as produce a certain order in social relations and prevent chaos and arbitrariness.

Social and cultural system of any civilization involves abovementioned catalogue of elements. However, their content varies, which accounts for various character or 'style' of civilizations. The style is marked by generally accepted, customary, centuries- and millennia-old rules, norms, values, meanings and symbols that explicate identity and peculiar features of civilizations and life-style of 'super-systems', all these elements are inherited and handed down from generation to generation. Social and cultural system enables one to treat culture as a universal concept in all its complex manifestations and in the interaction of the following elements: (a) a system of norms, values, symbols; b) people's activities regulated and organized by these norms; c) objects of reality resulting from these activities.

Polylithism as a doctrine of cultural diversity, cultures' ability to respond to foreign challenges or inner demands, tends to investigate internal circulation of social and cultural systems, to determine their basic directions and principles for the cultures and civilizations to cooperate.

5. The dialogue of civilizations should take into account that elements of social and cultural systems can only transform to different extent in their contacts with foreign cultures. Among the steadiest ones are religion, morals, traditions, beliefs, customs, social conventions. As for

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[125] *Huntington S.* The West is unique, and not universal // In: Foreign Affairs, 1996. Apr. 8. [Rus.tr]

legislation, forms of state structure, technical and economical standards, they are highly flexible, dynamic, translatable and easily naturalize.

The largest 'axial' civilizations originated from main world religions that triggered evolution of all fundamental elements of social and cultural regulation. One can only understand the core essence of any culture by estimating interaction and interdependence of all integral elements of the culture. This results in fundamental cultural concepts differences, such as good and evil; the reward according to one's work and retribution for vices and sins; concepts of liberty and equality; the role of legislation in human behaviour as compared with other ways of normative regulation; the status of women, etc. The same concepts can bear a completely different ideological connotation.

What is obvious for a person from an Eastern civilization can be hard to perceive for another from other cultures. Likewise, many symbols and values of the Western civilization are unacceptable in other cultures. An American legal scholar H. J. Berman was right to notice that in the past a Western man was heralding his law all over the world. However, under the contemporary conditions the man from the East and from the South offer different alternatives.[126]

Interaction and mutual cooperation in a cultural sphere is an essential step on the path to harmonize civilizations. But this path is long and hard enough, as it is difficult to overcome the established barriers and deeply-rooted beliefs.

6. It seems crucial to find an answer to the question if it is feasible at all to make a global civilization and if we really need to strive for it.

I suppose that cooperation of cultures and overcoming of cultural barriers is essential for uniting people in order to solve key problems of the world order. Such a union should be based on the following universal values:
- accepting and observing the principles declared in the UN Charter;
- maintaining belief in basic human rights, human dignity and value;
- accepting the priority of law, liberty and justice;
- accepting the equality of various cultures and civilizations;
- respecting a person of a foreign social and cultural origin;
- acknowledging the essential need to protect the environment;
- exchanging beneficially cultural values and innovations in science, technology and production;
- avoiding forcible intrusion of models and standards of 'powerful civilizations' into foreign social and cultural milieu;
- observing the rules of a 'fair game' in the world economic relations, eliminating any possibility for the 'gold billion' countries to use the labour forces and natural resources to the disadvantage of the underdeveloped countries;
- consolidating efforts to struggle against any extremist manifestations that may hamper progress of natural life and activities of people, countries, civilizations.

This is far too incomplete a set of principles for the integration of cultures. However, making a global culture is not a promising process. One has to take into account the social self-confirmation of civilizations, their urge to preserve their unique identity, traditional values and customs. The incompatible that every civilization has inside itself is difficult to bend to a global process of submission. Global culture presupposes a united multicoloured worldview. United in the key issues of the world perception, civilizational cultures should preserve their originality, individuality, singularity.

Mohammad Reza Majidi[127]

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[126] See: *Berman H. J.* Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Moscow, 1994, p. 48. [Rus. tr.]

[127] Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation, Permanent Delegate of the Islamic Republic of Iran to UNESCO, B.Sc. (Electronics), M.B.A. Author of a number of

RAPPROCHEMENT OF CULTURES: AN INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The past century was characterized by war and violence. Two devastating world wars, regional wars, tensions and conflicts, prevalence of violence at a global level and the continuation of the same approach in the current century, are considered as examples which lead us to contemplate and look for the ways and approaches to find durable and sustainable solutions to help us to get rid of this tragic situation. I personally think that attaining this goal and eradicating the root causes of violence, tension and wars is the most common ideal of all humankind.

First of all we should answer to this question that what are the root causes of violence in our world? At first glance, the answer seems rather simple. In today's world, the arrogance of the mighty, humiliation of the oppressed, discrimination, poverty and in one word: injustice are considered by many peace-loving people as the most important causes for occurrence of violence, terror and conflict.

How can we stop this trend? This is the most important question in our world today that should be answered. Many thinkers believe that if we put due emphasis on the issue of culture and move towards the Rapprochement of cultures, violence and conflict can be avoided. Respecting the diversity of cultures and at the same time, trying to reach a global culture trough finding the communalities and putting aside the differences would be a key to the peace and security in our world.

It is to be noted that every society has developed its own traditions and belief settings during the course of time, and as a result, every community has its own respected culture. Culture is a distinctive system of values, traditions, norms and practices. In general, culture is the way of looking at the world and we know that this vision regarding the world is different in various societies, civilizations and religions. If we manage to find a way to make these different views closer together, by emphasizing the commonalities and ignoring the differences, it would be possible for us to have a closer vision on global issues and as a result, consequently the conflicts would be avoided and the minor differences could be solved through dialogue. So we should rely on shared principles, values and objectives in order to find shared solutions. This would be a major step towards changing the existing situation through rapprochement of cultures and dialogue.

Dialogue is an important aspect of human life. It is a form of interaction between social forces. Dialogue is not negotiation. In negotiation, the parties involved are concerned with the satisfaction of their own interests. In dialogue in the contrary, there is a cooperative search for reaching the truth. The purpose of dialogue is to shed light on differences and find ways to bring the parties closer. So with the dialogue among cultures, unity of values could be reached while minor differences respected. All culture have some values that are common with those of others. By emphasizing the common values and respecting the diversity of cultures, we can develop an approach through dialogue on the differences.

Differences between cultures always exist. But these differences themselves can be considered as a driving force for development in human life. Resorting to force, violence and intimidation, which are the most important threats in our era, is the product of the laying artificial boundaries between cultures and highlighting the differences. Thus rapprochement of cultures with due attention paid to the cultural diversity is an asset that is indispensable for the reduction of insecurity and the achievement of sustainable development and peace. Having said the above, the acceptance and recognition of cultural diversity – in particular through dialogue, will be conducive to the respect and mutual understanding.

It is to be noted that the rapprochement of cultures as a pattern for establishment of peace and security in the international relations, seeks to replace wisdom for force in the area of international relations and is therefore a paradigm that works to stop human and social relations from being blocked. During the process of rapprochement of cultures, the hidden capacities of

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scholarly papers devoted to the issues of politics, science development, shipbuilding, technology development in oil, gas and other strategic fields, nano- and biotechnologies, development of cooperation between universities and branches of economy.

cultures should be recognized, examined and studied. In this regard, no one can speak more about the capacities hidden in each culture and civilization than religious leaders, thinkers, scientists, philosophers and intellectuals.

In one of the important verses of Holy Koran, Almighty God refers to the diversity of cultures and its significance for the mankind. The holy verse is as follows:

O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. (Al-Hujrat, verse 13).

This holy verse shows that the origin of all mankind is the same. Allah Almighty has made mankind into nations and tribes so that they would be able to know each other and this fact is emphasizing the importance of the unity of the essence and nature of human being and at the same time refers to the significance of cultural diversity and its key role in the life of mankind. In fact it refers indirectly to the religious – cultural dialogue that should be dominant in the interactions between people. If such dialogue exists between the main actors in the international arena, no conflict would take place at all and every problem will be solved trough dialogue and conversation. In fact, monotheism, which is the spirit of all Divine religions and worshipping none but God, Who is the absolute beauty and wellness in religious interpretations, and rejection of human's dominance over human, and emphasis on the freedom and human's respect before God are all issues that can not only become the subject of our dialog but also help us move toward building a better world.

Fortunately, by scientific and technological developments or in other words, the development of new software and hardware in our age, doors of communication and dialog among cultures and civilizations are opened more than ever now and there are greater chances of resorting to dialog and transitioning from an atmosphere of conflict into an environment of understanding. Today, world faces a much better opportunity to resort to dialog to accept the sovereignty of wisdom and ethics rather than force and domination. However, the dialog among cultures and its rapprochement as a pattern in a new world in which humans will not only be secure but also feel satisfied and respected spiritually and physically, must be agreed to by all the parties as an approach. We will also need to make practical plans at national, regional and international levels.

Now all people and communities should join hands and stay committed to ethics and values of equality, justice, indiscrimination and brotherhood which are common elements in all cultures and religions. Using these common elements, enables us to join together and refrain from any conflict in the future. As Sa'di one of the greatest Iranian poets states:

Human beings are members of a whole,

In creation of one essence and soul.

If one member is afflicted with pain,

Other members uneasy will remain.

If you have no sympathy for human pain,

The name of human you cannot retain.

The international endeavors in this regard including the proclamation of the year 2001 as the year of dialogue among civilizations and also announcing the year 2010 as the international year for rapprochement of cultures by the General Assembly of United Nations as wel as the initiative of The Alliance of Civilizations in 2005 show the vital importance of culture and cultural dialogue in safeguarding and establishing peace and security all over the world. It also highlights the significance that world attaches to the cultural elements and the dialogue among and within cultures.

Apart from theoretical dimensions and to pay more attention to the operational aspects of the debate, I would like to point the following practical measures that could be considered as useful steps:

Putting more emphasis on commonalities, highlighting the cultural diversity and different ways of life, avoiding politici-sation of cultural issues and taking proper steps towards the culturalization of political differences, beginning any effort on the basis of the respect for plurality and common matters, paying due attention to intellectual cultural heritage as a suitable

ground for dialogue and interaction, using media as a tool for culture and cultural dialogue instead of a pretext for tensions and conflicts, highlighting the role of elites in the field of scientific dialogue, and last but not least, using intellectual power and wisdom instead of resorting to violence. As'Molana Jalal-edin Roomi, a Persian poet says:

0 my brother, you are the same as your thought, nothing more

As for the rest, you are only bone and sinew.

1would not like to conclude my statement without referring to the role of spirituality in the field of peace and security. It should be accepted that forgetting the soul and paying attention only to the body and sticking to earth have not only made mankind face huge problems, but have also made life tedious and void of sense and tenderness. Fortunately, attention by today's humans to such a spiritual vacuum has made him hear spiritual messages of great religions and Divine teachings. This very fact has prepared the ground for dialog of cultures, civilizations and religions more than any time. Followers of great Divine religions are therefore advised to listen to this Verse of Holy Koran:

O people of the scripture! Come to an agreement between us and you: that we shall worship none but Allah, and that we shall ascribe no partner unto him, and that none of us shall take others for lords beside Allah. (Ale Imran, Verse 64).

V. L. Makarov[128]

THE INFLUENCE OF SYNTHETIC WORLDS ON GENERAL CULTURE

Let me first define the term. Such concepts as synthetic worlds, artificial worlds, digital worlds and virtual worlds are used as equivalents. In Russian the term 'artificial worlds' is mostly used, while in the West, 'synthetic worlds' is a more popular term thanks to the well-known book by Edward Castronova, an American professor (see: Castronova, 2005).

Following Castronova, I will speak of the synthetic worlds as a new phenomenon for the man's cognition of himself and the world and, finally, for the mankind's new intelligent choice of future.

The field of human gulture is vast. It fixates different pictures of the world which can be of interest to man. Literature, painting, photography, cinema, music and TV programs reflect the existing world, or else the way people want to see this world, i.e. their fantasies as to how this world might be organized. All said above has one common characteristic. The world reflected in this way turns out to be static or dead. We are prone to see the great masterpieces of culture as something set.

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[128] Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Central Institute for Economics and Mathematics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor.

President of the Russian School of Economics, Head of the Economics Department of the State Academic University for the Humanities of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director-Organizer of the Higher School for the State Administration at Lomonosov Moscow State University.

Author of more than 300 scientific works, among which are the following: *Mathematic Theory of Economic Dynamics and Balance* (Matamaticheskaya teoriya ekonomicheskoi dinamiki i ravnovesiya, with co-authors), *Intangible Assets and the Intellectual Property Value Assessment* (Otsenka stoimosti nematerial'nykh aktivov i intellektualnoy sobstvennosti, with co-authors), *Russian Science and High Tech at the Turn of the Third Millennium* (Nauka i vysokiye tekhnologiyi Rossiyi na rubezhe tretyego tysyacheletiya, with co-authors), *Russia in the Globalizing World. Modernization of the Russian Economy* (Rossiya v globalizuyuschemsya mire. Modernizatsiya Rossiyskoy economiki, with co-authors).

Professor *honoris causa* of Lomonosov Moscow State University.

Editor-in-chief of 'Economics and Mathematical Methods' journal (Eco-nomika i matematicheskiye metody), member of the editorial boards and panels of the journals: Economics of Planning, Social Sciences, 'Cybernetics and the System Analysis' (Kibetnetika i sistemnyi analiz), 'Economy of Modern Russia' (Ekonomika sovremennoy Rossiyi), 'Science of Science' (Naukovedeniye), 'Optimization' (Optimizatsiya) and others.

Laureate of the USSR Council of Ministers Award, Laureate of the L. V. Kantorovich Award and of the Demidov Award.

Another step toward the cognition of the world by way of culture is connected with games, plays, theatre in the broad sense of this word. In them, the man is not just a spectator. He is a participant of the creative process. Children like playing role games; through them, they get to know the world better; through them they realize their desires. In theatre, actors perform one and the same play in different ways. This is not an exact copy as the case is with a film or a novel. In some modern theatres, spectators are invited to participate in the performance. At pop-concerts, spectators can dance and sing along – they are physically engaged in the process. And in the old times, it was spectators who would make the decision whether to let the defeated gladiator live or die. No doubt in the playing technology, man uses more senses, more movements, to explore the world and the play than while just being a spectator.

The next step is computer games. Here the involvement of participants in the cognition of the world is significantly deeper. The player is not aware of what to expect at the next move. This teaches him the art of anticipation. The more thorough the artificial world is explored, the easier it is to anticipate and the more to enjoy the game. In computer games of newer generations, the player will be able to construct his own virtual world, or rather a fragment of this world, to be exact, in which he will be learning to 'live'. Those desires the man can not realize in the real world can be implemented in the virtual one. That explains why computer games appeal so to young people – to the extent that they develop a morbid addiction linked to the desire to escape from the reality into an imaginary world.

Lastly, the most interesting stage in the technology of self-and world cognition is constructing synthetic worlds to which the man personally belongs. Technologically, it is another generation of computer games for multiple players.

Those games are called MMORPG (Massively Multi-player Online Role-Playing Game – a terrible abbreviation!). The games are quickly finding their way in places with broadband Internet. They increasingly engage more and more players. Dozens of millions of people can be playing simultaneously. These MMORPGs are otherwise called synthetic or virtual worlds. Besides, they are 'live' worlds: they are constantly changing, evolving, getting better unlike the dead virtual worlds associated with 'The Star Wars', 'The Fifth Element', or the well-known 'Matrix'.

There is a natural doubt or objection regarding how good or creative the plunge into the synthetic world is. Statistical data is as follows: now people spend three to five hours watching TV. It is about the same amount of time which ardent fans of synthetic worlds spend on their plunges. On TV, you can see world masterpieces, the results of creative uplifting, the things which enrich our life, the life of the consumer. In a synthetic world, the participant wants to live a 'full' life, hanging around with the like, failing to enjoy the masterpieces of the world culture. It seems, therefore, that in a synthetic world the man should dumb down, lose inherent complexity or, at best, be affected by the creators of the synthetic world.

This, however, is contravened by a well-known open code technology that now embraces many spheres. For instance, Wikipedia, the popular web-encyclopaedia (http://ru.wikipedia. org) is made and supported by this technology, in which individual creative work is replaced by the work of masses and collectives, which bears excellent fruits.

There are a few dozens of synthetic worlds in existence from which the user can choose. Synthetic worlds are not universal, as compared to the real world, they are hand-made. Richard Bartle who made one of the first synthetic worlds suggested classifying users of synthetic worlds into the four groups:

Researchers, who are interested in how the world is built; they explore it, the richer it is the better.

Socialites, who long for communication with the other members of the society; they choose the worlds with numerous social groups, cities, clubs, arenas, weddings, hunters, etc.

Creators, whose primary mission is creating, building, accumulating wealth, constant construction.

Winners, whose primary aspiration is to dominate other people, to subjugate them; they choose such synthetic worlds where they can fight, with everlasting contests and rivalry; their goal is to win as in sports.

Let's turn to culture. Is culture enriched by synthetic worlds? Can it develop and be enriched using the tool of synthetic worlds? I will try to provide arguments in favour of the positive answer.

As I said before, there are, or to be more exact, there have been built, different synthetic worlds. If such a world is full of idiocy, then it is as shallow as those 'wham' games, and, quite naturally, a 'resident' of this world will not gain from it culturally. There are, however, synthetic worlds in which their creator will feel at ease – he will be able to apply his skills. There are technologies for making your own films, painting pictures and writing plays. You can even generate a new type of art, non-existent in the real world. A creator's fantasy in this world is less limited than in the world of reality, hence one can expectsuch advances in culture and art in it as can hardly be seen in the mundane world.

The advent of this new tool increases creativity. Why do Cameron's films attract a great deal of attention? Because apart from the rest, he uses such expressive means that have been unheard of before. Opponents of this statement will reason that in Bosch's pictures there are no less monsters that equally affect human psyche. Suffice it to take a glimpse at these pictures to be convinced of the opposite.

In fact, a significant turnaround has occurred. In the minds of earlier generations, the 'evil' was only personified by Baba Yaga, Kaschei the Immortal and vampires. Modern generation of people is brought up on computer games and, figuratively speaking, 'resides' in the world of monsters. The fairy-tale 'The beauty and the, beast' no longer impresses you as it did before. To sum it up, imaginary worlds have become closer to us, they have become part of everyday mentality.

Finally I will pose a general question: can we claim that information and communication technologies have led to a qualitative breakthrough in culture and art, to a new vision of the world?

Bulgakov in *The Master and Margarita* opened a new way of representing the world to the reader. A somewhat similar vision was suggested by Zamyatin in *We* and by Orwell in *1984*. This method, however, was actively used and lost its gloss. Synthetic worlds is a method of cognition, no doubt more fundamental and long-lasting. What can be achieved by this method, time will tell, and not before long.

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A. P. Markov[129]

INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AS A FACTOR OF FORMATION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL STUDIES

In the socio-cultural aspects consequences of globalization are very non-ambiguous. Negative aspects of this phenomenon are described in the literature comprehensively and convincingly, including such trends as the diffusion of national cultures and the increasing of complexity of finding of a personal identity, weakening of culture developing role of national languages, mass distribution of various forms of deviant, non-normative and deconstructive behavior (drug addiction, gambling, terrorism, etc.). On the other hand, modern civilization, submerged in global information space, conceptually alters many attributes of human existence and peace. Information

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[129] Professor of Advertisement and Public Relations Chair of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Pedagogy), Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation. Author of a number of scholarly publications, including: *Otechestvennaya kultura как predmet kulturologiyi* [Russian Culture as an Object of Cultural Studies], *Osnovy sotsiokultumogo proyektirovaniya* [Elements of Socio-Cultural Planning], *Proyektirovaniye marketingovykh kommunikatsiy. Reklamnyye tehnologiyi. Svyazi s obshchesrvennostiyu. Sponsorskaya deyatelnost'* [Project Planning of Marketing Communications. Advertising Technologies. Public Relations. Sponsoring Activities] and others.

becomes a unique ontological substance, inside of which something like "collective intelligence" begins to form – noosphere of Vernad-sky. The dialogue of cultures becomes real and constructive, which goes into the individual communication of scientists, also within framework of virtual communities.

The positive trend of globalization is the integration of humanity into the sphere of scientific knowledge. In recent decades the projects became truly global in the field of space exploration, deep comprehension of formation regularities of physical agent morphology, understanding of biological foundations of life, etc. The trend for the development of humanitarian knowledge is particularly important – if the development of natural sciences had always character of natural expansion of a new concept or idea, which easily overcame barrier of time, linguistic and other barriers, then in the humanitarian area the situation was fundamentally different. Until recently, the possibility of global humanitarian projects creation have been limited – by ideological boundaries that vigilantly protected value base of the human sciences with language and space barriers, mental vision of the world image, which substantially modified the conception of the determined scientific community not only about the priorities of research but also about the method of cognition.

Today these barriers do not exist. Globalization, based on the revolution of communicative means, created huge information space, inside of which emergence of self-organizing scientific communities became possible – as the creators and carriers of new humanitarian paradigms. "World Wide Web" made the dialogue of culture a reality, which is capable to claim constructively within the frame of paradigmal knowledge the ideas of scientists from different countries and continents. Trends of human sciences development of recent decades indicate that the paradigmal methodology of knowledge production – is a promising and universal model of existence and development of science in the global world. Paradigmal stage of methodology and structuring of scientific knowledge is related to the crisis of the positivist methodology for obtaining the truth.[130] In addition, in the second half of the twentieth century the class of complex socio-humani-tarian problems becomes actual, the scale of which exceeded the epistemological possibilities of each science separately. In the humanitarian field one of the most bright and compelling projects, emerged on the basis of the dialogue of cultures "within" global information space, is the formation and development of cultural studies – science, used the following culture as integrity and its anthropological projections, ie . images and modifications of the man within a certain cultural space. Since its origin cultural studies developed as a set of humanitarian scientific paradigms, specifically explaining the various aspects, levels and sides of the phenomenon of culture.[131] Cultural studies history of the twentieth century rs a process of formation and dialogue of the various paradigmatic models of integration of sciences and humanitarian knowledge organization, which differ from each other in understanding of the object of study, according to the method of structure of problem-thematic field. Anglo-American cultural studies, German philosophy of culture, native cultural studies of the 60-80-ies of the last

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[130] As an example of paradigimal organization of knowledge one can give synergistic paradigm, within the frame of which a picture of self-organizing reality was ontologized, as well as system-functional concept of Parasons, who attempted to structure different social sciences on the basis of a unified methodology. Bioethics is developing today within the frame of paradigmal knowledge as a conceptual system of knowledge about the limits of the possible manipulation of human life or death, as the area of interdisciplinary research that integrates achievements genetics, biology, medical and criminal law. In Russia as an example of research projects of intellectual-integrated nature can be called a paradigm of Synergetic Anthropology, studying the experience of "ontological transformation of the subject" in its movement for truth and meaning and are uniting not only humanitarian scientists but also artists, experts in the field of basic sciences. The conceptual core of the paradigm is written in the works of Moscow philosopher S.S. Khorudzhy considering synergetic experience in overcoming self-contained human nature as a path of transformation and transition into a different ontological status as a system of rights constituting the man practice of "being-action" directed to "ontodialogue" with God is uniting the person with His non-market energies which give "the image of God" in the "likeness" in its existence.

[131] Within the philosophical knowledge criteria of paradigmality fully correspond to existentialism, philosophy of culture, and today postmodernism fits in culturological paradigm, in which cultural problematics (as in her anthropological perspective and in plan of existence of various phenomena and social structures) occupies a significant place.

century, practicing activity approach – they all correspond to the key features of paradigm, which at his time T. Kuhn formulated: firstly, the presence of humanitarian profile scientists, the participants of which are united by the similarity of understanding of the key issues, and secondly, the specific problematisation and ontologisation of particular reality, stated with the categories of culture; and thirdly, the specific method of cultural reality cognition. Today, cultural studies continue to grow as an active dialogue among the various scientific paradigms, it livqs in the "voices" of different ages and countries, including in its structure the texts of Spengler and Toynbee, Taylor and White, Nicholas Danilevsky and Pitirim Sorokin, ideas and concepts of our prominent contemporaries Flier A. and J. Kondakova, V. Stepin and V. Mezhuev and many others.

The stage of conceptualization of cultural preceded formation of cultural studies as a field of humanitarian knowledge and followed as expansion of this concept in various human sciences. Primary conceptualization of the concept of culture is made as anthropo-typological studies (in particular, in the famous work by E.B. Taylor, "Primitive Culture", 1871). Then the term begins to actively expand its geography and penetrate into the fabric of a various academic disciplines, modified under the influence of the methodology of some or other human science. By the middle of the twentieth century, "the idea of culture" becomes one of the key categories of west-europe-an idea. As the American sociologist, Stuart Chase, noted in width of application this category are comparable with such categories like gravity in physics, a disease in medicine, the evolution in biology. B. Malinowski speaks of culture as "the most important issue of all social sciences" (1939). Cultural study context becomes a critical resource for explaining and understanding phenomena within the framework of psychology and psychiatry, sociology and pedagogy, economics and law. More and more cultural dimension the researches become which are carried out in the field of axiology and logic, ontology and aesthetics.

The formation of cultural studies as a science was carried out in the process of dialogue of scientists from different countries and areas of human knowledge on the three kea issues:

a)conceptualization and ontologisation of an object of research;

b)reflection on the specific character and the nature of the scientific method, its differences from philosophical knowledge and methodology of individual sciences;

c)An understanding of boundaries and content of the "problem field» of research, dialogue about the conception about the character and degree of actuality of the "painful points" of the cultural existence of man and the world.

Conventionally, the dynamics of views on culture as an object of knowledge over a period of the twentieth century can be represented as a number of successive conceptual models (or scientific paradigms):

1. Culture as "superorganics", ie the combination of components and parts of a custom: the language and beliefs, a behavior patterns and attitudes, laws and institutions, works of art and art forms, tools and results of labor.

2. *Culture as integrity* – this concept was adopted in the first two decades of the twentieth century (cultural studies historians call this period an time of culture "glorification"). Such objects of research as cultural centers, cultural types, cultural patterns, cultural closing up and contacts are ontologized. Scientists are interested in questions of birth and development of culture, signs of maturity and factors of death. Anthropologists became "biographers" and "anatomists" of culture at this stage.

3. Culture as activity. In native idea of cultural studies of the second half of the twentieth century anthropological orientation was realized in the activity approach – namely understanding of the culture as an activity defined not only the specifics of national idea of cultural studies, but also helped lay the solid foundation of all humanitarian knowledge (works of E. V. Ilyenkov, N. Davydov, ES Markarian, N. S. Zlobin, M. S. Kagan and others).

4. *Culture as a value* – the understanding of culture as a kind of "spiritual matrix", providing the identity of man and society, a unique mechanism due to which self-identity and integrity of society is ensured. In the Russian idea of cultural studies at the end of the twentieth century preservation of the culture begins to be considered as a basis for the spiritual safety of the public (a good example – initiated in the mid 90-ies by academician D. S. Likhachev project of "the Declaration of rights of the culture"). The variety of conceptional (or paradigmal) approaches –

the essential feature of cultural studies paradigm since its origin to the present day. One can observe how, depending on world view grounds of paradigmal community the conception of the phenomenon of culture as an object of research is changing.

Initially, culture-specific method of learning determined with anthropological research trends (not accidentally White called cultural studies a form of return to the original anthropological traditions, to the methodology "supersomatic anthropology"). American anthropologism had emphatically rational, utilitarian character – founders of culturogical science researchers (in particular, Tajlor, White, Kreber, Klakhon) started with the study of human behavior, and all that defines and determines it. The purpose of these searches – to find patterns that determine the human activities, to identify areas and instruments of influence of consciousness and behavior of ethnic and social groups.

The fundamental step toward understanding of the non-utilitarian culture as the integrity as a special symbolic world, for understanding of culture as an idea was made in the German philosophy, which concluded fundamental design of cul-turalogical methodology of knowledge of the Culture as the integrity and value (the ideas of WWindelband, W. Dilthey, G. Rickert, E. Cassirer). B. Mezhuyev in this regard, notes that "for the British and Frenchmen, prone to identify the culture with civilization, philosophy of culture today is also a nothing saying concept".

Cultural Studies in its development reveals different scientific schools, conceptual approaches and world view features that make some drama in the dialogue of its constituent entities. They are largely determined by the value-normativefeatures of the culture within which they are created, by the particularities of the mental worlds of researchers. In particular, significant differences are found in priorities and motivations of cultural studies researches rooted in the traditions of native, American and west-european humanitarian thought. It is primarily a question about the specifics of the fundamental motivation of cognition of the man and the world. Academician V.S. Stepin, revealing the genesis of the socio-human sciences, notes that the history of these sciences in the strict sense of this word begins only in the XIX century – as the specific scientific disciplines they were constituted themselves at the time "when the object-subject relation to the man and human society becomes dominant", when in the culture of technogenic civilization "relation to the various human qualities and to social phenomena as objects of control and transformation clearly took shape ".

Indeed, the utilitarian aspect of humanitarian cognition was characteristic of west-european (especially American) scientific traditions. And even deliberate attempts to go beyond the limits of the utilitarian to the region of integral knowledge about the culture and the person ends with "exploitationtion" of the results of such searches in areas distant from the principles of humanism, in particular, in developing of the technology of manipulating human behavior.

In the native humanitarian tradition motivation of cognition was different – in the philosophical research of the XIX -the beginning of the twentieth century holistic ontology and humanistic problematics, the traditions of which were not lost by many humanists of the Soviet period, dominates. Let's recall, how Academician Likhachev defined the mission of human sciences – to understand and implement humanistic content and meaning of culture, whose development is realized through chaos to harmony, through the expansion of the "sector of freedom" and enlightenment of higher meaning. Cognition, the academician thought, is committed not only with intelligence, but with faiti, love, it becomes a kind of communication with the object of knowledge, way of holistic self-realization of the cognoscitive man.

Paradigmal differences are found in the specifics of cul-turological method. Within the framework of the western cul-turogical paradigm humanitarian idea continued and developed the ancient tradition of rationalism, which found its logical continuation and completion of the positivist method of comprehension of truth. Humanitarian cognition that ignores the spiritual and moral aspects of life, gradually lose its ontological functions: energy of the soul and heart are excluded from the act of cognition, it becomes rational, partial, incomplete.

Paradigmal specific of national humanitarian tradition were identified with such features of the scientific method as integrity, the humanistic nature, ontologism. The latter, according to Pavel Florensky, is "basis and the characteristic position of the whole Russian philosophy", which deals with the Word, the Truth as a force that modifies human life. Authentic, holistic cognition can not

remain only at the level of intellectual statements, true knowledge is always "involved in being". This means that the scientific method acts not only as a way of knowledge, but also as a means of transformation of cultural reality.

Various methodological foundations are fundamental for common for cultural studies principle of anthropocentrism. West-european tradition acknowledges born in the days of antiquity idea of uniqueness and self identity of a person, the principle of "taking care of yourself." Within the framework of native anthropology ontological essence of a person is contained not in itself, not in its autonomy – it is regarded as a derivative of a certain integrity, part of which is a man, as a projection of a prototype. The aspiration to understand the ontological foundation of human existence of a man as integrity, to find spiritual practices of self-realization of personality lies in the tradition of national cultural knowledge.

Differences of paradigmal nature inside of the cultural studies are the condition and the background of the development of science, because constructive communication, as noted by M.M. Bakhtin, is possible as *differences on the basis of the whole.* For this dialogue to take place, it is necessary to expand the space world view community, while maintaining the conceptual originality of subjects of culturalogical discourse. Common today is, first, a common understanding of culture as a spiritual matrix of human life, destruction of which would inevitably lead to humanitarian catastrophe. Secondly, culture studies scientists are united in their awareness of the severity of the problems of development of contemporary civilization, the very understanding of which is possible only within culturogical methodology capable to carry out interdisciplinary synthesis of humanitarian knowledge, acknowledging a holistic vision of the world of culture and image of man.

It should be noted that the discourse of cultural studies of west-european and Russian scientists of the last two decades comes close not only in the positions concerning the object of understanding, but also in methods, in understanding of the critical issues of our time. Forming community of cultural studies scholars today are united with a resonance with "pain of routine", as evidenced by the numerous conferences and forums of the last decade (including the theme "Lihachesky readings", the series of round tables, organized by St. Petersburg State Unitary Enterprise in association with magazines "A person " and " "Cultural Studies issues"). Not by chance in problem-thematic field of modern cultural studies both native and western-european – the cultural-anthropological subject expands, caused by primarily anthropological crisis of the European civilizations. Culturological community is trying to understand the causes and factors of the growing natural and social conflict, catastrophic reduction of human size environment, destruction of traditional institutions of cultural continuity, increasing the range of deconstructive social practices (drug addiction, terrorism, dependent behavior), depletion of human energy, feeding the creative operations, the loss of a positive image of the future and the growth of its pessimistic projects.

Both the Western scholars and Russian scholars explore the causes of the anthropological crisis, develop cultural continuity of return of a man to himself, to his deep-seated nature, develop projects of gaining on lost a spiritual identity by man. Even in texts such seemingly distant from the cultural studies methodology of postmodernist philosopher Michel Foucault "roll-calls" with ontological practices of Christian hermitage developed within the national paradigm "anthropology of synergetics" are discovered.

However, the *"dialogue ofdifferences on the basis of common"* within culturological community does not lose its tension even today. In particular, very significant differences in the assessment by Russian and west-european scholars of the contribution to anthropological crisis of "texts" of the euro-pean culture of the twentieth century are still present, in the vision of "scenarios" of the future. Morally justified "voice" of native scholars are attempts to understand and find ways to overcome the anthropological crisis that emerged in the field of humanitarian knowledge (and is reflected in the dominating conceptions in the past decade, practicing the so-called "negative anthropologism"). Unfortunately, it should be recognized that the high moral pathos of west-european socio-philosoph-ical idea at the end of the twentieth century gave way to intellectual and moral agony of posmodernism, announcing the "death of a man". Even constructive in its origin existential-oriented line of philosophical knowledge eventually

degenerated into a philosophy of despair, despondency and despair, that is the project of destruction of the spiritual foundations of personality. Today, we see that indeed the beginning was the Word – first man was "dismantled" to "atoms" within the humanitarian knowledge, and only then he begart to lose integrity and fall apart at the level of existence. In particular, today fundamental principles of life are being challenged, concerning human rights to dispose of their bodies and lives (in this context the discussions is characterized by about the right on suicide, euthanasia, the manipulation of organs, human tissues and body parts), allowable limits of conduct resulting from reproductive needs and sexual deviations. It is " humanitarian disassembly" that brought the anthropological crisis, whose consequences may be no less serious than those sad events, which occurred after the man made out an atom on particles and on this basis, made fantastic by the destructive force weapons of mass destruction. The intrinsic link of humanitarian sphere and real world once again underlines the great mission of the Word of man and culture, says about responsibility of those whom this Word is given – given by vocation, status, talent. Native cultural studies in this regard can be regarded as a constructive alternative to the directions of humanitarian knowledge, which acknowledge "negative anthropologism" – it is trying to collect "the image of man", crushed and fragmented within the framework of specialized humanitarianknowledge, its field of interest includes key problems of being of the person as a subject of culture.

Today, the native cultural studies paradigm is unique meta-science that exists in the interdisciplinary space of dialogue, in the acute problem-thematic "focus", concentrating the "energies" of various human sciences. Its specificity consists in the rehabilitation of ontological line in cognition. Cultural studies provided a constructive coordination of humanitarian knowledge, worked out, as time demonstrated, effective ways of "connecting" of science to the significant for human life and society areas of activity. As the form and result of the integration of various areas of human knowledge, it is very different (in method, subject, and thematics) of the sciences that are "drawn" in her problem field. In the framework of cultural studies fundamentally different horizons of human existence and society are investigated not available to understanding of the classical humanitarian sciences.

The development of native culturogical paradigm is undertaken today in the global informational context, which provides unlimited possibilities for communication of scholars. World Wide Web has become for cultural studies a resource of development and space of implementation of global humanitarian projects, it made dialogue among cultures a reality, turning it into a living communication of ideas, concepts and deep-seated ideological positions, defined by national culture specific, mental feature and traditions of national humanitarian knowledge.

V. I. Matviyenko[132]

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[132] Governor of St. Petersburg, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

She graduated from Leningrad Chemical Pharmaceutical Institute, in 1985 she graduated from the academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1991 she completed the career development courses for diplomats under the Diplomat Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

In 1972 started career within the Komsomol organization as head of a department at Petrogradsky District Komsomol Committee; later she was the First Secretary of Leningrad Regional Komsomol Committee.

She was the First Secretary of the Krasnogvardeysky District Committee of the Communist Party, Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad Soviet. She was elected as people's deputy to the Supreme Soviet and headed the Committee on Women, Family Protection and Children Affairs.

V. I. Matviyenko served in the diplomatic service and held several diplomatic positions including posts of Russian ambassador to Malta, head of Department of Relations with Federal Subjects, Parliament, Social and Political Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of the board of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian ambassador to Greece (1997-98).

V. I. Matviyenko was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for Welfare.

On March 19, 2003 she was appointed Presidential Envoy to the Northwest Federal District.

ST. PETERSBURG IN THE WORLD CULTURE

The idea of a global world carved its way for many centuries. But the common course of history only became obvious in the 20th century when the opportunity appeared to embrace the existence of the humanity in a glimpse, centuries-long and planet-wide. The universal character of this process can be perceived from intergovernmental and international economic and political interactions, in a free advance of technological achievements through the world, in the informational links based on the latest means of communication throughout the globe, etc. The Schengen Visa and the common European currency make the realities of this process easily tangible.

Globalization goes through culture as well; furthermore, it is also present in arts, so complex and subtle a domain. However, those popular ideas of a new world order that may establish a common educational system, a commonly shared philosophy, religion and art, are fraught not only with starry-eyed naivete but also with a potential threat. Pushkin had good reasons to distinguish three main features for every nation's portrait: climate, faith and mode of governance. The loss of nationally specific features cultivated for centuries may result in a considerable waste.

It is obvious that a common world for the whole humanity means a universally shared culture, but not the uniqueness of its universal model that can only be obtained by force. A diverse natural environment with its unique colours, sounds and flavours, diversity of climate, particular modes of living and mentality are enough to determine cultural diversity. Besides, the essential sign of culture is characterized not only by national but also by regional features. Culture belongs to the humanity as that of Russia, of France, of Japan. And also, as the culture of Rome, of Florence, of Venice, of Moscow, of St. Petersburg, of Vladimir...

The world culture is not an obvious fact of different countries' and nations' cultures. The essential point here is the interaction and mutual influence, because the world culture is not a sum total, but a dynamic process that implies tolerance and reciprocal trust from all parties concerned.

St. Petersburg's openness to a foreign culture is one of its dominant foundations declared by Peter the Great. The city's architectural image is unimaginable without the works of Ras-trelli, Rossi, Quarenghi, Trezzini, Montferrand. The foundation principles of St. Petersburg ballet were laid by the stage work of Petipa, who actually came from France. Dozens of German actors who performed in Russia's capital on a regular basis encouraged the birth of Russian theatregoing. It was the Italians who introduced opera to St. Petersburg during the reign of Anna Ioannovna. St. Petersburg's culture was like a sponge taking in the trends of European art, and in doing so it was shaping its own unique image.

I hardly need to say again about the meaning of St. Petersburg's culture for the world culture. Dostoyevsky's writings, or Mussorgsky's, Tchaikovsky's, Stravinsky's and Shostakovich's music, or our museums and worldwide famous suburban parks speak for themselves. Without any doubts, they have become a part of the world's cultural heritage, as far as millions of tourists are truly delighted by what they see in our city. The cities where the integrity of image determines their position in the world history, are not so numerous. Paris, London, Rome... St. Petersburg is one of them. As early as in 1922, *St. Petersburg 's Soul* appeared, a remarkable book by Nikolai Ancifer-ov. The unique architectural image of the city gave birth to this metaphor which expanded on St. Petersburg's metaphysics as the centre of a spiritual quest.

The city is a complex system that comprises not only monuments and theatres, but also manufacture, trade, social network, nature characteristics, ordinary blocks of flats... The residents of St. Petersburg live here. The city's culture should not be limited to the idea of a 'context' (even if it were a 'cultural' context). Culture is the whole *existential world.* When approached like this, it doesn't only have to do with the human. Because the human is its *integral part.*

Is the phenomenon of worldwide famous 'white nights' of St. Petersburg only natural, or is it cultural as well? And it is not an idle talk, because the nights are white in Petrozavodsk, and they are even whiter in Murmansk. You cannot separate the white nights of St. Petersburg from the Bronze Horseman, from

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She was nominated Governor of St. Petersburg by Russian President Vladimir Putin and appointed in the office by St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly till 2011.

Dostoyevsky's *White Nights,* from the gleaming spires of the Admiralty and of St. Peter and St. Paul's Cathedral, as if painted in Indian ink against the night sky. Marshak, a famous Russian and Soviet writer, translator and poet, once wrote:

- The Neva is whispering in rhymes,
- Like Gogol's lines stretches Nevsky Avenue,
- The islands and canals are dreaming of Blok,
- And Dostoevsky is wandering along the streets.

These lines are almost to be taken literally rather than metaphorically. Such is the reality of the city, the existential essence of St. Petersburg.

The 20th century has also given the rise to some new characteristics. The courage of the city's residents during the 900-day siege – the symbol of city's spirit – has also become a phenomenon of the wqjld culture. To perform the first night of Dmitri Shostakovich's *Seventh Symphony,* the musicians were brought back from the front line. The symphony was performed for more than sixty times in the USA during the 1942-43 concert season. And it is not only the music that has contributed to the world's cultural heritage. The incredible preservation of the collection of seeds at the Institute for Plant Industry is also the same spiritual symbol of the people's heart and courage. The starving Institute staff didn't touch a seed. Weak starving women who could barely stand on their feet managed to defuse two hundred of firebombs targeted at the Public Library of St. Petersburg, thus saving twenty million books for us.

The city's image is hard to grasp apart from these facts -and there are hundreds of them! Each link in the chain of history of St. Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad-St. Petersburg, anew, is important. The residents of Leningrad stood up to the siege that cannot be renamed as 'the siege of St. Petersburg', and the Seventh Symphony of Shostakovich cannot be renamed either. The only fact that the city has had its name back is a significant mark in its history as well as in the history of the land.

In culture, a city's future is its past. This paradox becomes transparent through St. Petersburg's present. A lot of music festivals initiated in St. Petersburg are closely linked to the city's gorgeous architecture ('St. Petersburg Palaces', 'The Musical Hermitage Festival, 'Greater Hermitage Music', 'The International Arts Square Winter Festival') and to the outstanding classical composers (The Gavrilin Festival of Russian Music, The Sergei Prokofiev International Competition, The Andrei Petrov Music Festival). The festivals held by the Conservatory and the festivals at Mariinsky Opera House also deserve attention. This basic connection with the culture of the past makes up an authentic background for the progress of modern music and musical theatre.

It is widely known that St. Petersburg is a city of music -there are numerous concert organizations, musical theatres, instrumental and singing groups here. Competitions of a particular music instrument have become popular recently: The 'Golden Harp' festival, The Carillon Festival, The Organ Competition, The Double Bass Competition. Such competitions bring together the world's musicians, serve as a background for the musical art progress and provide an exchange of creative ideas among the talented. Held in St. Petersburg, they strengthen the city's atmosphere of creativity, which has always been here since the city was founded.

St. Petersburg cultural space is wide open. 'A Window into Europe' is a portal for European as well as for global trends. Consider those facts and judge for yourself: The 'Japanese Spring' annual festival, The Swiss Short Films Festival, The New Polish Cinema Festival, The Window into the Netherlands, the Week of Germany in St. Petersburg, The Balkan Theatrical Space, the Days of Krakow, of India, of Korean culture, the Weeks of Finnish, Brazilian and Danish cinema, the activities in the framework of the 30th anniversary of cooperation with Osaka (Japan) and a lot of other contacts with the world art and culture that contribute to St. Petersburg's spiritual atmosphere. These contacts bring here new vigorous energy, new forms and concepts.

For its 230th anniversary St. Petersburg Academy of Dramatic Art (the oldest theatre college in Europe) prepared a lot of banners that were located in the city streets. Those banners had the portraits of famous Russian actors – Sergei Yursky, Nina Urgant, Andrei Tolubeyev, Igor Vladimirov, Alisa Freun-dlich... The city residents were delighted to feel the connection with these wonderful actors, because the films and theatre performances where they appeared are

known to all Russians. There also was a carnival procession on the city's main street -Nevsky Avenue, where the students of the Academy participated. And they, too, belong to the city's cultural space. I would like to mention a curious detail. Together with the students of the Academy there were presidents of various European colleges of dramatic art who came to St. Petersburg to take part in a symposium on the world's dramatic art training. And they were carrying posters with the slogan 'Theatre Is Alive'.

St. Petersburg theatrical companies have successful tours round Europe within the framework of 'St. Petersburg Theatrical Season' project. Prague, Berlin and Helsinki applauded the talents and their unsurpassed acting.

We should keep in touch with the younger generation to maintain cultural tradition, to introduce them into the evolution of culture, for culture is one of the main means of communication and self-actualization. The Bryantsev Festival is annually held by the Young Spectators' Theatre, 'Christmas Parties at Mokhovaya', the fine arts festival for orphans, the 'Kastal Spring', initiated by the Academy of Dramatic Art and many other festivals try to involve children into creative work. Spirit can only grow when feeding by eternal values of culture and art and through the atmosphere of genuine creativity.

St. Petersburg participates in European projects on a regular basis. The experiment known as 'The Night in Museums' has become a hallmark in the city's life. There is a bus tour that takes thousands of people every night during the white nights season to three, four or five museums. Such tours make people excited. Later on this excitement transforms into a genuine interest in paintings, drawings, sculpture and in everything else that touches upon the soul's strings and gives food for thought.

The inseparable integrity of the past, present and future is the key feature of culture. Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, the first Honorary Freeman of St. Petersburg, was profoundly aware of this. He cherished a very distant past as if it were the actual present. The present and the future were the central points of his reflections, concern and civil pathos, which were so characteristic of that man who always spoke In a low voice. His very appearance seemed to emphasize the private character of his life. I cannot help quoting from his book for the youth: '...Memory is not about preserving the past, it is taking care of the eternity. Memory equally strives to preserve the past for the eternity as well as the future for the future, so that it doesn't vanish and serves the eternity. Memory is the eternity embodied and time overcome'.[133]

These words are a good start for thought. They also mark the essense of the human existence within the culture.

In conclusion, I would like to mention some problems of our deep concern. The solutions to these problems do not always depend on the city administration. I have already mentioned some real achievements in the matters of culture: music and theatre festivals, premieres, exhibitions, competitions and a great number of activities for children. But there are other aspects of life that are also connected with culture: youth crime, corruption, especially in legal matters, in medicine and in education, just where profession is inseparable in its nature from the moral mission to serve people. University students, a lot of young St. Petersburgians have never been to the theatre. We don't need any precise sociological statistics to detect a lower rate in the total cultural potential of the city residents.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights runs: "Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.' What if there is no need to participate? Or no money? There is a tendency of a growing gap between the cultural level of different groups in major capitalist cites. Is there anything that can be done to level the striking discrepancy between human rights and the resources to implement them? The world's biggest cities have common problems, and their mayors meet together on a regular basis to find solutions to these problems.

There are a number of issues that require a culture-philosophical approach. Which way does the old St. Petersburg correlate with the modern St. Petersburg that has overgrown its former boundaries? May there be no limits to the city, when it is acquiring a new nature? Can the concept

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[133] D.S. Likhachov. *Reflections.* Moscow, 1991, p. 146.

of 'St. Petersburg culture' retain its constant continuity when the diversity of its urban context is growing? Has the city's proverbial provincial atmosphere put an end to its inevitable metropolitan vanity? Such problems are numerous. The Conference is sure to find solutions to some of them. And of course, there will be new problems set.

I only have to express my gratitude for the invitation to the Conference, and I would like to wish its participants a fruitful dialogue and an interesting intercourse.

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V. M. Mezhuyev[134]
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IN SEARCH OF THE UNIVERSAL CIVILIZATION

In recent years the term 'civilization' has become widely spread in our philosophical, as well as social and political literature. Generally, it may be accounted for by the refusal to divide the historical process according to economic formations only, as it was customary earlier. 'Civilization', in the view of the majority of social scientists, is the most capacious term to mark boundaries dividing the modern humanity. It is possible to discuss where the boundaries are set, but it is wrong to deny the fact of their existence.

Taken alone, the idea of multiplicity of civilizations is not a new one. First formulated by N. Y. Danilevsky, as early as the 19th century, it was then used as the basis for 'a comprehension of history' by O. Spengler and A. Toynbee (regardless the differences in their conceptions). The idea, as it stands, was supported by several Russian historians and culture experts. In Soviet times, the theory of 'local civilizations' was elucidated by S.N. Artanovsky, E.S. Markaryan and other scholars. Actually, upon the disintegration of the USSR, the theory has been interpreted as all but the last word in historical science.[135] This theory is also applied to Russia, which it is customary now to call 'a specific civilization' distinct from the others.

Therefore, the idea of a civilization as a unified and universal way of existence for the whole humanity is considered to be scientifically groundless. According to A. Toynbee, 'the thesis of "the unity of civilization" is a misconception' existing in the minds of historians 'led by the strong influence of their social environment'.[136] Its source, as he believes, is the economic and political unification of the world under the influence of modern Western Civilization. This unification having resulted from the policy of expansion of the West seeking for world domination, should not be posed as a creation of a 'unified civilization'. The Western claim of the world predomination is groundless, at least because of its neglect of cultural diversities between states and peoples beyond the West that are more significant for them than economics and politics. 'The thesis of the unification based upon the Western economic system as a logical result of common

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[134] Chief scientific researcher of the Institute for Philosophy (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), professor. Author of a number of scholarly publications, including the books: *Sovremennoye znaniye o kulture* [Modern Knowledge of Culture], *Marks protiv Marksizma. Statyi na nepopuliarnuyu temu* [Marx Against Marxism. Essays on an Unpopular Topic], *Kultura i istoriya (problema kultury v filosofsko-istoricheskoy teoriyi marksizma)* [Culture and History: The Issue of Culture in Marxist Philosophical and Historical Theory], *Ideya kultury: Ocherhpo filosofiyi kultury* [An Idea of Culture: Essays on the Philosophy of Culture], *Mezhau proshlym i budushchim. Izbrannaya sotsialno-filosofskaya publitsistika* [Between the Past and the Future: Selected Socio-Philosophical Essays] and others, study guides: *Istoriya kulturologiyi* [History of Cultural Studies], *Filosofiya kultury. Epokha klassiki* [Philosophy of Culture. The Age of Classics], articles on the philosophy of culture, philosophy of history and philosophy of politics. Mr Mezhuyev is a member of the State Culture Policy Council under the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

[135] As an example, there is a collection of articles titled 'The Russian-Slavonic Civilization: Historical Sources, Modem Geopolitical Problems and the Perspectives of Slavonic Mutuality' published in 1998 (Moscow). E.S. Troitsky, the compiler, having reckoned all the theorists of local civilizations (beginning from Danilevsky and up to Toynbee and Spengler) among the people who had performed a 'scientific feat', finally urged his readers to 'add to our armoury his (Danilevsky's) conclusions' as a basic approach to historical knowledge (p. 20). In doing so, he overlooked the criticism of the theory by other outstanding Russian philosophers, and first of all, by Vladimir Solovyov.

[136] *Toynbee A. J.* A Comprehension of History. Moscow, 1992, p. 81. (In Russian).

and constant human history development, leads to the glaring misrepresentation and to strikingly narrow historical outlook.'[137]

We could agree with Toynbee's thesis that it is impossible to pose the economic Westernization (today we would say globalization) as a unified and universal civilization, if the possibility of existence of such a civilization was not regarded as a dubitable one. It is in culture (but not in economics and politics) that Toynbee finds proof of its impossibility. He seems to be right here. Nobody will deny that any unification, any adjustment to common scheme is alien to culture. And since, according to the British historian, 'culture' is practically a synonym for 'civilization', his conclusion about the uniqueness of any civilization (including the Western one) is understandable.

Today, most authors dealing with the given topic, support the opinion concerning a firmness of cultural barriers separating different civilizations. The number of civilizations may change, one of them gives way to other, but their separate existence remains unchangeable. And there is no force in the world that could overcome the barriers and bring together different civilizations.

The process of globalization taking place before our eyes seems to be opposite to the above-stated opinion. It is the globalization that is referred to by the authors defending the idea of a universal civilization.[138] One cannot but notice that the capacity of economic and informational systems to cross not only national but also civilizational boundaries provides new historical challenges threatening humanity, because the foci of anti-globalistic movement with its fundamentalist and left-radical slogans are formed especially along these boundaries. The tension in relations between the West and other world areas resulting from globalization, made several researchers (beginning with Toynbee) consider a threat of the clash of civilizations. In their opinion, breaking the civilizational boundaries rather than the borders between national states is fraught with even harder calamities (up to the international terrorism and nuclear war).

What may be set against the threat of such a clash? The answer has been found in the idea of *a dialogue of civilizations,* now intensively discussed by scholars, politicians, scientists and artists from different countries and areas of the world. The book titled *Crossing the Divide: Dialogue among Civilizations* created under the aegis of the UN and with the participation of intellectuals from 18 countries of the world may be a good example of this discussion. In their shared opinion, 'dialogue is a reliable instrument to build up a new paradigm of global relationship. Dialogue is the very first step that grants us a sense of involvement, as well as communicating with and listening to other people, we fnake the first step on our way to our fellowship.' A little later a great number of publications devoted to the same topic appeared in Russia.[139]

Accepting the idea of a dialogue as the best way for a human communication in general, it is, however, necessary to look deeper into the nature of this type of communication. It is not as easy as it might seem at first glance. What do we mean by a dialogue? What kind of communication deserves such a title? Does every civilization keep up a dialogue and is it ready for it? And what is necessary to do so that such a dialogue could occur at all?

A need for a dialogue does not emerge in any civilization, but only in such a civilization where an individual recognizes his/her affinity not only with his/her kind (tribe, ethnos, nation), but with the whole humanity. It is the civilization which has given rise to the idea of the humanity as a unified family for the first time. At earlier stages of the development when an individual did not distinguish himself from the others of his kind and merged with them completely there was no such a realization. People did not recognize at once that they all were brothers in mind or anything else. Only having got free from a direct adhesion to their community with which they

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[137] Ibid.

[138] The most elaborated idea of direct connection between the globalization process and making of a unified civilization is developed by N.V. Motroshilova in her recently published book *Civilization and Barbarism in the Epoch of Global Crises* (Moscow, 2010).

[139] See, e.g., the collected papers *The Dialogue of Civilizations: Agenda* (Moscow, 2005), *From Dialogue of Civilizations to Cooperation and Integration: Sketches of Problem Analysis* (Moscow, 2005, in Russian and English), *The Dialogue of Cultures in the Globalizing World: Outlook Aspects* (Styopin V, Gusseynov A., eds. Moscow, 2005). In addition there are a great number of monographs and articles on this topic.

were related in kinship, and only having recognized themselves as comparatively autonomous beings that have a right to choose their own cultural identity, people become filled with a sense of personal empathy with people of another blood and culture.

Here, the peculiarity of a human nature so different from any other is clearly displayed. The taxonomic unit of the mankind is not the species (as for animals and plants), but *an individual.* And only the individual is gifted with the awareness of belonging not only to the definite species, but to the mankind on the whole, and thus he/she begins to feel a need for a dialogue with representatives of other species. Therefore, the dialogue is not a way of interspecific communication, but a way of *inter-individual* communication. Species do not come into dialogue. For a species no other species exist, or they are perceived as alien or hostile. Even such a thing called 'friendship of peoples' is not quite an accurate a term. Since not peoples, but rather human beings representing different peoples can be friends; those human beings who are able to go beyond their specific (tribal or ethnic) identity, to rise to the recognition of their affinity with the whole mankind.

Only a civilization where people acquire a right of individual choice of their cultural identity (which is equivalent to their freedom), may be regarded as a universal civilization. As this right extends and applies to a wider circle of people, a degree of the universality of civilizational development also increases being aimed not at an abstract sameness of individuals, when all are similar and indistinguishable from each other, but at their existence as individualities who are inimitable in their uniqueness and unique identity. The 'individual' is a synonym for the 'universal'. An individual becomes an individuality as not an 'abstract' or 'private individual' (private owner, part-time employee), but as a universal, equal to the whole, human being who independently manages all values of human culture. Only this kind of the individuality needs a dialogue and is able to live in a universal world.

In this sense, it would be better to speak not about the dialogue of civilizations, but about the *civilization of dialogue* which is the only one capable of consolidating people on the worldwide scale. Within this civilization every person regardless of his/her origin and place of residence acquires a right of a free choice of his/her cultural identity and, therefore, a right to participate in the dialogue, because a free choice (in distinction to an imposed or compulsory one) is only realized in the course of a dialogue with other peoples. Being a tool of public relations and a way of communication, the dialogue best reflects the nature of human universality. People might never achieve a unified and shared by all system of values, i.e., a concordance of their opinions about what is good or bad, true or false, beautiful or ugly. However, even more important than such a concordance is the desire to defend their lightness by means of the dialogue, not violence. The universal civilization, if it comes into being one day, will differ from the previous civilizations by one aspect only: all disagreements and contradictions (they will not go away, of course) emerging among people will only be solved not by force, but by means of negotiations, i.e., a free discussion opened for everyone.

The universal civilization will not eliminate boundaries dividing different cultures, but will allow everybody to cross these boundaries freely and move from one cultural space to another looking therewith for a cultural space where an individual would like to settle. The civilization makes the boundaries movable not between cultures but between people, and connects people by not a unified and compulsory culture lacked of diversities but by the right of everybody to show his/her worth in culture, that is by his/her openness and tolerance towards any of the existing cultures. People's relations within such a civilization are always the relations of equality and partnership between different cultures. Due to these relations every" culture has a chance to become 'my culture', and the boundary between 'mine' and 'not mine' is set exclusively by the freedom of personal choice. Therefore, it is only a civilization making every human responsible for his/her cultural choice that deserves the title of the universal civilization.

E. V. Mitrofanova[140]

UNESCO' ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND RAPPROCHEMENT OF CULTURES

Annual scholarly meetings initiated by an outstanding Russian philologist, academician Dmitry Likhachov have become a universally recognized arena for representatives of scientific, political, and intellectual elite from many countries to discuss topical international issues in the city on the Neva.

As Chairman of the Executive Board of UNESCO, Permanent Representative of Russia to UNESCO I am happy to note that the agenda of the present Conference includes the subject 'Nation States and World Institutions: Cooperation on the Ways of the Making,of the Global Culture' among its key issues. I suppose it is our Organization that can best exemplify the world processes announced in the subject, which we will continue to discuss at the workshop on the second day of the Conference.

I am convinced that in the framework of our workshop at the Conference my colleagues, Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives, are offered a unique opportunity to speak on theoretical and practical approaches to solving problems that our shared cultural future faces and, in case some interest is expressed, to highlight the strategies of their countries on the most pressing international issues.

No doubt, that this distinguished audience of foreign representatives who are taking part in discussions today will reflect on the ways to trace new perspectives for *a cultural diversity, rapprochement of cultures and international dialogue,* which are among top priorities of the UNESCO. In the context of globalization, which is also that of migrations, the parallel challenges of preserving cultural diversity and cultural identities, on the one hand, and promoting intercultural dialogue, on the other hand, take on a new significance and urgency.

At the time of present turmoil the world is expecting reasonable and deliberate solutions aimed at consolidation of trust, tolerance and mutual understanding from UNESCO, the Organization established to achieve these goals, as I already mentioned at various forums.

UNESCO's mission in the 21st century is more topical than ever before: to promote universal regard for 'fruitful cultural diversity', i.e. to share a positive image of diversity. It goes beyond mere recognition of it since the system of relations between the nations, communities, groups, and people is formed in this way. From this standpoint, a fruitful cultural diversity is viewed as a unique sustainable resource called upon to find a sensible solution to the problems of our uncertain future taking into account all benefits of the cultural diversity and dialogue aimed at building trustful cross-cultural relations in the interests of the stable global world.

The UN General Assembly declared 2010 the International Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures recognizing the role of culture in the modern world and designated UNESCO as lead agency to coordinate all the events. It will base its action on UNESCO's invaluable experience in promoting mutual understanding between people and their knowledge of each other.

The International Year is called upon to demonstrate positive features of the cultural diversity by recognizing the importance of cultural exchanges and contacts between representatives of different cultures which emerged at the dawn of the humankind. It also means inclusion of principles of dialogue and mutual study in politics, particularly in education, science, culture and communication, so that distorted views of other culture's values and stereotypes could be eliminated, and a significant role of cultural diversity in enriching the human society convincingly proved.

The Year will be celebrated with a variety of cultural events in Russia, too, such as music, arts and theatre festivals of the peoples of Russia, the CIS and the Baltic States, international conferences and exhibitions. Among them there are the 9th Youth Delphic Games of Russia and the 7th Youth Delphic Games of the CIS, the 4th Forum of translators, writers and publishers of

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[140] Chairperson of the Executive Board of UNESCO, Permanent Delegate of Russia to UNESCO, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Dr. Sc. (Economics). Author of a number of scholarly publications on the issues of economic cooperation.

the CIS countries and the Baltic States, the 5th Forum of scientific and creative intelligentsia of the CIS countries.

The establishment by UNESCO of the High Level Panel on Peace and Dialogue among Cultures was the first event of the International Year.

The international Panel met for the first time in Paris in February. It comprises prominent intellectual, political and religious figures from all the regions of the world. Its members have been asked to reflect on and reinvent the construction of peace founded on justice, respect for the human rights, gender equality and solidarity in the context of globalization, and the challenges it poses, such as climate change, management of resources and ethical and economic issues.

The Panel's mission is to ring out UNESCO's message of peace in the world, through education, science, culture, information and communication.

I will remind, by the way, that some time ago we initiated the establishing of the High Level Group under the Director General of UNESCO on interreligious dialogue. The Group was composed of representatives of the major world religions. During the International summit of the world religious leaders held in Baku on April 26-27, yet another meeting of the Group took place. The Representative of the Director General of UNESCO took part in it.

Russia promotes democratization of international relations and reinforces commitment to provide each state with a worthwhile position in the community of nations. This approach has been prompted by the special features of Russian history, which includes century-long experience of peaceful coexistence between various cultural and religious traditions within a single country.

Our conceptual vision of the role of the religious factor in the world politics is connected with the necessity to couple approaches to relevant international problems with basic values of the major world religions, the latter forming spiritual and moral foundation of the universal all-human solidarity. Without taking into consideration these principles, it would be impossible to facilitate collectively and legally the solution to urgent challenges, to create the atmosphere conducive to confidence and mutual understanding between the nations in the context of globalization, under the conditions of the emerging multi-polarity when competition is acquiring a cross-civilizational dimension.

Tolerance is the keystone of a successful cross-civil ization-al, intercultural and inter-confessional dialogue. It is one of the primary criteria of the commitment to democratic values, sustainable development, coexistence of nations in rapport with each other, in mutual respect for others' beliefs and customs on the part of people, societies and countries.

UNESCO has been consistent in its attempts to promote the regard for a cultural diversity as such and a cross-cultural dialogue, and we pin our hopes on the fact that they will firmly take their stand on the international political agenda. On the basis of these considerations, the Organization is committed to strengthen the world diversity as a process rather than an end product through a true dialogue which needs constant facilitation and encouragement.

The world growing to be more interdependent and interconnected globally in all spheres of life, the relations between people, nations and cultures still need reinforcement. Misunderstanding, distrust and fear have been on the rise recently. In the context of widely spread sense of vulnerability, the need to search for new paths to preserve the peace both locally and internationally is urgent.

UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity of 2001 runs that 'the process of globalization, facilitated by the rapid development of new information and communication technologies, though representing a challenge for a cultur-

al diversity, creates conditions for'a renewed dialogue among cultures and civilizations.' I quote further, 'As a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, a cultural diversity is the common heritage of the humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations.' Besides, 'UNESCO calls upon to ensure the transition to cultural pluralism. Being inseparable from a democratic framework, cultural pluralism is conducive to cultural exchange and to the flourishing of creative capacities that sustain public life.'

I hope that our discussion will serve these noble goals, and St. Petersburg will leave a lasting impression on the guests.

Thank you for your attention. I wish the colleagues fruitful work.

G. I. Muromtsev[141]

MODERNLEGAL CULTURES AND THE GLOBALIZATION

The topic lies, in essence, in the question of the impact that globalization has on legal cultures of the modern world, or put differently, whether it is compatible with the diversity of those legal cultures? Examination of the topic need to be preceded by questions of methodology, which need is due to the fluidity of the concept of legal culture and to an insufficient study of the problem of typology and classification of legal cultures. An attempt to define the concept of legal culture leads us, in turn, to concepts of culture and law which form its basis... In this sense the concept of legal culture is in a way a related category which represents the element of law in culture, and the element of culture in law... [5: 92]. Legal culture is a form of a 'bigger' culture or culture in a common social sense. This is why substantial and structural 'parameters' of the latter in a sense predetermine the corresponding characteristics of the former... In the same way, the content and the structure of the concept of 'law' are a reflection of a corresponding legal culture. A large number of definitions of the concept of culture might apparently be reduced to the two interpretations – a 'wide' and a 'narrow' one. With the former the concept of culture identifies with some historically changeable 'world construction' within which the man lives and creates, and the society develops. The question is the characteristics of certain historical epochs, of social and economic formations, of certain societies, peoples and nations [5: 76]. An equally all-inclusive sense lies in the concept of culture which includes everything that in the surrounding reality is created by man unlike what was created by nature [2: 14]. It is important to point out that culture expresses means (or methods, mechanisms) of vital functions of men, the results of this vital activity in material and spiritual spheres but not social relations proper [5: 77].

With the 'narrow' content of the concept of culture, it only refers to the sphere of spiritual life of humans or specific spheres of vital activity (the culture of labour, the culture of the way of life, etc.). To our mind, both approaches are characterized by the notion of culture as some unity of man and the cultural milieu, the product of which he is. That is why almost everywhere the two 'strata' of culture can be observed that can conveniently be named as the objective and the subjective one.

In real life there is constant interaction between the objective and subjective elements (or 'strata') of culture. At that, the former is the cultural milieu that forms a person as the bearer of a certain culture and that acts as the 'coordinate system' where the vital activity occurs. The latter 'stratum' in the structure of the concept of culture representing a micro-level of culture is only a subjective reflection of cultural milieu as a man's habitat in his consciousness [5: 78].

The content and the structure of the concept of law are in a number of parameters similar to corresponding aspects of the concept of culture; this is at least due to the fact the former concept is an inseparable element of the latter's structure. However, this similarity is incomplete because a part and a whole presuppose differences. The point of similarity, in particular, lies in the fact that wideness, multidimensionality and fluidity of the content are inherent in both the concept of law and the concept of culture. In particular, like culture, law also includes elements of both the objective and the subjective nature. Their correlation, viewed by this or that researcher, to a great extent predetermines the character of the notion of the law. For instance, it can be 'narrow' including only the whole set (system) of regulations which are compulsory for all, and 'wide'

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[141] Professor of Theory and History of State and Law at People's Friendship University of Russia (Moscow), *LL.D.* Author of books: *Konstitutsiyi arabskih gosudarstv* [Constitutions of Arab States], *Musulmcmskoye pravo (structura i osnovnyye insliluly)* [Muslim Law: Structure and Main Institutions], *Istochniki prava* v *razvivayushchihsya stranah Aziyi i Afriki. Sistema i vliyaniye traditsiyi* [Sources of Law in Developing Countries of Asia and Africa: System and Impact of Tradition], *Konstitutsionnoyepravo razvivayushchihsya stran* [Constitutional Law of Developing Countries], *Teoriya gosudarstva i prava* [Theory of State and Law], *Pravo ipolitika sovremennoy Rossiyi* [Law and Politics of the Modem Russia].

when besides it its structure also includes legal consciousness, legal relations, etc. At that, in any case it reflects the specificity of the historical epoch and of the culture determined by it.

Various approaches to the definition of the concept of the legal culture can also be reduced to the two types – a 'narrow' and a 'wide' one. The bases of one and the other are formed by the differences in the notions of law and culture. For instance, the 'narrow' or the regulatory legal notion is compliant with an equally 'narrow' notion of legal culture which boils down to a certain state of legal consciousness, to people understanding and obeying legal regulations [4: 331]. Interpreted in this way, the legal culture becomes a phenomenon which is exterior to the law.

Some authors identify a 'wide' notion of the legal culture with the legal system of the society [1: 801], others assign a wider meaning to it which can be compared in a number of aspects with the concept of culture in common social sense [3: 514]. Although this approach is not an undisputable one we cannot deny that here the 'bigger' culture acts as a paradigm of legal culture. While admitting the relevance of both approaches to understanding the legal culture – the 'narrow' and the 'wide' one, we view it in the 'wide' sense in the context of this paper.

An important component of this topic is the issue of typology and classification of legal cultures. We will base our typology on the type of civilization within which the classification of legal cultures is conducted. From this point of view we will obtain the traditional, i.e. pre-bourgeois, and the bourgeois (post-bourgeois) types of legal cultures. The traditional type of legal cultures is distinguished first of all by the specificity of the doctrine (legal interpretation) of the structure and the sphere and mechanism of applying the law. For instance, the traditional interpretation proceeds from the assumption that the law was not created, it was given by God, by the ancestors, etc. Hence this law has a religious form or is religious in its essence and is unified (at a certain level of its structure) with morality and religion. It predetermines the specificity of its effect: it involves the relations that are not of the legal character from the point of view of the modern European legal interpretation. Consequently, the mechanism of the effect of the traditional law does nofc always presuppose the necessity of state protection of legal regulations. The traditional type of legal cultures includes the culture of common law and the culture of traditionally religious law (Judaic, Hindu, Zoroastrian, Muslim). The bourgeois type of legal cultures includes Anglo-Saxon and Romano-Germanic legal cultures. The specificity of the modern legal map of the world is that along with the developed legal cultures of the bourgeois type and with those in a period of transition towards them (like, for example, in Russia), it includes the elements of all the preceding types of traditional legal cultures. With a different degree of intensity they become apparent in vast regions of Africa, the Near and the Middle East, South and South-East Asia. At that, the role of the 'supporting frame' in national legal systems is performed by the law of a European type that has considerably pressed the traditional law in the sphere of national law and order over the last one and a half or two centuries. Along with that, constitutions of the countries of the Islamic East usually guarantee a number of fundamental principles of Islam (the state nature of the Islamic religion, shariah as the basic source of law, etc.). The constitution of Iran of 1979 includes extensive quotations

from the Koran, etc. It all is the proof of a certain and sometimes considerable impact of traditional legal cultures on social consciousness of the mentioned countries.

Besides, the unified character of traditional legal cultures give rise to the phenomenon of the so-called 'live law' that forms and takes effect in the traditional (semi-traditional) society of the mentioned countries without the participation of the state, i.e. beyond official legal systems. This situation is secured by an incredible stability of the traditional (semi-traditional) social structures and of the corresponding forms of social consciousness even in the countries that are economically prospering (India, Emirates of the Persian Gulf), and also by the fact that the gap between the levels of social, economic and cultural development of the most highly-developed and the most backward countries is not getting narrower but, on the contrary, it is getting wider.

If the process of globalization in the sphere of law means conferring a universal character on the ideas, regulations and institutions that appeared on the basis of the European legal culture, can one in the present conditions predict its successful completion in the foreseeable future? There seems to be no definite answer to this question today...

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Kinhide Mushakoji[142]

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION FROM THE EAST

Introduction

To oppose the West to the East, or more broadly to the Non-West, in discussing differences in the meaning attributed to concepts like "conflict" or "cooperation" may not be a productive exercise. In fact, there exists so many different interpretations of these two terms both in the West and the non-West, that to oppose the two World regions to each-other may be meaningless.

In addition, the post-modernist critique of the modern Western epistemological constructions, which includes obviously the concepts of "conflict" and "cooperation" nay not lead to any constructive results. The existence of Eastern alternative constructions of the two concepts should not be used to deconstruct the corresponding Western conceptions. Such de-construction is meaningful only if it leads to find some better ways to construct an epistemological system which makes the wold a better place to live in. The East may have other ways to define "conflict" and "cooperation". This only proves that, both in the West and in the East, such concepts are constructed by the society under certain power relations, different in the two parts of the world. It does not indicate where will lead the de-construction of the Western concepts.

It is, nonetheless, possible and meaningful to ask the following question. Are there some concepts, discourses, or epistemological approaches in the East which may be useful in pointing out some particular aspects of "conflict" and "cooperation" which are not covered adequately by the Western human and social sciences in their understanding of how people go about quarreling or living together? If there were* such epistemological approaches to the two related concepts which help improving the ways we understand the world, as well as the way to improve it, it would be useful to identify such approaches, not because they are found in the East but because the scientific community needs to enrich itself by assimilating old ideas so far disregarded because of their "exotic" origin.(l)

This paper will discuss one example where different approaches to the pair of terms under consideration which are found in one part of the Pax Sinica World could help improving the understanding of how people behave in positive or negative ways making the World a more peaceful or a more secure place to live in. We have to repeat that what follows does not intend to give a standard interpretation to what the terms mean to everybody in this vast world where so many different thought currents have been in conflict or in cooperation for so many mil-leniums. We wish, only, to point out that there exists a particular trend which differs from the standard interpretation of the terms in the West. We would be happy to learn from our Western colleagues that some similar approaches exist also in the West, although held by some minority thinkers and

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[142] Director of the Centre for Asian-Pacific Partnership at Economics and Law University (Japan), Vice-President of the UN University for Regional and International Research, professor. Author of scholarly papers: *An Introduction to Peace Research, Political and Cultural Background of Conflicts and Global Administration, Japanese Foreign Policy in a Multipolar world. Behavioural Sciences and International Politics* and others.

their few followers. This would enrich, undoubtedly, the inter-cultural dialogue we are engaging ourselves in this IPSA exercise.

Western and Eastern Epistemologies

The following description of how "conflict" and "cooperation" are dealt with in the Pax Sinica World,(l) defined as the Central Kingdom and its Tributary States which have adopted the Chinese Civilization including its ethical conceptions supporting its world order, as well as the basic epistemological principles of its "world view", can not be an "objective" description of the hundred flowers which bloomed in it during the more than 3000 years of existence, during which so many different intellectual debates have taken place and so many schools of thought have competed in accumulating knowledge. We will contrast the^e features with the mainstream Western epistemology, by builkding their ideal types, in the Weberian sense of the term, so as to emphacise the possible contributions this approach may make to gain a better understanding of conflict and cooperation.

We will build our ideal type in reference to the Chinese classics. The nationality of the author who is Japanese will necessarily influence his interpretation of the thoughts contained in them. We believe that this will have its advantage, in that it will provide an interpretation originating from the periphery of the Pax Sinica. The peripherality of the approach will, hopefully, add to the interest of the ideal type, since it will indicate the impact of the concepts of conflict and cooperation on the whole of the Pax Sinica world including its most peripheral part like Japan, for the sake of constructing an ideal type, we assume in a very rough manner that the West tends to assume that cooperation and peace are good and that non-peace and conflict are bad. Two complementing traditions exist which explain this dichotomy, either in moral terms or in pathological terms. For both non-peace and conflict are undesirable states of the world caused by conflict. The former passes a moral judgement and condemn conflict, whereas the latter abstain from a moral judgement and sees in it a pathological state of the world. "Cooperation" at the opposite pole is defined as a good and healthy situation. The Western approach is in this way combining a condemnation of the bad people who become the cause of conflicts by their bad decisions, with an effort to resolve conflicts by curing the system.

At first sight, the two approaches seem to be unquestionably the only rational ways to approach conflict and peace. The dichotomy, however, divides the states of the world into two mutually exclusive sets of "good" or "bad" deeds, or "good" or "bad" health. Such black and white distinction leads to condemn and judge the bad leaders who committed bad deeds. Without this dichotomous moral approach to "conflict" and "cooperation" there can not be any penalization of human rights violation. So this approach is making a positive contribution to the modern world order, guaranteeing the legal framework of its democratic development. The dichotomy established between pathological "conflicts" and healthy "cooperation" has helped the creation of various conflict data-bases which identify well defined types of "conflicts" determine their characteristics and the antecedents and their end-states. Such data could be collected only because the researchers believed that there was a clear distinction between sickness and health, and that a state of sickness had a clear beginning and an unambiguous end.

Having recognized the positive value of the Western approach, we would still like to look into a different ideal type of ethics and epistemology. One where good and bad, health and sickness are not posed as mutually exclusive opposite poles but rather as a continuum of more or less good or more or less healthy states of the world and states of human mind.

It is true that also in the ethical and epistemological spaces of Pax Sinica, order and disorder are polar concepts. Yet the

perception of these two states of the world are quite different from the Western dichotomy for the following reason.

There are many different schools of thought in China, but all of them share two basic concepts, "Tian" and "Dao". Though interpreted in different ways, these two concepts are perceived to present the transcendent points of conversion from where everything is generated through the tow principles of "yin" and "yang". According to "Yijing" translated as the "Book of Change", yin and yang oppose each- other, mutually include each-other, transform into each-other and thus

constitute a cyclical path, which is the "dao" where ups and downs follow one after the other and a softening and a hardening of the state of the world occur consecutively.

This is why, "conflict" and "cooperation" are neither good vs. bad nor sick vs. healthy. They are defined, according to this epistemology as states of the world which have both yin and yang aspects transforming constantly one into the other. The important characteristics of this approach to "conflict" and "cooperation" is that it combines in a dialectical manner two discreet ontological principles which polarize the state of different sectors of the reality, and assumes that the complex interactions between the two principles constitutes a world full of continuities and discontinuities, which are grasped as constantly changing states. This can not be defined in a black and white manner, since the only thing in the world which is black and white is the polarity between yin and yang which never appears in isolation from other similarly polarized aspects in different combinations.

Therefore, the epistemology developed in the Pax Sinica World is not in mere opposition to the Western dichotomous epistemology. In fact, it is equally dichotomous, and does not define the states of the world in terms of continuums of more or less good or bad or more or less healthy or sick.(2) The yin and yang epistemology is binary digital and not analogical. Yet, it approaches the world by approximating its different continuums as a complex combination of different binary aspects, just as modern digital computer technology translates the analogical world of sounds in CDs by a complex combination of binary messages. This example is given here in order to disspell the erroneous belief that East is East and West is West, without a chance to meet. The most advanced application of Western informatics to CD technology is very much analogous to the most traditional Chinese epistemology of yin and yang.

Now, the West has perceived the epistemological constructs of Pax Sinica, with a strong emphasis on Confucianism, which ethical position is more easily understood in the West due to its emphasis on a "good" or "virtuous" order, where the yang principle helps to establish a dichotomy between good and bad, in spite of the yin covert aspects of any act where non-good, non-virtuous hidden characteristics exist behind the overt yang" morality of each of them. This emphasis on the yang aspect corresponds to the political/civilizational project of Confucianism which is to build an Order under the rule of yang subjugating the yin to it. Women to men, children to parents, subjects to masters, etc.

In opposition to Confucianism, Daoism, especially its metaphysical representative thinkers Laozi and Zhuanzi emphasise the predominance of "yin" over "yang".(3) The opposition between the two schools should not be understood in a static way. Both the Confucianists and the Daoists believe in a constantly changing world through the complex interactions of the two principles. The difference lies in the fact that for the former, the hierarchical order based on the supremacy of yang over yin is constantly exposed to upsurges from yin factors which make the Order to degenerate in micro and macro disorders. The ruler, representing the supreme manifestation of the yang principle, i.e. Tian=Heaven, must be replaced when He does pile up yin manifestations of unvirtuous acts. This is the revolutionary principle of the "change in the Mandate from Heaven". Heaven determines the path of Men according to the universal ritual code of conducts of "li" and the universal Reason ruling the universe; "li" . This approach is different from but functionally very close to the Western ethics in terms of its definition of conflicts and cooperation. But, very difficult, in terms of epistemology, which is context-sensitive, in contra-distinction to the Western modern epistemology which is context-free in its universalism and formalism.(4)

Conflict is bad and pathological, while cooperation is good and healthy since it conforms to the context-free principles of good conduct and Reason, while cooperation is good and healthy, since it respects the supremacy of yang over yin. This similarity m*es the Confucian ethics better appreciated by Western intellectuals and media, so that there was, for a time, an interest in the Confucian path to industrial development. For our purpose, which is to detect an approach to conflict and cooperation which is different from the Western and can help complementing it, Confucianism is not as interesting as Dao-ism which epistemology shows quite different characteristics which enable us to develop a quite interesting epistemological approach to "conflict and cooperation".

For the Daoists, the passive aspects of the world and virtues of peoples represented by yin principles, as well as the chaos which provides a matrix for them, constitute the path to follow for a good governance. All the yang aspects of any reality and any act is grounded and generated by the yin aspects. Heaven, the Yang par excellence, must be complemented by Earth, the yin principle. Nothing can happen without their interaction.

Conflict and cooperation are thus perceived by the Daoist epistemological tradition from a point of view literally different from the Western modern approach, or more precisely in the ideal type we have proposed above. Compared to the Confucian School it reads the yin/yang relations of social relations from yin to yang rather than from yang to yin, and gives to the relationship between cooperation and order an interpretation diametrically opposed to the Confucian formulation. According to the Daoist interpretation, cooperation between different pairs of social statuses are good when the person in the low position is respected by the one in high position.

This is the teaching of "Laozi" clearly stated in its Chapter 35. In the present era of democracy and human rights, the Confucian ethics is difficult to be accepted since it builds a top-down context where yang rules over yin, men over women and ruler over the ruled. Quite different, and much more acceptable is the Daoist epistemology which is built ona bottom-up yin over yang context which alerts us to the existing contexts of inequality better than the context-free Western epistemology.

Conflict receives also a treatment entirely different from the Western as well as the Confucian approach, in that it does neither involve good /bad nor healthy/sick dichotomies. The myth of King Chaos of "Zhuanzi" gives us a concept of conflict and conflict resolution based on the emphasis on the view that it is generated by the yang dimension and that it can be resolved by the strengthening of the yin dimension.(5)

King Chaos, according to this legend, welcomed the two Kings of the North and of the South Kingdoms. To express their gratitude for his hospitality the two reconciled Kings decided to give King Chaos different sensory organs, since he had none. They took turn in carving on his face each day, two eyes, two ears, two nostrils and one mouth, at the end of the seven days, King Chaos died. This myth combines two lessons, one that to be in good terms with two conflicting parties you have to be Chaos, in a complete state of yin unable to see, to hear, to smell or to taste, the other that Chaos can not survive the exposure to yang factors affecting him through sensory organs. This lesson, however hard to understand for us who live under the influence of a completely opposite epistemology, both empirical and rational, tells us that conflicts are the result of yang factors instigating the actors, (the Kings of the North and South Kingdoms) to fight for things they see, hear, smell or taste, so that the only way to reconcile them needs the intervention of a third yin party who does not have these yang capacities. Mediation does neither imply distinguishing the good from the bad, nor the healthy from the pathological. It simply means to transform the arena, or the context, into a space free from, or at least minimizing the effects of any yang obstacles leading to power-thirst and greed. Chaos, not only the mythical King but the epistemological reality corresponding to him, dies when it can not keep its yin detachment and is forced to enter into the inimical epistemological world of the yang factors.

This Daoist epistemological approach to "conflict and cooperation" seems to emanate from Yijing, the Book of Change, which is a classic whose authority is recognized not only by them but also by the Confucians. This Book defines these two concepts within the context of the system of human rapports which are isomorphic with the system of rapport in the Universe, built on the fundamental polarity of Heaven and Earth. In spite of the rationalist interpretation of this book of "fortune telling", the epistemological system it develops is of great interest. It seeks to identify different states of the Universe which provide the context of different human situations correspond is full of lessons for one who looks for some alternative classifi-catory systems of "conflict and cooperation".

Conflict and Cooperation in Yijing

Yijing defines different situations where specific combinations of yins and yangs contextualize and shape different human situations within given yin/yang contexts of human relations. Naturally, whether it is propiscious or not to take certain actions in situations of conflict or

cooperation are of major concern for the fortune-teller, and also for the author of the Book of Change.(6)

In the case of conflict vs. cooperation which is our concern, different contextual patterns of conflict and/or cooperation are identified by a hexagramme module composed by two sub-modules. One symbolizing Heaven and the other Earth, of three pairs of yin/yang symbols. Each corresponding to Heav-en/Earth/Men (with my apology about this masculinist expression which is not implied in the original Chinese expression).

The pattern called "hexagramme" looks therefore as follows:

> Yin or Yang
> Yin or Yang
> Yin or Yang
>
> Yin or Yang
> Yin or Yang
> Yin or Yang

Where each X can assume two values, either YIN or YANG. This gives a combinatorial of 64 distinct patterns:

$(2^3)^2 = 64$.

Each of the 64 patterns represent cosmic contexts within which human activities take place. The reading of these patterns are themselves complex. Beside the overall meaning of the pattern which is determined by the six yin/yang pairs, taken together, there are different readings of the three pairs on the upper "Heaven" side, and those on the lower "Earth" side which have to be read separately, and then interpreted together as a whole. In addition to this second type of readings, a third one exists which looks into the different pairs of rows which are interrelated, for example the first row of both the upper and the lower sub-modules.

The epistemology of Yijing is, in this way, based on a context-sensitive epistemology assuming that all states of the Universe within which human activities are contextualized correspond to 64 patterns. However, the patterns, represented by the hexagrams, correspond to different dynamic situations in statu nascendi, not to static states of the system which could be defined as good or bad, healthy or pathological, since each pattern represent complex combinations of good and bad, healthy and unhealthy forces which constitute a context within which a given activity has always positive and negative aspects. The actor is "free" to choose his or her path, but the appropriateness of such choice depends on the complex context within which the action takes place. In certain situations, it is appropriate to be aggressive, or self-assertive, in some others it is necessary to be passive, and to refrain from manifesting one's own intent or free will.

Conflict or cooperation, viewed in the Western epistemology as discrete states which result from the free decisions of actors who operate in systems in healthy states of "cooperation" or in pathological states of "conflict", are defined in this Yijing Epistemology as fuzzy subsets of the above complex system of contextual patterns. Whereas the Western modern epistemology wants to identify universal principles common to all conflicts or cooperation, removing as much as possible the variability introduced by the different ontological contexts, the Yijing is based on an epistemology which concern is to read the ontological contexts within which conflict and cooperation may be part of quite different dynamic processes where the same choice by actors may result in quite different situations. This is why we may define this epistemology which prevailed in the Pax Sinica World as a "context sensitive" epistemology in contrast with the Western modern "context-free" epistemology.

The context-sensitive epistemology of Yijing represents conflict and cooperation within complex contexts, and this make the interpretation of the two concepts quite different from both the moralistic and the pathological approaches characterising the Western modern epistemology.

Firstly, the Yijin and more generally the Daoist tradition does not pass any moral judgement on the goodness of people behaving cooperatively, and the badness of those who start conflicts. Whether a particular action is good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate depends on the context, i.e. the circumstances or the situation in which the given action is taken. Yijing is nothing but a

classificatory system of 64 hexagrams which defines such contextual situations within which certain actions are judged to be good or bad. This is why we have used the term "context-sensitive" to point out the specific characteristics of the epistemology of the Pax Sinica world in comparison with the Western modern world. Conflicts are neither separated from a heaslthy state of cooperation. There are different conflictual contexts which should not be confused with each other. Some of them are coming as an unavoidable end of non-conflict situations, but other are also unavoidable preparatory states for new states of cooperation.

Tai (Peace)(7), for example, is defined as the state of cooperation between Heaven and Earth, which provides a context within which men in yang position and in yin position cooperate with each other. The hexagramme of Tai puts three yins over three yangs. The Earth on top of Heaven. This seemingly upside-down situation which is legitimized by the author of Yijing as a state of the world where the qi (cosmic energies) of heaven mounts from below and the qi of the Earth descends from above. Important peoples put themselves below small peoples and this brings about cooperation and peace.

Fou (stagnation)(8) is represented by a reverse hexagram from tai, with three yangs on top of three yin. This represents Heaven on top of the Earth, a normal state for a rational Western intellectual. Yijing, sees in it, however, a situation where the qi of Heaven mounts and the qi of the Earth sinks leaving the people between them in disarray, important people act arrogantly and small people become more abject. This causes a lack of cooperation between people holding complementary roles.

In Tai cooperative action may be good or bad depending on the contextual circumstance, if you are in good terms beyond any conflict of interest with everybody you can try to cross a river on foot all of your cooperators together, yet, when the end of the tai phase approaches, and new trends of disharmony begin to appear, you should limit yourself to protect your land and refrain from any new activities. Even in Fou time, when the sage is surrounded by unwise people, if he knows to act by order of the king and not on his own, he can cooperate safely with other wise people. So, cooperative or conflictual activities are neither good nor bad in themselves. All depends on the context and how you adapt yourself to it.

Conflict in Yijing, by the way, is identified and visualized in different forms depending on the contextual situation. We find "song" (conflict)(9), a hexagon with three yang on top of yin yang yin, which symbolizes Heaven over water, the top people are tough and the small people are rough. Song is a low suit where the sage should always be careful to find the right time to begin any activity. He should seek advise from neutral wise people. Conflict is also a state of falling apart. The hexagon called buo (Pisplitting apart)(10) is composed by five yin on top of which one yang is maintaining an insecure position. The wise men should show restraint. Otherwise they will be destabilized by unwise people. When the bed crumbles down the person sleeping in it also falls. However, if the wise person leaves the bed of the unwise ones, he can avoid the danger of falling. An entirely different conflictual situation is created when the time of destruction is about to end and reconstruction can begin. Then

The hexagramme is called fu (return)(11). Five yin are supported by one yang at the bottom. When the conflicting context is in this state, it is still unwise to take hasty actions, yet, time has come to join in with peoples of virtue (therefore cooperate) and express your thought in a non-extreme way. Conflict may also be an occasion for renewal. The hexagon ge (revolution)(12) represents such context with one yin on two yang on top in the upper triad, and one yin between two yang at the botoom. This is a struggle between fire and water. Action should not be hastilly taken but when time is ripe resolute actions are good. The wise people change their position as time changes. Other hexagos related to conflictual circumstances give different lessons about how to take action and when to cooperate in different contextual situations, (note that cooperation is an option which exists also in situations of conflict) but we will not expand on them for lack of space.

A New Interest in Context Sensitivity

From the above discussion, it became clear that the approach to "cooperation and conflict" does not have necessar-illy to take the form it took in Western modern intellectual history. It is

possible to develop a quite different epistemological approach, as is found in the Pax Sinica World, especially, in the yijing and in the Daoist tradition which interprets this text from the yin side. The major difference lies in the fact that the former perceives the two concepts to represent mutually exclusive states of the system, involving good or bad choices by the concerned actors, which cause the whole system to be either healthy or pathological.

This position is based on the context-free essentialist epistemology characterizing the Western Modern World since the time of the Enlightenment. A rational approach to "cooperation and conflict" is to build a context-free definition of the two mutually exclusive concepts which is valid under the ceteris paribus condition. The researchers and the policy planners have to develop and apply a context-free theory valid in any situation and under any conditions. This epistemology is indispensable to the social order based on individual citizens equal with each other and all sharing a set of universal values applied without any distinction of the contextual conditions. It is also the foundation of positivist social sciences.

In opposition to the Western modern World, the Pax Sinica World has developed a highly heierarchical social order, where, as we saw above, the pairs of roles provide the context within which different acts are expected from all the actors depending on the context within which they operate. What is permitted in one context is forbidden in another. A context-sensitive ethics has been developed, and a corresponding epistemology accompanied it.

It is easy to argue that this ethics is undemocratic and that the a context-sensitive epistemology fails to develop context-free universar»concepts which constitute the very basis of scientific inquiry and of rational planning and decision-making. As we have pointed out before, however, it may be useful, at least, to ask whether the context-sensitive approach can not complement the context-free approach, in terms of social ethics, in scientific inquiry, and in planning and decision-making. Fortunately enough there is a growing realization in the West about this fact.

Firstly, as to the context-sensitive ethics, the moral decision based on given pairs of vertical roles, parents/children, husband/wife, ruler/subjects, etc., is definitely undemocratic when it stresses the supremacy of the upper role over the lower, as does Confucianism. When the emphasis is on the lower role, children, wife, subject, etc., as Daoism does, to be context-sensitive is important in order to denounce injustices committed by the person with a higher role vis-a-vis another person holding a lower position. The feminist insistence on "gender-sensitivity" is a typical case where radical democracy demands every citizen to be context-sensitive.

I use here the term "radical" because the conventional approach to democracy assumes that all "men" are equal under the rule of universal values, i.e. under the context-free regime of democracy.

It is, therefore, not only in the case of feminists aiming at building a context-sensitive society that it is inappropriate to associate democracy with context-free universalism, and consider context-sensitivity as a characteristic of pre-modern undemocratic societies. Those who do so, and try to "democratize" non-Western societies commit a big mistake. To ignore the existence of specific socio-cultural contexts in these societies, and try to apply context-free Western-style democratic institutions, such as "free election" based on a party system, has led, in many cases, to tragedies. This was the case in different African countries where the United Nations conducted elections which were just reflecting the relative numerical importance of different ethnic groups because the voting pattern depended on the ethnic context. They just confirmed the rule of the most numerous ethnic group over the minority groups. The assumption that voters voted according to their context-free individual preference was wrong and counter-productive.

It is interesting to take note of the fact that, in recent years, the Western intellectual community and media has shown a considerable interest in a context-sensitive undemocratic non-Western model of development. The assumption that all cultures would evolve from pre-modern societies into modern societies, and therefore from context-dependent to context-free societies was broken recently by the recognition that there were in Asia some exceptional cases where industrialization was taking place without a shift from context-dependence to context-freedom. Attention was drawn to the case of the undemocratic culture of "confucian capitalism" which made it possible to Japan and to the Asian NIEs to industrialize rapidly. The undemocratic nature of this version of

Capitalism was deliberately overlooked by the Western intellectuals who were interested in its economic efficiency.

This success was made possible by the dedication of the workers to the company managers, and the protection/allegiance relation between the "mother firms" and the sub-contracting firms. This contextualization of labour-management relations and of a sub-contracting division of labour into a Confucian ethical context is undemocratic but better suited for the rapid industrial take-off of a developing economy. After the Asian Financial Crisis, this Asian NIEs version of Capitalism is the target of criticism which now, that it is in crisis, call it "crony Capitalism". The "cronyism" is also part of the Confucian contextual ethics, since it stresses the need to make management decisions always taking into consideration the context of the network of the family firms and their business supporters which is composed by cronies in Government and elsewhere. However, by puttingan end to this undemocratic "cooperation", the IMF context-free conditionalities has generated a general "conflict" complicating the already lack of cooperation trig-gered-off by the Asian Financial Crisis.(13)

It is no more evident, as it used to be two decades ago, that all the non-Western cultures will adopt in their process of industrialization a context-free democratic universalism. Neither is it universally true that context-sensitivity leads only to the rule of the superior roles over the inferior ones. It is important in this connection to mention the existence, in East Asia, of a peasant movement which built its Utopia on making horizontal all the vertical roles in the name of Heaven who treats all human equally. It is the Tonghak (Eastern Learning) Movement of the late 19 century, which established for a while in the zone under its control, communities where gender-equality was practiced in their egalitarian institutions. This movement did not adopt a context-free universalistic ethics. It rather developed an egalitarian context-sensitive ethics as demanded by the gender-sensitive feminists.(14)

It is, therefore, at least problematic to associate democracy with context-free universalism, and consider context-sensitivity as a characteristic of pre-modern undemocratic societies. To ignore the existence of specific socio-cultural contexts and try to apply context-free Western-style democratic institutions has always led to tragedies in different African conflict-laden societies where elections were expected to lead to a reconciliation among the conflictins ethnic groups. The result was quite opposite because the voting pattern depended on the multi-ethnic context where voting reflected only their respective numerical importance. The assumption that voters voted according to their context-free individual preference was wrong and counter-productive under these highly context-sensitive circumstances.

The importance of context-sensitivity is not limited to the understanding of modernization and democratization. It is also important in the development of research on conflicts and peace-building. There, the context-free research which has helped generate a huge amount of conflict data, inter-State and intra-state, has been recently found insufficient in order to give appropriate guidance to conflict resolution.

A research project called CEWS found it necessary to identify in all the military conflicts the different phases in which the conflict was erupting, escalating, reaching a peak, and then was receding into a phase of conclusion. This distinction of phases was accompanied by a new interest in conflict "narratives". This has led conflict research in a new stage where the researchers look into a complex process highly dependent on the contextual conditions and on their perception by the actors involved in it. For the moment, the research is conducted with no conscious effort to identify the context within which the narrative evolves. Yet, such new computerized conflict narrative data-bases will help develop an interest in the context within which the conflicts evolve.

A typical example of this new trend is the Prototype Action-Recommendation System (PARIS) which aims at helping the development of a "situatioally specific reasonning connecting available actions to concrete goals".(16) To be sytuationally specific is, in other words, to be context-sensitive. This new trend in conflict early warning research is a clear case where the academic community begins to realize the insufficiency of the Western modern context-free epistemology. This is where a context-sensitive methodology, a grammar so to speak, has to be developed to identify the context within which each of the actors involved in the conflictual

process perceives his or her chances, consulting the context in taking certain decision, either increasing or decreasing the existing tension between them.

This is where, just as an example, the Yijing grammar could be of some use. The "Heaven" factors composed by the various, propicious or un-propicious, trends in ideas and symbols used in legitimizing the conflicting positions of the actors, the "Earth" factors of conflicting interests of the actors and their supporters, on the geo-political and geo-economic terrain, the "Men" aspects of coalition-building and disbanding among the local actors and their supporters, as well as the institutions formed and transformed by them constitute a context within which each actor develops his or her narrative of the situation within which they take their decisions. It is not in replacement of the universalist theory of conflict and cooperation, but as a complement to it that we propose that a context-sensitive theory and methodology based on the non-Western epistemology of Yijing could play a role in understanding better the anatomy of conflicts.

On the policy level, a context-sensitive epistemology would play a certain role in approaching the question of conflict management with some concerns so far ignored by the international community. The present state of conflict research influences the conflict management and peace-building policies of the different international agents and agencies which early warning systems have been designed according to context-free conceptual frameworks. It is interesting to take note of the fact that a recent report produced by the Development Assistance CoOmmit-tee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a Report on Conflict, Peace and Development which takes a context-sensitive approach.(17) This Report is context-sensitive in three ways. Firstly it recognizes the existence of conflict cycles which are composed by shifts between the different phases beginning with peace, conflict-escalation, de-escalation and finally reconciliation. The Report recognizes the fact that these cycles take, in reality, different forms in different contexts and circumstances. The Report also recognize the fact that in certain cases peace and conflict can coexist for years and even decades.

This entirely new approach to conflict and cooperation corresponds to the emergence in the conflict research and practitionner communities of a certain interest in context-sensitive analyses. It is caused by a practical interest in determining the appropriateness of different forms of assistance which can not be universally defined, and need to pay a special attention to the contextual conditions if it wants to be useful. This is where the insights from the Pax Sinica culture may be of special relevance.

We wish to point out the fact that we have reached a new phase in the history of humankind when the non-Western cultural traditions begin to draw the attention of the West, including both the researchers and the policy-makers. This is not only because postmodernists are engaged in the deconstruction of the Western modern universal context-free ethics and epistemology. It is also because, conflict and cooperation between the non-Western political, economic and cultural agents are highly context-dependent simply because the decisions of these agents are highly context-dependent. The context-free norms and patterns of decision-making is valid between the Westernized agents who are not playing the principal roles in contemporary domestic conflicts.

In this age of transition, we must learn the wisdom of the East, not to replace the Western modern universal ideas of democracy and human rights, but to complement them, and to prepare the socio-economic and political context of the non Western regions for the implementation of these context-free values. Conflict and cooperation are two concepts which need to be approached both through the context-free Western epistemology and through the context-sensitive epistemology of the East. East and West must meet in face of so many complex conflicts in this age of globalization.

Notes

1. About the Pax Sinica world view:

Cf. Kinhide Mushakoji, "Post-Modern Cultural Development in East Asia: Beyond the Japanese version of Confucianism", Eleono-ra Barbieri Massini, Yogesh Atal eds., The Futures of Asian Cultures. Bangkok, 1993, pp. 57-80.

2. On epistemology, cf. Kinhide Mushakoji, Global Issues and Interparadigmatic Dialogue: Essays on Multipolar Politics. Torino, 1998. Pp. 3-28.

On dichotomous epistemology which combines the polar concepts of "yin" and "yang":

Cf. Akira Ohama, Chugoku-teki Shii no Dento (The Tradition of Chinese Thinking) Tokyo, 1969.

3. On the contrasts between Confucianism and Daoism, Cf. Ibid. Pp. 54-57.

We will not discuss here the position of the legalist school (fajia) which is in some sense the closest to the West, in terms of both positivism and realism. This School which may constitute a third pole, yang to the Confucians who would constitute an yin, and yin to the Daoist who would assume a yang position. We will not enter here in a detailed discussion of this trilateral yin/yang relation. Suffice it here to mention that the Legalist School is also highly context-sensitive. For example the book Han Fei Zi in its Fifth Chapter, stresses the need for the ruler to follow the "dao" (path) by being passive in listenning to the voices of his subjects who constitute his context. Cf. Osamu Kanaya Translation. Han Fei Zi, Vol. 1 Tokyo,1994. Pp. 78-82.

4. By "context-free" we mean an epistemologica; system which generates a discourse which either represents universal truth or a general tendency valid ubder the "ceteris paribus" condition. A context-sensitive epistemology generates discourses which are either qualified by a "when" or by an "if.

5. Cf. Osamu Kanaya Trans. Soji (Zhuanzi) Vol. 1. Takyo, 1971. Pp. 234-236.

6. Cf. Shinji Takada, Motomi Goto Trnas., Vol 1. Pp. 11-61.

For the English speaking reader the following translation can be helpful although it gives only a selective translation of the original text.

Richard Wilhelm Translation rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes.

The I Ching or Book of Change. Princeton, 1967.

7. Cf. Shinji Takada, Motomi Goto Trans. Op cit. Vol. 1. Pp. 27-32. Cf. Richard Wilhelm. Op. Cit.

8. Cf. S. Takada. Op. Cit. Vol. 1. pp.151-161. R. Wilhelm. Op. Cit. Pp. 48-52. (T'ai: from here till note 13, we give the old alphabetical transliteration used by the author between brackets at the end of the citation.)

9. Cf. S. Takada. Op. Cit. Vol. 1. Pp. 162-166. R. Wilhelm. Cit. Pp. 52-55. (P'i)

10. Cf. S. Takada. Op. Cit. Vol. 1 Pp. 127-132. R. Wilhelm Cit. Pp. 28-31. (Sung)

11. Cf. S. Takada. Op. Cit. Vol. 1. Pp. 221-225. R. Wilhelm. Cit. pp. 93-96. (Po)

12. Cf. S. Takada. Op. Cit. Vol. 1. Pp. 226-231. R. Wilhelm. Cit. Pp. 97-100. (Fu)

13. Cf. S. Takada, Op Cit. Vol. 2. Pp. 118-123. R. Wilhelm. Op. Cit. Pp. 189-192. (Ko)

14. Cf. Kinhide Mushakoji, Japan and Cultural Development in East Asia: Possibilities of a Human Rights Culture". Jefferson R. Plan-tilla, Sebasti L. Raj, SJ eds., Human Rights in Asian Cultures: Continuity and Change. Osaka, 1997. Pp. 292-322.

15. Oh Byung-Sun, „Cultural Values and Human Rights: The Korean Perspective", Jefferson R. Plantilla, Sabasti L. Raj, SJ eds., ibid. Pp. 230-231.

16. Cf. Jafar I.Adibi, et al., "A Prototype Action Recommender's Information Support System for Conflict Prevention" (Paper presented at the XVIIth IPSA World Congress, Seoul, 1997)

17. DAC, OECD. Conflict and Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century. OECD, 1998.

V. V. Naumkin[143]

[143] Director of the Institute for Oriental Studies (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Dr. Sc. (History), professor. He is the author of over 500 scholarly publications, including books: *Istoriyi Vostoka* [Histories of the East], *Ocherki po etnolingvistike Sokotry* [Essays on Ethnolinguistics of Soqotra], Sokotriytsy [The Soqotri], *Islam i musulmane: kultura i politika* [Islam and the Muslims: Culture and Politics], *Abu Hamidal-Gazali* [Abu Hamid al-Ghazali], *Pravilnyye vesy* [The Right Scales], and others. Mr Naumkin is the Chair of the editorial board of the 'East (ORIENS)' journal, of 'Vostochny arhiv' ['The Eastern Archive'] journal, he is a member of editorial boards or editorial councils of the following journals: *Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz* [Central Asia and the Caucasus] (Sweden), *Vestnik rossiyskoy natsiyi* [Bulletin of the Russian Nation], *Vestnik MGU* [Bulletin of the MSU. 'Oriental Studies' Series], *Sovremenny Islam* [Modern Islam]. Many of his books have been translated into foreign languages.

THE ISLAMIC WORLD, RUSSIA, THE WEST: A DIFFICULT DIALOGUE

A number of triangular structures can be found in the universal civilizational classification matrices of different kinds; among these are the ones where our country participates: Russia – the USA – the European Union, Russia – China – India, Russia – Belarus – Kazakhstan, etc. The triad mentioned in the headline of this report does not mean that there are equipollent relations between its members. Not at all. But the differences in mutual relations do not mean that they do not face the same probkms, for instance, those of fellow citizenship of people belonging to different faiths and ethnic groups or migration flows.

Modern Muslim states play a huge role in world economy, politics and culture. These three dimensions are inextricably interwoven with one another. For example, the fact that these states supply energy resources to the world market has a considerable influence on political processes and events of a global nature. But politics is also closely connected with culture. It is the cultural or civilizational dimension that actually determines the character of mutual relations of the Islamic world with other parts of the world community.

The only correct way of promoting these relations is a way of dialogue between religions and cultures, of their cooperation and mutual enrichment, of respect and tolerance to one another.

In the globalizing world, it is civilizations, cultures, peoples and states that are making an increasing impact on one another due to a more active circulation of capital, people and information (though, as a matter of fact, the circulation is only free for the capital and information, but not for the people). Globalization is not a product of our time. But its character and scale are changing. And while the basis of globalization in the last quarter of the 20th century was the domination of the USA, in this century the situation has changed. As Fareed Za-karia wrote in his famous book *The Post-American World,* the epoch of the rise of the West was followed by the epoch of the rise of the Rest in the 21st century.

Under the conditions of globalization all nations, states and civilizations are actively interacting with one another, rules and norms of functioning of economic and political systems are becoming closer, but any civilization rightly values the cultural foundations as its very identity depends on their preservation. At that, even in the economic sphere institutions and rules worked out in one civilization can appear to be globally more effective than the ones another civilization has. For instance, under the circumstances of the world recession, Islamic banks demonstrated greater stability and efficiency than the Western ones.

Unfortunately, the relations between the Islamic world and the West tend to deteriorate nowadays. The reasons are clear. First of all, it is the occupation of Arab Palestine and the unjustified use of military force in other parts of the Islamic world. Also among the reasons are the terrorist attacks from those who arbitrarily assume the right to act, as they say, on behalf of Islam. Certainly there are great hopes that the situation can be improved. These hopes are in part connected with the policy of President Obama of the USA who is trying to radically improve the relations with the Islamic world. This policy is strikingly different from the one which was for a long time carried out by the neoconservatives who used to hold power in the USA. It will be recalled that yet four years before the 11th of September 2001 the list of Middle-East regimes and organizations targeted for force intervention by Podhoretz, Bennett, Ledeen, Netanyahu and the 'Wall Street Journal' which reflected the views of politicians and political scientists of this orientation, included Algeria, Libya, Egypt, the Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the movements of Hezbollah and Hamas, the Palestinian administration and the so-called 'militant Islam'.

The image of the 'Evil Empire' opposing the 'Democratic Good Empire' – the USA – was being constructed. The development of this image was further promoted by S. Huntington's book *The Clash of Civilizations* published in 1993; in this book the Islamic world was viewed as an opponent of the West. 'The crescent-like Islamic world has bloody borders...', the political analyst, who had timely borrowed the idea of 'clash' from Bernard Lewis, prophesied eerily. The concept of clashes of civilizations became the *plat du jour* for Western political science in the 1990s. In February 2004 during the annual dinner at the American Enterprise Institute Charles Krauthammer triumphantly claimed that the Americans had created 'the biggest empire ever in the

world history'. According to his statement America is not only a 'unipolar state' but the 'keeper of the international system'. And in the 2000s part of 'neo-cons' considered Saudi Arabia to occupy the first place among the centres of Islamic threat. On the 10th of July 2002 Richard Perle invited Laurent Murawiec (a former advisor to Lyndon LaRouche) to give a briefing at the Defense Policy Board which he headed at that time; during the briefing Murawiec maintained that the USA should give an ultimatum to Saudi Arabia. 'Either you,' emphasized Murawiec, 'prosecute or isolate those involved in the terror chain, including the Saudi intelligence services, and stop anti-Israeli statements in the country, or we will launch an invasion, seize the oil fields and occupy Mecca.'

Fortunately for the USA and for the Islamic world the administration of G. Bush Jr. did not follow Murawiec's advice and the campaign against Mecca did not take place. But the attempts of a part of American political establishment to form an image of the enemy of the West in the person of the whole Islamic world remained unchanged. The persistent attempts to spread democracy in the Islamic world and to overthrow regimes for its sake discredited the slogans of democratization. This strategy began to be viewed by the Islamic world as a screen for realization of other goals of geopolitical character. Till Palestine, Iraq and, to a smaller degree, Afghanistan remain the proof of the unchanged policy of 'double standards' and of a stake put on military force, this policy will be perceived as a continuation of the former colonialism of the West refreshing the memory of citizens of many countries about the years of dependence and national humiliation.

It will be recalled that a famous American journalist Robert Fisk spoke ironically about the claims of Israel on biblical territories: 'We all have the lands the God or our fathers gave us. Didn't the Queen of England Mary Tudor die with the word "Calais" on her lips? May Spain have a legal right for the Netherlands? Or Sweden for Norway and Denmark? Or does Great Britain have the right for India? Or Muslims – as well as Jews -the right for Andalusia of the 15th century? Any colonial state including Israel can advance such ridiculous claims.' Even the Palestinian leaders could not have put it so definitely.

In this context I cannot but remember the story told by a Spanish writer Carlos Lencero who had lived in Moroccan Rif for a long time. The landlord of the house where he lodged was an old man who had first fought against Franco during the rebellion in Rif, and then during the civil war in Spain he fought on his side against the republicans (about one hundred thousand Moroccans fought on the side of Franco, twenty thousand of them were killed). Lencero asked the old man if he saw any contradiction in such a dramatic change of positions. The old man raised his eyebrows as if in surprise: 'What is strange about it? We always did one and the same thing: killing the Spaniards.' We have nothing left to do but hope that the relations between the Islamic world and the West do not develop in the line of this logic.

An idea of the Islamic world as a community that presumably denies democracy has become a habitual cliche in the Western political discourse. This stereotype was often used to justify pressure on those Muslim states that politically do not follow the course of American policy. However, as American experts in Islamic studies J. Esposito and J. Voll wrote: 'Adherence to westernization does not guarantee democracy as well as application of the Islamic law does not prove the innate authoritarianism in Islam.' It is common knowledge that the best model of combination of Islamic values with the modern management methods, human liberties and rights is intensively searched for all over the Islamic world. To put it in another way, the inevitable changes cannot be avoided by any societies, it also concerns Muslim ones but they also have the right to take pride in those spiritual values and moral traditions which were given to them about one and a half thousand years ago. They are also making and will make their impact on outer world as the process of mutual enrichment of civilizations is a two-way road.

One of the roads which this traffic is going along at an increasing speed is 'the way of migrants'. Turning of the Muslim Diaspora in the West into an influential social and political force cannot but influence the system of governmental and political institutions in the Western countries. On the whole, its increase in number and the growth of its influence promote the appearance of new centres of power and the growth of uncertainty in the system of world politics. Those new relations that are formed between the actors of the world politics in part owing to the

factor mentioned above can be described with the help of a concept of poliarchy (translated from Greek as 'multiple authority'). This term was first introduced into the scientific circulation about forty years ago by an American political scientist Robert Dahl to describe the processes in developed democracies, and then, a little later, it was used with regard to the world politics by an American international affairs expert Seyom Brown. Brown remarked that this term meant what was loaded in its etymology, that is 'the political system which can be quite chaotic, ruled by different actors'. However, it is not anarchy (which means the complete absence of management): with regard to the world politics 'it is the description of a system where sovereign states are significantly important players and where there are no supranational actors with their imposing power over states'. In the recently published article the author conceptualizes poliarchy as a system which 'includes influential non-government, supranational and transnational actors in addition to national governments and embraces regional and universal institutions with supranational authorities'. Thus, the concept in the most simplified form reflected the main trend of the modern process of transformation of the world management system: from the dramatic decline which took place at first to the rapid growth of the number of players of different weights who take part in this management. It is natural that in the context of this process communities of immigrants are seen as such.

Basing upon the achieved level of theoretical comprehension of the problem one can speak of the three globalization-cultural paradigms or prospects, according to the conception of American scientist Nederveen Pieterse, about the cultural differentialism or continuing distinctions; cultural convergence or growing sameness; cultural hybridization or constant blending. The key factor here is the attitude towards cultural and civilization distinctions: whether globalization will lead to their levelling, wiping off by way of some of them being absorbed by others, homogenization (convergence) or, on the contrary, whether they will be established, perpetuated (differentialism which forms the basis of Samuel Huntington's theory of the 'clash of civilizations') or the process of their blending (hybridization) will go on. It should be remarked that the discourse based on this conception of hybridization known since the 19th century was developed in the West in the literature devoted to the phenomenon of migration. In this context the Muslim East performs the function of an agent of hybridization.

Here we should come back to the idea of a dialogue which I think possible to name cross-civilizational. This term has established, come into the global political lexicon and despite a great attractiveness and correctness of use of a different scheme, 'one civilization – many cultures', this term is quite acceptable as an instrument of a theoretical discourse. Indeed, the interaction is realized not by some abstract civilizations but by people carrying different cultural and civilizational values. However, ideational motivations along with cultural and civilizational framing of actions not only of individuals but also of much bigger communities of people such as nations or states frequently take on such particular significance that they can act, without exaggeration, in the role of the well-known 'motive power of history'.

That is why the cross-religious and cross-cultural dialogue mentioned above has become an imperative in our epoch of globalization, which is enlightened but full of conflict. It is an important means of overcoming estrangement, lack of understanding, hostility between people, which are particularly dangerous for the destinies of the world. This dialogue is not a linear but a multidimensional construction, and it can only be a success with the proviso that it is supplemented with a intra-civilizational dialogue and debates about the essence of this or that culture, conducted by the representatives of one. As we know, these debates sometimes become more heated than the debates between the representatives of different cultures.

Unfortunately, even in liberal, democratic and enlightened Europe not everything is done so far to provide the Muslims living there with a comfortable entry into the society. Integration is often understood as deprivation of migrants of their own cultural identity. Jurgen Ruttgers, the prime-minister of the German land of Northern Rhine – Westphalia and an undisguised xenophobe, believes that nowhere in the world is there an example of a successful multicultural society. He says: 'Integration is not assimilation. You do not have to abandon your religion but you have to obey our fundamental values.' He is also the author of a statement: 'Kinder statt Inder' ['More children but not Indians']. And a Sweden trade union leader G6-ran Johansson when

answering a question about what he means by integration gives a little different reply: 'It is of no interest to me whether you respect our culture. You just have to obey the law.' An American author C. Caldwell misinterpreting the views of one of European Muslim professors maintains: 'It is only when the European traditions will be understood as Muslim ones, that the Muslims will obey them. If not, they will not.' Journalist Ian Buruma goes even further in ascription of non-existing intentions to Muslims saying that, like Islamists of the past who 'cynically used the technological innovations of the West', the Islamists of our century 'treat Western liberties and rights in the same way'. In fact, it is this approach demonstrated by the journalist that denies the cultural diversity, the development of which has always been advocated by Western thinkers.

Let us remark that the number of Muslim scholars trying from different positions, both modernist and conservative-protective ones, in this or that way to adapt Islam to life conditions of the Islamic Ummah living in societies with non-Muslim majority and non-Muslim government, is quite large. A most prominent Muslim lawyer of America and the founder of Fiqh Council of North America sheikh Taha Jabir Al-Alvani is considered to be the creator of the conception of 'minority fiqh' which began to spread since the mid-1990s. Jurists who develop the doctrine of this 'new fiqh' with the help of fatwa correct the legal regulations of the traditional Muslim law without any contradiction to the bases of Shariah. For instance, in the fatwa of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, Muslims are not only allowed, but are recommended to congratulate non-Muslims on their holidays, which was not allowed by many jurists, but are forbidden to take part in celebrations with the exception of secular national holidays of the states they live in.

Turning to Russia, in the first place, I will repeat the well-known truth which is often forgotten not only by our foreign colleagues but also by some compatriots: Russia in itself is not only an Orthodox but also a Muslim state. This is why we cannot live ignoring the Islamic world: it is both outside and inside us at the same time. Let me touch upon history which is not simple – the union of the country into a unified multicultural organism was accompanied by conquests and armed conflicts between the communities which finally joined it, these conflicts often being not on the ethnic basis – even Russian principalities were at war with one another. Let us remark that in Europe they fought with one another much more often and much more furiously. Even in the wars of Russian principalities with the Golden Horde which made a great cultural impact on them on both sides there often were representatives of Russians, Tatars and other peoples of that remote epoch. The host of the Russian Alexander Nevsky defeated the Western invaders with the help of soldiers from the Muslim Golden Horde.

Having united and having won, Russia, afraid of new foreign conquests and taking care of its security, widened along the perimeter of its borders but, unlike Europeans, it never tried to colonize other countries. Our ancestors bequeathed a good field of mutually friendly relations with peoples of the Muslim world. Certainly, as was common in those ancient times, they took up arms while competing for influence with the neighbouring empires, Persia and Turkey, but at that they never set a goal of conquests or of submission, and today our past seems to draw us together with these two most influential states, the new centres of power of our multipolar world that are friendly to us.

The policy of toleration finally triumphed in Russia in the epoch of Catherine the Second in the 18th century. But, contrary to a widespread belief even before it, in the Petrine epoch when the attitude of Peter the First to Muslims was influenced by the conflict of interests with Persia and Iran there was no Islamophobia in the tsar's policy. He was always surrounded by representatives of Muslims, even in military campaigns. For instance, during the Campaign of Prut in 1711 a representative of one of the famous Muslim aristocratic families, Tevkelev, began to rise from the ranks. The tolerance of Russian Islam, the loyalty of the forming and growing Russian

ummah to our multinational and multidenominational state has for a long time been one of the main cementing foundations on which our statehood is based. But that'll do for history, though today it is more and more often appealed to by politicians; it is at times disreputably manipulated with. On the whole, as President Medvedev rightly said while giving a speech in Cairo we do not have to search friendship with the Islamic world as Russia is its integral part.

It is also important that Russia has moral ideals similar to those in the Islamic world. Among them are a man's civil and state responsibility, mutual help, the role of family values, moral approach to international relations and many other factors. We can speak about civilizational similarity of our peoples. Today Russia lives in the epoch of resolute restoration of our national cultural and historical memory. In this single important dimension of the process of establishing our statehood the Orthodox and Muslim traditions are united both by their God-given closeness and by vital interests of people who face stunning challenges of the era which defies the national foundations of globalization. For the Islamic world, it is also the challenges of active secularization which are brought by some groups in Western societies.

The religious roots of our cultures go back to one, though the branches have grown in different directions. But is it so important that in our Orthodox churches the icon, as John of Damascus wrote, is a 'worshipped holy image' and in mosques there is no anthropomorphic image? It is important for tolerance and the readiness for co-existence of cultures to always triumph in our relations. It is tolerance which is the pivot of all world's holy religions.

Finally, together with the Islamic world we are the energy storehouse of the mankind. I will not stop at it in detail. It is well-known that Russia and the Islamic world jointly own the main part of energy resource potential of the universe. We are to sail in this boat together for a long time, the longer the better.

To sum it up, a few words about the so-called 'world war on terror'. The term 'Islamic terrorism' is flatly unacceptable, which was very timely remarked by our president; this term has become a tag that the foes of Muslim societies gladly fasten on them. However, let us remember that inside these societies, unfortunately, there are malevolent forces that undermine them from within, illegally assume the right to speak on behalf of Islam and with the help of religion try to justify the actions that contradict its values. They have consigned to oblivion the fact that not only love to coreligionists and respect for friends are typical of a Muslim culture, but also respect for enemies and mercy for the conquered.

But both the Islamic world and Russia, which also has its ailments, have to cure their maladies themselves, and it is not within the scope of responsibilities of foreign advisors who willingly resort to military force for a treatment. In the triangle that I spoke about in this report, the dialogue, cooperation and cultural synthesis only in one segment – in relations between Russia and the Islamic world – give us hope for a conflict-free future.

A. P. Nazaretyan[144]

SOCIAL VIOLENCE AND THE PROSPECT OF A PLANETARY CIVILIZATION[145]

Comparative-historical and cross-cultural research, added to by special calculations of the *bloodshed coefficient* (the ratio of an average number of murders to the population size at a unit of time) shows that the widespread opinion of the increased violence in the modern world is doubtful. Actually nowadays the level of political and domestic violence is much lower than ever before in the history of mankind. Our common concern over the current situation should not mask the historical dynamics fact: *never before has an average person been so well protected from political and domestic forms of violence, from biological aggression (pathogenic*

microorganisms, wild animals etc.) and starving as they are now. According to the WHO research, at the beginning of the 21 century the annual average number of suicides in the world exceeds the number of mutual murders; such situation is historically unprecedented.

The illusion of *growing* violence is caused by the psychological effect of a *retrospective aberration:* the objective improvement of social life conditions (economic well-being, social mobility, political freedoms etc.) is accompanied by the advancing growth of expectations. Due to these expectations the dynamics of processes is perceived by the commonplace sense as 'quite the opposite'. That is the reason for growth of dissatisfaction with the state of things.

The reduction of the general level of violence in the modern society is accompanied by an unbelievable *decrease in the threshold of sensitivity to violence* (as well as to pain, death, dirt, unpleasant smells etc.): every event containing a violent component causes much sharper and mass feeling, than during any previous epoch, and becomes a subject of a biased discussion. Along with it the *semantic rows' sublimation* is taking place: the word 'violence' is applied to a variety of actions which were not viewed as such in the past.

But the point is not only in psychological and psycholinguistic effects. Proportionally to the power of technologies the *price of violence* has cardinally increased: local events are more fraught with far-reaching consequences, including the threat of a global disaster than ever before.

This circumstance reflects the universal historical dependence – the law of a techno-humanitarian balance: the more powerful industrial and military technologies are, the more sophisticated means of restriction of aggression are necessary for the society preservation. When the technological power is not counterbalanced by proportional regulators, the internal stability of a social system decreases, i.e. it becomes more sensitive to fluctuations of mass moods, errors of charismatic leaders, etc.

According to the latest observations, throughout all human history and its background the system dependence between force, wisdom and viability served as the *selection* mechanism (thus, screening) of societies, cultural values and norms according to the criterion of their conformity to the growing technological power. Owing to this mechanism in the long-term retrospective, with the growth of destructive power of the weaponry and population density, *the bloodshedfactor of societies did not just fail to increase but it decreased in a non-linear way.* We are surprised to find out that even the 20th century with its world and civil wars, concentration camps, horrors of the genocide and Hiroshima is second to any previous century in terms of this index.

The new technology (not only military) always poses threat for the existence of a society, but just to abandon it is a deadlock way. The technology is really dangerous only until the society has culturally and psychologically 'digested', 'tamed' it and developed the internal antidote. Only such a 'progressive' solution to problems is strategically perspective. For example, a very serious threat for the advanced civilizations of the past was the steel weapon, earlier the bronze, bow with arrows, etc. After the culture has adapted for technology, the danger dramatically decreases. *Danger is the value expressing the relation of objective threat to readiness of the subject to resist it.*

On the whole, the mankind, having gone through the crucible of local, regional and, in a number of cases, global disasters managed to develop fairly effective means of control over natural impulses of aggression to survive until the present day. But in earlier periods the centres of civilization, which had kept them aloof, were replaced by new ones which managed to continue the historical evolution. Now the situation has changed significantly. Over a hundred years – from the middle of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century – the killing power of weapons increased in its energy expression by a factor of 6 (a million times!), which put the planetary civilization to the brink of survival. For the first time in history there was a situation where for *an irreversible global catastrophe to occur it was enough for a small number of active characters (who have access to the 'buttons') to experience a breakdown in the minds.*

The fact that since 1945, people have managed to refrain from direct use of the most destructive weapons is a major achievement of the mankind. However, it was paid for by sewage of global contradictions into the mainstream of local armed conflicts. In total, these conflicts have killed up to 50 million people, however, taking into consideration the loss of hundreds of millions or billions which had been expected, the opposition of blocks in the second half of the century is

called the 'Cold War'. At the same time it was made possible to achieve an unprecedented scale and efficiency of international agreements -the discontinuance of nuclear tests in three spheres and other global events. According to the retro-prognosis conducted several years ago, if human activities had remained exactly as environmentally polluting as it was in the 1950s and '60s, then by 1990 the life on the planet would have become unbearable.

'Classical' nuclear weapons half a century ago brought mankind to the brink of survival, but today it is not a global threat, because humanity has been able to mentally 'digest' it, turning it into a tool of deterrence. The appearance of these weapons in the USA and the Soviet Union helped to deter the worst scenario of the third world war. In China, it excluded the resumption of civil war, and claims of mainland China to Taiwan were toned down by the 'nuclear umbrella', spread out over the latter by the Americans. The creation of atomic bombs by Pakistan and India immediately ceased hostilities in the disputed Kashmir, renewable every year before. And if in 1999, Yugoslavia had had a nuclear bomb, the NATO aggression would have been excluded...

The rhetoric of the 'struggle for nuclear disarmament' should not distract the attention of public organizations that are just wasting efforts, helping governments-monopolists to preserve a monopoly on weapons. The emergence of the atomic bomb in each 'new' country creates *zones where it is difficult 'to establish democracy' or 'render fraternal assistance' by force from the outside,* and this circumstance gives rise to a neurotic concern of the rulers of the superpowers. What is absolutely not worth doing is transferring (selling) the latest technologies to third countries: a model of techno-humanitarian balance and a rich international experience of the past century show that it is fraught with serious local disasters.

The practice of military containment of global conflicts in the 20th century saved mankind from a global catastrophe, but its *continuation in the 21 century is suicidal.* On the agenda there are qualitatively new technologies of mutual destruction (nuclear mini-charges, nanotechnologies, genetic engineering, robotics, etc.), all of them cheaper and more available. Along with it, the widespread growth of education, in parallel with the intensification of national frustrations and political terrorism makes the continued inertia of force conflicts increasingly threatening. In the words of an American scientist B. Joy, the century of weapons of mass destruction is being replaced by the century of *knowledge of mass destruction.* Political terrorism, equipped with increasingly sophisticated technologies of 'dual use' becomes as a cruel means of educating humanity as the atomic bomb was in the 20th century, and before that (with the removal back in history) – as gunpowder, steel, bronze, bow and arrows etc. In the worst scenario, it threatens to become the gravedigger of the planetary civilization, but in the best case scenario it will serve as a sobering shock tool.

For the first time in history the mankind faces the vital necessity not just to limit or *sort* physical violence (the task which for thousands of years was fulfilled by religions and other macro-group cultures, dividing people into 'us' and 'strangers') but to *remove* it – or rather, to finally force it out into virtual reality. Despite the tremendous advances in the development of non-violent manipulations, the means of cultural control which were worked out before prove to be insufficient, and often even counter-productive. Among the most alarming trends are 'religious renaissance' and other forms of resuscitated fundamentalism.

According to special calculations, in the next decades the planetary civilization is to experience a grand 'phase transition', which can be expressed with either irreversibly collapsing processes or with approaching the space frontiers of development. Relying on a number of conceptual grounds, we believe that the law of techno-humanitarian balance is a universally valid mechanism for historical selection not only on the Earth, but everywhere where any intelligent entity evolves. According to the systems theory all potentially admissible scenarios must be realized in the Universe, and in this case, we might be unwilling participants in a *universal natural selection.*

It seems that the conservative mechanism of the Universe is composed in a way preventing the decompensated aggression from breaking out of the planetary locus and becoming a factor of universal destruction. *The planetary civilization can become a space factor if only it gains wisdom proportionate to cosmically significant technologies.*

The planetary civilizations, which were not able to cope with the accelerating technological progress, one way or another, *are dying under the wreckage of their own power,* eliminating themselves from the evolutionary process. Only those which will be able to pass the purgatory of boosted global crises will approach cosmically significant milestones of progress. As in this polyfurcation phase the number of landslide scenarios clearly exceeds the number of scenarios of survival, it is logical to assume that the fundamental solution to global problems is given to few. It is not impossible that only one planetary civilization is meant to become a real cosmic one.

As it is estimated the bifurcation phase in the development of the Earth's civilization will be reached in the coming decades, the next generation of people are to determine if the civilization on our planet will be among the ones which continue the cosmic evolution, or among the ones which are meant to remain the consumable material of the Universal History.

The task of the Earth civilization's survival rests on the success of the cultural and psychological adaptation of the humanity to unprecedented instrumental capabilities. The key question of our time is whether the humanity will have time to outgrow a childish need for guardianship of the supernatural and (or) authoritarian and ideological authorities, and reach maturity before the descent into the abyss of self-destruction becomes irreversible; accordingly, whether people will learn non-confrontational solidarity ('we' without 'them'). This, in turn, depends on many factors, among which is the effectiveness of secular and international education and the development of palliative critical thinking. Only reason, free from macro-group (religious, ethnic, class, etc.) identification, can acquire a planetary nature and consequently – a Space nature...

N. D. Nikandrov[146]

GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL CULTURE: ONE MYTH BREEDING ANOTHER

So much has been written about globalization that it seems difficult to add anything. Numerous publications, original and reviews, have traced it from the times immemorial, since the ancient world. Then and even earlier there was migration of the population and – therefore – an exchange of ideas, inventions, technologies and economic instruments. The scope, of course, was different. Approximately in the mid-20th century the quantitative changes somehow grew into qualitative ones 'by themselves', and when speaking of the modernity it is this time that is most often connected with the real start of globalization as a process that has embraced the whole planet and practically all spheres of activities.

Considering these processes retrospectively and emphasizing first of all the economic aspect of the matter contemporary researchers debate the pros and cons of globalization, whether it is a good or a disaster, whether it increases poverty in the world or, on the contrary, decreases it. Thus, in the late '90s K. Annan, then Secretary General of the UN said that 'millions and millions are experiencing globalization not as a godsend, but as a force of destruction: as an assault on their material standards of living, or on their traditional way of life' ('Izvestiya', 22 August, 1998).

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[146] President of the Russian Academy of Education, academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Education), Professor

Author of more than 300 scientific papers including the following books: *Russia: Socialization and Education at the turn of the millennia* (Rossiya: sostializatsiya i vospitaniye na rubezhe tysyacheletiy); *Development of Values: Russia's Version* (Vospitaniye tsennostey: rossiyskiy variant); *Prospects of Education Development in Russia* (Perspectivy razvitiya obrazovaniya v Rossiyi); *Education and Socialization in Modern Russia: Risks and Opportunities* (Vospitaniye i sotsializatsiya v sovremennoy Rossiyi: riski i vozmozhnosti); as well as the following course books: *General Foundations of Pedagogy* (Obschie osnovy pedagogiki, with co-authors); *History of Pedagogy* (Istoriya pedagogiki, ed.); *Didactics of Higher Education* (Pedagogika vysshey shkoly); *Organization of Teaching and Education Process at a Pedagogical Institute* (Organizatsiya uchebno-vospitatel'nogo protsessa v pedagogicheskom institute); *Introduction into the Speciality* (Vvedeniye v spetsial'nost').

Member of the Committee of the Russian Federation on UNESCO.

Laureate of the Award of President and Government of the Russian Federation in the field of education.

In a similar vein were the statements of J. Stiglitz, a Nobel prize winner in Economics; in his book re-vealingly titled *A Great Disappointment* he claimed that globalization does not work either for the poor of the planet or for the stability of the world economy (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 280). It is easy to find opposite statements, especially the ones which in one way or another reflect the interests of financial circles and transnational corporations. For instance, in 2002 the World Bank claimed on the first page of a book compiled by them that 'on the whole, globalization allows eradicating poverty' (Mon-dialisation..., 2002, p. 1). And the researchers who are difficult to suspect of lobbying those interests, including those who work in the sphere of the humanities, for instance, in education, quite often see first of all the pros of globalization though mentioning its cons as well (Myasnikov et al., 2009).

Within the limits of this paper we will not interfere with this debate on financial and economic issues. It is enough to bear in mind that (1) this is nothing but a debate, nobody has given uncontroversial or commonly acceptable arguments for or against, (2) we should distinguish between ideological arguments and real results, (3) economy in one way or another influences all other aspects of people's activities, (4) economic power is often expressed in economic imperialism, in the same way one can speak, and often does, of cultural imperialism, powerful countries (not necessarily in terms of culture) imposing cultural patterns upon countries which are less powerful economically.

We will be interested in globalization in the humanities, in the sphere of culture, science and education. At that, we certainly remember that everything created by man (including science, education and lifestyle) is culture in its wide notion. But some ideas and names from socio-economic and political sphere are still worth remembering because they (people and ideas) in fact determined the trend of development in the humanitarian sphere quite a long time ago.

The point is in the concepts of convergence and ideology. Both ideas appeared in the mid-20th century. First of all we should recall the works of D. Bell who was born in 1919 and is still in good health. In a sense his destiny and the transformation of his ideas are a good illustration for the wise Prime-Minister of France G. Clemenceau's thought that 'a man who in his youth was not a radical hasn't got a heart; a man who in his old age has not become a conservative hasn't got a head'. In the early '60s D. Bell grounded his conception of de-ideologiza-tion according to which social conflicts diminish, class struggle becomes a thing of the past, and societies move to a concord. But very soon in his famous book *The End of Ideology. On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* he rejects his ideas of de-ideologization; on the contrary he speaks about the importance of ideologies, especially of religion (Bell, 1965). Later the scholar grounds milder ideas of a post-industrialist society, much later he comes to liberal conservatism.

But the point, certainly, is not only in Clemenceau's formula of the natural age development of men and their ideas. In fact, very soon after the ideas of de-ideologization, which had sanguinely been expected to bring a universal agreement, many appeared to have rejected these ideas, some with regret, some just conforming to the reality. The same thing happened to convergence, an idea of rapprochement of countries, economies and ideologies which was supported by A.D. Sakharov in the USSR in the '70s. Hopes here were evidently ahead of the reality. Ideas of globalization appeared at the same time in the mid-20th century and developed in a similar way.

In a relatively short paper it is not quite appropriate to indulge in retrospections of a personal character. But I will make an exception the reason for which is certain to become clear after the following exposition. It was at that time when the author was interested in learning foreign languages. So, I often used to listen to foreign ('alien'? hostile'?) radio stations very attentively. Sometimes in Russian, which was not easy because of the jamming war, but more often in a few foreign languages I was heartily studying. At that at first I was little interested in the ideological and political aspect of the broadcasts – I was a conventional and ordinary, public-spirited Soviet person. Nevertheless, the time spent at a radio receiver led me to considerations of ideological nature. I was surprised (then, now I have not been surprised for a long time) to find out that with all the variety of radio stations, of the types of programmes, their topics and languages there was an absolutely transparent similarity and sometimes identity of estimates, arguments and even examples given concerning the main issues of a political and ideological sphere. It concerned the situation within and outside the USSR, the Soviet regime, the USSR's politics in a broad sense.

Certainly, concerning other questions which had little or less effect on political mentality (though this word was almost never used then) there was both diversity and polemics.

Having got accustomed to some programmes and names I learned to predict beforehand who would say what and where on this or that issue. At first it was just fun as a sort of intellectual exercise. Then I came to understand that this was the real reflection of the ideological struggle: the assessment depended not on the real state of affairs, not on common sense and logics but on how that formed assessment fit in the common ideological construct of a person – an organization – a radio station – a society – a state.

I certainly knew at that time the proverb according to which he who pays the piper calls the tune. I also realized that the payment did not necessarily have to be in the form of roubles, dollars or other currencies. It could be a payment in the form of different services, fixing up for a job or job maintenance, your own or your family's security, etc. Consequently, true – absolute – independence was impossible. Besides gross or mild levers of pressure (let us put it more mildly – of influence) there is self-censure which is often the most reliable means allowing 'to have the pie and eat it too'.

Each of us is sure to know examples when people in different situations really expressed their point of view despite possible and obvious risks of different types; while doing this they put their well-being, freedom and even life at risk. But we are not speaking of examples, even numerous ones, but about the typical conduct of workers of 'humanitarian front' (especially mass media) of those times and, which is more important, of our time. For the situation has inherently changed very little. And it is not said with contempt but with understanding – life is life. In 1930 Ch. Scott, editor of the 'Manchester Guardian' newspaper, coined a historical phrase, an elegant and witty maxim: 'Comment is free, but facts are sacred'. But all the following years only confirmed the fact that it is possible to divide facts and arguments, facts and interpretations only over time and distance (for instance, in different programmes or in their different parts), but the general ideological picture, the general message is always unambiguous. The fact is only too well demonstrated in a number of works (see, for instance, Kara-Murza, 2002; Nikandrov, 2007; Olshansky, 2003; Zapesotsky, 2008). In some cases issues of PR (even of black PR) are subjects to legal regulation (Dorsky, 2005), but more often it is about regulating by moral norms and market laws which harmonize badly and often contrast.

Taking into account what has been said it is easy to understand that the humanitarian sphere, i.e. everything created to make an impact on culture, morals, mentality, loyalty, the a person's behaviour is 'loaded' with ideology, uses – and cannot but use – ideological formulas, myths and cliches. In its turn, it determines to a great extent the general message of an article, a book, a film, a TV programme, a TV channel and, finally, of any work of culture, and thus the direction and the results of a man's socialization. This is why specialists speak about 'dysfunction', 'deformation' of institutions of socialization (Gatalsky, 2009). I suppose we can well speak of more, of the fact that education (i.e. the process that is specially organized at schools, higher educational establishments, etc) and socialization (upbringing by life) work not only in cooperation, but also in a reversed phase and confrontation. It leads to a person losing their own identity, becoming more dependable on external factors and influences (Lektorsky et al., 2008). Particularly and specifically on the influence of mass media (Zapesotsky, 2008).

It is sometimes said that mass media only reflect the situation in the society but do not predetermine it. However, they form the perception of a situation and in this way they do often and to a great extent create it. Yet in 1928 the so-called 'Thomas theorem' was formulated: if men define a situation as a crisis, it is real crisis in its consequences (Thomas & Thomas, 1928). I*was much later that D. McQuail drew an interesting deduction of a general nature from this theorem which only seemed to have referred to psychology. This deduction was about a 'provocative' role of mass media: if CNN should call a situation a crisis, it is really bound to become a crisis with all its consequences (McQuail, 1993). And even without having to perceive either the theorem or the deduction as undoubted mathematical theorems, the tendency, I believe, was grasped correctly.

As we are first of all interested in the situation in this country, in Russia to confirm everything that has been said we need to analyze the stream of information which circulates within the country and is directed at it from abroad. As for the interior stream I would like to rely on the

experience of a reader of books, newspapers and magazines, that of a television viewer, a radio listener, the one surrounded by advertisements, and an occasional cinema-goer. Due to the reasons mentioned above, for over fifty years the author has gained a considerable experience in analyzing this stream from different countries and in different languages. The limits of the paper are too tight to give any meaningful set of examples from 'the basis of probative evidence'. Thus I will just enumerate the messages that are carried by the global stream of information and finish the list with the ones that come from abroad. The latter can be checked by all those willing to when watching western TV channels and listening to foreign TV programmes in Russian and foreign languages, which is quite available now. The most imposing and clear example would be the programmes of Radio Liberty which had been financed by the CIA since the 1st of March 1953, and since 1971 it has been financed by the USA Congress.

So, what are the messages (the 'content') and the means by which they are brought home to us (the 'carrier frequencies' in a way)?

The negative and evil prevail over the good in the world. The means are the predominance of the negative in the information stream, especially in brief news.

Our world is a world of violence (physical, military, sexual, psychological), of opposition and rivalry, which is natural. The means are the naturalistic demonstration of violence with the use of all texts, audio- and video means. Let us also remark that according to modern research such a demonstration of violence even in 'the good fight', for example, in combating crime gives rise to anxiety, children and people with unstable state of mind can try imitating the means and the 'methods' of the application of force.

The basic (sexual) instinct is the real basis for everything. Here it is difficult to determine the 'limit of availability', but according to numerous data at present we are literally 'far ahead of the planet' in this respect. The means are the same: the naturalistic demonstration and advertisements of intimate services or different goods with images containing sexual elements in the background. Additional 'favourable opportunities' are provided by the Internet.

A 'dolce vita' cult, of wealth in general and money in particular, is natural and indispensable; 'the upbringing of reasonable needs' is an anachronism of the communist period, higher (spiritual) needs take root either in scarcity or in stupidity. The means are demonstration in connected stories or without a story.

The market rules the world not only in the economy but also in all relations between people. The means are the verbal and graphic (audio-video) persuasion that everything can be bought and sold, including the market vocabulary applied to a person (for instance, buying, leasing and exchange of sportsmen).

Rivalry and competition for profits and resources are natural, mutual aid and, moreover, altruism are an exception, the lot of eccentric people or saints ('enjoy your life to the full'). The means are selection and frequent demonstration of suitable stories and the ones mentioned in item 5.

Let us supplement these messages and means of the global nature with the ones directed at Russia from abroad.

The Russian authorities at all levels do not take care of their people and are highly corrupted. They were better in the '90s (i.e. when they agreed to everything that the USA demanded. – *N.N.).* The means are giving emphasis to the respective information in the news, a more frequent repetition of such news in programmes, special programmes to 'concentrate' the negative of this type especially with the organized participation of the radio audience. The talk-show genre (blah-blah-blah show, as people name it) is especially useful for it. At that it is reckoned (quite right) that the people who have real problems in their worldly, everyday sphere will phone most actively while the ones who are satisfied on the whole usually constitute 'the mute majority'.

The Russian army, militia (police forces) and all bodies of law and order are anti-people, cruel and corrupted. The means are the active search for suitable stories, their frequent repetition in the news and special programmes.

The civic patriotism in Russia, if ever was possible at all (for example, during the Great Patriotic War), is now out of the question due to the type of relations between the people and the government. The means are the corresponding interpretation of real events, speeches of human

rights advocates, de-glorification (dethronement of the heroes of the past), foreign patriotism (stories about masculinity, heroism and courage of higher officials and representatives of law-enforcement agencies in certain selected foreign countries).

The citizen's rights and freedoms in Russia are not protected and are deliberately violated by the government and by people in their relations to one another; it happens more often than in 'civilized' countries. The means are the same as in items 8 and 9.

The supreme hierarchs of the Orthodox Church in Russia are tainted with their cooperation with the KGB in the past, and with the unscrupulous use of market mechanisms for making profits of late; at that it is the Orthodox Church that the government unilaterally supports thus infringing upon the Constitution. The means are the same as in items 7 to 9.

The level of Russia's development is extremely low. The means are emphasizing the real (quite often) and the supposed technological superiority of the 'civilized', 'developed' countries; frequent, caused or not caused by the storyline, use of these terms to characterize the countries when comparing them to Russia; one-sided and often distorted interpretation of international comparisons of different types in the spheres of education, science and culture. Thus, the 'immaturity' of Russian democracy is often emphasized, at that it is often forgotten that serfdom in Russia was abolished in 1861 while slavery in the USA was only put an end to in 1867, that up to the mid-1950s racial inequality was a real and hard fact in the USA, and that even now it cannot be considered to have been overcome in common everyday life.

There are insuperable contradictions between the countries of the CIS caused by the history of the Soviet and Russian empires and the imperial 'ambitions' of contemporary Russia. The means are the one-sided interpretation of historical events 'leaving out' the vast help of Russia in the development of many former provinces and republics of the USSR and emphasizing other facts (for instance, the 'occupation' of the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union).

The Russian government is inefficient because it is disrupted. There are insuperable contradictions between the Centre and the regions, between the branches of power and in the 'Medvedev – Putin' tandem. The means are the selection of plots allowing the misinterpretation of real events in this way, the constant repetition of corresponding stories in talk-shows.

The ideological messages mentioned above can be acknowledged by anyone who analyzes their own experience of reading, watching television and advertisements, listening to the radio. We do not even have to turn to foreign sources speaking another language, as some Russian radio stations and TV channels demonstrate the same. We want to remark that the author is not in any way feeling like 'abusing' or 'blackening' authors, commentators, TV presenters and actors who take part in this work. It is work that people do in one way or another always answering their own question 'who are you with, masters of culture?', and it could be said interpreting M. Gorky laterally 'who are you with, humanitarians?'. At that, it does not matter whether this work is paid for (most often, it certainly is) or is done 'on a voluntary basis'.

Viewing the humanitarian knowledge and action from the positions stated above let us try to understand what globalization has in store for us in cultural sphere, which hopes, as it is clear now, were not realized, and what may not be really necessary for us or is even harmful.

It appears that one may and is supposed to expect a relatively peaceful co-existence in the cultural sphere and in the sphere of human relations. In part due to globalization, the intensification of exchanges and communications, in part owing to realizing the vast power of the potential of destructions accumulated by the humanity, which could sweep away everything, sweep off the whole world if the ideological opposition should turn into the Cold War with the prospect of turning into the hot war. It also should be worked on, and everything connected with tolerance to another person, to another nation, another state or another world outlook favours success. The ways have been described in hundreds of works. On the other hand, fundamentalism of any kind hinders success. And, certainly, with all the talk about globalization, the dialogue of civilizations and cultures, the friendship of peoples, with all the useful steps in this direction it is important to remember the idea that was clearly and simply expressed by Alexander III the Peacemaker (the Peacemaker! – *N.N.)* that Russia has only two allies: its army and its navy. As the ideological divergences of Russia with other countries existed yet before the year of 1917, after it, they do exist and are bound to exist. The contemporary military doctrine of our country

with its peaceful orientation in fact admits the military risks; there are also risks in the social sphere (Strategic..., 2005). But we should work so that the dialogue of cultures could alleviate these risks.

It is certainly possible and necessary, and on the assumption of mutual tolerance it is to lead to mutual enrichment. Here we do not have to give special grounds; it is enough to remember B. Shaw's witty comparison: 'If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange these apples then you and I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea and we exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas.' A good and a very concrete version of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations is shown in an interesting collection of papers *The Dialogue of Civilizations* (2006) and in all *Proceedings* of the 'Likhachov Conference'. A dialogue like this is possible and necessary in education. If we mean the contemporary world, it is especially interesting to trace it from the 1950s when the regulated process of rapprochement of the systems of education started which later turned into the Bologna process. But from the very beginning and later practically in all papers of the Bologna process it was emphasized that the best components that had justified themselves in national systems of education should be preserved in them. It was the inobservance of this principle that caused little enthusiasm of the Europeans (including the Italians) about the Bologna process and the fact that many Russians doubt its usefulness. Besides political and scientific version of the dialogue there are other possibilities like effective people's diplomacy, unlimited communication of citizens of different countries concerning various issues. The experience shows that even with military and diplomatic complications such communication though hindered by formal limitations does not usually lead to real worsening of relations between people.

However, I suppose, we should not even think of the global culture which is impossible due to economic, political and ideological competition. Certainly, we can bring everything to the formula of unity in diversity. But then we, like Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain who had been speaking prose all his life without knowing it, have been living in this situation. The Holy Trinity is one in three hypostases, the USSR was one in fifteen different republics, Russia is one in its 88 different subjects, Europe is one in dozens of quite different countries, and music is one in different genres, and so on. And every unity, every integrity protects itself from other unities and integrities not only on the level of philosophy but on quite a concrete level. For instance, it is enough to take into consideration the punishments imposed by the French law for an unauthorized use of a language other than French (first of all English) in advertisements, films, etc ('Toubon Law' of 1994, named after the French Minister of Culture and the French language – and yes, this is how the post occupied by Jacques Toubon was called: *ministre de la culture et de la francophonie – N.N.).* And if we remember that the basis of any culture is the language, then to call for global culture means to call for a global language, which is unlikely to be subject to protection rationally and even less so emotionally.

A very revealing example is that of Americans who are now rarely speaking about their 'melting pot' which forms the single American nation, the American 'new man'. This term (first 'smelting pot', then 'melting pot') existed in this interpretation yet in the 18th century when the USA was perceived as a kind of a new Promised Land where a new man would be brought up. And this term the SovieJ interpretation of which was much laughed at by the critics of Soviet sociology and pedagogy in the 1990s also has existed in the USA since time immemorial ('American new man'). But *tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis* – times change and we change within them, as the ancient Romans said. The idea of a melting pot has gone; there are more linguistic and cultural problems in the USA than ever before. The situation is not trouble-free in Russia either, it is high time we took steps to protect the Russian language, as the Federal Law of 2005 No. 53, though made very similar to the corresponding French one, does not operate reliably.

And in conclusion let us come back to the beginning of the paper, to its title. Certainly, globalization in itself is not a myth – it is an objective phenomenon if we interpret it as a process and a result of increasing and intensifying connections between civilizations, states, nations, communities, social groups and people. The myth is interpreting globalization as a melting pot in the image and likeness of the American one relegated to oblivion where all the separate subjects

mentioned above were supposed to have joined and 'melted' away one day. In fact, this issue is not taken up in this way, but if to use the IT term 'on default', we are supposed to be on our way to it. It may be an ideal which, as any ideal, cannot be fully achieved but remains desirable. However, if we use a different analogy it will lead us to a primeval chaos, entropy, disarray, disintegration of connections as the real subjects of these connections will disappear. If some people do not like the name of Marx mentioned, then according to Hegel, there is no development without differences, dissimilarities and contradictions. It refers not only to the issue of achievability but also of desirability of globalization when interpreted in this way.

Thus, global culture is a myth though the dialogue of cultures and the dialogue of civilizations are quite real. And here is the real field of cooperation, joint action on different levels – of the state, the society, different communities in Russia and abroad.

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Yu. S. Osipov[147]
THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES IN THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

The topic of the current anniversary International Likha-chov Scientific Conference 'The Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations' encourages one to comprehend the phenomenon of the Russian Academy of Sciences in a historical and culture-centred aspect.

Science is known to be a supra-national phenomenon. The laws of nature and society take effect 'beyond' the national borders and the scientific knowledge found by some scholars in a short period of time becomes the property of other scientists and – in a broader sense – becomes the source of social and civilizational development. But science is at the same time a constant dialogue. The dialogue between scholars and schools of thought. The dialogue of the society, the state and science. In this context the role of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) or, as it is often called 'the headquarters of the Russian science' is to make this dialogue constant, for the dialogue to acquire a new content, for science not just to develop but to provide the country with a priority position in the world. This function of the Academy has a historically established character.

The 8th of February (according to the Gregorian calendar) is generally thought to be the date of the foundation of the Russian Academy of Sciences when the Senate confirmed the project of Peter I for the establishment of the Academy of Arts and Sciences in St. Petersburg. In particular, the project said: 'It is necessary to make such a building through which not only the glory of this state would for increase in sciences extend at present but through education and arrangement of these the people would gain advantage henceforth.'

But even before proposing the project of the Academy of Arts and Sciences to the Senate Peter I pre-determifted its role in the dialogue of civilizations, countries and generations. He followed German thinker Leibniz's advice in creating the Academy as an integrated organism of sciences and education, as a laboratory and a higher educational establishment at the same time. Leibniz also drew Peter I's attention to the benefits which the European science could get from the information supplied from Russia, and Russia from the information of European scholars. Following the great philosopher's advice Peter I invited to St. Petersburg great scholars whose names went down in the history of Russian science: mathematicians Nicolaus and Daniel Bernoulli, Christian Goldbach, physicist Georg Kraft, astronomer and geographer Joseph De-lisle and others.

A couple of decades later in the Russian Academy there appeared the first academicians of our country: Lomonosov, Trediakovski, Krasheninnikov, some time later Popov, Kotelnikov, Protasov, Rumovski and others.

Many historical facts make one consider the evidence of the dialogical character of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the context of scientific knowledge and – broader – of the history of Russia.

The Library of the Academy of Sciences is known to be 10 years older than the Academy of Sciences, and its names varied: St. Petersburg Imperial Library, the Russian Library, the USSR Academy of Sciences Library and again the Russian Academy Library (RAL). The accumulation of the library was started by an imperial decree of Peter the Great in 1714. It became the first state, the first national and academic library. Only some time later there opened the Imperial St. Petersburg Library (1716), the Royal Library in Paris, later given a new name of the National

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[147] President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor. Author of over 150 scientific works: *Akademiya* v *istoriyi Rossiyskogo gosudarstva* [The Academy in the History of the Russian State], *Litsom к науке: o nauchno-tehnologicheskoy strategiyi Rossiyi v 21 veke* [Facing Science: On the Scientific-Technological Strategy of Russia in the 21st Century], *Nauka i obshchestvo* [Science and Society], and others. Mr Osipov is a member of Security Council under the President of the Russian Federation, of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Russian Federation. Editor-in-chief of the journals: *Vestnik Rossiyskoy Akademiyi Nauk* [Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences], *Vychislitelnaya matematika i matematicheskaya fizika* [Computing Mathematics and Mathematical Physics], *Doklady akademiyi nauk* [Reports of the Academy of Sciences]. He is chairman or member of a number of governmental, scientific and public councils. Honorary member and doctor of many foreign and national Academies of Sciences.

(1735), the Library of the British Museum in London (1753), the Library of the US Congress in Washington (1880).

The extent of the RAL is cosmic indeed: 63 million of units of storage. In the building in Birzhevaya line and in academic institutions of St. Petersburg there are 21 million of them. The rest are dispersed in academic libraries of Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk. The Library of the Russian Academy is the biggest academic library in the world. There is nothing to compare it with because, unlike other great libraries of the world, it is a state library. The RAL is also the memory of science because all academic publications are kept there which have come out since 1728 in the printing house of the Academy – almost two million of them. Peter I's library is stored here as the greatest treasure. Every day new editions continue to be received by the RAL from all over the world.

At the time of Peter the First the admission to the RAL was free for everybody, after looking over the collection its readers were treated with a glass of wine, a 'zuckerbrot' and seasonable fruits. Since 1716 the library not only showed its collections but lent them out to readers. Just a stranger could walk in from the street and work in the library.

Since 1721 the RAL has been expanding international exchange. Today it has about two thousand partners in 75 countries of the world. It is a permanent member of the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions and of the International Association of Bibliophiles, which gives the library an opportunity to communicate with colleagues directly, to receive new documents and exchange experience.

The history of the RAS is proof not only of the fact there here the foundations were laid of the exchange between scholars from different countries, which we are accustomed to today, and of the dialogue of sciences between Russia and Europe. In the meantime Peter I put forward an idea of the 'tripartite composition ': the Academy of Sciences – the Academic University – the Gymnasium. It is a certain dialogue of cultures between the generations.

The Academic University was to become part of the Academy and to train, as it would be put today, new highly-skilled staff for it. This aim got closer when M. Lomonosov became the head of the Academic University (the 50s-60s of the 18th century). After his death the Academic University in Petersburg began to die away and was soon closed. But the idea of the 'tripartite composition' could not vanish. Soon it was realized in the establishment of Moscow University.

The credit of organizing the dialogue between science and education on a systematic basis goes to the RAS. Russian scientists not only created new educational establishments but they also wrote textbooks for them, taught, translated treatises, published popular-science magazines. Members of the Academy wrote and published about 30 study guides in Russian for educational establishments. Among them was the first Russian textbook on natural science 'Outline of Natural History', two textbooks on geography 'Brief Land Description of the Russian State' and 'Extensive Description of the Russian State'. Men from the Academy took part in reorganization of school education in Russia. Academician Aepinus, for instance, made a 'Plan of primary and secondary education reorganization in Russia' which became the basis of school reform. Participation of the Academy in its implementation also found its expression in training of over 400 teachers and in setting up of the first Normal school in Russia.

So, by virtue of the Academy of Sciences the state system of school education began to be formed in Russia. It resulted in the growth of the share of literate population in the country: from 6.9 per cent in 1797 to 42.8 per cent in 1917. Having acquired the best national and western traditions Russia, according to D.S. Likhachov, became 'the country of high educators and high schools. Schools with a capital letter.'

The St. Petersburg school of Karl May, the son of a Prussian national and of a Swede, can serve as an example of it. Organized in the Petrine spirit – 'to prepare a youth for labour, useful to society', it gave Russia 12 academicians of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 7 members of the Academy of Arts, 3 Academicians of Architecture. Academician D.S. Likhachov was one of this school graduates. He wrote: T was lucky. I studied at a very good school. The school of Karl Ivanovich May, a great humanist, an educator-humanist. And there differentiation based on property status was not common. Both a doorkeeper's son, and Mechnikov's grandson, and the son of a banker 'Mitka' Rubinstein, who lent money to Nicholas II, studied at that school.'

Almost three centuries later the idea of a 'tripartite composition' was realized in St. Petersburg. In 1999 the Research and Education Centre of the Ioffe Physical-Technical Institute was set up, which later became St. Petersburg Physical-Technological Research and Education Centre of the RAS. And in 2009 it became St. Petersburg Academic University – the Nanotech-nology Education and Research Centre of the RAS.

This university has united literally under one roof both schoolchildren, students and scientists. In particular, pupils of the lyceum 'Physical-Technical school', students and graduate students of the Department of Physical Science and Technology of the State Polytechnic University (6 departments), the Academic University itself and Department of Optoelectronics (SPbETU). Scientific academic laboratories also work at this university. Here lectures are delivered by research officers from the Ioffe Physical-Technical Institute of the RAS, from St. Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute of the RAS and from other scientific institutions of St. Petersburg.

Science and education are in constant movement. Their development is promoted by dialogue with the eternal universal substance – culture.

The Petrine principles of establishing the Academy of Sciences also imparted a new capital quality to St. Petersburg: professionalism. This is what D.S. Likhachov wrote much about. He considered Petersburg's professionalism to be expressed, among other things, in the close link of sciences and arts with education. In his lecture delivered in 1993 at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, at the ceremony of his initiation into a doctor *honoris causa,* he noted that Petersburg University has always been not only an educational but also a research institution. That the Army Medical Academy has always been a research, patient care and educational institution at the same time. And that the Academy of Arts also combined science and education and functioned as a museum. The Imperial Court Chapel has also been not only a concert hall but an educational and research organization.

In the triad of science—education—culture the first place was occupied by the task of the world exploration from the first day of the Academy's foundation. In the first decades the Academy's research was carried out in three main directions: mathematical, physical and humanitarian. At the same time academicians became involved in studies of the cultural wealth of the country. They had at their disposal the abundant collections of the Kunstkamera. There were created the Dissecting Room, the Geographic Department, the Astronomical Observatory, the Physical and Mineralogical Laboratories, and the Botanic Gardens. Due to the research conducted by the Academy's scientists, foundations were laid for mining, metallurgy and other branches of industry. Research was conducted on geodesy and cartography. In 1745 the first general map of the country was created, *Geographic Atlas of the Russian Empire.* On the Academy's initiative and with its participation there were held complex expeditions that discovered natural resources of Russia, showed distinctive cultures of its peoples to the world, gave new knowledge about its flora and fauna resources, introduced the history of its regions. In the early '40s several volumes of the catalogue of Kunstkamera were published.

The Acadenty became the treasurer of monuments of our country and of foreign science. In the '70s it bought Kepler's manuscripts, which still constitute the pride of the academic archive and which were used by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences when publishing the complete set of his works.

The Academy began to maintain a constant dialogue with European research institutions and journals. Its own *Kommentariyi Peterburgskoy Akademiyi Nauk* journal [The Commentaries of Petersburg Academy of Sciences] (in Latin) gained popularity and authority in the scientific community and became one of the leading editions in Europe. It was in 1728. Some time later the Academy organized its own publishing house that was entitled to publish all literature in the country. Then there appeared *Akademicheskiye izvestiya* [The Academic Bulletin], *Opisaniye Zemli Kamchatki* [The Description of Kamchatka Land], *Kalendari* [Calendars]. Famous Russian writers and poets – Fonvizin, Derzhavin, Pushkin – became its members. The Academy occupies a key position in the development of our country's culture. It allows it to take the place of honour among other biggest research institutions of Europe. It was reported by a French physicist of that time (1736): 'Petersburg Academy has achieved dizzying heights since its birthday; it took Paris and London Academies 60 years of hard work to achieve this height.'

In the 18th century over 160 foreign scholars became honorary members of the Academy, among them Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, Linnaeus, Franklin. In their turn Euler, Lomonosov, Lepyokhin, Pallas became honorary members of foreign academies.

In this way the high dialogue of sciences was founded, which today is formally called 'international links of the Academy'. In the 1820s-1830s when a special building had been built for the Academy a new stage began in its work. On the basis of Kunstkamera collections, Botanic, Zoology, Ethnography, Mineralogical, Asian, Egyptian and Numismatic museums were established. Later some of them became part of the Hermitage. A remarkable event was the discovery of Antarctica in 1820 (M.P. Lazarev, F.F. Bellingshausen) and the foundation of Pulkovskaya Observatory in 1839 (V.Y. Struve). It expanded the dialogue of Russian and foreign geographers and astronomers even more. Scientific heights began to be achieved by Russian mathematicians (P.L. Chebyshev), researchers of aerodynamics (R.E. Zhukovsky), biology (K.M. Baer), physics (E.H. Lenz), medicine (I.I. Mechnikov), physiology (LP. Pavlov), geochemistry – radiochemistry – radiogeology (V.I. Vernadsky) and hundreds of other scientists. It is a very short list – just a dotting of the path of the Russian science of that time.

And then there came the year of 1917. The Academy actively joined in solving the socio-economic and cultural problems of the country and was soon proclaimed 'the Highest All-Union Scientific Institution' – the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. It could seem that historical, revolutionary events would make to conduct a revolution in the Petrine principles of work of the Academy. But it was not so. Scientists working outside its system – in higher educational establishments, in applied-research institutions and in other organizations – are elected to

the Academy. It allows integrating within it most prominent figures of science and culture and keep up their dialogue.

Departments and branches of the USSR Academy of Sciences were established in national republics and in big regions of the country – in the Ukraine and in the Far East, in Byelorussia, in Siberia, in Pushchino, in Chernogolovka, in Troitsk.

Fundamental results almost in all areas of knowledge brought the Russian science to an exceptional level. After the first Russian Nobel Prize winner Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, this highest scientific prize was awarded to N.N. Semyonov (1956), PA. Cherenkov, I.M. Frank, I.Y. Tamm (1958), L.D. Landau (1962), N.G. Basov and A.M. Prokhorov (1964), P.L. Kapitsa (1978), J.I. Alfyorov (2000), V.L. Ginzburg (2003).

Speaking about the achievements of the Academy of Sciences in the 20th century we should begin with physics and atom for peace. Fundamental results were gained by mathematicians. Multiprocessing computer systems were created. Ideas of the Universe were extended. Lasers were made. Installations for thermonuclear fusion research were built. And more – biology, medicine, chemistry, neurophysiology and human brain research, humanitarian and social sciences, economics and the sciences which develop at the intersection of classical disciplines. Science of the 20th century takes particular pride in space.

These achievements allowed the Academy of Sciences and later the RAS to conduct a new dialogue with the world. These were scientists who were the originators of major international agreements – Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in three spheres of the world programme of peaceful application of atomic energy. It was in the Academy of Sciences where the concept of a new dialogue of civilizations was worked out – of the modern stage of international relations as of a forming multi-polar global system of interlinks, reflecting the diversity and integrity of the interests of a citizen, society, state and the world community.

Recently the Academy has been preserving and developing the traditional directions of work and its historically established, time-proved principles. With regard to the new realities of time they have certainly acquired new forms, but remain the same in their content.

For example, such form of dialogue as bilateral agreements on cooperation with research institutions of different countries has become a regular fixture. Among these foreign research institutions are national research centres of France, England, Germany, the USA, Slovakia, Romania, the Republic of Korea, India, Italy, Poland, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Israel, China, Japan, Mongolia and of other countries. The treaties with foreign partners signed by the RAS provide for scientists exchange, allow getting important information about foreign

projects, programmes on studying, for instance, the World Ocean, space, climate, ecology, thermonuclear energy, human biology and many other important issues.

The RAS, its institutions and other scientific establishments are members of international research organizations dealing with almost all spheres of theoretical and applied science, cooperate with authoritative Inter-Governmental organizations.

The RAS is a member of nearly 230 international non-government organizations, trade unions and associations. Among them is the International Mathematical Union, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the International Social Science Council, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, international unions for theoretical and applied physics, chemistry, biochemistry and molecular biology, biophysics, astronomy, geography, geodesies and geophysics, geologic sciences.

Scientists of the RAS are properly represented in academies of different countries where the elite of scientific community is integrated and which the RAS is constantly in touch with. In particular, among these are the European Academy in London, the European Academy of Sciences and Arts in Salzburg, the World Academy of Art and Science in the USA and others.

Historically, from Peter I, supporting integration processes of Russian and European science the RAS has been member of the All-European Academies Network (ALLEA) and with over 50 academies – its members effects scientific cooperation in pan-European area.

In 2000 the RAS took part in the establishment of the Inter-Academic Council, with Presidents of 15 leading academies of sciences of the world in its executive body.

Leading scientists of the RAS actively work in the International laboratory of High Magnetic Fields and Low Temperatures in Wroclaw the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg (Austria) created on the initiative of scientists of Russia and the USA, in the European Organization for Nuclear Research in the CERN.

For the last 10 years over 10 thousand research officers of the RAS have participated in international congresses, assemblies and symposia. Here are some of them: the 28th General Assembly of the International Union of Biological Science; the 6th General Assembly of the European Federation of National Academies of Sciences and Humanities; the 29th Congress of the Federation of European Biochemical Societies (FEBS); The European Congress of Mathematicians; the 27th Consultative Meeting on Antarctica; the 32nd International Geological Congress, the 38th International Congress on Polymers; the 35th Scientific Assembly of the Committee on Space Research – COSPAR; the International Polar Year...

For the last years in our country the RAS has held about 800 congresses, symposia and conferences, in which about 18 thousand foreign scientists and specialists took part.

Occasionally we can hear some voices (mostly from the press) that the RAS has become a closed organization and even a club of veterans of science, it is suggested that either a supervising council made of officials should be appointed or a complete reforming done. This opinion is hard to agree with. The Academy of Sciences, on the one hand, is a community of scientists, of members of the Academy of Sciences. On the other hand, it is a big organization, a lot of institutions, where thousands of scientists work besides members of the Academy, and everybody does one business. The life of the Academy is subject to the law 'On Science' and the Statute of the RAS and it is determined by the real needs of the state, as it has been since the times of Peter I.

The dialogue between science and authorities has greatly intensified in the 21 st century. Authorities are laying greater stress on the role of science in Russia's revival.

Russia's great future is inseparably connected with the greatness of Russian science, with the future of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

It is symbolic that the Academy Seal of 1735 was made upon the design of an outstanding mathematician, conference-secretary of the Academy Christian Goldbach. In its centre, with the double-headed eagle in the background – the symbol of Russia – we can see a shield. On the shield there is Minerva, the Goddess of Wisdom. On top there is an inscription: 'Hic tuta perennat' – 'Here she rests in safety'. It is a very succinct symbol in terms of politics, cultural anthropology and semantics. The Russian Academy of Sciences preserves its traditions and is performing its unique mission in the dialogue of sciences and civilizations. It serves not only as a guarantee of

progress and prosperity of the Russian science, but as a factor of enrichment of scientific knowledge on a world scale.

Romas Pakalnis[148]

PRODUCTIVE PARTICIPATION OF LITHUANIA IN THE UNESCO ACTIVITIES

The culture of Lithuania goes back thousands of years. The Millennium of the first mention of Lithuania's name will be marked in 2009. The first written mention of Lithuania was in the Annales Quedlinburgenses in 1009 (Vaitkevicius et al. 1986, Giese 2004). Later Lithuanians conquered neighbouring lands, finally establishing the Great Duchy of Lithuania in the 13th century. In the 15th century Lithuania became the largest state in Europe, however, in the end of the 18th century it was erased from political map. In 1918, the democratic state was reestablished. However, it was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. In Soviet times Lithuanian people (especially scientific community) communicated with the UNESCO only through Lithuanian Programme "Man and the Biosphere" (Kairiiikdtis, Eringis 1977)

Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union on March 11, 1990, the first of the Soviet republics to do so. Since 1991 Lithuania has joined in UNESCO. Lithuania has several successful attempts to inscribe cultural sites on the World Heritage List (http://www.unesco.lt; http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf): Vilnius Historic Centre (1994), Curonian Spit (2000), Kernave Archaeological Site (2004) and Struve Geodetic Arc (2005). Lithuania is devoting a major effort to promoting its cultural heritage. Lithuanian cultural heritage is also presented on the World Heritage List Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity: Cross-crafting and its Symbolism (2001) and The Baltic Song and Dance Celebrations (2003).

World heritage list objects in Lithuania

Vilnius Historic Centre is included into UNESCO World Heritage List as having outstanding universal value (under ii and iv criteria of selection). It is historic part of city created in X1V-XVIII th centuries. Today it is recognized that in prospering times Vilnius made great influence on the development of culture and architecture in all Central and East European region. The objects of Vilnius historical centre are extraordinary examples of architectural ensemble and urbanized landscape type. One of the most beautiful capitals in Europe since old times was famous for its tolerance. In this, most to the east distant Western European cultural centre, coexisted both Eastern and Western cultural traditions. In the city and its suburbs settled the inhabitants of various confessions and nationalities. The ancient Lithuanian Grand Duchy political and cultural centre period is represented by complex of defensive systems and representative buildings. In the XVIth century, defensive wall surrounded historical centre of the city. In Vilnius old town are preserved authentic buildings, which served for defensive, residential, representative and spiritual purposes. Vilnius old town preserved the features of gothic, renaissance, baroque, classical styles. The architecture is unique, because all stiles join in one harmonious aesthetical unit. Typical Vilnius baroque school domes of the churches and restrained monumental classical architecture create very special atmosphere of Vilnius panorama of the XVIIth century. Vilnius Historic Centre is surrounded by new housing estates, but radial city plan so typical for Middie Ages and quite original harmony between architecture and natural environment preserved till nowadays (http://www.kpd.lt:80/en/node/733). At present, our society has been productively discussing on sustainable development strategies of our capital, implementation of conservation priorities in Historic Centre and development priorities in the former suburbs.

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[148] Chairman of the Lithuanian National commission for UNESCO.

The Curonian Spit-a 98-kilometre long peninsula, washed by the Baltic Sea on the west and separated from the mainland by the Curonian Lagoon to the east, is a superb example of the fine balance between human activity and nature, a masterpiece of functional landscape design on a massive scale. To contemporary human beings, confident in their supremacy over nature, the story of the Curonian Spit teaches a sober lesson. The Spit (with a total area of 180 square kilometres), only 370 metres wide at Sarkuva (now Lesnoe) and never exceeding 3.8 kilometres in its greatest width, at the Horn of Bulvikis, was sculpted by winds and water currents about 5,000 years ago. Archaeological findings indicate that the peninsula was inhabited at the end of the Neolithic period. Still more numerous finds date from the third and second millennia BC. The forebears of the Baltic tribes are believed to have settlements between the parabolic dunes where they could fish and find shelter from the winds. In the XVth century Curonian Spit was covered by majestic mixed forests and small villages situated close to the lagoon. Later come the felling forests time, especially during the Seven-Year War (1756-1763). Destroyed forests freed sand masses, and west winds brought additional sand from the seashore. Immense dunes have buries on the way more than one littoral fishing-village. Roughly two centuries ago ill-considered human activity destroyed the natural vegetation leaving entire fishermen's villages exposed to windblown sand. The Spit was saved only by a project extending over nearly one century that reintroduced protective layers of grass, shrubs and trees. This work continues to the present day, and will have to go on as long as people want this peninsula for themselves (Rascius 2006).

The Republic of Lithuania shares the Curonian Spit (the 52-kilometre long northern half), and the responsibility to protect it, with the Kaliningrad enclave of the Russian Federation. To recognize the unique interaction between people and the environment, as well as the combination of the natural and the cultural heritage, the Curonian Spit, a transboundary site, was inscribed in 2000 as a cultural landscape on the World Heritage List. By presenting the nomination, the two governments of Lithuania and of the Russian Federation re-stated their commitment, on the international level, to protect the Curonian Spit from destruction by the forces of nature and occasionally by human activity. Actually, we have been discussing about the necessity of implementation of protective measures versus economic activity or modern architectural invasion. We think that patronage of the UNESCO will help both governments to find optimal decisions.

The State Cultural Reserve of Kernave was declared (2004) a UNESCO World Heritage Site, thus recognising the importance of the area according to value criteria as a site, which presents an exceptional testimony to the evolution of human settlements in the Baltic region in Europe over the period of some 10 millennia (Vadisis & all, 2005). The site has exceptional evidence of the contact of pre-Christian and Christian funeral traditions: as an object with settlement patterns and the impressive hill forts representing outstanding examples of the development of such types of structures and the history of their use in the pre-Christian era. Kernave is a land that represents the primeval past of Lithuania. On the picturesque bank of the River Neris in the centre of the amphitheatre of the Pajauta Valley stand five hill forts, by where our ancestors have settled, lived and been buried since time immemorial. The landscape formed in the course of history, numerous archaeological finds testify to the historical processes and cultures, which have existed in the area for 11.000 years. The cultural heritage of the last pagan country in Europe – the remains of ancient capital of Lithuania – lies hidden under a layer of deposits. In written sources Kernave was first mentioned in 1279 in the Rhymed Livonian Chronicle. After the attack of Teutonic Order in 1390, wooden castles and old Kernave town were burnt down (Velius, G. 2002; 2005). It was not until 600 years later that archaeologists discovered old Kernave and named Lithuanian Troy (Luchtanas, 2002). Nowadays the results of investigations will form the basis for the nature management plan of the State Cultural Reserve of Kernave, taking into consideration not only the need of implementation of the main function of the reserve (preservation of cultural heritage), but also the measures for protection and management of natural environment (Sendtikaite, Pakalnis. & Avitiene 2007; 2008).

Struve Geodetic Arc (2005) is a joint World Heritage property of Belarus, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Norway, Sweden, Ukraine. The Struve Arc is a chain of survey triangulations stretching from Hammerfest in Norway to the Black Sea, through 10 countries and over 2,820 km. These are points of a survey, carried out between

1816 and 1855 by the astronomer Friedrich Georg Wilhelm Struve, which represented the first accurate measuring of a long segment of a meridian.

Trakai Historical National Park is inscribed into Tentative List. This Park represents second Lithuanian capital (XIII-XIV c.) with castles, churches, museums, lakes, original city planning structure. There live a remarkable minority of Karaites.

Memory of the world register

The Baltic Way – human chain linking three states in their drive for freedom. The Baltic Way was a unique, peaceful mass demonstration that took place on 23 August 1989, when more than a million people joined hands to form a human chain that was over 600 kilometres long, and reached across the three Baltic States, linking Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in their drive for freedom. The impressive human chain, together with expanding international support for the disclosure of historical facts, forced the People's Deputies Congress of the USSR to declare the German-Soviet pacts and secret protocols legally null and void on 24 December 1989. This nullification increased the opportunity for national self-determination for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and encouraged democratic movements all over the Soviet Union. The preparation for the inscribing of the Baltic Way into World Register of UNESCO began in 2005, when a group of experts from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania started to explore the idea. The decision on inscription was made in July 2009 (http://www.balticway.net).

Radzwills' Archives and Niasvizh (Niesviez) Library Collection (2009) material was prepared on the order of yhe representatives from 6 countries (Belarus, Finland, Lithuania, Poland, Russian Federation, Ukraine). The Collection was created by Radzwill's family from XV to XX century. In first period this collection served as an Official Archive of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy.

Collection of the Center of Documentation and Investigation of the Ashkenazi Community in Mexico, XVI-XXc. (2009). The Collection includes about 16, 000 volumes in Jewish and Hebraic, but also in Lithuanian, Polish, Russian, Hungarian languages written by emigrants from Eastern and Central Europe.

To end this presentation it is necessary to add that His Excellency *Valdas Adamkus,* President of Lithuania (to 2009), was designated a UNESCO Goodwill Ambassador for the Construction of Knowledge Societies (on 29 September 2003) in recognition of his contribution to social development, inter-university cooperation, water resource management, environmental and heritage protection, and with a view to benefiting from his wisdom and extensive experience in many of UNESCO's areas of concern for the construction of knowledge societies. This fact is also good illustration of Lithuania's contribution to different fields of the UNESCO activities.

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Idlir Peçi[149]

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEANIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW: AN INTERESTING BLEND OF LEGAL ORDERS AND LEGAL CULTURES

1. Introduction

When discussing the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations, one cannot ignore the developments within the European Union (EU) in the last fifty years. An organization which started with limited aims and targets, the EU is now moving towards an entity of a nation state character. I am saying it is moving towards the nation state character, because the EU is still far from reaching that stadium. However the main features of the nation state are in place. EU has its own executive body, the Commission, its own Parliament chosen directly from the EU citizens, a Court of Justice which is the guardian of the EU legal order and recently even e President.[150] While the EU has successfully harmonized many areas of law in its Member States (MS), the harmonization of criminal law has not always been 'smooth'. The dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilization is central to the harmonization process and the creation of the so-called *acquis communitaire*. In the process of harmonization of criminal law a consensus should be reached between the interests of the MS on the one hand and the interest of the Union on the other. The developments in this area have demonstrated reluctance from the MS to accept drastic impositions into their criminal justice system from the EU. This in turn is an obstacle to the political wishes to have the EU appear as an international organization with a national state character.

In this paper I will discuss the interaction of the legal orders of the MS with the EU legal order especially in the harmonization process in the EU and the obstacles in harmonizing criminal law. To this end I will first give a short historical overview of the European Communities, where attention will be paid to the original goals and objectives. I will then turn to a brief explanation of

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[149] Doctor of Law at Utrecht University (the Netherlands)

[150] It should be noticed here that the term President of the EU is incorrect. It is a shortcut frequently used by the media which actually refers to the President of the European Council.

the three pillar structure and the emergence of the EU with the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. This

discussion will serve as a basis for the analysis which follows on the harmonization of criminal law. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the legal basis is created for accession of the European Union to the European Convention for Human Rights and for the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor Office, hence some thoughts on these topics as well. The paper will close with a discussion on the idea of the EU as an international/supranational organization with the characteristics of a nation state and the obstacles that the EU faces in this respect.

2. Genesis of EC and enforcement of the EC legal order in an historical perspective

After the Second World War, the Western European countries were seeking to find mechanisms which would encourage dialogue between the nations, promote and protect human rights and find common values upon which long standing cooperation could be built. One example is the Council of Europe which in turn led to the European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR) and the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights. Another example is the European Communities. The main goal of the EC Treaty of 1957 (as amended over the years) was the establishment of the internal common market where people, goods, services and capital would move freely. The symbolism of the EC went however further than the establishment of the common market. MS who shared the same economic values and interests would not engage in hostilities anymore. Moreover, the free movement of people, goods, services and capital also symbolized an exchange of culture and a golden opportunity to get to know and accept each-other in times of prosperity and peace and in an area without internal borders.

The achievement of the common market and of the four core freedoms required that the MS delegate part of their sovereignty to the EC. Policies concerning agricultural, fiscal, customs, fisheries, transport etc., matters were not decided at a national level anymore; they all became common policies which were made the exclusive prerogative of Brussels. The EC operated from the outset as a supranational body, with its own executive, legislative and judicial institutions. In order to implement the common policies, which in turn would lead to the creation and maintenance of the common market, the EC produced a vast body of legislation by means of directives and regulations. The main goal of this legislation was the harmonization of legal rales and provisions in the domestic legal orders of the MS. In the field of competition the Commission obtained inspection and sanctioning powers. Inspection powers were also granted to the Commission in other areas which concerned the implementation of the common policies. However, those powers were highly depended on the national legal rules. The so called Euro-inspectors tan operate only within the legal framework of a MS, using the assistance of the national authorities. It was clear from the outset that the EC could prescribe rules in the field of administrative enforcement, but the actual enforcement was highly depended on the MS.[151] Another interesting development was also the establishment of the Anti-Fraud unit at the Commission, the so-called OLAF. In the early 90's of the previous century, the EC was already concerned about the protection of its own financial interests. In the mid 80's and early 90's a series of scandals concerning fraud with EC subsidies, custom duties and bribery of EC officials burst out in the MS. Examples of fraud, corruption, money laundering which affect negatively the EC are plenty. One of the most celebrated examples is that of the Greek maize, where Greek maize traders labeled Yugoslav maize as Greek maize in order to avoid customs duties when exporting the maize to other MS.[152] The Netherlands had a bitter experience with social funds and agricultural subsidies where the 'wrong' farmers benefited. Major fraud scheme was also discovered in Germany where EC money was used to smuggle cigarettes to Poland. Commission officials were bribed by journalists to leak information.[153] MS were not very interested in protecting the financial interests of the EC. Therefore EC legislation was enacted which initially

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[151] See: *Vervaele J.E.A.* "The European Community and Harmonization of the Criminal Law Enforcement of Community Policy: Ignoti nulla cupido?" in U. Sieber (et. al) Strafrecht und Wirtstrafrecht. Festchrift fur Klaus Tiedemann, Carl Heymans Verlag, 2008, 1355–1384.

[152] Case 68/88, Commission v. Greece (1989).

[153] Case T – 193/04, Hans-Martin Tillack v. Commission (2004).

gave the Commission the power to request the MS to start administrative inquires into alleged fraud cases. With Regulations 2185/96 and 1073/1999 the Commission and later on OLAF also got the power to autonomously start administrative investigations in the MS where the financial interests of the EC were at stake. As it was the case with the Euro-inspectors, OLAF's operational powers are highly depended on the national rules of the MS where the investigation took place. At the conclusion of an investigation OLAF must send its findings to the MS concerned. The reports of the finding should be drawn in accordance with the rules of evidence of that MS in order to constitute admissible evidence in eventual administrative proceedings. However, sanctioning remained a prerogative of the MS.

It is clear from the above that a new complex legal order, with its own principles emerged: the EC legal order. Some of those principles stemmed from the Treaties themselves, like the principle of sincere cooperation or the principle of community loyalty while others from the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) like the principle of direct effect[154] and direct applicability or the principle of primacy.[155] In the course of European Integration other principles, such as the principle of proportionality, which operated in the domestic legal order, obtained also an EC dimension. Legal principles are to a certain extend an important variable of the legal culture of the jurisdiction within which they operate. The interaction between the EC legal order and the national jurisdiction as far as legal rules and principles are concerned also meant an interaction between the legal cultures of the MS and probably the establishment of an EC legal culture which could not be seen as separate from the legal cultures of its own members. The interaction between the legal cultures has been very relevant in the field of harmonization of criminal law. In order to get a better understanding of this topic, I will first give a short overview of the developments which led to the establishment of the EU with its three pillar structure as we knew it until the Treaty of Lisbon which abolished the pillar structure.

3. Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam

The EU was established in 1992 with the treaty of Maastricht. MS felt it was necessary to extent cooperation beyond the EC and thus beyond economic interests. There was a need for a common foreign policy and cooperation in justice and home affairs. This was achieved with the treaty of Maastricht where the EU emerged and it is since then referred to as a three pillar structure with a roof which contains the common provisions applicable to all pillars. The first and most important pillar remained the EC, the second pillar the Common Foreign Policy and the third the Justice and Home Affairs. As I said in the introduction my focus is the harmonization of criminal law and therefore I will go more into depth in the third pillar. The EC established the common market and consequently also an area without internal borders where people, goods, services and capital could move freely. However, criminals and criminal activities could also move freely in the borderless Europe. Therefore, enhanced cooperation between police and judicial authorities was deemed necessary. Until the treaty of Amsterdam in 1998 the involvement of the EU in the national criminal law remained at cooperation levels and there was no legal basis for approximation of criminal law yet. The Treaty of Amsterdam changed this situation drastically. The third pillar was reformed and a new, somewhat vague, objective was formulated. The EU aimed at providing citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by preventing and combating crime, organized or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking, corruption and fraud.[156] These ends would be achieved not only through police cooperation but also through approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the MS, i.e. direct harmonization of criminal (procedural) law.

4. Europeanization of Criminal Law

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[154] Arret du 5 fevrier 1963, Van Gend en Loos / Administratie der Belastingen (26-62, Rec._p _00003)
[155] Arret du 15 juillet 1964, Costa / E.N.E.L. (6-64, Rec._p._01141)
[156] Article 29 TEU.

The negotiations for the reform of the third pillar in the Treaty of Amsterdam were not easy.[157] Although MS realized the need for enhanced cooperation in criminal matters, they were initially reluctant to a drastic involvement of the EU into their criminal law. All the MS have a long tradition of criminal law and criminal codes and procedures. The rules of criminal law mirror their national values and norms. Criminal law is considered the foundation stone in the sovereignty of an independent nation. Therefore a consensus had to be reached between the EU, with its own interests and goals, on the one hand and the MS trying to protect their traditions and legal cultures on the other. The consensus reached is visible in at least three aspects. Firstly, the third pillar remained intergovernmental as opposed to the supranational character of the EC. Decisions in the third pillar are taken with unanimity as opposed to the qualified majority voting in the first EC pillar. Secondly, unlike directives in the first pillar, the legal instrument chosen for the harmonization of criminal law in the third pillar, the framework decisions, do not have direct effect. They have to be implemented by the MS into their domestic legal order. To this end MS must reach the objectives of a framework decisions, but they retain a wide discretion as to the means of achieving the objectives. Thirdly, the conclusions of the European Council of Government Leaders and Heads of States at Tampere (October 1999) have demonstrated the reluctance of the MS to harmonize criminal law. The well-known EC law principle of mutual recognition became in Tampere the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in the EU. MS must mutually recognize each other's judicial decisions without many formalities. Mutual recognition is based in the concept of mutual trust: MS trust each other's legal systems. The principle of mutual recognition was adopted as an alternative for detailed and extensive harmonization of criminal law. It was however recognized in the Tampere conclusions that mutual recognition requires some common minimum standards which can be achieved only through a certain degree of harmonization of procedural criminal law.

Curiously enough neither the Treaty provisions nor mutual recognition have prevented harmonization. The events of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 accelerated the process. There is now a considerable amount of framework decisions which aim at the harmonization of both substantive and procedural criminal law. Some of these framework decisions do not show links with serious transnational crimes as they are often the product of the political agenda of individual MS.[158] Certain MS which have criminalized certain human behavior have a tendency to see that behavior criminalized in all the other MS and thus a new phenomenon has emerged. MS are using EU legal instruments to impose their political agendas and also their values and legal cultures to other MS. The liberal Dutch policy on narcotics for example is not easy tolerated by its neighboring country Germany. Also the Danish liberal approach towards prostitution is a thorn in the flesh of Sweden.[159]

Many framework decisions, regardless of whether they are the product of political agendas of MS or of the Commission, have had quite an impact on the national criminal laws. The Framework decision on Terrorism[160] is a good example in this respect. Most of the MS did not criminalized terrorism as a autonomous criminal offence in the past. In many countries terrorism was prosecuted under the formation or participation in (armed) gangs. Most of framework decisions which harmonize substantive law also contain rules on minimum maximum sentences. Recent research has demonstrated that this in turn has led to a higher degree of repression in the Scandinavian countries in certain areas of their criminal law.[161] In the field of criminal procedure,

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[157] See: *J. De Zwaan,* "The Future of the Third Pillar and Fight against EU Fraud: Evaluation of the IGC and the Treaty of Amsterdam" in J.E.A. Vervaele (ed), Transnational Enforcement of the Financial Interests of the European Union. Developments in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Corpus Juris, Antwer-pen/Groningen/Oxford, Intersentia, 1999, pp. 13-29.

[158] *J.E.A. Vervaele,* The Europeanization of Criminal Law and the Criminal Law Dimension of European Integration, Research Papers, College of Europe, Brugge, 3/2005.

[159] *Elholm T.,* Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 17 (2009) 191-226.

[160] O.J. (2002) L. 182.

[161] *Elholm T.,* Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 17 (2009) 191-226.

the Framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant is also relevant in this respect. The traditional diplomatic channels of extradition are now replaced by the European Arrest Warrant which is a perfect example of the application of the principle of mutual recognition. MS must execute a European Arrest Warrant without many formalities and the grounds for refusal are considerably reduced.

The Treaty of Lisbon has taken the harmonization of criminal law a step further. The three pillar structure is abolished. The Union is now mainly founded in two treaties: the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The latter treaty replaced and succeeds the Treaty on the European Communities and the words 'Community law" and "EC" have been replaced by Union law. The framework decisions have disappeared and criminal law may be now harmonized through directives. This means that the co-decision procedure and qualified majority voting apply. Directives have also direct effect, which means that in case of wrong or not timely implementation, citizens may directly derive rights from the directives. The directives should establish minimum rules in the definition of crimes and sanctions. This will happen particularly in the area of serious crimes with a cross-border dimension. Therefore new crimes will emerge the so-called EUROCRIMES. However, the reluctance of the MS to accept an important interference of the Union on their national criminal law system still goes on. The TFEU provides in art. 82 and 83 for the so-called emergency break procedure. A MS can express serious concerns that a draft Directive would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system. In such cases a MS can refer the draft to the Council for review. The procedure was inserted after some MS expressed their concerns that the competences of the Union could force them to adopt rules that would be alien to the traditions of their criminal justice systems.[162] The sensitivity of issues relating to criminal justice is also expressed by the fact that this is the only area within the Union in which the initiatives for legislation may come from both the Commission and the MS. Art. 76 TFEU excludes criminal law from the regular procedure in which the initiatives for legislation come from the Commission.

Art. 86 TFEU provides the legal basis for the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor. The offences for which the European Public Prosecutor will be responsible are those against the financial interests of the Union. The responsibility of the European Public Prosecutor entails the investigation, prosecution and bringing to judgment the perpetrators of and accomplices in offences against the financial interests of the EU. The European Public Prosecutor is for the moment far from being reality and it is therefore beyond the scope of this paper to speculate on its functioning and all the related questions.

Last but not least, the Treaty of Lisbon provides that the EU shall accede the European Convention for Human Rights.[163] Negotiations between the Council of Europe and the European Union have already started and one day, probably and hopefully in the near future, the EU will be a unique case where a supranational organization is a member of a convention which is ratified by nation states.

5. Instead of conclusions: the obvious and hidden symbols and signals of the Europeanization of Criminal Law

The European Integration as described above clearly demonstrates an interesting interaction between various legal orders. We saw that the legal orders of the MS have gone through a complex interaction under the umbrella of European Integration. As a consequence thereof the legal cultures of the MS have also interacted and influenced each* other. The emergence of the EU legal order is an even more interesting and complex subject matter. The emergence of EC and EU legal principles demonstrates an interesting inclination towards a European legal culture characterized by a blend of national legal cultures on one hand and variables, such as financial interests and harmonization of criminal law, which operate at a European level on the other. The harmonization of national criminal laws reveals another dimension of the European legal order and legal culture. The EU legislation harmonizing criminal law contains in the first place some obvious and explicit signals and symbols. These can be found in preambles, pre-works or even in

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[162] See: *Klip A.,* European Criminal Law, Atnwerp/Oxford/Portland 2009, p. 35.
[163] Article 6 (2) Title I of the common provisions Treaty of Lisbon.

the text of the legislation itself.[164] The straightforward objective is the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice where certain behaviors are not tolerated and thus criminalized. However, the harmonization of criminal law also contains symbols or signals which are hidden.[165] The political agendas and wishes of MS are one category of the hidden symbols and signals. The Framework decision on Unauthorized Entry is a good example in this respect. This framework decision came into existence after the events of at Dover where 50 Chinese refugees found a horrible death due to suffocation in a container after an attempt to enter the United Kingdom illegally. The British Government demanded extended penalties for this type of crime in all MS. Another hidden symbolic message is what Vogel calls "the 'colonial' goal".[166] In this view the EU is trying to transplant certain values to the MS without taking into account the legal and cultural context where these values are exported and no matter whether they solve or create problems in the receiving countries. The abovementioned examples of the liberal Dutch policies on narcotics can illustrate this. A third and maybe most important hidden symbolic message is the political wish to give the EU the character of a nation state.[167] Criminal law is considered the foundation stone in the sovereignty of an independent nation and its regulation at a European level certainly express a symbolic value. The Treaty of Lisbon has taken this process to another level. The idea of the European Public Prosecutor and the accession of the EU to the European Convention of Human Rights surely enhance the idea of a nation state. The persisting reluctance of the MS to accept full and unconditional harmonization of their criminal law is still a serious obstacle in this respect. However the way is paved and EU is slowly but steadily moving towards an international organization which bears the characteristic of a nation state with its own legal order and own legal culture.

Alfredo Perez Bravo[168]

PEOPLE'S WELL-BEING AS CORNERSTONE
IN THE DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS

Let me in first place to express my gratitude to the University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, in particular to the Rector Doctor Alexander Zapesotsky, for his kind invitation to participate in the 10th International "Likhachov" Scientific Conference. It is a privilege to join you in what becomes already one of the most important academy events in Russia, under the always current and valid theme: "Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations".

Having had the opportunity to serve as ambassador of Mexico to 47 countries, and having been in contact with many diverse cultures, I can not miss the chance to make some comments on the subject which brings us together these days. For that reason, I will dedicate the first part of my brief presentation to my personal vision on the Conference theme, and the second part of this document to highlight some points of the relation between Mexico and Russia

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[164] *Elholm* Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 17 (2009) 191-226.

[165] Ibid.

[166] *Vogel J.,* "Why is the Harmonisation of Penal Law Necessary. A Comment", in Klip and van der Wilt (eds.), *Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in Criminal Law* (Amsterdam 2002), 55-64.

[167] *Elholm T.,* Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 17 (2009) 191-226. See also J.R. Spencer, "Why is the Harmonisation of Penal Law Necessary", in Klip and van der Wilt (eds.), Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in Criminal Law (Amsterdam 2002), 43-54.

[168] Ambassador of Mexico to the Russian Federation. He has been accredited as Ambassador of Mexico to 47 countries. He was Head of the Political Division in the Mexican Embassy in Washington. Mr Bravo was the Ambassador of Mexico in Malaysia and Dean of the Diplomatic Corp. He is Ambassador non resident in the Republics of Armenia and Belarus. Author of the book *Mexico Today,* and of a number of scholarly studies published in 30 specialized journals.

The previous chapters of this International Scientific Conference had been working in the most diverse definitions for the better understanding of what we name "Civilization" and "Culture". It is not my intention to repeat some of those eloquent presentations, but I would like to emphasize on what I consider the backbone of both concepts, the human being, and if you allow me to be more specific, the people's well-being.

In a very basic description, we may agree that a civilization is the multidimensional space-time formed on the cultural, social and economic basis of a particular social group, and in this context "culture" is the set of all forms and expressions of a given society. With this in mind, when one reviews the history of mankind, it is easy to detect patterns and behaviors that are always present in the evolution of all civilizations, like power relations, religions, economic models, moral values, identity search, and more. And in these continuous social lines emerges without doubt "the man and his own social pact", the way how people have chosen to socially organize themselves within their community and with respect to foreign ones.

It is obvious that the degree of development of the society will depend of the manner that the social pact works. But what explains social development? What explains the growth, expansion or decline of social groups? In any time, the social advance has been possible thanks to the new tools created by the people, and certainly for their use and applications. The speed in the social change of any community, society, nation, has depended, precisely, by the creation, innovation and access to new instruments, to new technologies. The social transformation is base on the development of science and technology, and this principle is unquestionable.

The new discoveries and creations, the technologies, the techniques, the sciences have an accumulative effect, it means that all of them, especially science, takes and uses all the knowledge that has been achieved at all times and places. Consequently, social development is linked closely with the scientific and technological development, and therefore has the ability to accelerate its progress. We can observe in this way that social groups are shortening their cycles of change, of evolution. Therefore, we can say that changes in mankind in the last few decades amount to centuries of other millennia. And perhaps our decades will be time references equivalent to years of centuries to come.

Our social development speed is increasing; the accessibility to higher standards of living are mounting, but unfortunately the benefits of the progress and improvement is inequitable for the individuals in the same community, in the same society, and of course between persons of different nations. That, in my opinion, is the central point, the main universal challenge.

The profile of social groups changes as a natural part of human development, economic patterns are modified by their own forces, and political actors and their power relationships are adjusted to new and changing circumstances, but.. .but what it does not change is the very nature of human beings, their needs, aspirations, feelings, fears, desires, dreams, thoughts. I am convinced that men and women of the antiquity, medieval, renaissance, or from our century are identical in essence, what has changed is the quality of life, the number of opportunities that each person has or not, the kind of challenges that everyone has to confront compare with other moments in the history. Let me reiterate, the habits of the persons change, as well the habits of societies, languages, skills, but everyone's desire to live, to overcome, to walk into the future remains untouchable. Everyone is important, vital, and central.

In this line of thought, everybody is important and should have access to benefits and services generated by the social development progress. But the reality is different, and always has been. Over the centuries, the inequity between individuals, social groups, between nations has existed, but never before have had social groups, communities, nations, been so interconnected as today, and never before the opportunity to star to create a most fair world for everyone has been so near.

Relationships between people and those that exist between nations are based on their own interests. It is undeniable that each nation has its own project, as well as each person his own life. Everybody is looking, working, fighting for what it is best for them. *t is natural. However, unlike other epochs, our moment in time demands understand that the degree to which we attend to the needs of others, we will ensure the satisfaction of ours.

We must change our approaches; we need to consider the best strategies for reducing social and economic differences that exist between people and between nations, without affecting the

interests of everyone. These strategies should emphasize a new distribution of the benefits of scientific knowledge, new forms of access to technologies for everyone, new ways of cooperation among all the different organizations and nations, more common goals. Our public policies, our academic programs, our privet actions should be focused on addressing the needs of present and future generations, designed to seek the welfare of individuals, no matter what their origin or nationality it is. The more open the gap between persons and among nations, the greater the conflicts that will face the humanity, but I am certain that if the differences are reduce the human society will be more constructive, more comparable to what all of us have in mind, a more "civilized and just world".

Mexico and Russia today

Many years ago, someone asked me what an ambassador does? Now, after 20 years of representing Mexico with the rank of ambassador, my answer would be "serve as a bridge, create links, contacts that can be useful for the benefits of individuals and nations". Since September 2007 my main responsibility has been working on strengthening and expanding the ties between Mexico and Russia. Our two countries are today two of the fifteen largest economies in the world (Russia number ten and Mexico the thirteenth). Our international responsibility is huge, and the potential of our bilateral cooperation is enormous. Our political dialogue is constant, very positive and constructive. In fact during the last 120 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries there has not been any conflict. Mexicans have admiration, respect and sympathy for the Russian people, its history and culture, and I think that these feelings exist also among Russians toward Mexico. Trade relations (although not correspond now to the size of our two economies) begin to find new avenues for growth. In the previous two years more than 27 thousand Russian tourists visited Mexico.

February of this year, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made an official visit to Mexico. Together with his Mexican counterpart Minister Patricia Espinosa Cantellano, reviewed the items on the bilateral agenda, and advanced in various areas of cooperation. Previously, in December 2009, was held in Moscow the Fourth Meeting of the Joint Commission on Economic, Trade, Scientific-Technical Cooperation and Shipping, headed by the Mexican Minister of Energy, Dr. Georgina Kessel, and the Russian Minister of Education, Andrei Fursenko. This forum was instrumental for advance in cooperation activities already underway and for stimulates new areas of trade, investment and scientific and technical cooperation. In February 2010, the Minister of Agriculture of Mexico, Francisco Mayorga, led a major delegation of Mexican businessmen who attended in Moscow the food fair PRODEXPO 2010. Minister Mayorga also met with Russian Minister of Agriculture, Elena Skrynnik, and agreements were reached on new products likely to trade between both countries.

A new area of contact between Mexico and Russia, just created in the past two years, is undoubtedly the area of tourism. With the decision by Mexican authorities to reduce time in issuing visas to Russian nationals, the number of visitors to Mexico has increase in several times. Two years ago, for example, a Mexican visa for a Russian national was issue after six weeks. Today, this same process takes only two days, and can be done online in any part of the Russian Federation. As one of the results of this decision, since last December a charter flight bound for Moscow every 10 days to Cancun, and there are plans to increase the frequencies and the destinations.

With satisfaction we note that besides the excellent political dialogue today between Russia and Mexico, we have made important advances in fields such as trade, tourism, technical and educational cooperation, and we have establish basis for collaboration in new areas like energy, investment, innovation, technological and others dedicated to cover the needs of social development.

Russia and Mexico are, today, in a very significant moment of its relation. Both nations are working on higher levels of bilateral cooperation; the two governments recognize the benefit of it. We have common positions in the international field. The Mexican and Russian institutions have as an important priority to elevate the quality of life of their citizens. Our two nations recognized, at the same time, that our important international responsibility must be exercised with

determination and wisdom. For example, this year Mexico host four international summits: on energy (March 2010), the International Conference on Youth, within the framework of the United Nations Millennium Goals (August 2010), the World Summit on Migration and Development (November 2010), and finally, following up the recent summit in Copenhagen, Mexico will organize the XVI Convention of United Nations on Climate Change (COP 16) (December 2010).

I can not conclude my remarks without sharing with you the historical significance that 2010 has for all Mexicans. This year we celebrate 200 years of the start of the War of Independence of Mexico, at the same time we commemorate 100 years of the beginning of the Mexican Revolution. 2010 is a year of profound reflection for the Mexicans; we need to learn the lessons we get from the past, speak about our national identity, about our diversities and strengths, recognize our place and roll in the international community, and to work tirelessly for the better future we want to achieve, for the well-being of the generations to come.

Fabio Petito[169]

IN DEFENCE OF DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS:
THE CONTEMPORARY AMBIGUITIES OF RELIGIONS AS A SOURCE
OF CIVILIZATIONAL IDENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Against the prediction of the theorists of modernisation on the inescapable withering away of religion, it is today beyond any doubts that religions are back at the centre stage of international politics and often this return appears to be antagonistic and does not seem to be for the (common) good. But how can we explain this visible resurgence of religion in world politics in the post-Cold War era? What can we say about the logics -if there is just one – by which religion interact, infuse or even 'sacralise' international politics today? These are questions of great topicality especially in the light of how religion and politics have been recently interacting both in the Islamic and the Western world as well as in their precarious relationship, the main empirical source and question at the origin of this analysis. In this paper, my starting point is that the resurgence of religion as central factors in contemporary international relations is linked to the renewed visibility of the concept of civilization in post-Cold War political discourses. More specifically, drawing on Johann P. Arnason's recent work – and in this regard Samuel Huntington's argument retains part of its validity -1 want to argue that the resurgence of religions in world politics has to be read in the context of civilizations, defined in a fundamentally *culturalist* sense, reasserting themselves as *strategic frames of references,* not as direct protagonists, of international politics.

This development has also to be read as part of a longer term process of challenge to Western dominance, intensified from Second World War and that Hedley Bull called the 'cultural revolt against the West'. But does such "civilizational" reading of politicised religions can help to diminish the influence of the "culture talk" approach, with its essentialised and polarised tendencies? Can it also problematise the predominant reading of religion in IR as the ultimate threat to international order and stability (especially, in the forms of the identity politics of the 'new wars', the terrorist attacks of religious fundamentalists or the clash of civilizations thesis)? What does such a civilizational reading tells us about the status of the relationship between religion and politics both in the Islamic and the Western world as well as in their precarious relationship?

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[169] Professor of the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex (UK). Research interests: problems of interaction of civilizational, cultural and religious factors in international relations.

Author of more than 100 publications, including: *Civilizational Dialogue and World Order: the Other Politics of Cultures, Religions and Civilizations in International Relations* (co-edited, 2009), *Europe, the United States and the Relations Islamic World: Conceptualising a Triangular Relationship* (co-authored, 2009), *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order* (co-edited, 2007), *The Global Political Discourse of Dialogue among Civilizations: Mohammad Khatami and Vaclav Havel* (2007), *Introducing the International Theory of Carl Schmitt: International Law, International Relations, and the Present Global Predicament(s)* (2006) and others.

The Resurgence of Religion in World Politics: theoretical problems and alternative reading

For the predominant academic and public discourse following the end of the Cold war, the return of religion in international politics has primarily come in the form of a militant and violent-prone form of politics, almost as a God-sent plague or punishment on the earth, "the revenge of God", as the title of one of the first book that focussed on this resurgence seemed to evoke (G. Kepel). The examples are many: the conflicts in Bosnia, Algeria, Kashmir, Palestine, Sudan; but also the raise of world-wide Islamism and Hindu Nationalism or the growing role of the Christian Right on America foreign policy or of Orthodoxy on the Russian state; and of course the events of September 11 came as a seal to unequivocally confirm such a worrying and destabilising trend. More generally, I think that there are three, possibly fours, ways in which this resurgence of religion in international politics as been apprehended/read by the discipline of International Relations: 1) in the context of the so-called 'new wars' where political violence is often manifested within 'failed' states and driven by a politics of identity and irregular warfare designed along religious lines; 2) in the context of religious fundamentalism and international terrorism; 3) within the context and fears of a forthcoming "clash of civilizations"; 4) possibly, in the context of the growing attention to the role of religious domestic interests and agendas in the more assertive foreign policy of some states.[170]

Unfortunately, when the resurgence and relevance of religious identities in post-Cold War international relations has been acknowledged, in one of the above-mentioned four modalities, it has been detected and interpreted within the framework of what Scott Thomas has called the "Westphalian presumption", that is, the notion that religious (and cultural) pluralism cannot be accommodated in international society but must be privatized or overcome by a cosmopolitan ethics, if there is to be international order.[171] In other words, according to this view politics with reference to religious identity comes to the fore only *qua* ultimate threat to order, security, and civility, and its politicization is always an inescapable threat to security, inimical to 'modernity' and to the resolution of conflicts, as the 'new wars' driven by the politics of identity and the terrorist attacks of religious fundamentalists would for example show.

This view, which is very strong in western academia and political circles, is based on the assumption that politicised religion is always about political instability, a disordered state of international affairs, fundamentalist politics and terrorism and, as a result, it overlooks the positive role politicised religion (in a qualified way) can play to the modernisation, democratisation and even peace-building in several countries of the so-called Western and non-Western world as well as to the construction of a new normative structure adequate for a more *pluralist* and multicultural future world order. There are two reasons which can explain this biased approach of the predominant political analysis: the first has to do with the way we have traditionally thought about international politics, and its European experience and what as I mentioned could be called "Westphalian presumption"; the second has to do with the implicit bias of the social sciences against religion rooted in the Enlightenment' and Positivist's self-understanding vis a vis religion.

This is why I have argued that the rejection of religion seems inscribed in the genetic code of the discipline of International Relations (IR). Arguably, this is because the main constitutive elements of the practice of international relations were purposely established in early modern Europe to end the Wars of Religion. At that point in history—paraphrasing the powerful words of Thomas Hobbes—God made space to the great Leviathan (the sovereign state), that mortal God to which the new modern man owes his peace and security, religion was privatized, and through the principle of the cuius regio eius religio (the ruler determines the religion of his realm)

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[170] Examples of this approach are Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000) and Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). For a very insightful research that problematises some of the predominant views on 'religious fundamentalism' see, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *The Fundamentalism Project,* vols. 1-5 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991-1995).

[171] *Scott Thomas,* "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Society", Religion in International Relations, 21-53.

pluralism among states and noninterference were born and worshipped as the new sacred principles of the emerging Westphalian order: As a consequence, politics with reference to religion becomes the ultimate threat to order, security, and civility, and, must not inhabit both the practice of international relations and, subsequently, the discipline of study of International Relations (IR).

The second 'bias' lies, it seems to me, in International Relations' self-understanding as a party to the Enlightment project, in its self-conception as a social science that holds a privileged access to knowledge of social phenomena. Firstly, and more broadly, it should not come as a big revelation that religion and the Enlightenment have not always been on "very good terms" either theoretically or politically. Rather, the Enlightenment project envisages as its central mission the supersession of those traditional religious-based *worlds* into a universal individually-based and rationally-justified *modern world.*[172] Secondly, and more specifically, we have to remember that modern international law, arguably the predecessor of the discipline of International Relations, was born under the auspices of Alberico Gentili's celebrated cry *silete theologi in munere alieno*!— let theologians keep silence about matters outside their province!—which symbolically marked the end of the scholastic world and the advent of a new epoch, the Westphalian era, in which international politics would be examined from a secular rather than a theological standpoint.

This problematic and biased assumption/presumption precludes a different understanding of the resurgence of religions in world politics. I want to argue that if many philosophers and sociologists have interpreted this return as 'the end of modernity' or the 'de-secularisation of the world', what is more relevant from the perspective of politics and international relations is that in the post-Cold War era religion has become a critical source of civilizational identity in a context where civilizations, defined in a fundamentally *culturalist* sense, are reasserting themselves as *strategic frames of references,* not as direct protagonists, of international politics.

This development is in a sense a typical post-Cold War fact to the extent that as Arnason has pointed out 'civilizational claims and references now play a more important role in the global ideological context then they did when the rival univer-salisms of the cold War era dominated the scene'. It has, however, also be read as part of a longer term process of challenge to Western dominance, intensified from Second World War and that Hedley Bull called the 'revolt against the West'. According to Bull, the revolt against Western dominance comprised, five waves: firstly what he calls the struggle for equal sovereignty; secondly the anti-colonial revolution; thirdly, the struggle for racial equality; fourthly, the struggle for economic justice; finally, the struggle for what he calls the cultural liberation.[173] This last stage of the revolt against the West, what is also often referred to as the search for cultural authenticity of the non-Western world or the fight against its cultural neo-imperialism, had its most politically visible example in the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 and the worldwide emergence of political Islam but also the new assertiveness of Asian countries in the name of the so-called 'Asian values'.[174] It is my contention that we are today living in large part still within this process of cultural revolt, which it has arguably intensified since the end of the Cold War implied the political necessity of a common (political, economic, and social) liberal and western model for all the planet. Religion in this new context has become one of the major voices of resistance and provided the frame for a radical critique against the globalisation of a Western-centric and Liberal order. To use the effective words of Regis Debre 'religion turns out after all not to be the opium of the people, but the vitamin of the

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[172] *Alasdair MacIntyre,* Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988), see in particular ch. XVII entitled 'Liberalism Transformed into a Tradition'

[173] *Hedley Bull,* "The Revolt Against the West", in *The Expansion of International Society,* 220-24. See also Andrew Linklater, "Rationalism", in *Theories of International Relations,* 2nd ed., ed. Scott Burchill et al. (Palgrave, 2001), 103-28 and *Robert H. Jackson,* Quasi-States: Sovereignity, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. ch. 4.

[174] See for example: *Robert Lee,* Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). For the so-called 'Asian values' debate, see Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew", Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (1994): 109-26 and *Daniel A. Bell,* East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

weak' (NPP, 2008, vol. 25, no. 4, 35) and becomes one of the key vectors of the political resistance and struggle in the name of the social ethics of 'really existing communities' and of arguments which resonate in the everyday life of people. This process of the cultural revolt against the West, it seems to me, is relevant to understand the new centrality of civilizational politics in the post-Cold War era – and in this regard Samuel Huntington's argument retains part of its validity.

Finally, this development is made in my view even more clear and pressing by the new centrality acquired by the issue of democracy and democratisation in the post-Cold War international agenda and in particular in the post-9/11 context. Contrary to what many supporters of democracy-promotion have been arguing, the spreading of democracy will not necessarily reduce the growing contestation of the Western-dominated nature of contemporary international society, but it could rather reinforce it as there seems to be growing evidence that the most recent successful cases of democratisation in the non-Western world are the ones driven by the indigenisation and cultural reinterpretation of democracy.[175] This process, which borrowing from a notion developed in Christian theology, I would call of 'democratic inculturation',[176] seems to me to be the most appropriate way to root democratic institutions and forms of political participation into stable and lasting regimes – and definitively more likely to succeed than an externally-promoted (if not coercively imposed) strategy of liberal-democracy promotion. Such processes of 'democratic inculturation', which can be thought of as examples of the 'multiple modernities' paradigm, would arguably reveal even more clearly the political bias of contemporary international society by removing the criticism of the concrete impossibility of merging 'modern' political values and practices with 'traditional' cultures and ways of living.

Civilizations as *Strategic Frames of References* for World Politics and the Centrality of Religions

But what does it mean that civilizations, defined in a fundamentally *culturalist* sense, are reasserting themselves as *strategic frames of references,* not as direct protagonists, of international politics? And why and how religions end up playing a critical role in this process? These questions call for an engagement with Samuel Huntington's thesis of the 'clash of civilizations' and more precisely with its own understanding of civilization politics as one of the most recurrent criticisms made against Huntington's thesis concerns its use of the concept of civilisation.[177] The criticism, it seems to me, is a double-sided one. Firstly, it points to the contestable nature of the concept of civilisation: what is 'a civilisation' about, how is it defined and how can we empirically identify civilisations? This criticism seems often to go hand in hand with a rejection of the particular categorization of civilisations proposed by Huntington (in his view eight major contemporary civilisations can be identified). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the critics of Huntington have stressed the inadequacy of the concept of 'civilisations'

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[175] As a telling example since Islam is often represented as incompatible with democracy, I want to point to the growing role that mainstream Political Islamic parties have been playing in advancing the cause of democracy in countries such as Turkey, Jordan and Indonesia, see for example *John L. Esposito and John Voll,* Makers of Contemporary Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) and *Graham E. Fuller,* The Future of Political Islam (New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 2006).

[176] The term 'inculturation' is used in Christian theology to refer to the adaptation of the Gospel in native cultures and also the introduction of these cultures into the life of the Church. The term was popularized by the encyclical Redemptoris Misssio of Pope John Paul II (1990), but predates that encyclical. See: *Peter Schineller,* A Handbook of Inculturation (New York: Paulist Press, 1990) and *Aylward Shorter,* Toward a Theology of Inculturation (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1988). In *Redemptoris Misssio* Pope John Paul II consistently talks of inculturation as a bi-directional dialogical process, the ongoing dialogue between faith and culture. Such an idea, it seems to me, could also be productively applied to our contemporary understanding of democracy which could well be enriched by contributions of non-western cultures. For *Redemptoris Misssio,* see http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-missio en.html accessed on 15/1/2007.

[177] The very first reactions to Huntington's article in *Foreign Affairs* pointed to this problem. See *Fouad Ajami* "The Summoning", *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (1993): 2-9; *Albert L. Weeks,* "Do Civilisations Hold?", *Foreign Affai*rs 72, no. 4 (1993): 24-5; *Liu Binyan,* "Civilisation Grafting", *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (1993): 19-21. See also Huntington's first reply to the debate activated by his article, *Samuel Huntington*, "If Not Civilisations, What? Samuel Huntington Responds to His Critics", *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 5 (1993): 186-94.

for understanding contemporary world politics. Here, the major objections refute to the continuous centrality of the state as the key actor of international politics as well as to the fact that civilisations lack agency, that is, they are not in themselves actors, that is, active players of world politics. To this second set of criticisms, there is also often associated the question of who the representative is of this or that particular civilisation.

As for the first set of issues raised by Huntington's conceptualization of civilisation, there exists a large body of theoretical literature on this phenomenology and it can indeed be argued that in contemporary social theory there is a growing interest in the idea of civilisation both as an object of study and an analytical category.[178] This is acknowledged by Huntington who, overlooking the range of different versions of civilisational theory, yet argues that a "broad agreement also exists on central propositions concerning the nature, identity, and dynamics of civilisations"[179] and from this minimum communal denominator articulates his characterization of civilisation as a plural, cultural entity, comprehensive, mortal, and different from political entities.[180] The operationalisation of this definition into eight major contemporary civilisations— the Sinic, the Japanese, the Hindu, the Islamic, the Orthodox, the Western, the Latin American, and (possibly) the African civilisation—is no doubt problematic in some aspects, but I do not see any other alternative that would not be so (although it is also clear to me that this categorization fits very well with his particular political agenda). What is more critical, as Arnason has observed, is that Huntington's approach has an implicit "strong preference for interpretations which stress civilisational closure" whereby there exists a strong case for arguing, as Benjamin Nelson has shown, that intercivilazional encounters have to be seen as an integral aspect of civilisational patterns.[181]

The empirical sociological phenomenology that is, however, behind this renewed visibility of the concept of civilisation in geopolitical discourses and analysis is the return of cultural and religious identities as central factors in contemporary world politics.[182] It could be argued that Huntington is right to stress the global resurgence of culture and religion in world politics -on the basis of the sociological studies that since the 70s have empirically criticized the predictions of the various versions of modernization theory – but is wrong when he entered the debate as to whether or not these ideational forces converge and are fixed into civilisational entities. This argument would also seem to be more attuned with the idea that the concept of civilisation is more useful and appropriate for a historical analysis that takes the longue duree as its horizon of interpretation rather than for a political analysis of the contemporary social world.

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[178] See the two recent special issues on civilisation and civilisational analysis of *Thesis Eleven* 62, no. 1 (2000) and *International Sociology* 16, no. 3 (2001). In particular, see *Shmuel N. Eisenstadt*, "The Civilisational Dimension in Sociological Analysis", *Thesis Eleven* 62, no. 1 (2000): 1-21; *Edward A. Tiryakian*, "Introduction: The Civilisation of Modernity and the Modernity of Civilisations", *International Sociology* 16, no. 3 (2001): 277-92; and *Johann P. Arnason*, "Civilisational Patterns and Civilizing Processes", International Sociology 16, no. 3 (2001): 387-405. More broadly for the field of 'sociology of civilisation' see Eisenstadt, Comparative Civilisations and Multiple Modernities and Arnason, Civilisations in Dispute. See also the recent attention to Civilizational analysis in IR, Hall, *Martin and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson*, eds., Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of 'Civilizations' in International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2007) and *Katzenstein. Peter J*, ed., Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives (Routledge, 2009).

[179] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations*, 40.

[180] Ibid, 40-48. For an insightful criticism of Huntington's conceptualisation of civilisation see Arnason, *Civilisations in Dispute*, 11-13.

[181] Ibid, 11. *Bejamin Nelson*, "Civilisational Complexes and Intercivilisational Encounters", *Sociological Analysis* 34, no. 2 (1973): 79-105 and *On the Roads to Modernity* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981). For a critical review of Bejamin Nelson's pioneering analysis see *Donald A. Nielsen*, "Rationalization, Transformations of Consciousness and Intercivilisational Encounters: Reflections on Benjamin Nelson's Sociology of Civilisations", *International Sociology* 16, no. 3 (2001): 406-20.

[182] For the now widely accepted 'return of culture and identity in International Relations', see: *Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil*, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996). The focus on the issues of culture and identity in IR theory in the 1990s has been supplemented in the following decade by a growing set of works devoted to religion, a dimension on which IR theory had oddly remained silent, see *Petito and Hatzopoulos*, eds., Religion in International Relations; Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); *Scott Thomas*. The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2005).

Regardless of this particular criticism, however, what is relevant in my view is not to identify a certain number of civilisations and then study their balance of power and the emerging international order, as Huntington does, but to point to the growing role in the discourses and in the connected practices of world politics of 'traditional' cultural and religious elements as essential components of what world politics is made of today. Therefore, from my perspective the key issue is not general about 'civilisation' (a la Huntington) but specific about the growing reference to Islam, Asian values, the Confucian pole, the Christian heritage, the African culture as central political categories in contemporary world politics shaping the action of a plurality of actors, from state and non-state to international actors, at multiple levels, from local and state levels to that of global politics.

This reference to actors leads me to the second common criticism against Huntington's civilisational framework, the one about the issue of agency.[183] But before moving to that, I want to make clear that my disagreement with Huntington does not lie at all in the identification of 'cultural and religious' dynamics as central to the understanding of contemporary world politics but in the political crystallization of these forces into a civilisational framework. This exercise in social-scientific over-simplification while extremely successful in terms of wider public appeal – which is politically speaking a very relevant achievement and has even prompted some scholars to talk of the dangers of a self-fulfilling prophecy[184] – resulted into a flawed analytical picture even if, in Huntington's reading, a civilisation is "a culture writ large" with "religion [being] a central defining characteristic", in other words, something made of the very key dynamics that I am stressing.[185]

As I said, the question of whether 'civilisations' have agency has been the other major criticism against Huntington's use of this concept. Concretely, the problem relates to the identification of the political entity representing this or that particular civilisation and it is linked to the issue of the continuing relevance of the state as the central actor in international politics. In other words, Huntington's civilisations would lack agency: there would be no evidence or signs of the emergence of civilisational blocks (alliances formed along civilisational lines), neither civilisational international organizations nor institutions and it would be even more problematic to identify the 'spokespersons' of these civilisations given this lack of a process of 'civilisational integration' (who's speaking in the name of the Islamic civilisation? The Islamic republic of Iran? The president or the supreme guide? Why not the Saudis or the Egyptians?).

Here again some of the criticisms brought against Huntington have perhaps been unfair to the integrality of his argument. Even in his 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article, Huntington had maintained the continuing centrality of the state in international politics and in the following book had specified that civilisations "are cultural not political entities".[186] But I do not think that the recurrence of this criticism can only be explained by an inadequate reading of his work, for this duality of civilisation and state remains a matter of fact in his formulation, which constantly moves from one level to the other under the implicit assumption that states are converging, merging in some sort of civilisational container. Equally, it is not enough to say that "civilisations have no clear-cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings... [and that] they evolve, adapt" and then to identify and work with several civilisations as if they were clearly separate and fixed entities.[187]

Therefore the problem of agency – where, at which level do I concretely find the return of civilizational politics in world politics? Who are the actors of this return? – takes a different turn from the Huntingtonian argument: the return of civilizational politics as an essential element in shaping the discourses and practices of contemporary world politics is taking place through a plurality of actors and at a multiplicity of levels. The return of civilizations in world politics is

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[183] See for example the review essay of Huntington's book by Stephen M. Walt, "Building up New Bogeyman", *Foreign Affairs*, 106 (1997): 177-89.

[184] For a discussion of this critical argument see Chiara Bottici and Benoit Challand, 'Rethinking Political Myth: The Clash of Civilisations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy', *European Journal of Social Theory* 9, no. 3 (2006): 315-36.

[185] *Huntington*, The Clash of Civilisations, 41 and 48.

[186] *Huntington,* The Clash of Civilisations, 44.

[187] Ibid., 43.

first of all an ideational (or ideological) change whose vectors are diffused throughout international/global society. What is happening, as we have already argued is that "civilisations, defined in a fundamentally *culturalist* sense, are reasserting themselves as *strategic frames of references,* not as direct protagonists of international politics".[188]

It is not only about non-state actors such as indigenous groups, religious NGOs, cultural- or religious-inspired liberation movements/terrorist groups, local communities searching for cultural recognition and states and international organization whose international behavior is now more influenced by civilizational (cultural and religious) considerations but – using the language of IR constructivist scholarship – this is also about a kind of 'systemic' shift in the way world politics is constructed by and through new ideas, discourses, and shared knowledge, which today, I contend, tend to be more civilizational in nature.[189]

This characterization of civilisations as strategic frames of reference for international politics and not as collective actors, however, risks giving a misleading impression: that this return is a kind of discursive magma or nebula that has enveloped contemporary international society and that cannot be reduced to any clear 'actor' but merely to a post-modern errant and unidentifiable multiplicity of disconnected and atomized agencies.[190] I do not think that this is necessarily the case and any social-scientific attempt to identify a typology of these new actors of civilization politics would be welcome. In this respect, the notion of *community* as the sites where cultural and religious traditions are constituted and socially embodied as set of ideas and practices may be a useful analytical tool. Here I follow Alasdair MacIntyre's elaboration of social tradition as a set of practices embedded in a community. For MacIntyre, every notion of morality (virtue) – as well as any notion of justice and practical rationality and, hence, politics – is embedded in a social tradition as a set of practices of a particular community.[191] Therefore the return of civilizations in world politics I have been referring to means at the same time and inseparably the growing political relevance of cultural and religious *traditions* and *communities* — what in one expression MacIntyre defines as *social traditions*. Here some further clarification would be in place as to this characterization of community and tradition.

According to MacIntyre, who together with Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor, has articulated what is regarded as the classical communitarian standpoint within the Communitarian/Liberal debate of the 80s and 90s, moral and political thinking always presuppose a social context, a set of practices embedded in a particular community.[192] My point is not to discuss in details the logic of the complex argument MacIntyre puts forward, but to use his notion of social tradition to identify more precisely the meaning of the return of civilisation in world politics which forms the object of this paper. Moreover – in a shift that perhaps points to a more basic difference with Huntington' conceptualization – I want to maintain that the political and intellectual struggles first of all take place *within* each particular tradition and then – although often at the same time – among different ones. This is because social traditions are dynamic, ever-changing, time- and place-dependent objects, which are first of all contested internally as well as opposed externally – and, as MacIntyre has argued, it is actually their very internally contested nature, which is the ultimate sign of their good state of health.[193]

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[188] *Amason,* Civilisations in Dispute, 11, my emphasis.

[189] 1 am not interested in joining a particular strand of constructivism although it is clear in my view that the process I am talking about cannot be reduced merely to state-state interactions. For a discussion of the different strands in IR constructivist scholarship see *Maja Zehfuss,* "Constructivisms in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf and Kratochwil", in *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation,* Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen, eds., (Armonk, NY and London: ME. Sharpe 2001), 54-75.

[190] For such a 'post-modern' conceptualisation of agency see *Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,* A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans, and foreword by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

[191] See fh. 27 and 28 in chapter 1 of this thesis.

[192] MacIntyre, *After Virtue,* ch. 3. See also *Walzer,* Sphere of Justice; *Sandel,* Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; *Taylor,* Sources of the Self.

[193] With regard to this important dimension of a tradition, MacIntyre has interestingly argued: "We are apt to be misled here by the ideological uses to which the concept of a tradition has been put by conservative political theorists. Characteristically such theorists have followed Burke in contrasting tradition with reason and the stability

The label 'cultural and religious social traditions', however, seems to cover such a broad area of ideas and communities that the question becomes: at whose expense is the growing role of civilizational traditions and communities (social traditions) in world politics taking place? The answer is straightforward: the political tradition of the Enlightenment Project, yesterday in the form of the rival universalisms of the Cold War and today exemplified by the predominance of Liberalism, which in its strongest view, has been and is based on the idea of modernization as the process by which the traditional (and religious) social world is doomed to be overcome or disappear. Of course, and here it is part of the philosophical problem discussed by MacIntyre with reference to moral philosophy, Liberalism does not recognizes itself as a social tradition in the same way that the supporters of modernization theory do not recognize Modernity as a separate civilization, a theoretical move suggested by Eisesnstadt. From this standpoint, the return of culture and religious communitarianisms to world politics is about the 'demodernisation' of international society and, of course from a liberal viewpoint, its dangerous degeneration into incivility and barbarism; from our perspective, on the contrary it points to the extremely complex and ongoing debate about the genesis and nature of modernity and the possibility, to use Eisenstadt's formulation, of multiple paths and configurations of modernity.[194]

Having said that, however, I want to reiterate – and by now this should not be surprising – that among the major ways of the new civilizational politics are the great cultural and religious social traditions of which Huntington speaks – the Sinic, the Japanese, the Hindu, the Islamic, the Orthodox, the Western, the Latin American, and possibly the African civilisation – though he does so with an essentialising tendency and political agenda that I do not share. Here, in particular, I want to stress the problematic nature of the definition of Western civilisation put forward by Huntington and, by doing so, outline an essential historical connotation of the concept of civilisation.

Huntington ha»argued that "the West was the West long before it was modern" and this implies that he interprets the emergence of modernity as a change *within* a given civilisational context.[195] But as Arnason has argued "among those who accept the case for civilisational perspectives, the prevalent view would seem to imply a sequence of civilisations" and not "an unbroken line from ancient Greece to advanced modernity".[196] This point, of great historical and political relevance for the contemporary relationship between the Christian and the Liberal social traditions within the so-called "Western civilisation", adds a further dimension of chronological complexity that relates to the unresolved theoretical and historical issue of continuity and discontinuity as well as to question of the extent to which civilisations give rise to regional identities.[197]

In conclusion, our hypothesis is that the post-Cold War resurgence of religion in world politics is taking place through the reassertion of civilization, defined in a fundamentally *cultural-ist* (and therefore religious) sense, as strategic frame for world politics. What is at stake in this context is neither what the most theoretically appropriate definition of civilization is nor how we can better develop a civilizational analytical framework; it is rather the recognition – which Huntington has wrongly transferred into the realm of the academic debate on the definition of civilization – that the current political understanding of civilizations is significantly shaped by religious traditions. In other words, the predominant contemporary political understanding of civilization has naturalised the still important academic thesis that see in "religious cores the most constitutive elements of whole civilizations"[198] which is base n the insight that "[t]he moral and spiritual

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of tradition with conflict...Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict. Indeed when a tradition becomes Burkean, it is always dying or dead", *After Virtue,* 221-22.

[194] See: *ShmuelN. Eisenstadt,* ed., Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese and Other Interpretations (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

[195] *Huntington,* The Clash of Civilisations, 69.

[196] *Arnason,* Civilisations in Dispute, 307.

[197] Ibid, see the sections "Traditions in transformation", 304-14 and "Civilisations and regions", 315-22.

[198] *Arnason,* Civilisations in Dispute, 233. Of course lire the locus classicus is Max Weber's analysis of the religious pre-conditions for Western modernity and capitalism, see *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London, Unwin, 1968)

architecture of every civilization is grounded, more than any other factor, in religious commitments that point to a source of normative meaning beyond the political, economic, and cultural structure themselves".[199]

Civilizational politics is the way in which religion infuses or even 'sacralises' international politics today. Civilizational politics is nor new neither unchanging. However, the contemporary civilizational politics seems to have very clear cultural-ist/religious connotations, which were less relevant for example, during the Cold War where civilizational politics was defined in a fundamentally ideological/political way. It is enough to think of the political transformation that the notion of the West has gone through from the political community of the Free World which included, for example Japan and Turkey, to then culturalist-religious notion of a Judeo-Christian legacy which in the post-89 context makes much more difficult to refer to Japan and Turkey as part of West, even if the old strategic and security alliances still prevail.

Of course, other definitions of civilizations are possible and therefore different kinds of civilizational politics can be imagined: for example, we can think of civilizations as material cultures as Fernand Braudel has done with the Mediterraenean; as a result, for example civilizations, defined as material cultures, could become strategic frame of reference for a civilizational politics of regional integration as it has been modestly attempted by a number of political justifications for a Mediterranean-centered regional political initiatives.

In Defence of Dialogue of Civilizations: Civilizational Politics, Orientalism and the Political Construction of the Other:

What can we say, therefore, about the working of the civilizational logics by which religion interact, infuse or even 'sacra-lise' international politics today? Unquestionably what we have seen in a number of a recent events that have characterized the relationship between the Islamic and the Western worlds is the risk of an intellectual/political construction of the cultural Other. To warn against the political exercise of the construction of the Self through opposition to a negative-valued, dangerous or threatening Other is of great topicality in a time when the discourses of the clash of civilisations as well as the 'us versus them' and 'good/evil' oppositions have acquired a worryingly prominent place in the public spheres of many different countries. Probably the book that highlighted such a risk more than any other is Edward Said's *Orientalism.* As Said himself puts it, the main intellectual issue raised by *Orientalism* is: "Can one divide human reality into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions...and survive the consequences humanly?"[200] This is a question that poses also an important challenge to the camp that supports a dialogue of civilisations as the solution to the worrying possibility of the clash. It is a critique that cannot easily be dismissed as it is widely and sincerely held not only by liberals but also by a large spectrum of secular-minded and humanist scholars: this view is in fact deeply rooted in that constitutive intellectual-political experience of modernity, which Scott Thomas has effectively called the "Westphalian presumption", according to which the assertiveness of religious and cultural differences in the political realm is doomed to lead to instability, conflicts and political violence and therefore must be privatised if there is to be international order.[201]

From this perspective, in the context of politics the emphasis on civilizations and religions – even if within the framework of a dialogical mode – risks activating the politically dangerous mechanism of the Self/Other opposition. For this reason Said had a certain understandable uneasiness towards such broad cultural categories as the Orient and the West and persuasively argued for a critique of essentialised identities on the ground that civilizations are hybrid, historically constructed by encounters, exchanges, impure by definition, are always internally contested and are objects of a plurality of interpretation.[202] This is also why he opposed the romantic interpretation of cultures as internally coherent and organically sealed and even identified in the historicism of Vico and Herder, scholars to which he acknowledges an

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[199] *Max L. Stackhouse,* 'Introduction', *God and Globalization,* vol. 3, eds. Max L. Stackhouse and Diane B. Obenchain (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002), 11.

[200] *Said,* Orientalism, 45.

[201] *Thomas,* 'Taking Cultural and Religious Pluralism Seriously". See also *Scott Thomas,* The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2005).

[202] See also *Edward Said,* Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993).

intellectual debt in other important ways, the roots of dangerous nationalist tendencies.[203] A similar concern has also recently been voiced by the Indian Nobel prize winner Amartya Sen who has accused what he has dubbed a 'civilization-based thinking' of being extremely dangerous and one which can be deleterious not only when used in the theory of the clash of civilisations but also in its well-meaning attempts of dialogue.[204]

This view, which assumes a link between 'strong' religious-cultural identities and political violence, is in my view implicit in Said's critique of the construction of the Self through the opposition to a negative-valued Other as well as rather explicit in Sen's recent volume bearing the self-explanatory title: *Identity and Violence.* More generally, this thesis has provided one of the predominant interpretative frameworks on the nature of post-Cold War political violence and instability, whether in the form of the new ethno-religious civil wars driven by the politics of identity, or the replacement by religious fundamentalists and fanatics ftf the political with 'apocalyptic millenari-anism' possibly portending the lethal combination of martyrs with weapons of mass destruction or even scenarios involving possible conflicts and confrontations on large cultural-religious scale as in the case of a coming clash of civilisations.[205]

From the perspective of Said and Sen, there is a sense that to prevent cultural or religious inspired political violence, the only ways are either to stress the necessarily multiple nature of cultural-religious identities or to call for their 'privatisation'. What this argument, which as I have already mentioned holds a powerful academic status both because of the 'Westphal-ian' experience and a certain implicit bias of social sciences against cultural and religious traditions, overlooks is the theoretical and empirical point that is increasingly emerging from a number of recent strands of research according to which this kind of political violence is often characterised by doctrinally 'weak' and superficial religious or cultural identities as these are the most conducive substratum to violent politicisation by political entrepreneurs.[206]

With reference to religiously-inspired political violence, arguably the paradigmatic and most difficult test for the above-mentioned thesis, the protestant theologian Miroslav Volf, a Croatian immigrant to the US, who was personally confronted with this phenomenon first through the use of Christianity in the harrowing civil war in ex-Yugoslavia and then through the fundamentalist politics of his own American coreligionists, has effectively argued that the political violence legitimized by religion is normally the result of the politicisation of a "vague religiosity" conceived of as exclusively a private affairs of individuals or reduced to "cultural resources endowed with a diffuse aura of sacred".[207] In other words and contrary to the predominant view, religiously-inspired political violence would be characterized by a doctrinally 'weak' religious identities, that it, identities that are up-rooted and banalised and have often not been sustained by a process of generational transmission of tradition. On the contrary, doctrinally 'strong' religious identities would rather be more common in religious actors involved in processes of conflict-resolution and peace-making.[208]

In addition, as some contemporary research in the field of sociology of religion suggests with specific reference to the rise of Christian fundamentalism (although the same could apply to other

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[203] For Vico and Herder as precursors of 20th century historicism with its emphasis on organicistic and nationalist-prone view of culture, see *Said,* Orientalism, 118.

[204] See: *Amartya Sen,* Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2006).

[205] See respectevely: *Mary Kaldor,* New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), *Martin Van Creveld,* The Transformation of War (New York : Free Press, 1991) and *Huntington,* The Clash of Civilizations.

[206] For the mechanisms at work in the violent politicisation of religion see the two chapters by Carsten Bagge Lausten and Ole Wæver, "In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization" and Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Ritteberger, "Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict", in *Religion in International Relations,* 147-80 and 107-45.

[207] *Miroslav Volf,* "Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Justice: A Theological Contribution to a More Peaceful Social Enviroment" // *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (2000): 862 and 866.

[208] See: *R. Scott Appleby,* The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000) and *Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson,* eds., Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)

forms of religious extremism), there seems to be a correlation between the so-called individualisation and subjectivisation of belief, referred to as' light religion', and the rise of an assertive commmunitarianism manifesting the conservative moral positions and political orientations of a politically 'strong religion'.[209] This would reinforce the view that when cultural and religious identities are vague and stripped of a thick reference to an ongoing tradition, politicization provides a mechanism to supplement a 'light' cultural-religious tradition and consolidate the community of the (religious or secular) faithful around a small number of political 'hot issues', as the 'culture war' of the American domestic politics of the last decades seems to suggest, as well as the politicisation of religion in the nationalist construction of the Other in the Balkans of the 1990s has proved.[210]

Summing up, contrary to Said and Sen's normative rejection of 'civilization-based thinking' as politically dangerous and irresponsible, recent analyses seem to suggest the need, in a qualified sense, for 'more' religious and cultural traditions rather than less in order to oppose religiously-inspired political violence. As also Peter Berger has noted: "Contrary to currently fashionable assumptions, the difference between civilizations in not a threat in itself but rather a precondition to formulating identities that are characterised by a certain degree of stability".[211]

There is also a second point of tension between *Orientalism* and the idea of an active politics of civilizational dialogue and relates to Said's scepticism towards the theoretical possibility of a genuine dialogue given the omnipresence-of-power thesis implied by *Orientalism's* critical (Foucauldian) stance. Here rather than entering into a complex argument on the philosophical nature and political implications of the Foucauldian power/knowledge framework assumed by the thesis of *Orientalism,* I want to briefly point to Said's ambiguous and problematic reading of Louis Massignon (1883-1962) – the great French orientalist – as part of *Orientalism,* that is, of a discourse inextricably linked to the colonial enterprise. In contrast to Said, it seems to me that Massignon's work and life stand as a very concrete proof of the possibility of a real and productive dialogue of civilisations that can escape the yoke of the *Orientalist* accusation.

When one reads the pages of Orientalism devoted to Louis Massignon, one feels that the theoretical machinery of *Orientalism* is slipping. Leaving aside the specific assessment put forward by Said of Massignon's scholarship, something that would require a complete different direction of research, what the discussion reveals more broadly is this scepticism as to the theoretical possibility and (even political opportunity) of a dialogue of civilisation. For Massignon, the dialogical approach was the foundation of his scholarly and political engagement.[212] In a way that neatly resembles to the Gadamerian hermeneutics of dialogue as 'fusion of horizons' in the form of being able to 'stand in the other's shoes', Massignon argued that: "To understand something is not to annex it, it is to transfer by decentring oneself *(par decentrement)* to the heart of the other...the essence of language should be a kind of de-centring.

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[209] *Daniele Hervieu-Leger,* Le pelerin et le converti. La religion en mouvement (Paris: Flammarion, 1999) *and Jean-Pierre Bastian, Francoise Champion and Kathy Rousselet,* eds., La globalisation du religieux (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001). For an in-depth and comprehensive research project on religious fundamentalism with empirical studies on all the major religious traditions, see the five volumes by *Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby,* eds., The Fundamentalism Project, vols. 1-5 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991-1995).

[210] For the American 'culture war', see: *James Davidson Hunter,* "The American Culture War" // *The Limits of Social Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation in Pluralist Societies,* ed. Peter L. Berger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 1-37. For the role of religion and nationalism in the end of Yugoslavia, see: *David Campbell,* National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). Interestingly Campbell starts his analysis with the following quotation from a Bosnian woman, which reveals the 'light' nature of the religious-nationalist consciousness before the war started: "I am a Muslim", she told us, "but I didn't know that before the war. Before the war, of course, we were all atheists!", 1. For a enlightening discussion of how the issue of religion and culture interacts in the context of nationalist projects see: *Anthony D. Smith,* "The 'Sacred' Dimension of Nationalism", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29,* no. 3 (2000): 791-814.

[211] *Peter Berger,* 'Conclusion', *The Limits of Social Cohesion,* (1998), 372.

[212] See the collection of essays presented at UNESCO in 1992 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Massignon's death entitled *Louis Massignon et le dialogue des cultures* (Paris: Les Éditions du CERF, 1996). For the dialogical approach as a central dimension of Massignon's work see the chapters in the just-mentioned volume by Jacques Waardenburg, "L'approche dialogique de Louis Massignon", 177-200 and Herbert Mason, "Réflexion sur Louis Massignon et son legs du dialogue", 171-75.

We can make ourselves understood only by entering the system of the other".[213] This decentring implies for Massignon what he calls a "science of compassion" which is about living and sharing the sufferings and the aspirations for justice of the Other and it is based on what he has guarded as the main existential lesson from his encounter with Islam, "l'hospitalite sacree", the sacred hospitality towards the stranger and in particular the weak and the poor.[214]

For Said, who at times acknowledges and praises Massignon's tireless engagement in favour of Muslim civilisation, this sympathetic approach was nevertheless part of the problem and instrumental to that "summational attitude" which was ultimately about making a relatively uncomplicated statement about the Orient as a whole:[215] to the point that he could say that: "seen in such a way, Massignon is less mythologized 'genius' then he is a kind of system for producing certain kinds of statements, disseminated into the large mass of discursive formations that together make up the archive, or cultural material, of his time".[216] Here I cannot discuss in depth the reasons for this problematic reading of Massignon, but one element seems to me important to outline: Massignon was indeed committed to the search of the originality and authenticity of civilisational, cultural and religious phenomenologies as he believed that the fact that world civilisations were the product of borrowings and encounters, what he even called syncretism, did not imply the lack of a 'fundamental originality', which was actually discern-able in the way those borrowed and exchanged elements had been ordered and organised.[217]

Such an idea of a 'fundamental originality' is unquestionably a form of essentialism too far away from Said's intellectual references. Such a search, however, was for Massignon an important dimension of his scholarly engagement and actually an integral part of that journey between Self and Other leading to discovery of that deeper 'unity in diversity'. And how it could have been otherwise for that young adult atheist who had been converted to his original faith, Christianity, through the encounter with Islam? To that man to whom, as he would use to narrate in his old age, God spoke first of all in Arabic? In a sketchy and evocative way, the deep anchorage of Massignon into his Catholic faith and his cultural community of destiny, France, was never an obstacle to reaching a higher level of universality but was rather the necessary pre-condition for

any transgressive creative journey, as was the case of his elaboration of a theology of Abramithic religions whose impact on the recent history of Christianity and Muslim-Christian relationships has already been very significant and whose daring intellectual insights and *elan* are still far from having exhausted their potential.[218] But these were the arguments of someone who has also been described as a mystic and arguably resonated at a different (but not incompatible) level to Said's secular humanism.

Returning to the present times, the tension between Massignon and Said, and therefore, between dialogue of civilisations and the critique of *Orietnalism* is also interestingly mirrored in the different replies the two authors developed against the thesis of a coming clash of cultures. Writing in the aftermath of 9/11, Said concluded his excellent critical essay entitled "The Clash of Ignorance" with the following words:

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[213] *Louis Massignon,* "L'involution sémantique dans les cultures sémitiques", *Opera Minora,* vol. II, (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1969): 631.

[214] See the collection of unpublished texts (including his important correspondence with Mary Kahil) by Louis Massignon, *L'hospitalité sacrée,* ed. Jacques Keryell (Paris: Nouvelle cite, 1987). See also Jacques Berque, "Une réponse de Louis Massignon sur PIslam", in *Louis Massignon et le dialogue des cultures,* 19-31.

[215] *Said,* Orientalism, 255.

[216] Ibid., 274.

[217] *Louis Massignon,* "Interpretation de la civilisation arabe dans la culture francaise", *Opera Minora,* vol. I, 187-202.

[218] Here I would like to mention those hugely erudite and amazing texts known as 'The Three Prayers of Abraham' that Massignon revised throughout all his life, from his return to Christianity in 1908 to his death in 1962, but which were only fully published a few years ago thanks to the editorial work of his son Daniel Massignon, see Louis Massignon, *Les trois prieres d'Abraham* (Paris: Les Editions du CERF, 1997). Overall, I believe that the life and intellectual contribution of Louis Massignon deserve a more in-depth analysis in the context of the idea and theory of dialogue of civilisations.

These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice, than to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed analysis.[219]

Fifty years before, in 1952, Massignon had written an essay for *Politique Etrangere,* the reference review for the French foreign policy community, which has surprisingly been recently republished in 2006 on the occasion of the 70th anniversary issue of this journal. As the title of this essay written at the time of the decolonisation struggle – "L'Occident devant l'Orient: Primaute d'une solution culturelle" -[220] makes clear beyond all doubt, in front of a potential clash between the European and the Muslim worlds, for Massignon the priority and primacy should be given to a cultural solution, "a solution of justice possible by means of exemplary names and maxims of wisdom; which the instincts of masses understand".[221] In other words and contrary to Said's argument mentioned above, we need not escape into a realm of entirely universal maxims but rather excavate even more profoundly into the fundamental originality of our different cultures, trough a sympathetic dialogue, to find that justice which, whether in the colonial era or in the post-colonial predicament, can deeply resonate as authentic and true justice in the peoples' collective psychologies. Therefore, in 'diverging agreement', Massignon and Said oppose the 'Orientalist mindset' which nowadays risks leading to a dangerous 'clash of ignorance', but as far as the political discourse of dialogue of civilisations, the solution is still within the cultural horizons, in what Massignon envisaged as a dia-logical 'unity in diversity', which is first of all respectful of a true cultural pluralism.

V. F. Petrenko[222]
SPIRITUAL PSYCHO EXPERIENCE IN THE CREATION OF TOLERANCE AND NON-VIOLENCE ATMOSPHERE[223]

There is a good saying: «A good beginning makes a good ending». The trueness of this opinion is vividly shown by the fact, that the Likhachev Readings, dedicated to a great Russian humanist, were held for the tenth time and for the tenth time they gathered the elite of Russian liberal intelligentsia (well-educated middle class), men of art, writers, stage managers, poets. As Soren Kirkegaard once wrote, «You cannot learn the Truth, you can live within it». The tragic biography of Dmitriy Sergeevich Likhachev, his life and work speak about the principles he was sticking to. We should also thank the rector of the University A. Zapesotskiy and a vice-rector and a professor L. Sankin, who every year provided excellent conditions for this intelligentsia forum in Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences. Let us wish a favour wind to this undertaking.

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[219] *Said,* "The Clash of Ignorance", 3.

[220] *Louis Massignon,* "L'Occident devant l'Orient: Primaute d'une solution culturelle (1952)", *Politique Etrangere,* no.4 (2006): 1033-38.

[221] Ibid., 1038, my translation.

[222] Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Laboratory for psychology of communication and psychosemantics at the Psychology Department of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Psychology), professor. Mr Petrenko is the author of over 240 scholarly publications, including monographs: *Vvedeniye* v *experimental 'nuyu psihologiyu: issledovaniye form reprezentatsiyi* v *obydennom soznaniyi* [Introduction to Experimental Psychology: Studies of Representation Forms in Everyday Consciousness], *Psihosemantika soznaniya* [Psychosem antics of Consciousness], *Lektsiyi po psihosemantike* [Lectures on Psychosemantics], *Psihosemanticheskiy analiz dinamiki obschestvennogo soznaniya (na materiale politicheskogo mentaliteta)* [Psychosemantic Analysis of the Dynamics of Social Consciousness (on data of political mentality)], *Osnovy psihosemantiki* [Elements of Psychosemantics]. A member of editorial boards of journals: *Psihologicheskiy zhumal* [Psychological Journal], *Psihologiya* [Psychology], *Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost* [Social Sciences and the Modernity], *Istoricheskaya psihologiya* [Historical Psychology], *Moskovskiy Psihoterapevticheskiy zhumal* [Moscow Journal of Psychotherapy], *Metodologiya i istoriya psihologiyi* [Methodology and History of Psychology].

Many participants of the Forum in their reports draw an idea about the necessity of a dialogue between different cultures, of tolerance and liberality to other cultures. Hereby we can recollect the idea by W. R. Ashby about the value of diversity for the existence of complex systems, and human civilization is an example of this. But such appeals, not opera-tionalised, not supported with particular rules and algorithms, helping to implement these true statements, may stay nothing but the appeals: «Guys, let's get along» in the vein of the cat Leopold from a popular, not politically correct cartoon.

Even here a work of a psychologist, a politician, a lawyer is useful. A psychologist works with a human conscience, a worldview of a man. Social identity researches by H. Tajfel and J. Turner have already become the classics; they showed that a simple categorisation and labelling of schoolchildren as Group A and group B and assignment of certain symbols and attributes to either group led to competitiveness and intergroup discrimination («We're the best, let's show those weenies from group A or B, who rules here»). It is totally like group fights «village vs. village», «district vs. district)) in a relatively near past, or outrage of football fans at present.

The roots of «A friend is always right)) principle lie deep in history and pragmatics. When I was a student, I got shocked, when learnt that a blood feud was the initial form of law, that provided relative security to the tribesmen, as the power of a tribe guaranteed so-called intercommunal (intergroup) interests of its members. An outsider, who did not belong to any tribe, appeared to be out of law. Only after the principle «a guest is a messenger of God» was delivered by the Old Testament, and mountain-dwellers framed xenial customs that told to defend a foreigner, who entered your house, – only after that the cultures that accepted those rules, won a competitive advantage in their development due to cross-cultural communication, change and adoption of others' experience. It should be noted by the way, that the principle of personal responsibility for committed actions, common for a free democratic society, sometimes seems inadequate in the sense of jurisdiction in traditionary societies, where a solution (e.g., genocide or terrorist act commitment) is subject to a wish of a headman, a chief, a tribe leader, who shall share responsibility with executors.

But let us go back to the work of psychologists on the change of categorization forms and, as a consequence, of a man's worldview. A famous Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, in particular, studied egocentrism phenomenon. Thus, if we ask small children to sit around a model of a house and to choose among a variety of photos of this model the one that corresponds to a child's view position, children cope with the task easily. But if we ask a child to chose a photo, corresponding to the view of a model, seen by a child, sitting opposite, he/she will experience difficulty in doing the task and will show the photo, corresponding to his aspect of view. This means that he is not able to view a situation from other's position. A similar egocentrism phenomenon children show in logical judgements: «Pete, do you have a brother?)) – «Yes, I have brother Vov-ka» – «And does Vovka have a brother?)) – «No, he doesn't.» This means that a child shows egocentrism of his own position in asymmetry of logical relations between himself and another person.

Asymmetry of relations is fixed in language as well: «He's our reconnaissance officer, but their spy». A similar ethnocen-trism phenomenon I saw while studying TV link-ups with foreign countries (V. Petrenko, 1997) that native television was enthusiastic about in the early days of perestroika. Thus, Russian lookers-in were rather critical about the image of «a typical Japanese)), but while evaluating «the image of a typical Russian from the Japanese point of view» they were sure that the Russian are adored. The Soviet agitation system was successful in the myth-formation about a special love to the USSR of «common people» in capitalistic world. A similar ethnocen-trism phenomenon was achieved during the study of family and household stereotypes of Russian and Azerbaijan girls (V. Petrenko, 2005).

In semantic space of Russian girls the Russians' behaviour was not alike anybody else's, while Azerbaijan girls were close to Georgian, Uzbekistan, Armenian girls. In semantic space of Azerbaijan girls Azerbaijan girls themselves possessed unique features, while the Russians in their opinion behaved similar to Ukrainian and Baltic girls. This means that in the zone of«self» differentiating percipiency (cognitive complexity of consciousness) is very high, while in periphery details are hardly differentiated and a scale of «cognitive тар» is too small.

Ego- and ethnocentrism phenomena result in «intergroup discrimination)) phenomenon, parallelisms, prejudices in the estimate of other people's behaviour. Carl Rogers developed psychological trainings on centrism relieving and increasing of cognitive complexity of consciousness, aimed at settlement of conflicts. During group trainings participants of a therapeutic group or a personal growth group learnt to take another's place. For example, during family therapy a father can play the role of a child, a mother – the role of a father, a child – the role of a mother. Taking another person's position, role playing in the situations, where it is necessary to understand another person's feelings and view, or even reconstruction of his point of view and its estimation by the third person, – all these actions widen consciousness and decreases prejudices in personal position.

Beside fair psychotherapeutical work he tried out a group training by Carl Rogers for reconciliation of Caucasians and Afro-Americans. The culture of training groups, personal growth groups, encounter groups, sensitivity trainings and other group training techniques was spread widely around the world and in our country. In some native and foreign publications there appeared a term «psychological society», that is the final point of the society evolution through acquisition of psychological experience.

Other psychological aspects of tolerance propagation that lay within the culture are also connected with categorisation mechanism. Language, semiotic systems, categorizing human relationships, may both separate through the contradiction between «Them» and «Us» (as Sartre wrote, «The hell is oth-ers»), and unfte into consolidated «Us» on a higher level of categorisation. For example, in the Medieval Arab world there used to be a notion «people of the Воок», who for the Muslims meant both the Jews and the Christian, and that fact provided tolerance to the representatives of those confessions. Christian crusaders, having conquered Jerusalem, with pride noted in historical chronicles, that «blood was flowing like water». In my opinion, modern ecumenism is a form of consolidation of various confessions into a communion of a higher level (There is one God, but people of different nations worship Him in different ways).

It should be noted that consolidation on a more generalised categorisation level does not reject differences on concrete, particular levels that may represent higher levels in the system hierarchy. Indeed, generalisation removes differentiating aspects that may be a core of a doctrine. According to Se-dov-Nazaretyan law (A. Nazaretyan, 2008) development of a complex system on higher levels involves standardisation, unification, while on lower levels – variety limitation. Thus, cell organisation of life forms from Infusoria to the Mammals has similar structure, consisting of a core, a membrane, mitochondria, etc.

Nature that during evolution process created tan optimal basic cell structure, further reproduced it in a wide variety of life forms. Standardisation on a basic level leads to a possibility of progressive evolution and diversity on higher levels (in our example on the level of an organism). In human tech-nogenic civilisation this law operates as well. For example, in the early days of electro stations emergence each of them generated current flow of peculiar frequency values. Standardisation in this sphere made it possible to unite a network of electro station into the united power supply system that satisfied the needs of developing industry and population.

Sedov-Nazaretyan law operates in the field of human mentality and in spiritual sphere. (Put simply, when we observe the rale to cross the street during the green signal of traffic lights, we save mental energy to solve more difficult tasks.) When Axial Age started (a term by Karl Jaspers) – the age, when main world religions appeared (Hinduism, Buddhism and Dao-ism in the Far East, Zoroastrianism and Judaism, and further Christianity and Islam in the Middle East), in different regions of the Earth, in different cultures there appeared similar ethic imperatives: «thou shalt do no murder», «thou shalt not bear false witness», that in general was formulated in the Old Testament «do as you would be done by». Kant's categorical imperative actually is a paraphrase of this principle. This means that humankind developed unified basic principles that make ethic ground for civilisations, and provided a variety of cultures and religious experience, basing on this ground. Violation of these basic ethic principles leads to backslide both from God and Human culture.

A form of spiritual training, removing common stereotypes and imprints that impose an image of an enemy, «a hostile al-ien», is a meditation. Though ingoing into the altered state of

consciousness is an attribute of almost all religions, conscious and motivated activity to enter a trance state through meditation, through «retreat» (form of solitude aimed at spiritual train-ing, basically close to orthodox hermitary), breathing training and asanas of the Yoga, is inherent to Hindu religions: Brah-manism, Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism, for sure. The latter has a variety of branches: Hinayana, Mahayana, Vajrayana, that, in their turn, are divided into schools of Kagyu, Nyingma, Dzogchen, Sakya and Gelug (Dalay Lama belonged to it).

The main difference of Hinayana (lit. «the low vehicle)) in Sanskrit) from Mahayana (lit. «Great Vehicle)) in Sanskrit) is that the final aim of Hinayana is achievement of Arahant, a state of personal liberation-enlightenment, and achievement of Nirvana, that breaks the bondage of samsara and stops the chain of Karmic rebirths. «He whose inflowing thoughts are dried up, who is unattached to food, whose dwelling place is an empty and imageless release – the way of such a person is hard to follow, like the path of birds through the sky. When a man's senses have come to peace, like a horse well broken by the trainer, when he is rid of conceit and without inflowing thoughts – even devas envy such a well set man", – this is the way the Great Book of Buddhism Dhammapada characterizes Arahant.

Hinayana doctrine (18 schools) is often called Theravada, that in Pali literally means «The Teaching of the Elders», and its canon of scriptures contains, in particular, the Tripitaka (lit. «three baskets))). Theravada is closer to the Southern place of Buddhism origin, and Mahayana – to the Northern and the Far Eastern.

The aim of Mahayana is achievement of Bodhisattva state (bodhi – enlightened, sattva – existence, or enlightened existence), i.e. the state of a being, who generated enlightenment, but who did not reach Nirvana for the benefit of all living beings and to bring this dharma to people. In this aspect Mahayana is close to Christianity due to the position of love and beneficence. But there are vital differences. Christianity underlines that «faith is dead without deeds», and it requires, beside prayer, penance, abstinence and other things to do by a believer, active deeds in a society, help to afflicted and helpless, and participation in charity.

Buddhism does not hold such an active position in a society, and puts an emphasis on the lineage (i.e. the enlightenment) and on mental meditation. Buddhism does not support the dualism idea (opposition between the material world and the world of ideas), coming from Platonists and the Old Testament, that is why a thought is considered to be as active, as a deed. That is why, for example, a meditative technique of ((collection and feedback)) (See: Elo Rinpoche, 2006), when a meditative collects inwards others' sufferings and grieves in a form of a black light, and gives back positive energy to the afflicted in a form of a gold shining, – is a really working spiritual training of har-monisation of the world.

Both Theravada texts and Mahayana texts contain a detailed description of meditative methods, that can be divided into two main branches (see: Bhikku Khantipallo, 2005):

1) Samadhi – a way of stillness and tranquillity;

2) Vipassana (or vipasyana) a way of insight and sensible wisdom, transcendental analysis and intuitive observation.

Samadhi is achieved through concentrated meditation and stillness of mind, as verbal associations and thoughts («stream of consciousness)) – according to James, 1993) are stopped. Shraddhotpada Shastra gives the following description of meditation: "Should there be a man who desires to practice "cessation", he should stay in a quiet place and sit erect in an even temper. His attention should be focused neither on breathing nor on any form or colour, nor on empty space, earth, water, fire, wind, nor even on what has been seen, heard, remembered, or conceived. All thoughts, as soon as they are conjured up, are to be discarded, and even the thought of discarding them is to be put away..." (http://www.buddhistische-gesellschaft-berlin.de/downloads/theawakeningoffaith.pdf, The Practice of Cessation).

Other techniques of thoughts cessation are related to narrowing of consciousness field, its fixation not on notions, but on direct perception. For example, days-long practice of concentration on walking, including continuous recognition of each movement, or concentration on the breathing process results in the narrowing of consciousness field, and then to its alteration.

E. H. Shattock, who came through a 3-week practice of meditation (satipatthana) as mind guidance, that was developed on the basis of ancient practices by talapoin Mahasi Say-adaw in

Saasana Iita in Rangun (Burma), gives the following description of a continuous mind concentration during the full course: «Buring a walk you shall concentrate on movements of either foot, while they rise up, move forward, go down on the floor or on the ground; each of these movements should have been followed by mental repetition of words «up», «down», «forward», or «rise»... During each step you should not allow yourself to distract from the movements. Every time you pass the needed distance, you should switch your attention to stop, turn and start walking again... Every time the mind distracts from the object, and the attention is attracted to something external, you should note the fact in your mind and slowly, but steadily turn it back to the object of observation... Soon my life appeared to be directed by a routine – walking, sitting, walking again. And that process led to the thing, that was to happen – the outside world began to retire from my conscious-ness» (E.H. Shattock, 1994).

Shattock writes that the aim of a Buddhist, taking a course of satipatthana, is acquisition of vipasana, or insight. Only when the mind is soothed, insight or intuition can get access to the experience, laying in the roots of Buddhist doctrine. The experience appears spontaneously in the consciousness as visual images or authentic stories, bearing resemblance with parables.

In hypnotic sessions (that are much shorter), when a patient's concentration level is lowered by a suggestor, fixation on arms heaviness, on a body restraint and its further «dissolu-tion» in the space is practised. Concentration leads to the cession of consciousness stream and the patient, as a rule, perceives homogenous area of one colour, that varies due to the patient's emotional state.

Orthodox Hesychasm practice (See: Horuzhiy S. S., 2005) uses, actually, meditation practice of cessation: «Those who wish to be owned by oneself and to become a true religioner of an inside man, should put the mind inside the body and keep it there... As those being in great trouble of soul not for long, have a bounding mind, and they have to take it back again, but it still escapes from beginners, who do not know that there is nothing more uncatchable than their own mind, – that is why some people advise to follow attentively every breathing in and out and to hold breath for a bit, and with this the mind is held either, until he have reached the highest step with God and have made his mind non-skipping and non-floating, and after that he will learn how to concentrate in «united convolution)) (G. Palama, 2005, p. 47). After «a supreme ascension we join with inexpressible)), – Palama quotes Dionisiy Areopagit. Concentration on the heart of a prayer arouses a stream of a bright white light, that is interpreted by hesychasts as emanation of celestial energy (Favour light).

At the background of colour space or light stream perception a meditating person can experience spontaneous feelings of moving through energetic flows, trips to unusual, hard to describe worlds, etc. In hypnotic sessions there can be randomly appearing scenes from a personal past, images of great places, experience of self as a freely flying bird, or a powerful animal, or a raindrop, sparkling in the sun.

In Vedic Brahmanism, that gave rise and then was opposed to Buddhism, there is a notion of Atman – a kind of a «divine spark», that is inside any being, and that further returns into

the Space Absolute Ocean (Brahmana). In Buddhism Anatman principle denies the existence of «self», underlines delusiveness of this experience.

In our opinion, statements of Buddhists, in particular, Buddhists of Yogachara and Madhyamaka schools (See: E. Torchi-nov, 2005), are close to the modern constructivism (J. Kelly, J. Gergen, V. Petrenko, R. Harre). Thus, R. Harre calls psychologists to stop their efforts to study the process of searching of Ego as an object of research and to switch to the constructing of Ego. In constructivist approach of J. Kelly human consciousness is viewed like a work of a scientist, who constructs the models of the world, of himself, of other people. «Person-ality», or «Ego» are considered to be cognitive constructions, «self-concepts», constructed by our consciousness to knit up a personal experience and integrate the events that the consciousness is aware of.

Buddhists express similar ideas of «поп-substantiality», delusiveness of «self» in a more metaphorically. «It is like when a mountain path got blocked by stones and ground; and to get to the top somebody cleans and levels the path, until he manages to climb to the top and achieve a full outlook. The factors of enlightenment can be compared with the cleaning and levelling of

such path. The only difference is that when you get a full outlook, you understand that there is nobody on the top!» (Bhikku Khantipallo, 2005, p. 79).

An idea of delusiveness of «Ego» has a great psychothera-peutical effect. In psychoanalysis an effect of repression can be relieved by its understanding and recognition, or, as S. Freud wrote: «You should place Ego in the place of It». Thus, through recognition and, with it, through generalisation (as consciousness is based on human culture) will erase the effect of a unique character of a psycho trauma («This can happen to anyone»)). «There's no fence against ill fortune)), – a Russian proverb says. Single is merged by Universal.

Buddhism in Anatman (Sanskrit) or Anatta (Pali) concept outsteps psychoanalysis, removing the effect of suffering due to the absence of a recipient. «Ego» as a temporary ephemeral combination of dharmas (elements of consciousness) does not bear the pain of the past. Recognition of Ego delusiveness removes the problem of personal suffering, replacing it with sympathy to all beings: people, animals, gods, spirits, etc. The place of Ego in Buddhism is taken by the Universal Self (the unity of all living beings).

In Buddhist spiritual practice there is meditation on scary and dangerous situations: e.g., meditation on death, meditation on corps (See: Thera Nyanaponika, 1994), that is connected to the cultivation of non-affection to a body (chod practice – fear excision) and recognition of the Self delusiveness (anatman principle), and in psychotherapeutic practice – activation of self-protection instinct and of immune system work. «A feeling of heaviness in a body is impressed, you have no ability to move, as if you were sucked in by a greasy malodorous morass. Boggy slush squeezes your body stronger and stronger. Bubbles of marsh gas are slipping over your body. Leeches bite into your skin. Residues of rotting plants and decaying relics of animals get into your mouth». After the experience of death agony there appears a feeling of a decaying corps. The body seems to be dissolving in the marsh. As the body dissolves and disappears (Buddhists consider this experience to be equal to the loss of the Self) a person is freed from the fear of death.

The Self, that lost its physical shell, gets into a wider and richer image (space): «The elements of a body scheme (a shell of the Self) are movements of air streams, sunlight streams, water and forest stretches. Life in all of its aspects. You can see a wood side on the edge of the marsh, covered with bright leaves. Bright sunlight. Snow-white clouds are floating in the sky. You can hear birds' songs. Everything is full with sounds and colours. Everything is full with the movement of life» (V. Petrenko, V. Kucherenko, 2008).

Meditation practice leads to the change in the Self-categorisation as a unique, but dying Ego, and unity of the Self (anat-man) with all the humankind, living beings, to the removal of duality between the world and the Self. «We» category (actually, meditation, achieving Nirvana, removes any categorisation) is very wide and fills a meditating person with a feeling of integration, love and acceptance. There is no diversification, no contraposition. In this aspect meditation practice, whether it be Buddhist Samadhi or Vipasana, orthodox Hesychasm or dynamic meditation like Zikr dance in Sufism, is a powerful psychotherapeutical tool against strives and hatred, aggressiveness, narrow-minded nationalism and intolerance.

But still a social w«rld is not the Kingdom of God on the Earth, and a merely psychological spiritual work on removal of conflicts and hostility between different cultures and states shall be supported by elaboration of political, legal, moral forms of interaction between cultures and people. But this is quite another topic for conversation, so let us give the floor to our colleagues of other specialities, who sent to the Xth Likhachev Readings articles, containing deep and interesting thoughts.

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E. I. Pivovar[224]

THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE AND THE RUSSIAN WORLD AS FACTORS OF SOCIO-CULTURAL DIALOGUE IN THE POST-SOVIET AREA

The term 'the post-Soviet area' constantly used after the collapse of the Soviet Union both by scholars and by mass media has become of less frequent use over the last years. Year by year this region is becoming more and more heterogeneous, but at the same time a very important aspect consists in the necessity to understand what connects and unites the countries on the post-Soviet area.

The Russian world for our country is undoubtedly the integration factor in the countries on the territory of which Russian-speaking citizens live. In the first place it concerns the states whose independence resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union. For the last centuries the Russian science and culture have served as real conductors of the world social experience and scientific and technical achievements for the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and for other nations and nationalities which inhabited the USSR.[225] Today the Russian Diaspora is one of the most

[224] Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, President of the Russian State University for the Humanities, Head of Department of History of Former Soviet Republics and History Department, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor. Author of over 200 scientific works, including: *Sovetskiye rabochiye i NTR. Po materialam avtomobil 'noy promyshlertnosti SSSR* [Soviet Workers and Scientific and Technical Revolution. On the Material of Automobile Industry in the USSR], *Nashe Otechestvo. Opyt politicheskoy istoriyi* [Our Fatherland: An Attempt of Political History], *Materialy po istoriyi dissidentskogo i pravozaschitnogo dvizheniya* [Materials on History of Dissident and Human Rights Movement], *SSSR i holodnaya voyna* [The USSR and Cold War], *Rossiya v izgnaniyi. Sud'by rossiyskib emigrantov za rubezhom* [Russia in Exile. Fates of Russian Emigrants Abroad], *Teoreticheskiye problemy istoricheskih issledovartiy* (Vyp. 1-5) [Theoretical Issues of Historical Research. Issues 1-5], *Rossiyskoye zarubezhye: social'no-istoricheskiy fenomen, rol' I mesto v kul'tumo-istoricheskom naslediyi* [The Russian Diaspora: Socio-Historical Phenomenon, Role and Place in the Cultural-Historical Heritage], *Postsovetskoye prostranstvo: al'ternativy integratsiyi* [The Post-Soviet Area: Alternatives of Integration], and others. Member of editorial boards of the journals: *Vestnik arhivista* [Archivist's Reports], *Rodina* [Fatherland]. Mr Pivovar is a member of the board of the Russian Union of Rectors. Member of the Presidium of the Board of Rectors of state universities of Moscow and Moscow region.
[225] *Pivovar E. I.* Postsoventskoye prostranstvo: altemativy integratsiyi. St. Petersburg, 2010. p.147. [The former Soviet Union: alternatives of integration].

important factors of the world civilization being a model of cross-cultural interaction. For almost a century and a half it has been the subject of research for culture historians, political scientists, sociologists and economists from many countries. The study of the phenomenon of the Russian Diaspora is a core element of research both into Russia itself and the countries whose history, culture and social development were greatly influenced by it. Without understanding the importance of the Russian world globally it seems impossible not only to form an objective view upon the historical process but also to comprehend the modern socio-cultural processes and predict their development.

This range of problems has gradually become an important area of focus for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation which is becoming more and more topical every year. At that, the cooperation with the Russian Diaspora is not only a development element of our country's culture, but, taking into account the potential of the Russian world, it is able to make a considerable positive impact on the development of science and education, technology, economy and business.

On the level of state politics of the Russian Federation interaction with the Diaspora and protection of compatriots' rights is postulated to be one of the priorities of the state, and this approach is imposed by the very strategy of our country's further development. Such an approach to the range of problems of the Russian Diaspora is well-grounded, as the synthesis of cultural background can make the culture of any nation more multi-faceted.

At the beginning of the 21st century the Russian Diaspora in the world exceeded 25 million people and in terms of number it is second to the Chinese Diaspora only. At that, the modern Russian world is of heterogeneous character. This phenomenon is much wider and more complex than the notion of emigration. In the 1990s due to the collapse of the USSR the Russian-speaking inhabitants in the former Soviet republics became a Diaspora. 'The new abroad countries' appeared to be a very complicated and important additional element of the process of Russia's search for the course of inter-state relations, adequate to the existing political realities, maintenance of authority on the international scene, ways of providing domestic stability.

A radically^iew image of the Russian world stimulates the search for new theoretical and practical approaches to its evaluation and perception. In practice, when speaking about the Russian world, we usually mean its part that exists beyond the geographic borders of Russia and coincides with the traditional concepts of the Russian Diaspora and foreign Russia. At the same time the idea of comprehension of a more culturally and politically complicated phenomenon than the conglomerate of the Russian Diasporas scattered all over the world.

The term 'the Russian world' is apparent to imply a multiple-aspect socio-cultural phenomenon uniting Russia proper and the civilizational field connected with it. The Russian Diaspora is a unique object in the development of which we can see the specifics of interrelations between the phenomena of language, culture and ethnos. The dual identity and sometimes even more complex models of self-identification are established as one of the main characteristics of the modern Russian Diaspora.

The notion of the Russian world has recently become a part of domestic and foreign politics of the Russian Federation as it allows uniting in a single complex all those development problems which are connected with migration streams of all directions. At the same time the transnational global migration, having become a global process, also makes an impact on the Russian Diaspora, forming the new socio-cultural political and legal requirements addressed to the world community and to Russia.

All this is proof of the fact that the Russian world with its complex evolution can be viewed as a part of the global historical process. It constitutes a phenomenon having not only the past but also the future. The activization of the role of the state in terms of the development of contacts with the Russian world in all spheres and of its study as a unique phenomenon ensures that the role of the Russian world in history, culture and socio-political life of our country and of other countries where live Russians and all those interested in Russia, will steadily grow.

A special place in the full-fledged introduction to cultural, spiritual, moral, intellectual values and traditions belongs to the language. The Russian language was and still is one of the world languages. According to the estimated record for the number of people who speak it (500 million people including 300 million people abroad) it is one of the most wide-spread languages in the

world. It is an official or a working language in most leading international organizations (the UN, the IAEA, the UNESCO, the WHO and others).

However, at the end of the previous century worrying tendencies concerning functioning of the Russian language as a world language resulted from different reasons and became apparent in a number of countries and regions. The Russian language experienced the most difficult situation on the territories of the former USSR. It still plays the role of a language of international communication there, but as a result of the adoption of the languages of titular nations as the only state languages the Russian language was gradually being supplanted from socio-political and economic life, from the sphere of culture and mass media.

During the Soviet Union period Russian as the basic language was spoken by 286 million people, it was well known by almost all inhabitants of the Union republics, and learning it was obligatory for all schoolchildren. Today the population of the 14 former republics of the USSR numbers over 140 million people (the population equal in number to the population size of Russia), however Russian is actively used there (constantly used at work, in the process of learning, in everyday life), according to experts' estimates, only by 63.6 million people, and 39.5 million people know Russian passively (to a certain extent understand it but do not use is as a means of communication and are gradually losing their skills of using the language), and almost 38 million people do not know the Russian language any longer.[226]

It can be clearly demonstrated by the example of the Ukraine where the share of population speaking Russian has invariably been declining. In the first turn it is caused by the state policy in the sphere of education at all levels and the mass media where the Ukrainian language has gradually become the dominating one though it has not yet completely supplanted the Russian language which still stands its ground.[227] In the mid-and late 2000s the decline of the share of the Russian-speaking secondary education including the decrease in the number of schools teaching in Russian continued. Also the steady decrease in the number of those taught in Russian in higher educational establishments in the Ukraine has become apparent in the recent years (20 per cent in 20040-5 academic year, and 17 per cent in 1006-7 academic year).[228] The contraction of the Russian language sphere of use also concerns everyday sphere and the sphere of mass communication.[229]

As a result of the conducted policy in the majority of new independent states there can be seen a considerable decrease in the number of Russian schools, centres of the Russian language and culture, Russian-speaking mass media including printed ones, which corresponds to the legal status of the Russian language in these countries. Unlike Russia's legislation, in the legislation of the new independent states there is often no normative system regulating the legal status of languages and the status of the state language. In the countries where the law contains certain regulations about the status of the Russian language the interpretation of these norms is of discrepant and ambiguous nature.[230] Another worrying tendency concerning the functioning of the Russian language in the former Soviet Union is the dismantlement of the system of education in Russian, which has been realized recently with different degrees of intensity. At the same time we cannot but remark that in most countries-members of the CIS there is an urge towards renewing education links with Russia, towards solving problems of mutual recognition of documents of qualifications, setting up branches of Russian higher educational establishments where students are taught in Russian. At the same time the Russian language is being rehabilitated in the former Soviet Union.[231] Steps are being taken to form a single (shared)

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[226] Skolko ludei govoryat i budut govoritpo-russki. DemoskopNo. 251-252, 2006. [The number of people who speak and will speak Russian].

[227] Russkiy yazyk v novyh nezavisimyh gosudarstvah. Moscow, 2008, pp. 89-96. [The Russian language in new independent states].

[228] Ibid. pp. 94-95.

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[231] *Nikonov V.* Russkiye sobirayutsya. Izvestiya. 28.05.2008. [The Russians are gathering].

education area. On that score a number of certain agreements have been signed. Besides those agreements on international level there are conventions on regional and inter-academic level such as documents about setting up consortiums of near-border higher educational establishments, about student and academic exchange, about cooperation in the sphere of distant education and in the sphere of science.

Permanent contacts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia with a number of establishments, institutions and public organizations (the Ministry of Education of Russia, the Ministry of Culture of Russia, the Press Ministry of Russia, the Rus-InterCenter under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Russian Language Development Centre, Pushkin State Institute for the Russian Language, the International Association of Teachers of the Russian Language and Literature, the Russian Association of Teachers of the Russian Language and Literature and some others) contribute to the increase of the effectiveness of the steps taken to promote the Russian language. They serve the cause of coordination of actions in this sphere and of the maximum use of the funds allocated to this task; they also promote the studies of the Russian world as a socio-cultural phenomenon.[232]

Owing to the reactivation of the Russian Language Council under the Government of the Russian Federation which took place in 2002 and to its active work there has recently been formed a certain system of spread and support of the Russian language in foreign countries. The confirmation of the Federal Target Programme "The Russian Language' has become an important step in this direction.

A vast experience in supporting the Russian language has been gained by Russian foreign establishments. The Ruslnter-Center has a network of permanent Russian language courses abroad. A good account is given of the Russian Association of Teachers of the Russian Language and Literature established in 1998 and of the Russian Language Development Centre established in 1999, which has held a number of large-scale international events at a high organizational and professional level; those events evoked a wide public response.

The development of socio-cultural cooperation between the post-Soviet countries is promoted by conducting meetings and forums of representatives of academic elites of these states. The interaction in the sphere of literature and book publishing has become more active of late; they are noted to aspire to reconstructing cultural and literature affiliations.

The starting point of moving the range of problems of the Russian world as an element of foreign policy of Russia to a qualitatively new level was setting up 'The Russian World' Foundation under the decree by President of the RF V. Putin on the 21st of June 2007. Among the founders of the Foundation were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF, the Ministry of Education and Science of the RF; the Foundation's board of directors which is its executive body is appointed by President of the Russian Federation. Among the main tasks which the 'Russian World' Foundation faces are: support of public, academic, educational organizations which deal with the range of problems connected with the Russian world and financing their field-oriented projects, supporting Russian and foreign centres of Russian studies, forming good public opinion about Russia abroad, interacting with Diasporas, advancing export of Russian educational services, supporting associations of graduates from Russian higher educational establishments, supporting Russian-speaking mass media outside our country, etc.

The realization of these goals can be a success only in case of clear awareness of the fact that the Russian world is not only a notion which characterizes ethnic Russians who live abroad, but a much broader concept including, for instance, foreign citizens who are interested in Russian history and culture, who know or speak Russian, a concept determining a whole multi-confessional, multiethnic layer to some extent united by their involvement in the destinies of Russia. In its work the Foundation bases upon the broadest understanding of the Russian world as a phenomenon that comprises all those who are interested in Russia. There is no doubt that such a concept allows getting new tools for cooperation with the rest of the world on the whole.

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[232] The report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 'Russkiy yazyk v mire'. Moscow, 2003. [The Russian language in the world].

A serious step in the direction of organizing work with compatriots on a new basis became the establishment of International Council of Russian Compatriots, members of which are organizations from dozens of countries in the world. The main goal of the council is to render assistance to the Russian Diaspora and the Russian language abroad through promoting the union and coordinating the work of public associations of compatriots.

In many countries of the world there are councils of Russian compatriots. A considerable place in the cultural work of Russian-speaking Diasporas is occupied by the propagation of the Russian language, literature and traditions among the children and the youth.

The decrease in the use of Russian as a language of international communication leads to intercultural dissociation of the peoples of Russia and of other countries-members of the CIS. In this respect the aim-oriented efforts to support the Russian-speaking space, the propaganda of the Russian culture are the priority aspects of the activity of field-oriented bodies of state authorities and of public organizations of humanitarian character.

At present, on the whole, in the post-Soviet area there is a process of reduction of the frequency of use of the Russian language in the sphere of management, office work, business, mass media, science and education; this process is also under way in everyday life. It is driven, on the one hand, by the objective process of decline in the number of ethnic Russian population in the CIS countries and the Baltic States, and on the other hand, by a subjective factor of state policy concerning the linguistic issues in the post-Soviet countries.

The key point with regard to the preservation and consolidation of the positions of the Russian language is the work of field-oriented state and public organizations of federal and regional levels, international associations promoting the pertaining of the common humanitarian space. Certainly, the growth of their activities, the increase in the effectiveness of their work in this direction are conditioned by financial expenses, so any long-term programmes can only be realized with the proviso of a broad state support.

A most important role in the preservation and consolidation of the positions of the Russian language must be played by education policy and inter-academic cooperation. To support the academic and educational cooperation in the post-Soviet area and to enhance opportunities of the CIS citizens' to get educated in Russian, it seems rational to promote cooperation between higher educational establishments of Russia and academic-education centres of the countries of the CIS including the realization of cooperative education and academic programmes; to intensify academic and inter-library exchange; to encourage setting up centres and representations of Russian educational establishments in the CIS countries; to intensify and modernize cooperation in the sphere of cross-regional inter-academic interaction by way of forming cross-regional higher educational consortiums; to provide regular monitoring and discussing the situation and prospects of Russian-language education and the current status of the Russian language in the CIS countries; to promote public interest in the range of problems under discussion in the CIS countries and in Russia by way of creating new specialized media resources and by use of mass media working currently.

A serious role in consolidating the positions of the Russian language in the post-Soviet area must be played by cross-regional near-border cooperation. A separate aspect is supposed to become the support of training, retraining and professional development programmes for the teaching staff involved in teaching the Russian language and literature at schools and universities of the CIS countries and the Baltic States.

As for an educational aspect, an important step to take could be a creation of a special humanitarian institution that should provide specialists with training (retraining) professional development opportunities in a broad range of humanitarian qualifications which are in demand in the CIS countries and for their study. The establishment of this specialized educational-research structure will advance the development of cross-disciplinary approaches to the issues of humanitarian cooperation, stimulate long-term and systematic partnership in the humanities, encourage intensifying implementation of innovation methods of the development of humanitarian education oriented on rapprochement and cooperation between young people of the post-Soviet countries, between academic and teaching community, which will allow realizing a

task-oriented specialist training for the CIS countries in humanitarian specialities in demand in these countries.

However, the realization of all the above-mentioned tasks will only become possible in the context of understanding the Russian world as a phenomenon concerning ethnic Russians as well as all those interested in the Russian culture, history and language. Only this multiethnic and multi-aspect perception of the Russian world defining it as a multi-confessional multiethnic layer to a certain degree united by the interest in Russia's past, present and future will promote consolidation of our country's international image and the spread of its culture in the global context.

Enrico Ponziani[233]
ON THE ROLE OF MIGRATION IN THE INTERACTION BETWEEN SOCIETIES, CULTURES AND CIVILIZATIONS

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is an honour to be here today to take part in the 10th International Likhachov Scientific Conference. I wish to thank the organizers for inviting the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to participate in this important event.

IOM is the leading inter-governmental organization in the field of migration with 127 Member States, and 94 Observers, States as well as NGOs. As many of you will know, IOM has been actively working in the CIS region for over fifteen years and enjoys excellent institutional and working relations with the CIS Member States, indeed most of these States are also part of our membership. Our Organization is mandated to concern itself with migrants, refugees, displaced persons and others in need of migration assistance and protection. Our aim is to promote humane and orderly migration for the benefit of all.

There are few issues in the international discourse that stimulate as much passionate public debate at both national and international levels as migration. One reason for both the attention and the controversy is the fact that migration is primarily about people – people who move between countries and societies – with all the social, economic and political complexities that this may entail. Another reason is the scale of this phenomenon. With the number of regular international migrants now exceeding 200 million and every country in the world serving as a point of origin, transit and destination, the effects of migration are visible on the streets and the squares, parks, shopping centres, railway stations and airports of all countries. This is particularly evident in the Russian Federation – the second largest recipient of migrants after the US; and in the whole CIS – one of the most active migration regions in the world with significant migration flows within, into and through the area. Regardless of their direction, migratory flows respond in large part to economic, demographic, human rights and environmental disparities. As many of these disparities will persist and grow, we need to accept that migration is here to stay. The Third Millennium looks destined to be the age of the greatest human mobility in recorded history.

This is to say that migration will continue to have a wide ranging impact on the economies, societies and cultures across the world. While current approaches to migration tend to focus on the economic dimension of human mobility, with economic drivers for migration and the impact of migration on the labour markets of countries of origin, transit and destination being widely documented, the intrinsically social and cultural nature of migration is no less important. It is this aspect of migration that has particular relevance to today's conference and, I am pleased to say, has been attracting increasing attention of policy makers. This year for instance, the IOM membership selected the theme of *Migration and Social Change* to guide IOM's International Dialogue on Migration. The role of migration and migrants in the interaction among societies, cultures and civilizations is at the heart of these discussions. So, what can be said about this role?

First of all, we need to remember that migration process is a process of change, for the migrants, for their families but also for the host and home societies. This change can be for good -

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[233] Director General of the International Organization for Migration (Moscow).

migration has the potential to enrich not only the economies, but more importantly perhaps the culture and societies of both countries of origin and destination. For example, while financial remittances are now widely recognized as a product of migration, social remittances, including the transfer of ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital, have received much less attention. Secondly, migration establishes linkages across societies and countries, it facilitates cultural exchanges and contributes to better understanding among the peoples. Finally, migration transforms societies, making a significant contribution to shaping the world as it is today, not only in economic terms, but more importantly as a social process with a transnational dimension. All these transformations migration brings can strengthen the dialogue and partnerships among different nations and cultures and also contribute to the development of a transnational or global culture.

Yet, migration, especially in its irregular forms, also presents some serious challenges. The social and political schisms it continues to cut in some countries, the social cohesion and identity and migrant vulnerability issues as well as the challenge of responding to diversity such as religious pluralism are not the least among these. The relevance of these issues is further amplified by the social consequences of the global financial crisis and the resulting changes in the perception of migration and migrants.

However, these challenges are not insurmountable. It all depends on the policies that governments adopt and implement. To take advantage of migration's potential benefits and address its challenges, protective and empowering policy environments are necessary in both host and origin countries. The Russian Federal Government has made significant efforts both in the political and legislative areas to develop such an enabling environment. On January 15, 2007, new migration legislation came into force in the Russian Federation.

However, migration as a transnational phenomenon cannot be managed effectively in the long term through national measures alone. By definition, international migration involves the movement of people between one or more countries. Most of the countries in the world today are part of a global migration system where migration policies of one State are likely to have impact on other States. Therefore, cooperation is essential for success in migration management – for IOM, inter-state cooperation is key.

IOM strongly supports bilateral and multilateral initiatives geared towards creating broader consensus on migration practices, approaches and systems.

Formal mechanisms of inter-state cooperation are essentially legally binding treaty commitments relating to cooperation on migration, which states have concluded at the bilateral, regional and global level. These agreements may take the form of treaties solely concerned with this subject, as is the case with bilateral labour agreements or broader agreements, such as the specific regional and international conventions relating to the protection of migrant workers, which also include provisions on inter-state cooperation.

Bilateral labour agreements are still the most common binding mechanism in migration management. They formalize each side's commitment to ensure that migration takes place in accordance with agreed principles and procedures.[234] By encouraging orderly movement of labour migrants, they promote good will and cooperation between origin and destination countries.

There is a growing recognition of the importance of cooperation at the regional and sub-regional levels all around the world. Governments come together in regional processes to discuss migration management issues and to take cooperative action by sharing best practices among countries of the region to facilitate regular migration; enhance the potential development of migrants; prevent, control and combat irregular migration and human trafficking; protect the rights of migrants and promote their successful integration; as well as promoting cooperation among the countries of region, both transit and destination, on migration-related issues.

The work that has been undertaken in the CIS context to foster partnerships on migration management is a good example of the importance of regional cooperation on migration. On January 29-30, 2008, the Council of Heads of Migration Services of the CIS Member States was established with the purpose of: facilitating productive collaboration among the CIS Member

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[234] Essentials of the Migration Management, Inter State Cooperation p 23.

States in the area of labour migration, supporting of legal environment for migrants, facilitating their movements within the CIS as well as jointly combating irregular migration.

Such cooperation is essential not only for better migration management, it can also contribute to reducing cross-cultural tensions and enhance regional development and regional stability.

The number of regional cooperation processes is growing steadily. Increasingly, States recognize the need to improve communication and dialogue across the different sub-regional and regional processes and groups. Such dialogue allows for cross-fertilization as well as harmonization and coherence in migration legislation and management.

Furthermore, there are also examples of global and interregional cooperation. As an example, the Berne Initiative was launched by the Swiss Government with the International Symposium on Migration on 14-15 June 2001. It was a States-owned consultative process with the objective of obtaining better management of migration at the national, regional and global levels through enhanced co-operation between states.

The most important outcome of the Berne Initiative was the development of the International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM). IAMM is a non-binding source and broad policy framework on migration management at the international level, which was developed through a series of consultations involving interested states, as the main actors in this field with the advice and support of pertinent regional and international organizations, NGOs and independent migration experts (Nielsen, 2006).

However, much more progress needs to be made. Unlike trade or aid issues, where there has been considerable multilateral cooperation, migration remains primarily a concern of individual states. There are, of course, instances of regional cooperation (e.g. the European Union), but there is still a long way to go to ensure, that migration becomes "an integral part of national, regional and global strategies for economic growth, in both the developing and developed world".

It is also necessary to bring other stakeholders on board, including the private sector and the civil society and, most importantly, migrants themselves. Broad-based partnerships are needed if we are to have hope of developing fair, flexible and effective migration management system, which would contribute to the well-being and prosperity of people and societies world-wide.

Helping governments develop such a system and fostering partnership and cooperation at all levels is the goal toward which IOM will continue working together with all interested parties.

On behalf of the IOM Director General, William Lacy Swing, I wish you success in your deliberations. Thank you.

V. V. Popov[235]

THE ROLE OF THE ISLAMIC FACTOR: A CIVILIZATIONAL ASPECT

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[235] Director of the Centre for Partnership of Civilizations of the Institute for International Research at Moscow State Institute for International Relations (University) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, a member of the Board and Director on International Relations of the Islamic Culture, Science and Education Support Foundation, Candidate of Science (History).

From 1967 to 2007 he served as an officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Russian Federation. He held positions of the Ambassador of the USSR and of the Russian Federation for North Yemen, later the Yemen Arab Republic, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Tunisian Republic. Ambassador-at-large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in charge of the relations with the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other international Islamic organizations. He has a diplomatic rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

Author of the following monographs: *Persian Gulf in Plans and Policies of the West* (Persidskiy zaliv v planakh i politike zapada) and *Close Tunisia* (Blizkiy Tunis), as well as numerous articles in various Russian and foreign mass media. He took part in took part in numerous international conferences and also headed Russian delegations.

He was decorated with the Order of Friendship, several medals of the USSR and the Russian Federation as well as Tunisian Order of the Republic of the First Degree.

In 2008 he was decorated with the highest award of the Council of Muftis of Russia, the Order of Al-Fakhr.

1. The balanceof forces is changing dramatically in the modern world reflecting turbulent transformations of the society. At the end of 2009 China became the second largest economy in the world, ahead of Japan, despite the experts predicting this to become only several years later.

The world economic recession is acquiring a civilizational character. It does not only reflect contradictions between the globality of capital and sovereignty of a national state, but also manifests a new cycle of interethnic and geopolitical clashes which are based on rejection of the Western life style by the new civilizations emerging on the political arena.

Famous American political analyst Fareed Zakaria in his book *The Post-American World* (2008) emphasizes that in the current situation the degree of America's dominance will be inevitably decreasing as China, India and Russia are gaining power. 'Another characteristic feature of the 21st century is the existence of alternative socio-political models... In other words, modernization does not mean "Westernization" any longer. A five-century-long epoch of dominance of several European countries and the USA is coming to an end.' Experts are inclined to come to a conclusion that it is spiritual features, socio-cultural characteristics of a certain society or a region that influence socio-historical dynamics. This means not only erasing cultural-civilizational peculiarities of different countries but also the loss of polarity, which means the death of a civilization. French philosopher Jean Baudrillard commented on this process of retreat of the Western civilization: 'The white people themselves may disappear one day, not having understood that their whiteness is just a result of a shocking mixture and convergence of all races and cultures, just as the white colour is an amalgam of all colours.' (J. Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil,* p. 60, Moscow, 2006).

2. This process spreads into a sphere of confrontation of the West and the Islamic world, too. It happened so that at the beginning of the 21st century it was Islam that appeared to be the real opponent of the USA and other Western countries. As a matter of fact, many political analysts are convinced that the 21st century began on September 11, 2001, i.e. at the moment of the biggest terrorist attack in modern days when around 3 thousand people perished and the most significant symbols of the American capitalism were shattered. The relations between the Islamic and the Western worlds were not particularly serene hitherto (it was quite significant that a number of the Western-European states had colonized many Islamic regions). However, after the 11th of September this process of confrontation became much more evident.

Demography plays the decisive role in transforming the balance of powers. Even according to modest American estimates (The Carnegie Endowment), Islam will have become the first world religion in the number of adepts by 2023. Currently the total number of Muslims in the world is estimated differently and accounts to approximately one and a half billion people. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries the number of Prophet Muhammad's followers was estimated as one hundred million people.

Islam has certain properties that distinguish it from other faiths. First, it is an all-encompassing character of the religion which is not just a world outlook, ideology or a code of spiritual values, but a lifestyle, as it universally regulates a an adept's life. Second, it is a remarkable religion of solidarity which unites all believers irrespective of their skin colour, national identity and other characteristics.

3. Islam is a religion oriented on equality and social justice as the Quran contains a number of references that a true Muslim may differ from his fellows not in wealth, knowledge, experience or power, but only in piety. Simplicity and consistency of this religion's principles, its ability to provide the adepts with an integral and clear view of the world, society, the structure of the universe make Islam attractive for new followers. Nothing else but the religion unites the Moroccans and the Indonesians, the Iranians and the Malayans. Not a single other religion has such a great number of followers passionately and devotedly committed to their faith. Islam is considered by them as a foundation of life and a measure of everything. But as Islam is more than just a religion, the Muslim civilization connects people with very different mentality and customs, who still realize their affiliation to one religious fellowship. As outstanding Russian orientalist G. I. Mirsky supposes, 'This affiliation to the Muslim community creates a special solidarity which is based not only on common creed but also on world outlook, attitude to individuals and society in general, to ideas, to different objects in nature.' This is the only religion that has created an

international organization which originated many other consociations and structures – the Organization of the Islamic Conference that currently unites 57 countries and together with other subdivisions such as the Islamic Development Bank, the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Islamic Red Crescent Society, the Olympic Committee and others, present a mini-version of the United Nations Organization for the Islamic world.

The adoption of new rules at the 11th session of heads of states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in March 2008 in Dakar (Republic of Senegal) became a significant claim on the change of the OIC's role in the world.

Members' understanding of a modified role of Islam and the OIC's claim on the leading role in the Muslim world were reflected in the new document in comparison with the previous Charter of 1972.

In particular, members of the Organization made a commitment 'to work for the benefit of the revival of the leading role of Islam in the world guaranteeing viable development, progress and prosperity of the Muslim population of the member-states'. Another task of the OIC's members is to 'contribute to international peace and security, mutual understanding and dialogue of civilizations, cultures and religions, improvement and encouragement of amiable relations and good neighbourliness, mutual respect and cooperation'.

Member-states of the OIC aim at every possible contribution to Islamic-Christian dialogue and the dialogue of civilizations, cultures and religions in general, in the context of strained relations between the West and the Islamic world.

The OIC declared as one of its priorities the struggle with islamophobia which seized the entire Western world. It is not by chance that Islam is called a religion of solidarity and justice, one of its aspects being zakat – an obligatory poor-due tax of 2.5% of income. This aspect is quite appealing in the modern conditions when many people suffer in our unfair world.

Finally, this religion awards its adepts in paradise for altruistic deeds more than any other religion, especially for their dedication and even self-sacrifice for Allah. Religious extremists use this argument to prepare suicide bombers, the so-called shahids who sacrifice their life to punish 'enemies'.

After the defeat of Egypt and other Arab countries in the war with Israel in 1967, the influence of religion in the Muslim East has increased dramatically. This was caused by failure of many socio-economic doctrines which different Muslim states, mainly Arab, tried to apply. The projects of Arab socialism, baasism and nationalism have failed, as well as the attempts to build the society of scientific socialism in Afghanistan, and alike. That is why religious figures profess that all defeats of Muslims are connected with their digression from the true religion and the way to solve the problems lies through the comeback to the origins, to the correct initial Islam (which is called fundamentalism in the West), and this statement is immensely popular.

In fact, religion and politics in the Muslim East are one whole, and this accounts for the appearance of Islamic radical sects and movements.

Unfortunately, the actions of these radicals result in identification of Islam as terrorism, and crimes of a small group of extremists are attributed to the religion itself which is considered to give birth to violence and hatred. This is far from being true as in its essence Islam is a peaceful religion, and mercy and goodness have always been among the main cultivated merits.

Islam is the youngest of all monotheistic religions. It emerged 14 centuries later than Judaism and 6 centuries later than Christianity, its birthday being 622 A.D., i.e. Prophet Muhammad's passage from Mecca to Medina. Thus it is quite natural that it took in many features of the two mentioned Ab-rahamic religious doctrines. At the same time Islam is peculiar for not having passed a period of changes as it was during the West-European Reformation, so the mosque is not separated from the state, and in the majority of Muslim countries Islam is a state religion. This circumstance may influence the fact that Prophet Muhammad's creed is becoming a powerful viable religion. Still we cannot disregard that the majority of international terrorist attacks were conducted by Muslims, and this makes many people in the West perceive this religion as a threat. But a» in-depth study of the Quran refutes statements of those who declare Islam as 'the religion of opposition and hatred'.

Certainly, civilizations are not solid and conflict-free. The majority of victims in the two world wars of the last century belonged to one Judeo-Christian civilization. Retardation of the Muslim world in the course of the last centuries led to its standing on the sidelines of the world politics and this favoured the appearance of Islamic fundamentalism and even radicalism. Fundamentalists declare that weakness and dependence of the Muslim countries is a consequence of godlessness of those Muslims who stepped away from the path pointed by Allah and chose instead 'secular materialistic ideologies of the West and East, capitalism or Marxism', as American professor John Esposito wrote. Muslims are proud of their old and rich civilization but note with bitterness that other nations rule and govern the world. This in particular creates the ground for an emergence of radical movements which profess the ideas of violence. Still the overall majority of Muslims adhere to the principles of temperance and mercy. The potential world of Islam with its great cultural traditions and hundreds of millions of devoted followers possesses a colossal strength and dynamism and will undoubtedly contribute to the development of the human society.

A demographic factor plays a most important role for the new position of Islam in the modern world. It is not by chance that Islam is called the fastest growing religion in the world, and even Americans suppose that in thirteen years Muslims will outnumber Christians of all denominations. Nowadays the majority of the world problems are connected with the demographic situation in particular. In general an increasing tendency of changing the ethnic content of the planet's population is evident, as the communities of immigrants are extending and penetrating at a very high speed. Islam is currently the second largest religion in the USA ahead of Judaism. Twenty million Muslims live in the Western Europe, and according to calculations this number will double in the next ten years as the dynamics of population number of the indigenous European Community population does not provide for the growth of the working forces to the necessary level. In 1960 the population of European origin made one fourth of the world population, in 2000 one sixth, by 2050 they will have accounted to one tenth considering the current development dynamics.

Age factor is also important. In 2000 444 million people lived in Europe aged 15 to 60. By 2050 their number will have droped to 365 million people. In fifty years the ratio of working and retired people will change from 5:1 to 2:1. The EC states will have to increase immigrants inflow not to let happen a dramatic decrease of life standards. Immigration of workforce to Europe is not an altruism or desire to help the poor Muslim countries but a tough necessity. It should be noted that Muslim communities are growing in all regions of the world. The number of Muslims in India accounts to 200 million people, that is more than in Pakistan. In China official statistics give the figure of 30 million, but Muslims themselves say it is 100 million. The Muslim population is growing quite rapidly in Latin America, too.

These tendencies are topical for Russia as well. According to Russian scholar A. Kazantsev, by 2050 the population of Muslims and Christians will have become equal on condition of the same tendencies.

More than two thirds of the world energy resources of gas and high-quality oil are placed in Muslim regions, and this is a real powerful support for the increasing influence of the Muslim community in international business. For example, the cost of one barrel of oil output in Saudi Arabia is ten times as low as in Russia. The influence of Islamic countries in world economics will be growing if we take into account the dependence of modern world on oil and gas. Three Islamic countries – Indonesia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia – are present in the list of the world's twenty biggest economies. The control of OPEC over oil prices is well-known. New financial might of rich Muslim countries should also be considered. If oil prices are 75-80 dollars per barrel in 2010, then the total income of the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf will come close to one trillion dollars. The highest skyscraper in the world which was opened at the end of 2009 in Dubai symbolizes the new power of oil-exporters, and the number of such symbols is growing. Islamic banks functioning on the principles of Islam made a good showing during the economic recession. The Islamic Development Bank is functioning efficiently and has given credits of more than 50 billion dollars.

Islam is approaching the centre of international activity in a number of regions but still it is not always talked and thought about in a positive way. It is often regarded as a serious threat, especially in the West. Besides, Islamic separatist movements from Philippines and Thailand to China and India are regarded as a danger for territorial integrity and independence of the countries.

Muslims' historical memory about their past might, their desire to revenge the West for the decades of humiliation and abuse of rights, to overcome underdevelopment and re-establish reputation and influence in the world – all these become a powerful stimulus for uniting efforts and strengthening the Islamic world. Islamic faith appears to be an efficient means for achieving this, as it presents an adequate moral force of influence on the conduct of Prophet Muhammad's followers and a way for their consolidation.

The Islamic world is currently actively positioning itself as a strong player in the international arena. In the 21st century we witness its consolidation due to a number of historical factors. The advancement of the Islamic world which was previously called by many political analysts ^a civilization of the poor', to the world politics field is becoming more evident nowadays.

Interestingly enough, even many American and European scientists acknowledge that recently there has appeared elite in the Islamic world equal to and perhaps even surpassing the Western elite in some respect. The point is that the Muslim public figures have studied in the West and are well familiar with the principles of the Christian and other cultures. But at the same time they know Islamic life profoundly. Achievements of modern Turkish authorities on bailout, on strengthening of the international position of the state are recognized even in Europe. Such activists as ex-Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir bin Mohamad, current General Secretary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, President of the Islamic Bank of Development Muhammad Ali, Director General of ISESCO Abdulaziz Altwaijri are opinion leaders in their spheres of activity. This list could be endless. In recent years several Muslims were awarded Noble Prizes. At the beginning of January 2010 President of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, elected for the third term, released his third pop-music album. This time his songs are performed by famous Indonesian pop-singers, previously he was singing himself. All revenues are given to charity.

Muslims have stronger spirit and are certain they struggle for their truth, as it is recognized by many political analysts. Compared with the de-Christianizing sybaritic Europe, Muslim communities appear to be harbours of ideological confidence and readiness for decisive protection of their rights. Muslims do a lot to prove that their peace-loving and merciful religion and terrorism have nothing in common. Currently the Muslim world mobilizes its resources for a struggle with extremists, and it is becoming more and more successful. Consolidation of the temperate forces of the Muslim world is a process which is gaining momentum. It is no longer easy to claim many organizations to be terrorist as they are regarded as such in the West.

Simultaneously a process of confrontation of the West and the Islamic world is deepening. A famous concept of *The Clash of Civilizations* by Samuel Huntington defines that Islam is the main threat to the Western civilization, adding that 'the main problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism but Islam as it is another civilization'. Its followers have persistently declared that solidarity of Muslims presents a real danger as religious similarity is their highest value. Moreover, in the USA and the Western Europe there have been printed heaps of books proving that this religion gives birth to violence and in it there is the core of the opposition between the West and the Islamic world, and not in the policy of the developed capitalist states. Some political analysts mention that the Islamic civilization has a lower level of development – a phrase of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi about the superiority of the Western civilization is well-known.

The clash of civilizations predicted by Samuel Huntington has not occurred but civilizational split-up is evident and is getting worse. It is mainly expressed in the escalation of the strain of the four main crises between the West and the Islamic world. They are the Middle-East conflict, the situation around Iran, the Iraqi drama and the Afghani-Pakistani knot. All these conflicts may lead to the gravest consequences for the international peace and security. If we add a number of

recent conflicts in Yemen, Somalia and the Sudan, the whole picture appears to be rather alarming.

Ideological opposition is especially acute in Europe. This involves not only terrorist attacks, but also the so-called 'cartoon scandal', numerous protests against the Islamization in Europe, activation of the right anti-immigrant parties, the Swiss poll on prohibiting building minarets and many more cases which could be included in the long list.

At the beginning of February, 2010 French authorities did not grant naturalization to a foreigner based on the argument that he had forced his wife to wear burqa that fully covered her face and body. At the end of January, 2010 the French Parliamentary Committee recommended to ban women from wearing traditional Muslim full face veils in certain public places (although only 1900 women are implied, according to data of the French Ministry of Home Affairs). Earlier President Nicolas Sarkozy declared that wearing burqa and yashmak 'humiliates a woman and is not supported in France'.

This process of civilizational split-up is also apparent in the USA where at the end of November, 2009 an American Army major of the Palestinian origin shot dead thirteen of his countrymen and wounded forty in protest against his possible expedition to Iraq and Afghanistan.

With reference to everything stated, it is Russia that may help to bridge the gap between the West and the Muslim East and play the most important role in joining forces, in creating and strengthening the atmosphere of mutual understanding and collaboration. Our relations with Islamic countries have been rapidly developing in the recent years. In 2005 Russia became a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference as an observer – the only country among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. It gives the Russian Federation an opportunity to better perceive the modern life of the Islamic

world, as well as to strive for a deeper mutual understanding with the Muslim countries on many topical questions.

'Russia is a great Eurasian power situated at the junction of civilizations and possessing a unique experience of coexistence and collaboration of various cultures, nationalities and religions', says the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated July 2, 2005 in reference to giving Russia the status of an observer in the OIC. Russia's mission presupposed byfiistory itself consists in contributing to strengthening the unity of the world civilization together with other countries.

The Russian Federation is a multinational and multidenom-inational country with more than fifteen million Islam followers officially registered living here which makes more than 10 per cent of the country's population. Islam appeared on the territory of modern Russia even earlier than the formal Christiani-zation of Russia took place. Christians and Muslims of Russia possess a unique centuries-long experience of living together, peaceful coexistence and mutual enrichment of their cultures, which the majority of the European countries do not have, especially if we take into consideration that there are more Muslims in Russia than in any other European country, and percentage share of Muslims is growing rapidly. The attitudes of Russia and the Islam world are close or the same practically to all global key problems. The common area of concerns on the Middle East, Iraq, energy security and others issues makes collaboration of our countries very topical, especially at the present stage of international relations.

Vladimir Putin said at the 10th Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on October 16, 2003 in Malaysia, 'Combining our financial, technological and human resources can become a meaningful factor in the world politics, the beginning of a breakthrough in many directions of the world economy.'

Nowadays our planet encounters a number of shortages of vital resources, such as water, food, and ultimately oil. But the main problem of the modern world is the lack of justice. It is the strengthening of Russia's role and more active collaboration of Russia and the Islamic world that gives hope for the revival of spiritual and moral values in the world. In the majority of Islamic capitals Russia is perceived as a powerful friendly state able to suggest realistic mutually acceptable solutions to the existing conflict situations.

That is why our Muslim partners keep on appealing for playing a more active role in preventing an intercivilizational split-up, or the so-called 'clash of civilizations'. Only with

energetic involvement of Moscow may any initiatives on dialogue and partnership of civilizations become a global project aimed at formulization of a new paradigm based on the true equality of rights and taking into consideration the interests of all the participants of the process.

As greatest Muslim Iranian theologian Muhammad Ali Ta-shiry stated at the conference 'Russia – the Islamic World' on June 23, 2008 in Moscow, 'Russia is a great country which possesses a distinguished culture and history. The fact that Russia sustains relations with the Islamic world is for the good of everybody.' Russia is distanced from the West and the USA that 'unjustly attack the Islamic culture and desecrate shrines'. Russia may become 'a bridge between the West and the Islamic world to reach the balance'.

To fulfil this, we need to strengthen collaboration between Christianity and Islam in our country in every way possible. These are the major confessions, as the other two traditional religions – Judaism and Buddhism – have much fewer followers. All this requires from the Russian state a straight and consistent attitude to the major faiths.

Collaboration of the Christians and Muslims in our country has always been a most important element of the internal political stability, and it should be safeguarded with an utmost care.

A consistency of the authorities' attitude towards the Muslim population and religion in general is extremely significant in regard to Islam's peculiarities and a specific solidarity of all the Muslims. In recent years there has been done a lot to sustain and develop friendly relations with the Islamic world. The Russian Federation has joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference as an observer (June 30, 2005), it was given the same status in the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO). In 2006 there was formed a Group of Strategic Vision 'Russia – the Islamic World' under the supervision of Ye. Primakov and M. Shaymiyev. More than twenty high-rank representatives of the Muslim states belong to it. Its activity is a most important constituent of our general policy in the Islamic world. During this period there have been created the Foundation for Support of the Islamic Culture, Science and Education, the Centre for Arab and Islamic Research, TV channel 'Russia Today' started broadcasting in Arabic, and so on.

The Russian Federation adheres to the principles of democracy which are strictly recorded in the Constitution guaranteeing the secular society, freedom of conscience, separation of religious associations from the state, rule of law, ban on religious animosity propaganda. The mentioned norms are detailed in the Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations defining the equality of confessions before the law and their equal distance from the authorities.

We are living in the times of globalization that have been marked by the greatest and dramatic civilizational changes which have ever been experienced by the humanity. The civilization has cleared the way for the unprecedented opportunities for the accelerated scientific and technological progress, for the interaction of states and peoples, for broadening contacts between people and their cultural and spiritual values. Establishing favourable relations between the Islamic world and the West with Russia playing a leading role will essentially mark a decisive turn for the better in international relations, as this involves more than half of the humanity, for Christians and Muslims together constitute more than three billion people.

Jean Radvanyi[236]

[236] Director of the French-Russian Research Centre for Social Science and the Humanities (CFRSSH, Moscow), Professor of *L'Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales* (INALCO, National Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations, Paris), Dr. Sc. (Geography).

Graduated from L'Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (National Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations, Paris), major in Russian Studies. In 1985 he received a doctor's degree in Geography at Universite Paris 7, since 1975 he has been teaching in L'Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, since 1992 he has headed the Group on Post-Soviet States Studies. Since January 2002 he has headed Centre de Recherches Russes et Euro-Asiatiques (Centre for Russian and European-Asian Researches, CRREA) (EA-D3576), since September 2008 he has been Director of CFRSSH (Moscow).

FRENCH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND GLOBALIZATION:
THE SEASON OF STEREOTYPES?

It has been over a year since I arrived in Moscow as Director of the French-Russian Research Centre for Social Science and the Humanities, and I keep wondering why mass media, which determines public opinion in Russia and France, resorts to stereotypes when analyzing and describing things in the other country. Almost every week I come across the same set of cliches with slight variations and they all reduce what happens in the other country to a few images deep-rooted in public opinion of the two states.

Moscow and Russia are viewed by many Frenchmen as a dangerous and risky destination. The image of Moscow cannot but astonish: any place in this post-Soviet city is allegedly unsafe, corruption flourishes there, muggers and mafia groups are on the spree, and the whole city is just the wrong side of the tracks. An acquaintance of mine has confessed to me recently that she is frankly afraid to take the position in a large French bank in Moscow proposed to her.

The image of France propagated by mass media and Russian tourists coming from Paris is no less surprising. It is a civilization that has to defend itself against an invasion of the black, the yellow, Arabs, and other immigrants who behave outrageously and shamelessly and who set the streets of our ancient capital on fire as it happened during the unrest of 2005. Their presence supposedly means the end of the authentic French culture, which is considered pure, but that purity is just a myth moulded of the material at hand by the clashes of imaginary concepts. How can we imagine the development of French culture without representatives of other cultures and immigrants who have been nourishing it for centuries: from Italians, from Leonardo da Vinci invited by Francois I to his court, to Yves Montand, from the Spaniard Picasso to Japanese Fujita, black Americans Josephine Baker and Archie Shepp, and many others who I have no time enough to mention?[237]

Some are certain to contradict saying that these are the extremes, vulgar interpretations that do not reflect the reality. Actually, French-Russian relations are not that bad and a good proof is a number of events held in 2010 in the framework of the year of France in Russia and the year of Russia in France. Of course, there are experts of both cultures who have had close contacts and have been inextricably intertwined. Fortunately, we can still name many 'middle people', men and women, who cherish these relations: translators, culture workers, scholars of various areas, representatives of different administrative bodies and regions who continue to spread, enrich and pass on our shared heritage.

Constant chewing over these images, however, in the most popular and major newspapers, on television, in blogs, turned them into truisms, but these platitudes are more difficult to"fight off in spite of the fact that our two countries are very close to each other geographically, though they are situated on the two poles of Europe in search of its borders.

There are quite a few factors explaining why the process of simplification and roughening of the other's image has spread so far that we face the risk of crossing out a centuries-long tradition of mutual understanding and mutual enrichment and creating another image, not necessarily a hostile one (according to the polls, France is not viewed by the Russians as a country posing threat to Russia) but at least somewhat distorted and far too misleading an image of each other.

One factor is connected with the mass media itself (I know that the issue has been raised repeatedly at your previous meetings): present-day television, especially the most popular TV channels, tend to avoid sophisticated issues. It welcomes short and simple programmes, compressed and univocal reporting. Any inconsistencies, alternative opinions and doubts are totally alien to it. This approach applies equally to films and TV series, many of which have

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Author of books: *Les États postsoviétiques (Post-Soviet States). La nou-velle Russie* (2007), *Atlas du Monde diplomatique* (co-editor 2003, 2008), *La Russie entre deux mondes* (with co-authors 2005), *Les États postsoviétiques* (compiled 2004), *Atlas géopolitique du Caucase* (with co-authors 2010).

Member of the academic board of Leibnitz Institut für Länderkunde in Leipzig (Germany), member of the editorial board of the 'Slovo' journal (INALCO).

[237] See about it the exhibition 'Paris: 150 Years of Emigration' (February 8 -April 12,2010) organized by Paris Mayor's Office.

turned into regular exercises of a standard set of topics. And when some television series, like the recently broadcast 'Shkola' ('School'), gets out of tune it is subject to criticism, and no matter how popular it is, it gets withdrawn off the air or moved far from the prime time. One can remember similar examples in France.

The World Wide Web is undoubtedly a more complex space where all sorts of ideas thrive, even the most heretic. However, the search engines, those network generals, turn up to lead our choice and bring a common user to standardized results when he is often unable to undertake more complex exploration and to critically assess the controversial information flow found on the Internet.

Linguistic problems deserve a special attention. Holding professorship at the Institute where 85 world languages are taught and where the most significant University research centre for the Russian language and civilization has been for decades, I realize perfectly well how contradictory the processes are that take place in this area. On the one hand, (it may sound strange, though) the Internet, new translation programmes and mass media have made more languages available, and the dominance of the English language as a tool of international communication seems increasingly doubtful. At the same time, we are witnessing quite a number of processes, which are considered natural by some and very disturbing by others.

If the universal dominance of the English language is far from being evident today, we have to admit that the world is roughening. In all spheres of activity, from tourism to international conferences, we can hear simplistic and poor English that is not fit for analysis and elaborate debates necessary to understand the partner, his views and peculiarities.

Actually, this process is a mere reflection of the general tendency typical of most languages, namely, their transformation, immense simplification (at least in everyday communication) under the influence of new means of communication like the Internet with its blogs and especially mobile phones with their SMS messages. Spelling no longer matters in these short formats, and the struggle to retain conventional academic orthography is doomed to fail.

Besides mass media, one should look closely at political practices of our countries and the methods our leaders consider appropriate to use in order to mobilize the public opinion. The fact is that states are becoming increasingly active in this field as is the case with national campaigns, no matter whether it comes to short-term political campaigns (election campaign, handing over the power) or commemorations in the hectic calendar that are expected to strengthen national and patriotic consensus in the society (the term is used both in France and Russia).

2009 and 2010 are commemoration years: the seventeenth anniversary of the beginning of the World War II, the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Allies' victory over Hitler's regime. These dates, on the one hand, made it possible to remind our young people of the significance of the struggle carried on by French and Russian nations side by side (which later strengthened our relations on all levels) and, on the other hand, prompted a public debate. If we take France for instance, it leaves us bewildered why our leaders did not invite any Russian officials to celebrate the events devoted to the anniversary of an allied invasion at Normandy. The USSR did not participate in the operation directly, but we are all very well aware of its remarkable role on the other battlefront and of the fight of many Soviet citizens in the ranks of the Resistance at Normandy. Besides, an ardent debate is sparkled by many proposals of the government. Here we are speaking of the school history course using a number of symbols, for instance, the letter by Guy Moquet shot to death at Cha-teaubriant; or propose that every class should take a killed Jewish child under their patronage.

In Russia an attentive observer cannot help getting concerned about the attempts to use these anniversaries to rehabilitate the image of Stalin and Stalinism, to conceal the pages that look unflattering. We surely do not mean that the role of the USSR in defeating fascist Germany should be denied or great sacrifice made by the peoples of the Soviet Union should be forgotten. I do not think that hanging Stalin's portraits in Moscow may help us answer the question, 'What is left of our victory?' (remember the headline of a polemic essay by Natalia Narochnitskaya in a French publication).[238] It is dangerous and probably futile to make an attempt to consolidate the

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[238] *Narotchnitskaia N.* Que reste-t-il de notre victoire? Russie—Occident: le malentendu. Paris: Éditions des

society by using half-truth, taboo or concealment. This idea can be applied not only to Russia. It took France years to come to the recognition of the significance of Vichy's collaborationist government and its impact on our society. I prefer bold and sober opinion of Daniil Granin and his 'Neprazdnichnye Mysli Na-kanune Dnya Velikoy Pobedy' (Non-festive Ideas on the Eve of the Great Victory Day)[239] to that simplification and revision of history.

There is no doubt that every generation should know its own history. Voluntary and sometimes demagogic solutions, however, hamper understanding of the past if they simplify and manipulate this or that equivocal event. Not long ago our Centre organized a conference devoted to the problem of 'History, Historians and Power', and I invite you to read the presentations by Pierre Nord, Benjamin Stora, Alexander Miller, or Isabelle de Keghel who were telling about various paths of national memory and the history of our two countries in the context of modern debates and interpretations.[240]

Finally, I would like to express my regret at the fact that the problem of visas and trips is still unresolved in spite of mutual promises and efforts of our diplomats. It is important for scholars and students who would like to visit the other country. We can only dream of such systems as 'Erasmus' (for students) and 'Socrates' (for professors) that would encompass the European space as whole. One of major achievements of the European Union in the last years is that thousands of students got an opportunity to learn another culture, languages of European countries despite the difficulties caused by limited funding of these programmes (which often makes such trips unavailable for families with a modest income).

Nothing helps debunk stereotypes better than personal encounters and learning life of another culture; so we wish the growing network of 'Erasmus' to connect Russia and France and to let young people of the two countries fill in the gaps in our scarce knowledge of each other that formed in the last decades. That would make the year of France in Russia and the year of Russia in France successful and I wish the rest of the year to be successful as well.

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Alexander Rahr[241]

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GERMANY-RUSSIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
AS THE CORNERSTONE OF STABLE EUROPE

Last year in Moscow Vladimir Putin held an interesting meeting with the so-called captains of the German economy. Never before had such a representative delegation of German business visited Moscow. The visit and the negotiations took place in spite of the financial crisis. Russia and Germany seem to have decided to come out of the recession in a link, leaning on each other. The strategic partnership has passed a maturity test. The relations between Germany and Russia turned out to be more capable of functioning than those between Russia and the European Union as a whole. Let us look into the reasons and the goals of the German-Russian partnership. In my opinion, they are the ones that lay the foundation for the architecture of future Europe.

Syrtes, 2008.

[239] Izvestiya, 08.05.2009.

[240] Exemplified by Pierre Nora, «Les avatars de l'identité nationale», Le débat n° 159, mars 2010. Some conference papers are available at http://files. mail.ru/SFEHVP.

[241] Director of Programs on Russia and CIS *of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* (the German society for foreign affairs), journalist, political analyst (Germany).

In 1977-85 he was a scientific member of the 'Russian elite' project at the Federal Institute for Eastern European and International Studies (Germany).

In 1982-94 he was a scientific member of the research institute of Radio Liberty.

Since 1994 he has been a scientific member of the Research Institute of the German society for foreign policy.

Author of the biographies of M.S. Gorbachov (1986), V. V. Putin *(A German in the Kremlin,* 2000), author of books: *Russia Floors the Gas* and *Putin after Putin. Capitalist Russia on the Threshold of the New World Order* (2008).

Member of the Board of the Russian-German discussion forum 'Petersburg Dialogue' ('Peterburgskiy dialog') and of the discussion club 'Valdai'. Professor *honoris causa* of Moscow State Institute for International Relations, member of the Board of Directors of Yalta European Strategy (YES).

But before touching upon the question of the strategic partnership between Berlin and Moscow, I will try to outline the changing architecture of Europe. It is still differently regarded by Germany and Russia. The Germans and the Russians have had different experience of Europe for the last half-century. Let us speak about the past half a century. About the making of Europe during this historical period. How such countries as Germany and Russia got incorporated into the process of creation of new Europe.

So, half a century has elapsed. For the Germans grown in the comfortable Western Europe those were peaceful, quiet years of well-being under the conditions of steady progress. The terrible consequences of the Second World War were fading away cured by time. For Germany, it was the time of an economic miracle; there was enough money for creating liberal market economy as well as for the establishment of a fair social order which was able to provide the socially weak with the maximum of protection. Climbing the social ladder stopped being an advantage of the narrow circles. Never before had the young generation of Germany grown up in such favourable conditions, enjoying complete liberty and the ideals of individualism.

In the late 1960s the USA won the space race and sent the first man to the Moon thus proving their technological superiority. Besides, the Cold War had also passed its 'hot' phase by that moment. During the twenty years after Stalin's death his successors had to fight for the survival of the USSR.

The economic superiority of capitalism over communism was becoming more apparent for all. The FRG initiated the so-called *Ostpolitik* towards the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Communist party of the USSR did not turn down offers of cooperation – they were given a chance for economic stabilization and modernization of the country. By the early 1980s the Soviet Union had accumulated a backlog of problems. Per-estroika [reconstructing the economy] became the only possible way of reforming the disintegrating empire. The values of the western democracy and the market economy gained more and more support.

And in Western Europe the 'replete' seventies were followed by even more well-to-do eighties. The unrest of the '60s and the following political radicalization of the society lost strength, the youth of the new generation began utterly and completely to look out for material values.

In the '80s in the West the abundance and freedom of information, social benefits, ease of travel, low price of accommodation and transport, numerous programmes of foreign exchange made the student's years of the generation born after the war perhaps the most trouble-free, the quietest and the happiest of all that had ever been seen by the history of studentship.

The Atlantic region was more and more merging politically and economically. In the late '80s the FRG had such powerful financial reserves that Helmut Kohl could buy the GDR hook, line and sinker without particular problems.

The years of the German reunion could have become a life-changing beginning of the new union between Russian and German people. Russia did not oppose the unity of Germany; on the contrary, Russia supported the reunion in every way possible. Those cheerful years – which seemed to have brought the final reconciliation between the FRG and post-communist Russia – will always be a cherished memory for all the contemporaries of those events.

Despite the fact that the price of the reunion both economically and socially turned out to be much higher than it had been expected, Germany and the Western Europe managed to keep up their growth and progress. The capable generation of 30-60-year-olds directed their efforts at the formation and establishment of the European Council.

A better time for Europe can hardly be imagined: all outside threats had disappeared. There appeared new European countries including the Baltic states and the Ukraine, Poland restored its past power and significance, many states stood in the line to be allowed to join the European Union.

As the 21st century came, the period of the dreamy euphoria was soon over. The West began to form its geopolitical interests trying to realize them even by force. The West drew the eligibility of its claims and actions from their victory gained in the Cold War. The military operation in Kosovo paved the way for further integration of the Balkan region into the structures of NATO and the EU.

A few months before the final collapse of the Soviet Union the countries of the West and the countries of the former 'Warsaw Pact' signed the so-called Paris Charter. The document could have become under certain circumstances the foundation of the future 'common European home'. The idea of the Great United Europe from Brest to Vladivostok, as we well know, was never realized. It even seems unthinkable today. But let us remember that some 18 years ago it was a serious alternative to the further development of Europe.

Let us also remember that in August 1991 Russia got rid of the communist totalitarianism all by itself. The Perestroika won a victory over the putshists. And only after Russia had become free, the bipolar world collapsed, with the communist ideology, the occupation regimes in Eastern Europe, in short – the iron curtain fell in Europe.

The epoch of short-lived liberalism in Russia is now forgotten, and, unfortunately, it is forgotten in Russia as well. At the end of the last century Russia chose the way of a powerful state. The Russian authorities had a social demand for this way. And the West, breaking its promises given to Gorbachev began to expand NATO to the east, up to the Russian borders.

The West reasons that the expansion of NATO and the EU strengthens and consolidates democratic Europe. There is no doubt that it really does so. But the West made a huge blunder by not integrating Russia into the new Europe. At that, the West did not have to admit Russia into NATO or the EU in a technical sense of the word. But pushing Russia out of Europe and out of the European civilization, as it does look now, meant a great strategic mistake. The future generations of Europeans may have to take the bitter punishment for it. Along with the expansion of the western structures, they should have moderated the consequences of the expansion for the Russian elite and ought not to have humiliated them.

Naturally, in was Moscow that to some extent encouraged the self-isolation by its actions. And in Russia the future generations vrill have to pay the price for the fact that Russia too hastily abandoned the democratic models of the West – out of pride or of the great-power superiority complexes.

Today the situation in Europe is as it is. By the way, it could have developed according to a much worse scenario. It is important to note that there is no new Cold War in Europe and that it is unlikely to take place.

Let us try to look into the present-day situation and think over how we could try to return to the favourable situation which reigned in Europe in the late '90s. In other words, how we could come back to the idea of Great Europe which would rely upon America's powerful shoulder on one side, and, for a full balance, on Russia's shoulder on the other.

Let us look at Russia. Moscow violently opposes further expansion of NATO to the borders of the post-Soviet territories, stigmatizes the US plans to build a missile defence system in Central Europe, suspends the observance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Russia refuses to understand the reasons of the former Warsaw Pact countries for joining NATO. The idea of the united Europe where big and small states are equal and help one another is incomprehensible and alien to Russia. The Russian vision of Europe reminds of that of the 19th century: strong states dominate in the 'concert of Europe'. But the main thing that irritates and humiliates Russia is that it cannot influence the building of the architecture of Europe as it is not a member of NATO and of the EU -the organizations that govern Europe today.

Now let us look at the new members of NATO and of the EU, for instance, at the Baltic states and Poland. They are protected by the American nuclear umbrella, they are part of the common European economic territory, they are prospering more than ever. Unlike Russia, they enjoy the full-rights vote in building new Europe. But they have serious conflicts with Russia which they sometimes provoke themselves.

What reasons did Poland have to impose a veto upon the negotiations of the EU on the prolongation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia? The precious time is lost. We urgently need to agree with Russia upon the future system of energy supplies, upon the peacekeeping on the eastern borders of Europe, upon the international war on terrorism, upon Russia's joining the WTO. The Polish whim blocked the establishment of four areas to unite the EU and Russia.

The European business is shedding bitter tears – the relations with Russia are too loaded politically. Germany was not allowed to initiate a new *Ostpolitik* on behalf of the whole Europe towards Russia. This policy which could have become a conductor of the slow return to the principles of the Paris Charter of 1990 will be touched upon below.

Poland, Estonia and now Sweden have blocked laying a gas pipeline from Russia to Germany on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. The ecology issues, of course, cannot be ignored in this issue. But the total opposition to the gas tube is caused by political considerations. Without going into details, this is an apparent example of pushing Russia out of Europe.

It is quite impossible to force Russia to transport their utilities through Belarus and Ukraine, as the latter apparently blackmail Moscow with their privileged position of transit countries, as well as Russia blackmails them with the price for gas. Here the idea of the energy NATO will not be helpful. Russia will just leave for Asia.

It is no good that the Russian factor has split the West and Europe again. At that, it is along the same Tine' as the West was split on the threshold of the Iraqi war in 2003. The 'old' Europe has indeed put up with Russia. It wants to build up the strategic partnership with Russia, the final aim being: a EU-Russia free economic zone, visa-free regime, perhaps even a common security zone.

Honestly, I do not understand why the USA have so fervently been opposing the policy of closer relations between the EU and Russia recently. Is this an attempt to involve Europe in an intensified transatlantic community where there definitely will be no place for Russia?

The countries of the 'new' Europe still feel victims of Russia's occupation in the post-war period. They seem to make no difference between Russia and the USSR. There seems to be no reconciliation between them and Moscow. On the contrary, the countries of the 'new' Europe resent old Europeans' 'naive belief in good Russia'. Sometimes one can suspect that some representatives of 'new' European elites think that they joined the old NATO and the old EU – of the Cold War time when the West did its best to defend itself against the Soviet Union.

The result of the split because of the Russian factor is obvious: the European policy of security and defence is not efficient, there is no consensus between the countries and it is unlikely to be reached, the mutual distrust is increasing. In Estonia Germany is blamed as if Berlin were supposedly promoting a new Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact! There are stringent demands for Germany to show solidarity with the new members of NATO and the EU in their conflicts with Moscow. At the same time these countries do not show solidarity with the countries of the 'old' Europe in the latter's attempts to establish partnership with Russia for the sake of stable Europe.

The 'young' Europeans in fact 'have shot down' the so-called 'group of the three' – the format of meetings between the countries of Germany, France and Russia. In fact the mechanism of the 'group of the three' allowed Europeans to integrate Russia mildly into the common European affairs. Russia within the 'group of the three' felt part of the European politics. Today only the format of a summit the EU-Russia is in operation towards Russia; this summit is held twice a year, but it has become absolutely formal.

One should admit the arguments about the attitude to Russia are also held in Germany. We can even say that the German elite, as well as the EU, is split by this issue.

Within the German elite there is a pronounced ideological approach to Russia: until Russia accepts the liberal model of government it should be ignored and restrained. Moscow must be forced to observe human rights. These forces in Germany stopped believing in the real cooperation with Russia a long time ago and do not want to integrate anywhere with it. Russia, in their reasoning, is an alien country to Europe; Russia does not build its identity upon European, universal values.

But in Germany there are more influential forces who think and act in a different way. Following the tradition of the social-democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt many German people sincerely, perhaps due to a guilt complex and having conquered their fear of Moscow adhere to close relations with Russia.

An example of such close relations in practice is the work of Petersburg Dialogue and of many other similar non-governmental organizations. These German people clearly feel the sympathy for them from the direction of the Russian society. Strange though it may seem, the German people is the second favourite people of the Russians after the Byelorussians.

It is wrong to think that Germany is seeking closer relations with Russia only because of its commercial interests or out of fear to be deprived of the Russian gas. Dependence on Russia is exaggerated. In Germany there is a strong intention to try to form the future architecture of Europe not against and not without, but only with Russia. This German position was clearly demonstrated during the summit in Bucharest.

The EU-Russia energy alliance is the first and most important step towards the strategic inclusion of Russian in Europe. In September 2001 President Putin speaking in German Bundestag called for uniting all the territories of the EU and Russia for mutual consolidation of Europe. The chancellor of that time Schroder believed him and created – together with France and Italy – a basis for the energy alliance. The energy concerns of these three countries got access to the extraction of energy supplies in Russia.

But at the same time the contradictions within the EU were growing, the impossibility of making common decisions on most important issues leading to political stagnation of the Union. After 2005 some unnecessary conflicts with Russia began to multiply. There was a fatal impression that the West perceived stronger Russia as a threat for its own welfare and security.

In Russia some people became firmly convinced that the West was pursuing a policy of encirclement and restraint. A number of 'colour revolutions' on the post-Soviet territory only furthered the positions of the sceptics in the Kremlin. Along with the deepening 'disappointment' in the West the voices of the supporters of the orientation 'to the East' were becoming louder and louder, which in the long term could have quite negative consequences for Europe.

The climax of the confrontation was the August conflict in Georgia. The cooperation between Russia and the EU was called into question. There was an impression that the EU did not want to deal with Russia even in the role of a supplier of energy resources. In the horizon there loomed a shadow of the Cold War again.

In the '50s and the '60s, during the Cold War many people in the West including George Kennan lobbied for Europe with Russia basing on the idea that sooner or later Russia would set itself free from communism. Nobody doubted that the powerful post-communist Russia will become an important element of the future European architecture. After the collapse of the USSR this dream could have come true. But changes had taken place in Europe: 'the economic union' had turned into 'a society of values'. The attitude of the European Union to Russia became more fundamentalist and pragmatic. The West was celebrating its victory in the Cold War. Strung out, Russia lost a third of its territory and thus retreated geographically from Europe.

Europe of the 21st century is built not on the basis of the common European Home. It is more likely to remain a product of cooperation with the USA as part of a transatlantic community. NATO and the EU are considered to be the pillars of the European architecture. The USA and not Russia play the main role in Europe. Russia does not have the right for the decisive vote in Europe – as it is not a member of either NATO or the EU. The OSCE is degraded. In the opinion of the West Russia should put up with the role of a junior partner.

Every wish of Russia to pursue a model of reintegration on the post-Soviet territory was blasted by the West. NATO still refuses to sign the agreement on cooperation of the CSTO. Some countries of central and eastern Europe see themselves 'in the front rows of liberty' – in the policy of restraint of Russia.

Naturally, Russia also makes gross political mistakes in its relations with the West. The new independent states have full rights for a free choice of a new union. Moscow cannot insist on the exclusive 'droit de regard'. And Russia has to understand that the EU and NATO are making a more magnetic influence on these countries than politically less attractive Russia.

The war in Georgia in 2008 became a climax in the fight for influence on the post-Socialist territory. Today the West has recognized the 'red line' of Putin which he laid up in his speech in Munich in 2007. NATO and the EU criticized Russia's policy but did not apply any sanctions and soon returned to their current affairs. Moreover, the USA need Russia's help in Iran and Afghanistan.

Three scenarios of returning to the principles and the European spirit of the Paris Charter are likely. The first one is a bound linkup of the EU and Russia on the grounds of self-defence after the terrorist attack of September 11th. The second is an environmental disaster, a demographic

challenge or a climatic emergency which to some extent are bound to threaten Europe. The third is the evolution of the relations of today into a mutually beneficial economic cooperation.

Finally, let us pay attention to the German experience of integration into Europe again. In the '50s the Germans built up some union of coal and steel with the former enemy, France. This mutually beneficial union promoted the establishment of a common European market some years later, and decades later – the European Union in its current form. Why don't we try, through a careful energy alliance of the EU-Russia, to form the basis for reconciliation and integration with Russia?

It is clear that Russia will not follow the way of the postwar Germany and will not repent to the former enslaved peoples of the Soviet empire. We should stop demanding that Russia follow the German way. Russia did not lose the Cold War to the extent to which Germany lost the Second World War. But certainly, a gesture of reconciliation should also come from Russia. I sincerely hope that in the nearest future the first visit of the Russian President will take place to the Baltic States. The situation cannot continue when neither the first nor the second president of post-communist Russia had time to visit at least one of the Baltic republics.

Medvedev wants a more significant role for Russia in building up new Europe and an agreement for the Russian influence in the CIS. Russia would like to create something of a nature of a treaty on co-existence or a non-aggression pact with the West to put it in the language of the 20th century. But the West is satisfied with the existing architecture of Europe and is not trying to change it but at the same time it does not want to refuse it to Medvedev.

The problem is that Russia is in search of its identity, and this identity does not comply with the Western criteria. The problem of the West is that it does not have a common view upon Russia. Some countries want strategic partnership with Russia, while other countries consider the EU and NATO to be instruments of the policy of restraint of Russia as it was during the Cold War.

Disagreements in Europe about Russia will deepen because such countries as Germany, France, Italy and Spain will not become hostages of the unsuccessful policy of reconciliation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. But Russia will also meet a historical disaster if it loses Europe. Europe will only become stronger with the help of Russia.

Let us remember once again Putin's historical speech in the German Bundestag in 2001. The essence of Putin's suggestions was that it is necessary to build up a common economic area on mutually beneficial conditions as part of the German-Russian and then the Russian-European strategic partnership and cooperation. Russia was ready to buy all the necessary technologies in the West in exchange for energy supplies directly transferred to Europe. But not as cheap goods, it would participate in selling gas directly delivering it to the final consumer and would influence upon the pricing. This is what 'Gazprom' is still striving for. In exchange Russia was to have opened the direct way for German investors who wanted not only to sell ready-made goods but to produce it at joint enterprises in Russia. This was the best design imaginable.

But the idea was not put into effect because a number of European countries opposed this deal. Moreover, the USA during Bush's rule was not interested in it at all and opposed its realization in every way possible. This opposition is still continuing. The USA does not want western technologies to come to the Russian market. So Russia saw a cool attitude to its suggestion. When oil prices rose dramatically Russia began to regard itself as an energy superpower and started to treat western investors as exceptionally junior partners. The western politicians in their turn began to shout that they did not want strategic investors from Russia, China or Arab countries.

The financial crisis made both sides reconsider rationally the offers made at the beginning of the century. Now the situation has changed completely and the income of Russian money is only welcome by Europeans because there is no other money. But, unfortunately, the expected Russian-German deal with the purchase of 'Opel' shares failed. It was to have become a typical deal: the Germans supply technologies, produce new cars with the Russian entrepreneurs and sell the cars in Russia and for export. Russia gets access to one of the historically most successful enterprises in the West. On a similar basis, a chain could have been built to connect other branches of industry of Germany and Russia. But influential circles in the USA did not allow to do this deal.

The second example is the purchase of Germany's Waden Yards. And though 'Gazprom' has not officially acknowledged this deal it is already known that super-tankers will be built in the dockyards needed by both the countries for transportation of liquefied gas. The German dockyards unlike Russian ones have modern technologies. No one in Germany opposes this strategic deal. Only Americans do. Russia having got access to the Western European technologies is a nightmare for them.

The third example is the investment of JSFC 'Sistema' in the biggest European manufacturer of electronics 'Infineon'. These are the most modern high technologies which Russia badly needs! There is another large-scale deal that is not widely advertised: the purchase of the German firm Nukem Technologies GmbH with its technologies and works for reprocessing nuclear waste by the state corporation 'Rosatom'.

The Kohl–Yeltsin or Schroder-Putin unions did take place, and now there is a certain Merkel-Medvedev union. In the 1990s the FRG invested considerable sums in Russia, so that the Russian chaos could not absorb Europe. Russia has not only paid its debts but it willingly flung the door open for German companies, which allowed them to scrape up fortunes. This is why no matter who the Federal Chancellor of the FRG is they will have to reckon with the opinion of pro-Russian business circles. Do you remember what Frau Merkel said in 2005? She said that Russia reminded her of the GDR and she stood for harmonization with the USA. Today Merkel is permanently visiting Russia and is heartily defending Russian investment in the German economy which she opposed a year ago. She fervently supported Sberbank in its wish to buy 'Opel' and the failure of this transaction is a blow to Merkel.

There were metamorphoses in the views upon Russia of the latest chancellors. Let us take the example of Helmut Kohl who had had an extremely negative attitude to Russia at first but by the end of his governing he began to dispute the expansion of NATO to the Baltic States (in order not to provoke Moscow). Similar changes were seen in the views of Gerhard Schroder. After his first visit to Russia in 1998 the first thing he said on return was: 'There is sheer corruption there! Who shall I deal with there? Never in my life will I go there again!' To his mind, Kohl had done strikingly stupid things by sinking into Russia 6 billion dollars in 1997 just before the world crisis. But a year passed and Putin persuaded Schroder into making friends with Moscow.

There has been a special link between Russia and Germany for the last twenty years, and this link cannot be accounted for in the terms of political science. Russia's way to Europe may go through Germany.

Now Europe has come to its senses. Everybody has understood that we are threatened with shocks other that the old geopolitical conflicts of the 20th century. Terrorism has not been conquered. The financial and economic crisis is dramatically changing the existing world order. The USA have not been able to stabilize their economy and there are not many hopes for the USA to regain its previous positions. China is quickly approaching the role of the second world leader, which can augment the international tension in the foreseeable future. But in this volatile and worried world we can see new grandiose prospects of cooperation. The leading countries of the world, and the countries of Europe in particular began to join their efforts in coming out of the recession. The EU has proved that it is capable of effectively and jointly performing anti-crisis management functions.

What will the world be like in 10 years? By the year of 2019 the world order will have taken a different look.

The 'golden' half-century of progress and growth will be over. There will come hard times. We will have to solve new global problems. 8 billion people instead of 6 billion will have to live together on our planet. Will the mankind have sufficient vital forces and will there be enough resources on the Earth?

One thing is sure to happen, and I really want to believe it -Russia and the European Union will become a unified whole. Only in this way will the European civilization be able to survive. The historically right and the only acceptable idea of the United Europe is and will be absolutely urgent. Only after having achieved a level of complete continental consolidation will Europe be able to guarantee its status of a sovereign and independent subject of the world politics.

The process of Russia merging with China would become a disaster for Europe, which could in some 10 years lead to the appearance of a tremendous centrifugal superpower on the borders of Europe and, as a result, we will have to part with our national sovereignty and put our destiny into the hands of weakening America.

Russia is the second shoulder, America being the first; Europe should rely on both the shoulders if it wants to gain a firm ground in the world of tomorrow. But the USA could choose to retire to isolation due to domestic reasons. The Arab world might gain nuclear weapons, the modern architecture of security would then disappear as well as the ideals of the liberal world trade with WTO and other institutions. The Asian countries will gather strength and outstrip the spoilt Europeans.

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N. M. Rimashevskaya[242]
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LIFE QUALITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH
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A typical feature of the post-industrial society is profound and multi-aspect humanistic relations, when material and economical wealth is followed by expansion of human potential, with special attention to freedom of choice. Human resources theory has transformed into a freedom-oriented concept of development rather than a concept targeted at gross domestic product that provides output and consumption increase.

Consequently, life quality, being the basic value of each individual and society on the whole, is the way people identify themselves in cultural environment and in the system of values that they use to the advantage of their goals, expectations, standards and interests (The World Health Organization, 1997). The core essence of life quality is health of both an individual and a society on the whole. Physicians argue that the living standards have long been considered as the primary element of human life value, as it is important for a man not only to have long expectancy of life but to keep healthy, fit and energetic.

Life quality is determined by the solution to the three problems: how to live a long and healthy life, how to get relevant knowledge, how to get access to the resources providing high living standards.

Health plays a crucial role not only in the demographic development, it rather measures human resources of a country, character of economical resources and, most important, life quality evaluated in terms of health and longevity. Regardless of whether we want it or not, we have to admit that health is the main priority of social welfare, a touchstone of efficient social campaigns.

No wonder that economical and social achievements of any country are determined, first and foremost, by public health. Unfortunately, considering this situation in Russia on both pop-ulational and individual levels, we have to state that health status of the population is distressing. According to the life expectancy index Russia ranks the 100th country of the world, while the index of the disabled is 5 times as high as that in the developed countries. Besides, an average level of individual health grades 3 on the 5-score scale, the perfectly healthy total only 3 per cent of the population, the relatively healthy rate a quarter of the population, the satisfactorily healthy rate a bit more than two thirds of the population, the sick and the very sick total 8 per cent.

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[242] Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, an advisor to the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Laboratory for Gender Problems at the Institute for Socio-Economic Problems of the Population (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Dr. Sc. (Economics), professor, *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation. Ms Rimashevskaya is the author of over 450 scientific works, including monographs: *Ravenstvo Hi spravedlivost'* [Equality or Equity], *Okno v russkuyu chastnuyu zhizn'. Supruzheskiye pary v 1986 g.* [A Window into Russian Private Life. Married Couples in 1986], *Chelovek i reformy. Sekrety vyzhivaniya* [The Man and Reforms. Secrets of Survival], *Rossiya v globaliziruyuschemsya mire. Politiko-ekonomicheskie ocherki* [Russia in the Globalizing World. Politico-Economic Notes], Sberezheniye naroda [Preservation of the People], and others. Editor-in-chief of the journal *Narodonaseleniye* [Population], member of editorial boards of the journals: *Ekonomika i matematicheskiye metody* [Economics and Mathematical Methods], *Monitoring obschestvennogo mneniya* [Monitoring the Public Opinion], *Ekonomicheskiye i sotsial'nye peremeny* [Economic and Social Changes], *Trud i sotsial'nye otnosheniya* [Labour and Social Relations], *Intellectual Economics* (Lithuania).

Health behaviour reveals more dangerous tendencies as the curve keeps descending. In fact, more than a third of the newly-born have congenital disorders or fall ill immediately after birth. For the last 15 years this rate has grown 3 times as much. Special examinations show that every next generation turns out to have poorer health than the previous one, that is our children possess lower health potential than their parents, while their children's (our grandchildren's) potential is even lower. Official statistics report that from 1990 to 2008 disease incidence had grown 1.5 times as much.

Every year the number of healthy people in the reproductive age decreases, thus they reproduce a less healthy generation. (The sick give birth to the sick like the poor give birth to the poor). This is how the social whirlpool effect of disease is formed. This negative process can happen to become irreversible unless we bring it to a halt.

The data given above are veritable medical facts.

The gender paradox reveals no changes either: the male's life expectancy is 12-13 years less than the female's one whose individual health potential is much lower (this rate is higher in Russia than in other countries). It is caused by a whole set of objective and subjective factors than can't be left unnoticed. The woman is a depositary of human gene pool, but she bears a double burden in life, thus her current health is poorer compared to the man's. All the ideas to raise the retirement age of females are groundless, no matter how attractive they may seem to some people. We might increase not only the death rate, but the disability rate as well.

What is there to be done? How should we overcome a negative trend in public health?

Examinations of factors and causes of health decrement have been carried out for more than 25 years, they display 3 bodies of causes.

The first body of causes is new generation's vulnerability rooted in the high rate of the newly-born with congenital diseases (more than 30 per cent), when only 60 per cent of the newly-born are relatively healthy. But in the course of their life children lose health potential they had in the infantry rather than acquire it.

It is not by chance that official statistics displayed the following figures: the rate of healthy children is less than one third; more than a half have functional abnormalities, while the rest suffer from chronic diseases.

There are two main reasons for such a situation: (a) a low level of health of pregnant and nursing mothers, about 40 per cent of which suffer from anaemia. Meanwhile, it is a well-known fact that anaemia signifies a low level of material security; (b) almost half of children are born in the families with substandard income or at the edge of it.

The latter fact demands no comments.

The second body of causes lies within the lines of loss of labour motivation resulted from lowering remuneration of labour and unemployment. Cost of living that determines the poverty line and minimum remuneration of labour rate are only levelled and structured to provide physiological surviving. They depend on the level of social inequality that affects health in three ways. It causes public frustration, mass stress and breaks the dynamic stereotype of higher nervous activity. It leads to a decrease of immunity and body resistance to pathologic exposures, which in its turn leads to cardiovascular diseases, cancer and diabetes.

The third body of causes is based on a low level of life value which concerns both individuals and the whole population. It is partly based on the theory of 'economically efficient population' brought to Russia from outside. The main danger results from the lack of self-preservation in everyday routine, when a man has to convert his health into extra earnings because of low remuneration of labour.

It is obvious that the current health factors naturally depend on poverty and social polarization among the population.

It is known that poverty in Russia has a labour nature, as one third of it results from extremely low remuneration of labour of the employed population. Minimum earnings are 5-7 times as low as those in Europe and 10 times as low as those in the USA. About one quarter of the employed get payments below the cost of living.

Men in Russia live one year less than men in India, despite the fact that the income level in India is 3.5—4 times as low as that in Russia. It means that it is rather the distribution conditions of social product that negatively affect health than the level of income.

All the above-said proves that overcoming negative tendencies in public health is naturally connected with modernization of product distribution, which will allow not only to increase the living standards, but increase minimum wage as well as income factors. All this will help to meet the basic needs of every citizen at best through all his life from birth to death. Without these measures it is useless to talk about public health, as wishful thinking is pointless.

Russia has already formed mechanisms and tools to modernize product distribution, but the longer we postpone these measures, the more will we have to pay in terms of public health.

We are in need of resoluteness and political will.

Peter Roell[243]

MARITIME TERRORISM – A THREAT TO WORLD TRADE?

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Firstly, I would like to thank the St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences very much for inviting me to the l0Likhachov International Scientific Conference. I still remember the high-ranking and substantive deep discussions during the 9Likhachov Conference in St. Petersburg in May 2009 and the exciting cultural programme.

In my short lecture I would like to present three observations of our research work to you:

1. Maritime terrorism is not fiction but reality

2. „Choke Points" and mega harbours are in the focus of terrorists

3. In order to fight maritime terrorism and piracy cooperation between governments and the private sector is crucial

Definition of "Maritime Terrorism"

It is difficult to define maritime terrorism, particularly because the United Nations have so far not been able to find a binding definition for terrorism. The US Department of Defence defines terrorism as "unlawful use or threatened use or force of violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives".

I think that this definition can be useful to describe maritime terrorism too.

It is obvious – if we have a look at the attacks by pirates at the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean – that monetary reasons prevail, acts of hijacking and blackmailing cannot be defined as maritime terrorism but as Organised Crime.

Let me now come to my first observation.

Observation 1: Maritime terrorism is not fiction but reality

To analyse the maritime terrorist threats it is not enough to examine the capabilities and motives of terrorist groups, but also to examine the maritime industry, shipping practices, the vulnerability of trade shipping as well as countermeasures by the authorities and other institutions which are entrusted with the security of the shipping routes. Let me give some examples of planned or executed maritime terrorist attacks:

January 2000. Al-Qaida members carried out an unsuccessful attack in Aden against the USS Sullivans. But the boat, overloaded with explosives, sank before it could reach the target.

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[243] President of the Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (Berlin), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy). Mr Roell was a chief foreign policy and security advisor at the Permanent Representation of the Federative Republic of Germany to the European Union (Brussels). He is the author of a number of publications, such as *The 11th of September for India, Is Terrorism a War?*, and others.

October 2000. Successful Al-Qaida attack against the US destroyer USS Cole in Yemen. 17 US sailors were killed, 39 wounded.

June 2002. Members of Al-Qaida, who had planned attacks against British and US ships in the Strait of Gibraltar, were arrested by Morocco's secret service.

October 2002. A terror group from Yemen, having connections with Al-Qaida, attacked the French oil tanker Lim-burg off the harbour of Ash Shahir. One crew member was killed, others wounded. 90 0000 tons of oil polluted in the Gulf of Aden. As a result the monthly container transhipment in Yemen declined from 43 000 to 3 000 containers. 3 000 dockers lost their jobs and the national economy contracted by 1 % GDP.

February 2004. Bomb attack by the Abu Sayyaf group against a passenger ferry in the Philippines. Over 100 people were killed.

August 2005. Israel's security service Shin Bet warned four Israeli cruise liners – on their passage to Turkey – about a possible terror attack and redirected the ships to Cyprus.

July 2009. Egypt's security authorities prevented an attack against the Suez Canal and the adjacent oil pipeline. According to sources in Cairo the terror group consisted of 24 Egyptians and one Palestinian.

January 2010. Egyptian authorities investigated a new suspected terrorist group which planned attacks against US ships in the Suez Canal. This group also planned to deliver weapons and explosives to the Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Due to the knowledge of Western intelligence services some islamistic terror groups have declared, that it is their aim to interrupt Western supply lines. The 2man of Al-Qaida, Aiman Al-Sawahri: "We must stop the West plundering the oil of Muslims."

Often, people claim that terrorist groups could probably form alliances with organised crime groups and pirates. But so far there is no hard proof that criminal elements, such as pirates in Somalia, are working together with terrorist organisations. However, it could be that the pirates in Somalia are contributing to terrorist organisations by paying some form of protection money.

Islamistic terror groups isolate themselves extremely and are suspicious of outsiders, especially when they do not share the same ideology. It is worthwhile to note that during the last 15 years only 2 % of all terrorist attacks could be assigned to maritime terrorism. Although maritime terrorist attacks cannot be excluded in the future and should not be played down, special operational capabilities are required which the terrorists probably have not yet at their disposal.

In this context we should not forget the plans of Al-Qaida chief planner for maritime terrorism, Abd Al Rahman Al Na-shiri, also known as the Prince of the Sea, who was arrested in November 2002 in the United Arab Emirates. Nashiri had developed a strategy including the following four elements:

Ramming or blowing up medium-sized ships in the vicinity of other ships or in harbours;

Attacking super tankers from the air with small planes, laden with explosives;

Underwater attacks against ships using divers; Attacks against cruise liners and taking hostages.

Observation 2: „Choke points" and mega harbours are in the focus of terrorists

Terrorists will ask themselves at which locations they can decisively hit the infrastructure of the industrialised world because up to now the maritime terrorist attacks have not seriously threatened world trade. They will direct their attention to so-called choke points and mega harbours as 75 % of the international ocean traffic with approximately 50 000 ships is processed in approximately 2 800 harbours.

As many of the biggest harbours in the world are located in East and Southeast Asia and most of the trade is directed via sea routes in this region, terrorists will pay special attention to this region in their target planning. This may include the following harbours: Kobe, Tokyo, Yokohama, Pusan, Shanghai, Kaohsiung, Hong Kong and Singapore. Of course, also mega harbours in the United States and in Europe such as Los Angeles or Rotterdam, may be in the focus of terrorists.

The strategically important Straits of Malacca is one of the critical choke points. It connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the Pacific. It is the most important trade route

between the Far East, the Golf States and Europe. 90 000 ships per year pass the Straits of Malacca. One third of the world trade, 80 % of oil imports for East Asia and two third of the worldwide liquid gas transports go via this route.

A terror attack, for example the sinking of a tanker in the Straits of Malacca, would block the straits. Ships would have to make a detour of 1 000 km via the Indonesian Strait of Sunda and Flores. The ships would have to be at sea for 2 extra days, which would result in 8 billion US dollars additional costs per year. Freight and insurance rates would increase and the market price for all transported goods would also increase in a short period of time with negative economic effects on the region and world trade.

Blown up container ships could block harbours for weeks -quite apart from an attack in one of the 20 mega harbours with a so-called dirty bomb. A closure of the Singapore harbour for example, would cost more than 200 billion US dollars per year.

Also the terrorist attack of a fully loaded gas tanker in one of the mega harbours would have a devastating effect on the world trade and provide terrorists with an event comparable to 9/11 – one of their stated goals.

But terrorist attacks can also be expected at other choke points such as the Straits of Hormuz, Bab al Mandat, the Suez Canal, Bosporus, Straits of Gibraltar or the Panama Canal. We in Europe should also not forget the English Channel.

In conclusion: Yes, world trade is potentially threatened by maritime terrorism.

Observation 3: Fighting potential maritime terrorism and piracy cooperation between state institutions and the private sector is crucial

An efficient cooperation between states could improve the maritime security situation.

An example for this is the more intensive and successful cooperation between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia during the last few years.

As a result, pirate attacks in Indonesia have been reduced from 121 in the year 2003 to 15 in 2009. In the Straits of Malacca we also could observe a positive development.

In 2004, 38 attacks were recorded, in 2009 only 2. A similar development can be seen in the Straits of Singapore: 8 attacks in 2004, 9 attacks in 2009 – a slight increase.

The situation off the Horn of Africa is very different. In the year 2009, 217 incidents were registered. 47 ships were hijacked, 867 seamen were taken hostage. Whereas in 2008 pirate attacks concentrated at the Gulf of Aden, in 2009 more ships were attacked off the coast of Somalia. Since October 2009 attacks in the Indian Ocean increased, 33 incidents were registered – including 13 hijackings. Many attacks took place within a distance of 1 000 nautical miles from Moghadishu.

The presence and the cooperation of international naval forces to fight piracy in the region has had a positive effect. Several attempts by the pirates to hijack ships could be prevented.

Also helpful is the Container Security Initiative (CSI), initiated by the United States in 2002. The aim of this programme is to identify – out of the 230 million containers which are transported by sea every year – those containers with weapons of mass destruction or dangerous nuclear substances which could be used by terrorists for their attacks. Containers, designated for the United States, are checked at the harbour of departure. At present, US officials are working in more than 46 harbours.

However, US plans to examine all US-bound containers are unrealistic and moreover, impossible. Timely intelligence is here the name of the game.

In cooperation with state organisations and the industry, technical means are also used to protect against potential terror attacks. For example, the scanning of huge containers, the use of Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD) which proved to be very effective when pirates tried to attack the cruise liner Sea-bourne Spirit on Nov 5, 2005.

Furthermore, anti-boarding systems, such as 9 000-Voltprotective-fences for merchant ships make the boarding for pirates or terrorists more difficult. Also unmanned 'inventus systems' are used. Equipped with cameras, they are capable of searching large ocean areas and transmit data to a ship or to a ground station.

I also would like to draw your attention to a new trend. Due to the intensive attacks against ships, the loss of sea freight, the increase of insurance rates and the resulting losses of 16 billion US dollars annually, states are intensifying their cooperation with private security companies, which are specialised in maritime security. In this field, British and US companies are playing a leading role. The use of armed guards on board ships is however highly controversial, many ship owners reject this measure as they believe that this would result in an escalation of force.

Given the configuration of modern naval warships, designed to counter the threat of other modern Navies, it becomes clear that such ships are unsuitable to counter terrorists or counter piracy operations. We can either resort to the private sector, which could protect cargo vessels by deploying guards on board, or governments need to build and deploy suitable naval vessels designed to counter this new threat.

Another solution would be the deployment of Marines on board ships, reminiscent of Allied convoys during the Second World War.

If we understand security policy in a more comprehensive way, that means the political, economic, social, ecological and military dimensions must be considered together and must be brought together, then maritime terrorism can only be fought successfully in cooperation between state institutions and the private sector.

Let me finish my short statement with a motto that has guided NATO for many years and has provided peace, freedom and security to all of us: Vigilance is the price of freedom.

Mehdi Sanai[244]

AN ISLAMIC ATTITUDE TO DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS

The mankind more and more precisely realizes, that civilizations, existing in the contemporary world, are capable, owe and can coexist with each other. They may cooperate and whenever possible to supplement and to improve each other. Proceeding from this, and also taking into account existing level of scientific and technical progress, it is possible to reach a conclusion about necessity of stronger relations between various cultures and, accordingly, between various civilizations.

The initiatives of President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mr. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami concerning the idea of dialogue of civilizations as a primary factor in the contemporary world are related to deep comprehension of this necessity. In view of this necessity he marks: «Dialogue of civilizations is a stimulus for formation of universal model of the international relations' improvement in order to exclude the unilateral approaches and monologue in politics and culture*.

Thus it is necessary to take into account, that civilization should not be understood as the mechanical sum of making elements (countries, peoples or regions). It should be considered in view of the new system quality, acquired by it in process «of integrated effect». For example, for the Muslim civilization the word of God played a role of such «integrated effect». Really the Muslim civilization – one of few civilizations, which has arisen and spread on the basis of one Holy Scripture – Holy Koran». (Khatami S.M. Speech at the UN meeting dedicated to Dialogue of Civilizations, p. 54.)

Here it is necessary to note, that making elements of the Muslim civilization's system were peoples and countries, which up to the appearance of Holy Koran sharply differed from each

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[244] Member of Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Director of Research Centre for Russia and Eastern Europe at the University of Tehran (Iran), professor of the Law Institute at Tehran University, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies). He is the author of books: *Along the Great Silk Road... Encounters on the Kazakh Land, Relations between Iran and the CIS Countries of Central Asia: Social, Political and Economic Aspects, The Muslim Law and Politics* (a study guide), *Relations between Iran and Russia,* and of numerous scientific articles. He is the honorary member of the Writers' Union in Russia, a member of Kazakh Academy for Social Sciences, an advisor to *The Encyclopaedia of Islamic World* on Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

other in ethnic, socioeconomic, geographical attributes and were at various levels of cultural development. Just the following to a divine appeal has served as the powerful integrating factor, which has allowed the Muslim civilization to be formed.

But at the same time, all system making components of the Muslim civilization, i.e. the Muslim peoples, keep both cultural features and originality, each of which in its own way nourishes and enriches a civilization (Muslim): «Exactly the secret of a variety and abundance of achievements of the Muslim culture and civilization consists in it: the uniform Word of God has caused set of various interpretations and variety of the forms of expression)).

The important ways of realization of dialogue among various, in particular, the Muslim and the Western (frequently subdivided by the politologists and sociologists on European and North-American), civilizations are abilities «to speak», «to lis-ten» and «to understand)).

From this point of view each representative of the humankind is a «personality» who is a carrier of both general features and originality of each culture, to which he/she belongs. «In a human being soul of the East and reason of the West are concentrated, and denying of these two making parts of an essence of a human being has made our understanding of his essence defective and unsufficient».

The given situation in Islam proceeds from the doctrine of Holy Koran, in which to all representatives of monotheistic religions (Muslims, Christians, Jews, Sabaeans, Zoroastrians etc.) any benefits are promised and the tolerance and skill to listen to each other are attributed.

In this process God considers as the important means study of sciences. That is why the first Ayat (Divine Revelation) received by the Prophet of Islam began by words «read» (Koran, 96-1). Following the divine instructions, the Prophet of Islam gave the important meaning to a science and instructed all his followers to search for scientific knowledge. Really, it is one of the most reliable ways of inter-civilizational communications and of dialogue among them, as Islam does not recognize any borders in questions of cultivation of scientific and cultural values.

So, the important property of the Islamic doctrine is tolerance, which is offered to all members of the Islamic Umma. For example, Ali Ibn Abutaleb (Peace to him!) in the letter to the Egyptian deputy Malek Ashtar wrote: ((Kindness in relation to all citizens (irrespective of religious belonging. – *M.S.)* and friendship with them consider as an attire of the heart ... For there are only two groups of citizens: your brothers on religion and similar to you on creation)). (Green Memory. From "Nahdj ul Balaga", p. 14.)

In the other case, speaking about necessity to differ meaning of stated opinions from those who state them, he marks: «Do not look who speaks, and look for the content of the speech». That is, acceptable and esteemed there should be ideas and cultural values serving to interests of the mankind, instead of taking into account those who state them and from what positions they sound.

Renaissance was the important display of centuries-old dialogue of the East and the West in the field of culture. Contrary to opinions of some ideologists and historians, it is impossible to consider Renaissance as mechanical revival of the Ancient culture in Europe. Even on that simple reason, that before its revival in Europe, the Ancient culture (mainly philosophy) revived and was improved in the East, basically in the Muslim world. The Ancient philosophy, as the set of various humanitarian and in the whole as world outlook-ethical sciences, was reconsidered, systematized and enriched by such scholars of the Muslim world, as Al-Farabi, Avicenna, Ibn Rushd and others and was used in the next centuries by the European scientists.

The Muslim scholars developed and introduced many scientific disciplines, new to the medieval epoch. It is possible to name among them algebra (Al-Khorezmi), chemistry (Al-Jab-er, known in Europe as Al-Gaber), systematized medicine (Avicenna) etc. The large influences on development of the European literature have rendered Firdausi, Omar Khayyam, Hafiz and other representatives of the Muslim literature.

So, from the beginning the epoch of the European Renaissance in many respects is obliged to works of Eastern and first of all Muslim scholars. It was the epoch of a rough and rather fruitful exchange of scientific, ethical and aesthetic values.

Also is remarkable that contrary to the statements of many researchers of this epoch, Renaissance was not the period of withdrawal from religious values, and «other image of the religious man opened by Renaissance appeared to the world». (Khatami S. M. Soul of the East

and reason of the West are in a human being, R 44) The mutual openness of the world and a human being – basic idea of Renaissance, having in itself deep religious meaning. For Renaissance was directed on strengthening, refinement and distribution of religion, but not against it.

President Khatami offers dialogue between civilizations for the correct, humane and practical solution of many global issues of our time, such as: family crisis, ecology crisis, crisis of ethical character in relation to some directions of scientific research, crisis in the international political relations and so on.

Apart from that there are two ways of realization of dialogue of civilizations: 1. Their interaction during long time. This process is caused by natural development of events, geographical or historical reasons, and does not depend on someone's choice or will. Similar interactions were carried out for centuries, for example, between Iranians and Greeks in the Ancient times, and later between Europe and Asia on the Great Silk way etc. 2. Dialogue of civilizations and cultures by means of dialogue between their representatives. Such form of dialogue is accomplished through purposeful activity, which has not been caused by historical or geographical factors.

Pointing out to all growing importance of full value and comprehensive dialogue of cultures and civilizations, we at the same time deny possibility of conducting similar dialogue from a position of strength, imposing secularism, pressure and deterrence.

The dialogue of cultures assumes multipolar world and denies planetary changes in the sphere of globalization, which is directed on creation of more extensive commodity markets and absorption of national cultures by one prevailing culture.

The dialogue of civilizations is the only possible, but simultaneously complex and necessary lever of preservation of peace and stability on the planet. It is a stimulus for formation of universal model of improvement of the international relations, which does not admit the unilateral approaches and monologue in politics, religion and culture. It allows public

opinion to condemn any methods of the solution of the international and international conflicts and disagreements by force.

From this point of view many aspects of the international law require radical change. For they were elaborated in the previous decades, mainly in the interests of the Western politicians and public circles, without due reflection of interests of the Eastern and, in particular, Muslim countries.

The tendency to globalization should proceed and to assume multipolarity of the contemporary world with the account of: appearance of new morals, new collective right on the basis of the international institutes and laws, strengthening of the sovereignty and democracy in all states, increase of their responsibility on the international questions. For this purpose it is necessary, that all components of the international system (states and civil institutions) could actively and equally participate in elaboration and in adoption of decisions. (Khatami S. M. Soul of the East and reason of the West are in a human being, P. 47).

I consider that the events of September 11, 2001 cannot be a refutation of the doctrine of dialogue of civilizations. But these events are also convincing arguments that for solution of collected problems the mankind more than ever requires constructive and constant dialogue of civilizations existing in the world. Naturally, condemning any displays of terrorism, it is necessary to note, that for prevention of similar accidents the greater participation and greater mutual knowledge of various religions, cultures and civilizations of the West and the East on the international arena is necessary.

V. G. Schastny[245]
UNESCO'S ROLE IN PRESERVATION AND HARMONIZATION OF NATIONAL CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION

The stated purpose of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is to promote cooperation of nations in all spheres of intellectual activities, in international educational, scientific and cultural exchange, and also in exchange of publications, objects of art, laboratory equipment and various useful documentation. On the other hand, UNESCO defies any interference into domestic affairs of its members to guarantee their independence, immunity, cultural and educational identity.

UNESCO has been pursuing this dialectical practice for sixty five years now. How is balance achieved between the two, sometimes totally different, trends: profound international cooperation and opposition to cultural globalization?

UNESCO succeeds in doing so through making norms and regulations, for the first place. A number of international documents related to culture have been developed and adopted by UNESCO. Three of the conventions are of vital importance.

The 1972 *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage* stipulates the participation of all the States Parties to this Convention in protection and conservation of cultural and national heritage through international assistance and cooperation, since some items regarded as national and cultural heritage are of outstanding value and, therefore, should be preserved as part of the world heritage. Consequently, the world heritage objects situated on the State Parties' territory are considered subject to international jurisdiction.

The 2003 *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* is another important Convention that stipulates the measures to preserve and protect traditional cultures within the context of globalization. The preamble to the Convention admits that the processes of globalization and social transformation, alongside with the conditions they create for a renewed dialogue among the communities, also give rise, as does the phenomenon of intolerance, to grave threats of deterioration, disappearance and destruction of the intangible cultural heritage. According to the Convention, the 'intangible cultural heritage' means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural environments associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage.

While the outlines for the abovementioned Conventions were discussed by particular experts and panels, the elaboration of the 2005 *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* resulted in an international confrontation. The Convention was initiated by a number of European states, Belgium in particular. The essence of the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity – the Convention's predecessor – is clearly seen in its title. The on-growing dominance of mass culture, mainly one certain state's cinema, made even the countries with a developed culture take of measures of a decisively protective character. The reason for them was in the dependence of states on the framework of international financial institutes (e.g. WTO) that limit the funding of national projects, cinema and television in particular, to guarantee free competition. The Convention (though its title is somewhat obscure)

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[245] Chairman of the National Committee of the Belarusian Republic on UNESCO, a diplomatic official. Ambassador-at-large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Belarusian Republic, representative of the Belarusian Republic to UNESCO's Executive Council.

He served as an official in the United Nations Secretariat, New York, in the 1990s he was charge d'affaires of the Belarusian Republic to the Republic of Lithuania, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Belarusian Republic to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as well as an Ambassador with concurrent accreditation to Ireland.

He is also known as a translator and a playwright.

He is decorated with the Francysk Skoryna Medal, the UNESCO commemorative medal, he was twice awarded with the Certificate of Honour of the Council of Ministers of Belarus and the Certificate of Honour of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is also awarded with the commemorative tokens as Honorary Archival Officer and For the Contribution of the Promotion Belarusian Culture.

provided an opportunity to refer to the international communal opinion that adopted this document with overwhelming majority.

So what are the methods used by UNESCO in pursuing its goals in cultural domain, the practices that are ratified by its documents?

A number of publications of global importance are being issued under the auspices and with the assistance of UNESCO (for example, the multi-volume *Universal History).* Within the context of the UNESCO's Memory of the World (MoW) programme established in 1992 the International Register was launched. It includes 197 inscriptions of outstanding universal value. This programme and also the World Digital Library provide an access to the world cultural heritage. Furthermore, the latest information technologies provide vast opportunities for a shared access to the cultural heritage. As an example we may refer to the international projects with the participation of Belorussia's cultural establishments such as the virtual reconstruction of the Radziwill library and archive, M. Oginski's archive, the Chreptowicz library. Thus, implementation of the decentralization principle gave rise to some new trends in national and regional cooperation. They were fixed by the Agreement on Cooperation between UNESCO and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which was signed in Moscow with the assistance of the UNESCO Moscow Office. The International Conference 'The UNESCO Conventions in the Field of the Protection of Cultural Heritage and National Legislation of the CIS Countries' was held in the city of Minsk, the Republic of Belarus, in 2007. The participants exchanged opinions on the issues of regional character in the field of the protection of cultural heritage. The first meeting of regional experts with international assistance took place in the city of Minsk, in February 2010 at the 'Arts Education in the CIS States: problems and perspectives of development of the creative potential in the 21st century'. It resulted in signing the Conception of educational development in the field of culture and art of the CIS States Parties. The national training UNESCO/ICOM (International Council of Museums) 'Running a Museum – 21 century' was held in the Republic of Belarus in April.

If we review the role of UNESCO at the regional, and first of all, at the national level, we may see that it acts like a catalyst of some particular activity trends in the field of culture because of its authority among the States Parties. This is valid for the preservation of both tangible and intangible heritage. For example,, our country has started to take the preservation of traditional culture as providing for its viability, but not as mere archiving.

Thus, UNESCO takes national interests of the States Parties with due regard. And this is the key to its success. Such approach promotes a cornerstone principle of UNESCO – to provide for clearness of its activities.

Within the context of this approach more than twenty national and regional projects of cooperation with UNESCO are held annually in the Republic of Belarus. The majority of these projects are in the cultural sphere.

The United Nations General Assembly, under the UNESCO initiative, has proclaimed 2010 International Year for the Harmonization of Cultures. It will be a good reason to evaluate UNESCO's unique mandate, the main goal of which is to promote the information on the world heritage, on its conservation and preservation and on the protection of cultural diversity. In the conditions of globalization the implementation of these modalities are becoming even more conspicuous, making us realize the difference between the notions of 'globalization' (with its negative after-effects) and the 'global culture'.

M.V. Seslavinsky[246]

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[246] Head of the Federal Agency on Mass Media and Mass Communications (since 2004).

He was elected people's deputy of the Russian Federation (1990-93), twice held the office term of the Deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia, was in charge of the issues of education, culture and science. He chaired the Russian Union of Culture, was Head of the Russian Federal Agency on Television and Radio. Held the

RUSSIA AND FRANCE:
A HALF-FORGOTTEN PAGE OF ARTISTS' AND EDITORS' CULTURAL COOPERATION

1. After the famous Diaghilev seasons that triggered Russian and French marathon of cultural cooperation and encouraged their mutual benefit in the 20th century, another significant stage appeared, namely the cooperation between Russian artists and French editors in the period between the two World wars.

A number of research papers have been published lately about Russian immigrant artists who found themselves in France after the October Revolution of 1917. They include both general studies and a series of books devoted to some famous figures whose life and art present a thrilling and exciting material that may carry the researcher away to the last-century Paris to live through all the hardships of the Russian artistic immigrant community.

However, French publications of prominent Russian masters of painting and graphic arts lack profound studies so far. This issue is frequently cast aside or marginally touched upon in various studies, unlike exhibitions or theatrical life.

Many Russian artists illustrated French books, their number varies and can be estimated as 130-150 people. Those artists' ethnic background was of no particular importance at the time: all immigrants from Russia were considered Russians, as a rule. The number of the artists varies as a result from the fact that the majority of such illustrations were cartoons in periodicals, advertising booklets and posters, opera and ballet programmes. Some artists were more talented, some were less; some created illustrations for dozens of books, some for just a couple. The books included both bibliophilic luxury volumes published in a very limited number of copies and ordinary books for popular reading by a wide range of customers.

But, on the whole, the decades of flourishing cooperation between Russian immigrant artists and French publishers had contributed immensely to both publishing history and world art and culture. It is this contribution that can serve a brilliant explication for the famous quotation by Nina Berberova about the first wave of Russian immigration: 'We aren't in the exile, we are on a mission.'

2. Bibliophilic volumes publishing had become a separate branch of book printing by the mid-19th century in France. Certainly, richly-illustrated luxury volumes of limited editions had also existed in the previous century, but it was only since 1860s that some publishers made it their profession to issue books for bibliophiles. Among such pioneers was Auguste Pouet-Malassis, who published poems by Charles Baudelaire and Alphonse Lemerre, as well as works by Paul Verlaine, Al-phonse Daudet, Anatole France, Leconte de Lisle and other famous authors.

In the early 20th century a constellation of outstanding artists started working in the field of book printing. This branch of typographic art flourished, first and foremost, thanks to Am-broise Vollard (1866-1939), the successful collector, art dealer and publisher.

During the first Word War and immediately afterwards reasons that are quite clear prevented printing bibliophilic volumes. However, in the 1920s a boom began in the business.

High franc devaluation rate promoted investments into rare books and objects of art. The column 'Book Stock' appeared in various newspapers and magazines, which contributed greatly to profiteering activities. Rare books would be quickly purchased and disposed of, the price spiralling 2-3 times per week.

Despite such bibliophilic business being sort of adventurous in its nature, the situation gingered up the growth of luxury books market as well as new publishing houses forthcoming.

In 1986 a thorough four-volume work entitled *History of French Book Printing* came out under the editorship and supervision of professors Henri-Jean Martin and Roger Chartier. The last

volume includes a brilliant article 'Luxurious Series' by Antoine Coron who at that time was holding a position of Director of the Rare Books Treasury at the French National Library.

The author of this article shows a most interesting diagram of luxurious series published in France from 1874 to 1945. It clearly demonstrates the outburst in printing such books in the 1920s-1930s. The rate totalled 300-400 percents.

A number of publishing houses considers issuing luxurious well-illustrated volumes to be one of priorities in the editing policy, while others publish such volumes sporadically or as a pilot scheme. Anyway, the number of the publishers is increasingly growing, though their market activity can be very short.

At that period Marc Chagall creates a colossal abundance of book illustrations, among them being the ones forN. Gogol's *The Dead Souls,* La Fontaine's *Fables* and the Bible. These series of pictures about 100 pieces each were ordered by Ambroi-se Vollard, but the economic crisis of the early 1930s, and later his tragic death in 1939 as well as the beginning of the Second World War postponed a sound and full-rate publication of these ambitious projects. Advancing the topic, I would like to point out that *The Dead Souls* were published in 1948 in 368 copies due to the efforts of Eugene Terriard. The artist received the Grand Prix of Venice Biennale for this series of illustrations, the edition immediately turning into a bibliophilic rarity.

In the decades between the World wars the market segment of printing bibliophilic luxury volumes experienced a recession during the economic crisis of 1930-31. The price on bibliophilic editions depreciated greatly both in book shops and at black-market purchases. However, the period of 1932-38 witnessed rehabilitation (though not so magisterial and pompous) of luxury volumes segment of the market. But the total number of publishing houses specializing in such books could be counted on fingers.

Gradual growth in the market of bibliophilic volumes followed the shock of the first year of occupation in France.

It is particularly worth noting that immediately after France had been occupied the majority of publishers and artists of

Jewish origin had either to move away and settle in the un-conquered parts of France, or leave the country for good to save their lives from the anti-Semitic policy of Hitler's Reich. Among those who experienced those hardships were publishers Jean Schifrin, Fernand Nathan, artists Grigory Gluckmann, Leo Zach, Marc Chagall and others.

3. The volumes with frivolous and erotic illustrations deserve an individual treatment. Such editions have traditionally existed in France since the 18th century forming a specific sector of typographic culture. This topic is well-studied in the French bibliographic works, the volumes being examined and presented in a special substantive catalogue created by Jean-Pierre Dutel. He described 933 editions published from 1880 to 1920 and 1728 editions published from 1920 to 1970.

Actually, in the initial period frivolous pictures illustrating such kind of books only accompanied this type of literature, also developing in the French culture for three centuries.

At the end of 2007 a large exhibition was held in the French National Library. Erotic manuscripts, books, engravings and sketches were presented there. The exhibition was called 'L'Enfer' (Inferno), because that was the name of securely concealed closets, shelve stands or lockers where the largest libraries of France have kept erotic editions since 1830. Arranging an instalment of such a kind serves a good example of the fact that this segment of art and book printing is considered to be an integral part of the French culture.

Such volumes were abundantly published in 1920s-1930s, sometimes they were even arranged into series. But those editions rarely had true publisher's imprints especially if they contained eroticism bordering with pornography. No wonder that this segment of book publishing is presented mostly with either anonymous and illegal books or the ones of fictitious publishing houses located in other countries, mostly in Holland. Sometimes such editions were really printed in Holland that was much more tolerant to the rules of morality, but nevertheless, they were French volumes.

Russian artists like Yuri Annenkov and Feodor Rozhank-ovsky frequently applied their brilliant drawing skills in this genre nimbly creating sketches of that sort. This work was

profitable and remunerative and the artists seemed to enjoy it, as a lot of separate artworks of erotic and even pornographic figures (that were not ordered by any publishing projects) can be traced at the antiquarian arts market and in various collections.

4. French bibliologic works describe and classify bibliophilic volumes in the terms that differ from Russian ones that our experts are accustomed to.

One of the widely used terms is *livres d'art* that specifies artistically bound, richly decorated and well-illustrated volumes printed for bibliophilic purposes. It is exactly this term that was used by a famous Russian fine-art and museum expert Yuri A. Russakov, who published a number of works about such volumes illustrated by famous French artists.

Bibliognost Antoine Coron uses the general term *livres de luxe* that involves not only richly decorated book but all those that we in Russia call luxury ones; and *livres de peintre* that stands for unique books the layout of which is entirely created by artists, including the text, illustrations, cover, font, headpiece and end-piece, etc. In this case the artist uses the book form as the medium to create freely and to have freedom of artistic expression.

Russian bibliology hardly ever uses these terms in their literal meaning. 'Artist's book' and 'luxury volume' frequently refer just to richly-illustrated or quality editions of the early 20th century, various albums on art history or the books that in the Soviet times used to be called 'gift-books'. However, lately the term 'artist's book' has been commonly used in Russia in the meaning similar to that used by French bibliographers and experts. But the history of this term in Russia is too short, it refers, mostly, to publishing pilot projects. At least, world famous, prominent Russian artists did not leave this country any remarkable evidence of their works in this genre.

A widely-spread term in Russian bibliography and book printing industry is a 'bibliophilic edition'. A famous scholar, bibliographer, expert and encyclopaedist Oleg G. Lasunsky uses this term in his article of the Book Encyclopaedia published in 1999. It was also used by a famous researcher and propagator of antiquarian books studies, professor of Moscow State University of Press Olga L. Tarakanova. They both use definitions of this term based on the idea that bibliophilic editions are designed for a limited number of readers (namely, for collectors afld bibliographers), and differ from mass printed books by a set of typical features. If we compare these features with French bibliophilic categories of 'artist's books' and 'luxury books', we may notice very much in common.

5. A number of laws on free secular education was passed in France in the 1880s-1890s, initiated by a famous liberal political figure of that time Jules Ferry. Women could enjoy those laws, too, which resulted in gradual large-scale liberal anticlerical changes.

After the first World War a new type of children's libraries started to spread. It was initiated and funded by the American Committee for Library Service to Children. The new libraries called *L 'Heure Joyeuse* (Happy Hour) admitted children's open access to shelve stands, provided reading halls, held a lot of children's parties and were user-centred. It should be pointed out that French public libraries had been much more primitive in their set up: a child received books over the counter or through a small door window.

Extensive growth of children's readership gradually and inevitably resulted in the fact that the publishers realized the urge to produce well-illustrated quality books.

The decades between the World wars witnessed the outburst in traditional and *de luxe* children's books printing as well as flourish of typographic industry.

Pictorial pop-out books for young children were printed on the board, they gave summaries of popular works of literature, and those regular series transfigured children's book market. Parents would more often hear pledges to buy their kids' favourite series and weed off money, so this segment of typographic industry advanced further.

Russian artists illustrating children's books were employed by the two publishing houses: 'Flammarion' and 'Gallimard' that topped the list of the three leading publishers. Their activities were influenced and supervised by a scholar, educator, publisher Paul Fauche (1898-1967), who called for launching a national children's book publishing programme based on humanistic principles to cultivate the aestheticism in children. Paul Fauche seemed to have been well-informed about children's book publishing programmes in the Soviet Union, successfully carried

out at that time. Two large-scale exhibitions were held in Paris, they presented Soviet children's printed production richly illustrated by outstanding Soviet artists.

That served a good reason for Marina Tsvetaieva to write an article called 'On new Russian books for children' in the magazine ' Volya Rossiyi' (The Will of Russia), in which she described her impressions as follows:

'There is one thing in Russia that can be admired, it is booklets for young children. I mean 15-30 page books thin as school notebooks. It is the first time in the history of the world that a state has treated a child seriously. Just fancy – a young child under 6 – seriously. In England a child stops the traffic when he crosses the street. In Russia a child puts many processes in motion. "His majesty the child", the words were said in Europe, but put into life in Russia.'

It should be pointed out that the Soviet publishing house 'Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga' (International Book) translated a number of children's books with marvellous illustrations

into French and other languages and issued them for European readers.

Thorough preparations had been made by the publishing houses of 'Gallimard' and 'Flammarion' before the programmes of children's book printing were launched. A famous scholar and propagator of a high quality children's book Paul Fauche conducted extensive research together with child psychologists on the form and design of children's books, trying to foresee the young readers' reaction. Manuscripts were tested on various audiences. Eye specialists even advised on better layout, setting and print.

Children's book printing business demonstrated a serious outbreak with a brilliant work 'Mon Chat' (My cat) by Nathalie Parain that came out in 1930 in 'Gallimard'. Paul Fauche invited her to collaborate with this publishing house as well as with 'Flammarion' and made sure that children fairy-tales series had lasted through the 1930s. Before the second World War 25 books illustrated by that talented Russian artist were published, in 1941 she was awarded with *le Prix du Centenaire de I 'Académie des Beaux Arts* [the centenarian prize of the French Academy of Fine Arts]. In 1944 she received *le Prix* for her achievements from this academy.

The book series called 'Skazki Kota-Murlyki' (Tales of the Perched Cat) by Marcel Ayme illustrated by Parain, also included several books with pictures in Nathan Airman's individual style, they appear to be treasures now taking into account the fact that in his French period he left few samples of graphic arts in 'adult' books.

The 'Flammarion' publishing house was even more active in attracting Russian artists. They issued their most famous children's brand 'Papa Beaver's Albums', apart from Nathalie Parain's picture play books *Je fais mes masques* (I Make My Masks), *Je découpe* (I Scissor Out), many other artists took part in creating these series, among them were Ivan Bilibin's *Kovyor-samolyot* (The Flying Carpet), *Rusalochka* (A Little Mermaid); Feodor Rozhankovsky's many books about wild and domestic animal life; Alexandra Exter's play book *My Garden* with pictures to scissor out; famous folder books *Panorama du fleuve* (Panorama of the River), *Panorama de la côte* (Panorama of the Bank), *Panorama de la montagne* (Panorama of the Mountain).

Children's books were so popular and in such demand that publishing market sector had a place for everyone concerned.

6.1 would like to mention a prominent top ten 'golden' list of French publishing houses that collaborated with Russian artists in that period. First of all, it involves^the famous publishing house 'Le editions de la Pleiade' that specialized in bibliophilic editions. It was headed and run by a patriot of Russian graphical and book art Jacob (Jean) Chifrin. His contribution deserves a special study. Market leaders of French printing business, the houses of 'Gallimard' and 'Flammarion', follow it. Besides them, some other publishing houses that issued books illustrated by Russian artists are worth mentioning: 'Au Sans PareiP' whose name can be translated as 'the incomparable'; 'Les editions Mornay' whose owners attracted the artist Ivan (Jean) Lebedev; 'Nathan' that was famous for its series of historical novels; 'J. Ferenczi & Fils' whose active employee was Yuri Cherkesov; 'Fayard' that issued series of popular illustrated books; 'La Sirene' that published the famous *Skazka o Tsare Saltane* (The Tale of Tsar Sultan) illustrated by Natalia Gon-charova; 'L'Editions d'art H. Piazza' famous for bibliophilic volumes with graphic works by Boris Zworykin.

7. The present year has been claimed the year of Russia in France and France in Russia, it is a splendid chance to remember this stage of out mutual cooperation. In this respect, the Federal Agency of Press is holding the exhibition 'Rendezvous: Russian Artists in French Book Publishing' in Moscow and Paris. The exhibition installs more than 100 selected books created by international cooperation of publishers and artists.

Yu. S. Shemshuchenko[247],
A. V. Kresin[248]

COMPARATIVE LAW: MAIN STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AND ROLE IN THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND CIVILIZATIONS

Comparative law, as is justly pointed out in economically, politically and culturally most developed countries, has a great progress capacity both for advancing legal science and for affecting and enhancing international cooperation and economic relations; it also makes its impact on political and legal reforms, education in the sphere of social science and the humanities, as well as shapes democratic pluralistic views of the young generation.

Comparative law is abounding in methods and concepts, it can promote innovations and assist in overcoming a methodological crisis in jurisprudence and in social sciences and the humanities in general. Systematic state-encouraged comparative law research is the sign of the state's maturity, shows that the state is eager to keep a high profile in international affairs, to pursue a balanced and successful foreign policy, as comparative law being a key subject to train diplomats, experts on international relations and economy, this science gives not just knowledge but understanding of foreign, international and European law. Progress of comparative law research and education guarantees efficient defence for the state's economic interests and those of economic units on bilateral and multilateral levels, enables effective defence of the state, juridical entities and persons in international courts.

It is impossible to perform efficacious political and legal reforms based on home experience only or on brief inspection of legislative acts in a limited number of countries (as we have witnessed for the last two decades); on the contrary, it demands structured scientific information on the world and local tendencies of legal development, which is primarily accumulated by the comparative law. The latter is the only possible socio-humanitarian analogy of experiments and laboratory tests in natural science, that's why its value for legal reforms cannot be overestimated.

The draft Concept of Development of Law Education in the Ukraine considered introducing comparative law and its derivatives to be one of the core elements to reform Ukrainian law education, as competence in national law viewed in international and regional contexts is the only

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[247] Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine, a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, President of Koretsky Institute for State and Law (the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine, Kiev), *LL.D.,* Professor, honoured worker of science and technology of Ukraine. He is the author of over 800 scientific works, including books: *Mestnye Sovety i obespecheniye zakonnosti* [Local Soviets and Maintaining Law], *Chelovek, priroda, zakon* [Man, Nature, Law], *Akademicheskaya yuridicheskaya mysl'* [Scientific Legal Thought], *Gosudarstvennyy i obshchestvermyy kontrol* 'v *oblasti ohrany okruzhayushchey sredy* [State and Public Monitoring of Environment], *Pravovyye problemy ekologiyi* [Legal Issues of Ecology], *Priroda i zakon* [Nature and Law], *Pravoviy status Akademiyi nauk Ukrayini* [Legal Status of the Academy, of Sciences of the Ukraine]; scientific articles: 'Ekologicheskaya konstitutsiyazemli: konceptual'nyepodhody' [TheEarth'sEcologic Constitution: Concept Approaches], 'Sovremennaya sistema energeticheskogo zakonoda-tel'stva Ukrainy i osnovnyye napravleniya yeyo sovershenstvovaniya' [The Modern System of Energy Legislation in the Ukraine and Main Trends of Its Improving], 'Problemy razvitiya agrarnogo prava v Ukraine' [Problems of the Agrarian Law Development in the Ukraine] and others. Y. S. Shemshuchenko is academician-secretary of the Department of ecological and agrarian law of the National Academy of Legal Sciences of the Ukraine. He is editor-in-chief of the *Legal State* scientific yearly. Mr Shemshuchenko is Laureate of M. P. Vasilenko Award of the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine, the Ukraine State Award for science and technology.

[248] Academic-Secretary, senior research associate of V. M. Koretsky Institute for State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine (Kiev), Candidate of Science (Law), associate professor. Mr Kresin is author of a number of scholarly publications on comparative law.

issue that can provide an expert-to-be with deep awareness of the genuine meaning of national legal norms, their disadvantages, systemic problems and feasible ways of reforming them.

No less important is the value capacity of comparative law that manifests itself in its impact on shaping democratic pluralistic views of the young generation. It is universally admitted that it assists in overcoming such negative phenomena as isolationism, extreme nationalistic views, radicalism, chauvinism and other forms of superiority ideas and intolerance. Comparative law demonstrates multifaceted and pluralistic character of the world development, equality of political, legal and cultural experiences of various nations, as well as forms the world outlook basic for the dialogue of civilizations.

Comparative law is a highly institutionalized sphere of scientific research, education and practice in the developed Western countries. The fact that 2010 witnesses the 200th anniversary of comparative law is a good reason to evaluate its scientific capacity, estimate its value potential, summarize its achievements and arrange a package of measures to promote its further development in the former Soviet states.

Studies of the evolution of comparative law began, at least, 140 years ago,[249] and for more than a century it has been a special subject of research.[250] Despite a fairly wide range of views on the issue, we consider it possible to specify quite typical ideas of scholars concerning the time of origin, key factors and stages in the evolution of comparative law. Of course, from the basic data used by the researchers, we can only talk about Western, European and American comparative law.

To begin with, almost all scholars agreed on the fact that the 19th century saw profound vertical changes in comparative law research that engendered modern comparative law. The period preceding the 19th century is characterized with the following features: (1) lack of systematic research, snippets of information were gathered by a limited number of disunited scholars; (2) lack of distinct and consistently applied principles and methods of research; (3) dominance of natural law theory in jurisprudence together with logical and speculative ways of law studies; (4) poorly formed subjects of research, i.e. national legal systems; instead, the items to compare were over-national and particular legal corpuses that were also used in fragmented law of a region concerned, the so-called 'inner comparative law'.

Most scholars suppose that the trigger to initiate comparative law was advance of legal ideas, namely appearance of historical and philosophical (Hegelian and neo-Kantian) schools of thought in Germany in the 1810s-l 820s and their polemics. They were the schools whose methodological concepts were laid into the basis of comparative law of that period (till 1860s). Alongside with that, some scholars claim the role of historical school of law and its impact on the evolution of comparative law to be very contradictive, both positive and negative (L. J. Constantinescu) or utterly negative (G. K. Gutteridge, W. Ewald).

Another display of progress of comparative law at that time, as scholars state, was positivistic in their nature comparative researches of the early 19th century (made by K. E. A. Mittermeier, H. A. Zachariae, J. L. E. Lerminier, J. J. H. Felix and other scholars of their fold). Some researchers also point at the first attempts to institutionalize comparative law at that time, that is first publications of special journals and appearance of chairs at universities. Besides, the early 19th century as the date of birth of comparative law was also induced by other factors, non-scientific in their nature, such as the crisis of revolutionary movement in Europe and total completion of national legal systems due to the codification of law.

The features typical of that period of comparative law, as the scientists observe, lie within the following lines: (1) scholars transferred their attention from inner to outer issues in search of better solutions to legal problems; (2) comparative law was not detached from foreign law studies, the subject and content of it being poorly determined; (3) comparison was performed only

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[249] *Rennenkampf N. K.* O sovremennoy obrabotke sravnitel'nogo pravovedeniya (On modern processing comparative jurisprudence) // Порівняльне правознавство: Антологія української компаративістики XIX–XX століть/ За ред. О. В. Кресіна. – К.: Інститут держави і права ім. В. М. Корецького НАН Україні; Видавництво 'Лоґос', 2008.

[250] *Pollock, F.* The History of Comparative Jurisprudence // Journal of Society of Comparative Legislation. New series. 1903. Vol. 5.

among legal systems of the continental European countries? (4) German scholars dominated in comparative research. Judging from all the abovementioned, we consider the best definition for the period from the early 19th century till the 1860s to be the one by R.B. Schlesinger: comparative law became a problem-oriented area of legal research. However, after W. Hoog, we have to recognize this period as 'embryonic' from the point of view of a well-established jurisprudential discipline.

The next stage in comparative law evolution is connected with sociologically positivist (evolutionary) ideas and their expansion in the 1860s, as well as with establishing Comparative Law Association in France and the Chair for Historical and Comparative Law in Oxford University in 1869, together with issuing several special journals. Anumber of scholars also point out the debates in favour of German private law reforms that resulted in adopting German Civil Code (W. Ewald) and the appearance of ethnological movement (A. Kh. Saidov).

Among typical features of the period lasting from the 1860s to the 1910s (or the early 20th century) many researchers formulate the following: (1) world law evolution was considered as unilinear, progressive, naturally determined; while comparative law was treated as comparative (universal, general) history of law; (2) every particular legal case was regarded as having a single valid solution, and the best legal norm for it was expected to be found among various national law systems, and this norm was thought to be applicable in any state, the idea of the 'universal law' flourished, unification projects were proposed and cherished; (3) comparative law existed mainly in the form of comparative legislation whose subject was chiefly legislative norms; (4) critical academic re-evaluation of the science began though inseparably from the comparative law method. According to the works analyzed above, the majority of researchers state that it was the period when comparative law was gradually turning into a separate branch of jurisprudence, into a unique subject with its particular field of research. Some scholars even think that it sprang out in 1869 (W. Hoog, R. Heiland), while others only claim this period to be only 'embryonic' (R. Sacco).

A completely new period in comparative law evolution started at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, International Congress of Comparative Law in Paris in 1900 being its terminus a quo. A number of scholars claim this year to be the date of birth of comparative law, however, some researchers think that the initial period started later, in 1910s-1920s.

Various taxonomy of stages result from various criteria used by researchers. Undoubtedly, the Paris Congress was an outstanding event that recognized and proved the existence of comparative law and a certain corporation of 'comparativists'. It also served a ground for scholars to explicate and particularize their ideas on the content, subject and objects of the science. However, researchers dealing with the history of comparative law do not denote any other principal changes, either inner, theoretical and methodological; or in the nature and modes of comparative law studies; or in outer conditions for comparative law evolution in its legal, political and other aspects. So, the Paris Congress of 1900 as well as others unfairly forgotten annual congresses of the International Association for the Progress in Social Science (since 1862) and the World Congress of Lawyers and Judges in St. Louis in 1904 did not trigger out the new epoch in comparative law evolution, though they influenced greatly its intensive growth. In our opinion, the most reasonable date of the beginning of the next stage is the 1910s-1920s.

The new period is linked, on the one hand, with practically-oriented legalistic positivism dominating in comparative law, and the expansion of a functional approach, on the other hand. One of the crucial events that initiated its outcome was the end of the first World War. In particular, as sated by V. N. Denisov, there arose certain scepticism about principal ability to draw out universal world law, so further unification projects covered only the private law sphere.

Some typical features of this period that tentatively lasted till 1945 were the following: (1) the idea that comparative law is rather a method than a science or its branch was put forth; (2) the new doctrine of comparative law instead of comparative legislation appeared, it meant broadening the subject of studies that included various sources of law, its doctrine and historical evolution; (3) active studies were carried out in European common law writings; (4) the attitude towards comparative law changed from instrumentalist (as the means of law unification) to axiological (as the means to prevent legalistic isolationism and alike).

The next period in comparative law evolution started after the end of the Second World War. At that time, on the one hand, the subject of studies principally enhanced, as a range of postcolonial states had been formed, legal systems of the newly-formed socialist states transformed greatly, many legal systems started to seek for religious grounds. All these facts showed that the level of comparative law science did not meet the needs of the targets to be achieved. On the other hand, that period witnessed the rise and, later, the crisis of a functionalist approach as well as that of the 'critical comparative theory'.

Researchers claim that this period lasted till 1980s-1990s with the typical features as follows: (1) studies of socialist, postcolonial and religious law began; (2) systemic analysis was widely used by comparative law in creating the doctrine of law families, and 'non- Western' law was recognized as equal; (3) the 'theory of distinctive features' was advanced that shaped pluralistic mentality of comparativists, gave grounds for legalistic diversity, promoted awareness of multi-sourced and multi-factored law evolution; (4) comparative studies of public and procedural law were widely spread together with studies of interaction of law systems; (5) comparative law was intensively turning into a stable institution and it was introduced into the law education.

The latest modern stage of comparative law, as many scholars treat it, namely A. Kh. Saidov and Kh. N. Bekhruz, started in the 1980s-1990s. It is based on the debates about content and targets of law comparativistics under the new conditions that can be listed as follows: the progress of globalization processes and their apprehension, the collapse of the USSR and radical changes in the post-Soviet law systems that followed, tightening of the European integration that led to the new over-national law system of the European Union, appearance of a few new national law systems due to collapse of federative states, etc. As A. Kh. Saidov notes, typical features of the modern period are the crisis, the generation gap among the scientists and discontinuity in scientific studies.

We can suppose that the differences in researchers' views on periods in comparative law evolution are rooted in the following factors: (1) they have different views on the nature of comparative law treating it as either a science or a method: for instance, those who consider it to be a science tend to emphasize its institutional status as an element of intellectual legitimization; (2) researchers are of different ethnic origins and differ in their knowledge of foreign languages. They use fairly different studies material that affects their systematization of periods. Their own country's contribution is largely exaggerated, while foreign traditions of comparitivistics skip their attention. That's why researchers cannot come to a unanimous decision, for example, who was the first to use 'comparative law' as the term, and when it happened. Apart from that, materials of non-Western or non-American origin are not taken into account. For instance, closer studies of Eastern European researchers, advocates of historical school of law (the so-called School of Slavonic Law) could withdraw any doubts concerning the contribution made by this school into the evolution of comparative law. On top of that, a peculiar characteristic of Soviet, modern Russian and Ukrainian researchers is separate review of national and Eastern European traditions of comparativistics that do not include the world traditions (meaning, the Western). Of course, there are some other differences resulting from different comprehension of law and other factors.

We think that the suggested above the five-period evolution of comparative law is rather based on parallel and critical re-evaluation of various ideas than on mere compilation of them, because it takes into account and can to a certain extent reconcile basic positions on this issue.

The idea of the plurality of law evolution serves as a good ground for the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations. As far as it is concerned, it should be pointed out that the first branch of comparative law to draw a general concept for regional variations was historical school of law in the early 19th century. But for a long time methodological inventory of comparative law had enabled researchers to conduct studies within the frames of Roman and Germanic law or English and American law both of which considerably differ in their systems of legislation sources. However, studies comparing law in other states had not been carried out because researchers were unwilling to reckon non-legal factors that can to a great extent determine the evolution of law systems. On the whole, we can state that they were not only unaware of the law outside the similar legal systems group, but did not even want to be know it. Comparative law

was actually used as a tool for the universal law unification based on 'the common right of the civilized peoples'.

Since the 1920s, thanks to the ideas of the functionalist school, the borders of law sources to study were expanded. It resulted in withdrawing formal differences between continental and common right, it also benefited to systematic comparative studies of this issue. Non-Western and mixed legal systems (first of all, former colonial) were acknowledged as fully-featured even under the long-term domination of the functionalist approach in comparative law. But at the same time, the functionalist approach totally ignored culture's impact on law and on all the elements to differentiate national law systems, it failed to create inventory to comprehend and recognize non-Western law as a valuable one, whose typical feature is peculiar treatment of social norms and rights.

In the 1960s, Rene David formulated a new approach enabling comparative comprehension to spread world-wide. He offered a pluralistic (fairly eclectic) criterion to compare and arrange law systems into law families which included both juridical and methodological features and the influence of religion, ideology and culture on law. Among David's predecessors who attempted to create fragments of such an approach were W. Dilthey, M. Weber, R. Pound, G. Gurvich and others. This approach made the base to re-evaluate the jurisprudential world map, to recognize equality of non-Western law and the value of differences of law, it also showed the non-universal and local character of European (Western) jurisprudential heritage.

Let us consider now the axiological school and its evolution in comparative law. It is grounded on civilizational ideas and supports the view that over-national 'law traditions' do exist. David was the first to study Western law tradition, later this issue was fully developed and presented by Harold Berman. For the last decades we have formed exhausting perspectives on Muslim, African, Hindu, Hebrew, Chinese legal traditions. The debates on separate existence of Eastern European or even Eurasian legal tradition are very acute and politically-oriented, they exploit polar approaches, hence they lack scientific grounds.

The axiological school is to full advantage capable of ruining the deeply-rooted foundations of comparative law, because it declares that law traditions are not feasible to be compared or contrasted, they should be acquired phenomenologically and their distinctive features should be defined with intuitionist inventory, while systematic functional studies of them should be actually rejected. That's why the debates in comparative law between the supporters of functionalism or non-functionalism and the advocates of civilizationalism are in full swing, meanwhile positivism integrally predominates in the lawyers' practice. At the same time it is the axiological school in comparative law that affects immensely the international and European law evolution and establishes gradual expanding and concept-building of the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations.

In the Ukraine comparative law studies have long-dated roots. It should be mentioned that the paper 'On the wergild in the old Russian and Slavonic legislations as compared to the German wergild' by N. Ivanishev in 1840 became the first dissertation on comparative law published in the Russian Empire.

The establishment of the Sector of State and Law at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (now Institute for State and Law of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences) in 1949 appeared a crucial factor for further development of the comparative law studies in the Ukraine. Among the scientific and research interests of the Institute were the studies of the state law of socialist countries. Later this branch of research was expanded in the Institute. It is worth noting that researchers of the Sector (later Institute) did fundamental research on the constitutional law of African and Asian countries (A. Ganusets, Y. Plyasun, V. Pen'kovsky, V. Denisov, V. Shapoval), on Western Europe and the USA (G. Alexandrenko, V. Yevintov, V. Zabigailo, N. Kozyubra, M. Mikhailovsky, V. Selivanov, O. Zaichuk, E. Kubko, Y. Nyporko), on European socialist countries (A. Taranov, V. Pogorilko, Y. Tikhonova, G. Changuli, L. Krivenko). On top of these studies, the monographs Bourgeois Federalism by G. Alexandrenko (1962) and Law Systems of the Developing Countries: The Establishment and Evolution of National Law Systems in African Countries, Former British Colonies (1978) are particularly worth mentioning.

Nowadays, however, we should raise a principal question about methodological backwardness of post-Soviet comparative law, the methodological inventory of its sectors does not meet the contemporary needs of comparative law researchers because the inventory does not enable either to learn about or to understand and apply data on modern law and its over-national evolutionary tendencies. Both the Ukraine and Russia witness the domination of a primitivized positivist approach in comparative law studies, i.e. a simple comparison of legislative norms, sometimes texts of judgements of constitutional courts.

To advance and renew theory and methodology of comparative law the researchers at V.M. Koretsky Institute for State and Law of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences together with scholars from other scientific and research institutes and educational establishments have been compiling and publishing series of scientific publications: 'Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law' (treatises, reference books, including bibliographical ones, anthologies, dictionaries, since 2002); a series of scientific and educational publications 'Academy of Comparative Law' (demonstration lectures of leading comparativist researchers from many countries, since 2007); the international journal 'Sravnitelno-pravovye issledovaniya' (Comparative Law Studies) since 2005, as well as various collected papers, textbooks and course materials on comparative law. In 2006 the Ukrainian Association of Comparative Law was established, it holds annual international academic forums of comparativists. We also raise a question of restoring formerly eliminated scientific and expert centres of comparative law studies at the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Jurisprudences, the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice, another issue to be discussed is to acknowledge comparative law as a separate specialization for the defence of Candidate-of-Science (LL.B. and LL.M.) and Doctor-of-Science (LL.D.) dissertations.

Consistent scientific and institutional progress of comparative law in the former Soviet states should become the basis for it to perform its inherent functions: to shape open and pluralistic world outlook, to contribute to the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations.

N. P. Shmelyov[251]

QUO VADIS, RUSSIA?

The crisis that Russia is going through today is one of the many in its centuries-long history. The Russian people are most likely to overcome the ongoing crisis, as they have done before. Disorder and confusion in Russia have always given way to solidarity and to a new rise of moral and material capacity. So nowadays, with due regard to the difficulties that Russia is facing today, there is no reason to believe that the hard times of the transitional period have robbed the Russians off the basics: their natural instinct of self-preservation, their vital energy and determination to provide a solid future for their descendants and themselves.

In spite of the geopolitical picture of the past or the forthcoming changes in the world, Russia has always been and will remain to be Europe. A special Europe, of course: restless, difficult to

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[251] Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for Europe (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Dr. Sc. (Economics), professor Academician Shmelyov is the author of over 70 scholarly publications, including books: *Avansy i dolgi. Vchera i zavtra rossiyskih ekonomicheskih reform* [Prepayments and Debts. Yesterday and Today of Russia's Economic Reforms], *Evropa vchera, segodnya, zavtra* [Europe Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow], *Evropa i Rossiya. Opyt ekonomicheskih preobrazovaniy* [Europe and Russia: An Attempt of Economic Transformations], *Evropa i Rossiya: problemy yuzhnogo napravleniya. Sredizemnomorye—Chemomorye—Kaspiy* [Europe and Russia. Problems of the Southern Region. The Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea], *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [International Relations], *Ugrozy i prognozy (k voprosu ob ih adekvatnosti)* [Threats and Predictions: On Their Adequacy], *Rossiya v mnogoobraziyi tsivilizatsiy* [Russia in the Diversity of Civilizations] and others. He is the author of novels *Sil 'vestr* [Silvestre], *Vputi ya zanemog* [On My Way I Felt Unwell], collections of short stories and tales *Posledniy yetazh* [The Upper Floor], *Spektakl' v chest 'gospodina pervogo ministra* [Performance in the Honour of Mr Prime Minister], *Pushkinskaya ploshchad' [Pushkin Square], Nochnye golosa* [Night Voices] and others. Many of his works have been translated into foreign languages. He is member of the Economic Council under the Government of the Russian Federation. Member of the Human Rights Commission under President of the Russian Federation. Member of Moscow Writers' Union and the Union of Journalists of Russia.

forecast, undeveloped in many ways, with a huge but underused natural and intellectual resources, with its peculiar and sometimes even self-sufficient concern for Euro-Asian periphery and for other world's regions.

Russia is an essential integral part of the European culture and civilization. Though it is so peculiar and distinctive a part that its western neighbours sometimes even wished for its absence from the map. For the widespread view is that Russia has never proposed anything constructive and has always been a source, especially in the 20th century, for constant concern because of her urge to dictate her will to the others. It is a pity that this view is still predominant in the present-day western politics towards a different – new, democratic, non-confrontational Russia with market economy.

Such a view on the whole historical past of Russia should be defied. During its thousand-year long history Russia hasn't always been a perfect example of false goals only. It was Russia that stood up as Europe's protective shield against the Tatar hordes. It was Russia that eventually brought an end to the Ottoman expansion. It was Russia that crashed Napoleon's and Hitler's crazy dreams on the world hegemony, together with the Holocaust, such a totally dreadful outcome of totalitarian ideology.

A certain isolation of Russia from the rest of Europe is the result of not only the differently directed political game. This isolation is objective, and the perspective to overcome it in the short run is doubtful. There are a number of reasons for it. By all means, the country's vast size, its severe climate and historical heritage should be taken into account. But the main issue today is that Russia and Europe have different perspectives. Europe has already basically accomplished what Russia is only up to (provided it keeps its instincts of self-preservation): Europe has cultivated its lands, created a highly effective market economy, gained a respectable standard of living and established a civil, law-governed society.

These fundamental civilizational issues make up the core of Russia's national development in the 21st century and its main national concern. No one can say how much time it will take Russia to solve such problems. It is clear, however, that it's not a year-long or decade-long, but rather a generation-long matter. In favourable conditions barriers between Russia and Europe can be expected to be removed, Russia's openness towards its European neighbours to be growing, and the interaction and intertwining of economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other dimensions from the Atlantic Ocean to Vladivostok to be intensified.

If we put aside the extremes so characteristic of any community, we will see that Russia is getting through the lingering historical argument between the Westernizers and the Slavophils. This kind of argument has been proved hopeless: Russia's struggling against the civilizational currents hasn't done any good. A massive and unprecedentedly cruel experiment, which was meant to create a special kind of man differing from all the world proved to be a complete failure. Any Russian happens to be as economically motivated as other humans in the world. And the Russian mentality is European, Christian by nature. Russia's moral values are based on the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount, which constitute the essence of a European's mentality and of the whole European civilization, regardless of its present location.

By all means the Russian mentality is characterized by its distinctive features that spring from Russia's vastness, scarcity of its population, constant external pressure and the initial predominance of the Byzantine Christianity, which emphasizes a conciliar, collective responsibility to God, but not an individual one. This accounts for the vestiges of communal mentality and communal psychology that are manifested in distrust towards private property and eagerness to keep collective long-failed enterprises (mainly as a kind of insurance policy). This also accounts for the lingering adherence of Russia's society towards the state's advanced responsibility for the social situation of various strata of the society.

The 20th-century Russian history with its drama also gave rise to new psychological inferiority complexes that resulted in picturing the Russian as a negligent and lazy worker, a heartless, thievish, deceitful person, often ruined by drinking. Such an attitude is totally unfair. We cannot ignore the fact that three generations of Russians have been paid 'starvation wages', which is tens or even hundreds of times inferior to what people of the same qualification are paid in civilized countries. Naturally, a sort of concordat developed between the employer (initially, the state, and

later the entrepreneur) and the employee in Russia: we work as much as you pay (no pay, no work). During the last century the Russians formed a habit of mistrusting the state, and business, and social agencies, and life itself. New times have little difference from the past Soviet times for 'a man from the street': such 'democratic' moves as the 1992 total confiscation of population's saving or the hasty free privatization or the essentially criminal division of common people's property among the few selected, or the 1998 default that resulted in the state robbery, follow the pattern of Bolshevistic practices since October, 1917.

However, the following fact is curious: as soon as the Russian goes to more or less normal surroundings, for instance, when he or she goes to permanent residence in one of the western countries, as a rule, he or she instantly becomes a most respectable citizen, a sober and thrifty family man, a reliable neighbour, an industrious and creative employee, a law-abiding tax-payer and what not. Obviously, it is not the case of a special nature or mentality. The Russian is no worse, or duller, or lazier than other people. The thing that matters is the conditions that the Russian is doomed to.

We should also acknowledge the fact that the reform years have brought about a taste of freedom: a new active generation, familiar with the environment of liberty, has been raised. It must seem quite cynical, but the senior generations, which were used to the absence of liberty, with its emphasis on the party, the state, the leader, but not on the individual, will die out soon. The succeeding generations have framed a different mentality – a European-like mentality of a free individual who chooses his/her way him(her)self and who is the master of his/ her life. If nothing catastrophic happens within the next 30 or 40 years, 'the Russian mentality' is bound to become basically the same as in other civilized countries. It may also be a younger, more active and future-oriented mentality, when compared to those mentalities where the European civilization has grown somewhat decrepit.

Actually, the tragedy of the present-day generations of Russia is the moral and spiritual vacuum, total confusion and the loss of guidelines in life. But this can be helped, because the people of such a vast and young country cannot remain in confusion for a long time. The people will definitely find some inspiration, which might be a national idea or a national ideal. But this national idea cannot just be artificially designed by higher-ups. Russia has been through and has practiced everything that can be made up artificially. It has been through the great-power policy, through the unrestrained territorial expansion, through conciliarism, through the quest for some 'ultimate spirituality', through the attempts to build up a new community (invented by some ruthless theoreticians) and through the attempts to restructure the whole world to its own needs. The 'enemy' concept also seems to have run out of its potential. Russia cannot reach a solid and long-term consolidation if it's based on anti-Americanism, or anti-Europeanism (plus traditional mistrust for Germany), or 'yellow threat' or the threat of 'Islamic fundamentalism', or a struggle against another domestic foe. Russian people are exhausted by the massive bloody violence that they have been through in the 20th century... By all means, the Russian is ready to defend himself against the enemy (the last war in Chechnya has proved this). But this kind of defence cannot create a foundation for a prosperous state and an acceptable-quality life.

However, so far Russia has had no experience of implementing the policy of constructivism, creation, development, providing necessary facilities for individual as well as for communal life. To be more exact, Russia did try it. But it came out like 'Pyramids of Egypt, 'construction sites of communism', GULAG, disfigured rivers and ruined lands, numerous industrial monsters that produced only giant hips of useless weapon. It was meant against the man, but not for his sake. Thus, naturally it was interpreted as something alien and hostile, but not as personal and interesting.

A Russian is not likely to believe a new 'Messiah'. On the other hand, he is inclined to believe something simple, human and addressed to him and his family, something like 'my house is the best in the street, my street is the best in town, my town is the best in the country, my country is the best in the world'. There are certain markers of such trends starting to spread throughout the country. It's high time we built houses, planted flowers, raised children, paved roads and constructed schools and hospitals. Also it's high time we started cultivating those vast lands and

enormous resources that Russia is naturally rich in. The supply will be going for some centuries. And we'll see what happens next.

When we turn to the issue of Russia's future, it would be only reasonable to say that the European version of the social-democratic pattern has more appeal to Russia, provided that all corrections are made in accordance with the Russian milieu. In politics it would be legitimacy, democracy, civil society, a meticulous observance of human rights and freedoms alongside with the ultimate authority of state power; the predominance of market economy and private property alongside with the state's active regulatory function in economy, as well as socially oriented economic moves, maximum freedom for individual initiative plus generally established rules strictly followed; rising of the well-being quality for the whole society, blurring of social polarization, dynamic employment policy, combining market and non-market mechanism of social security (care, protection) and the state protected system of individual safety and private property security – in social sphere; freedom of creativity and human intellectual faculties alongside the large-scale state support of relevant needs and communal agenda -in culture, science, education and spiritual life; and, finally, in external sphere it would be the regulated openness, the determination to use the wholesome international competition and transfrontier capital transfer, peace policy and international security boost for all.

I cannot accept the assumption, which is widespread in the West, that Russia knows neither what she is up to nor what she has to do. Actually, Russia's society seems to have reached the fundamental agreement about the general reference frames for social and economic strategy of the nearest future. Particularly, it can be illustrated by the fact that the programs of the most influential political parties and movements – liberal and centrist and conservative – coincide in many ways (with an exception of the most extreme and marginal). The fundamental idea of all those programs is essentially identical: Russia is to establish 'a socially oriented market economy'. The restraining factors seem to be identical with the rest of Europe: to encourage market economy and to expel market society.

The advancement of the 'creative development' concept prompts some changes in the country's interaction with the outer world. It would seem reasonable, if Russia permanently shifted to a healthy, moderate and constructive isolationism. She should not have any extensive interest or engagement beyond the former USSR borders, except for the connections in the sphere of commerce and culture. Let the world live its life: Russia is too busy to digress from the tall order of her domestic problems. But as far as the present-day world is as cruel, self-interested and restless as it used to be, Russia's main guarantee in this environment should be in keeping her defensive potential at an adequately advanced level. If Russia keeps her nuclear deterrence forces at an adequate level and also keeps her compact and mobile regular armed forces that can confront any threat at a regional or local level, Russia's economic interests will inevitably advance to the forefront in her foreign-policy priorities, pushing aside the issue of Russia's influence in various regions (it should be understood that I don't mean the traditional Russia's interests within the post-Soviet environment).

Russian history witnessed such a fruitful yet brief period, when the country's behavioural patterns on the world's arena were determined by exactly the same policy. It was in the reign of Alexander III. Those were the times when Russia didn't interfere into any foreign conflicts, didn't take part in the division of the world's territories, when Russia's economy was almost transparent and its borders were almost open, when Russia was constructing the Trans-Siberian Railway and also many other vital facilities.

Within the same logic, the criterion of usefulness, benefit or particular interest should be the cornerstone of Russia's foreign policy. Should we 'open up?' – Of course, we should. But the whole process should be put into practice according to the ancient 'do no harm' principle, so that the country could have enough resources to manage it and so that it could contribute to the country's stability and further progress to democracy and market economy.

However, such a call for a certain sobriety and reticence towards the world does not mean a retreat to the 'besieged fortress' psychology. The challenge to the whole civilized world made by international terrorism, the growing aggression of Islamic fundamentalism, 9/11 in the USA, the 2002 tragedy in Moscow and other murderous misanthropic clandestine activities made it an

urgent agenda for all civilized countries to join their efforts against new global threats. Russia will surely find a proper place in the emerging global antiterrorist union. It will hardly be an exaggeration to say that Russia and the West and all the peace-loving powers of today share a common fate: they are either to perish or eventually reach the life standards that a human being deserves.

It was more than twenty years ago when Russia started its progress and it is unlikely to get back. In spite of all troubles: slump in production, impoverishment of the people, anarchic crime and corruption, weakening of authority etc. does not mean that Russia's society has lost its viability. Naturally, it needs to take its time: those fits during the unwise rush of reforms happened to be very painful for the most part of Russia's population, whose patience seems to be evaporating today. The main goal of Russian government is to bring peace to people's hearts and minds and to the surrounding environment. It should also win back the trust in the government and confidence in the country's future.

Russia needs no ideology to do so. It needs some usual common sense instead. And there seem to be certain indicators of common sense slowly getting back into Russia's life anew.

N. N. Skatov[252]

RUSSIAN LITERATURE IN THE EPOCH OF GLOBALIZATION

The late 20th and early 21st century witnessed a large-scale turmoil in Russia. The crisis of the 1990s wracked the country too pervasively to talk of the very nationhood. Those tragic years brought a new acute challenge: how to protect the national culture, to make it survive, how to defend Russian cultural values and cultural institutions against physical destruction. The primary target was to preserve the pillars of Russian culture in order not to let the whole construction fall down; to encourage the state to undertake measures to support culture. Many participants of this conference initiated such measures, the campaigns that forced the authorities to act.

Far be it from me to lessen the topical nature of the issue how to protect the national culture, whose essential integrate part is Russian literature, namely the great Russian classical literature. However, new aspects are highlighted nowadays. *The issues of propagation and education* have been added to those of preserving and supporting Russian cultural institutions.

Modern Russia is involved into globalization. I deliberately abstain from the evaluation of this process, it's a mere statement of fact: Russia is involved into globalization. Many facts provide an unheard-of stimulation of the dialogue of cultures in Russia, such as: new communication technologies, shifts in the market, growing openness of the country that promotes active communication of the Russian people with both Western and Eastern civilizations on a large scale.

For the Russian culture to find its proper place in this dialogue we need *deliberate and systematic mass cultural education and nation-wide cultural values propagation*. It isn't enough to preserve the Russian cultural values. *We have to get them to 'operate' on the new historical stage, we have to prevent Russian culture and Russian literature, in particular, from turning into*

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[252] Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philology), professor. Member of Presidium of St. Petersburg Research Center (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Editor-in-chief of the 'Russian Literature' journal. From 1987 to 2006 Mr Skatov was the director of the Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkinsky Dom) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is the author of over 300 scholarly publications, including monographs: *Koltsov, Nekrasov, Ya liru posvyatil narodu svoyemu: o tvorchestve N. A. Nekrasova* [I have dedicated my Lyre to my People: On art of N.A. Nekrasov], *Russkiy geniy* [The Russian Genius], *Sovremenniki iprodohhateli* [Contemporaries and Followers]. Author of collections of historical and literary articles 'Poety nekrasovskoy shkoly' [Poets of the Nekrasov School], 'Dalyokoye i blizkooe' [The Far and the Near], 'Literaturnye ocherki' [Literary Sketches], 'O kul'ture' [On Culture].
President of Pushkin Foundation 'Classics'. Chairman of Pushkin Commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Deputy Chairman of the Expert Council of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Russian Federation.

a 'memorial park' that only a limited number of experts and connoisseurs can find interest in. Such destiny will inevitably lead to cultural stagnation and, as a result, to the death of culture, if not ruined then 'mummified'.

To my mind, there are two directions for the propagation and education mentioned above: the inner and the outer ones.

The inner direction should assist in promoting active *dialogue between generations*. One of the typical features of globalization is a wide cultural gap between the generation of 'the fathers' who keep cultural heritage and traditions and 'the children' the majority of which fail to understand their 'fathers', even when want to. At least, two generations born in the 1990s and 2000s have grown complete 'aliens' to their parents' cultural environment, whose views of life had moulded in the pre-globalization period. The new generations have another language, another mentality. There is no other danger for us who keep cultural heritage than not to see the *difference* between *'alien'* and *'wrong'*. 'Alien' doesn't mean 'wrong' (although it doesn't have to be 'right' either). To put it in other words, we have to figure out the language, the way of life, the mentality of the 'aliens' who appeared out of the blue, that is our children. We have to sort the wheat from the chaff and, first and foremost, *arrive at the commonly shared communicative ground.* It isn't 'degradation' or 'losing your cultural ground'. I'd like to give a topical example. The Russian Orthodox Church can hardly be suspected in predilection for modernity. However, the other day, Patriarch Cyril entrusted the clergy with the task to study modern youth subculture (even of those youth groups that appear to be 'provocative' from a Christian point of view). The aim of the study is to promote the dialogue in order to *bring* the values kept by the church *home* to the youth. It seems a very wise strategy.

Professional experts in national culture should feel the urge to have such a dialogue, too! In particular, the Russian classical literature should become not only a subject of study in school classrooms, but turn into an *element of everyday cultural practice of the Russian youth* and become, as it were, home reading.

Below you'll find one of the ways to perform the transformation stated above. There is no denying that TV and cinema play a significant role in modern development of culture. It was *among the youth* that Dostoyevsky, Solzhenitsyn, Gogol's screen versions had unexpected success which we all remember. But screen versions of classical literature should be promoted and sponsored by the state, they should become a *governmental 'contract',* an integrate element of cultural policy! *Directors and actors involved in such projects should be by all means encouraged* and the projects themselves invested into. Every screen version of such a kind should be discussed in classrooms, on TV (what is more important, in prime time, which also raises the question of governmental donation). All this will inevitably enhance discussions among the youth, it will draw a 'response' and 'feedback', a desire to read and comprehend something chosen by oneself rather than imposed by the school curriculum. Such a desire can't be overestimated. This is the 'bridge' to link the culture of generations together. For instance, a brilliant screen version of 'The Quiet Don' directed by S.F. Bond-archuk that had long remained unavailable for the general public has recently been broadcast. But what was the reaction? Just some soggy criticism and reproaches to the late director for him 'having broken the traditions' and so on. It should have become a great event in the modern culture, and a large-scale discussion should have been held to get the youth interested. It was the duty of critics, educators, theorists of literature, but alas!..

As it has already been mentioned, on the other hand, we *have to arrange an outer propagation to introduce the national cultural values into the global cultural environment.* The world 'propagation' shouldn't intimidate anyone, as even the famous Diaghilev Seasons served distinct propagation purposes. S. Diaghilev himself kept repeating that the core essence of his 'Russian Seasons' was patriotic.

There is a little subtlety here. In the Soviet epoch a powerful propagation mechanism operated to promote the Russian literature and language outside the USSR. But its activities were predetermined by the historical context of two systems struggling and they were treated as the 'cold war' instrument. After the 'cold war' those activities turned out to be compromised and 'scaled down'. But do we have nothing else to tell our now friendly neighbours both in the West

and in the East except Marxist-Leninist concepts of a class struggle? Russian culture, Russian literature, Russian art have a large number of remarkable spiritual and aesthetical values that are valid not only for Russians. Why don't we propagate them outside the country? But to put it into life, there has to be a governmentally regulated mechanism, and the authoritative bodies have to be involved and perform systematic activities. Meanwhile such 'outer' activities are mostly performed by enthusiastic singletons who are not always Russians.

As far as the Russian literature is concerned, why doesn't the state cooperate with those (few) centres of Russian Studies abroad that are active in Europe, America, China, the Middle East? Why don't we initiate and invest into research and educational projects? Why don't we *cooperate with translators,* both national and foreign? *A large corpus of Russian literature including classical works has not been translated into major European languages to an accomplished standard yet.* Why don't we advertise publications of such translations, attracting Western readers on a large scale? Such cultural 'recruitment', unlike the political one, can induce nothing but sympathy and respect for the country. It will pay to invest money into it, not only in the ideological sphere, but financially as well (let us remember again Diaghilev's 'Russian Seasons' that created the brand of the 'Russian ballet school' that we are still exploiting and making profit of!)

In conclusion, I'd like to say: I wish that Russian culture protection changed from the 'passive' phase of 'deep defence' into an active attack. In terms of globalization and active dialogue of cultures such an attack is vital. We should not bury goldfields of precious 'talents' into the ground, but following the biblical example of the wise slave, 'put the money to work'. 'For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath' (Mt. 25:29).

D. E. Sorokin[253]

RUSSIA: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL PARTNERSHIP

1. Any country can be involved in the partnership of civilizations either as a part of one of the world civilizations or as an independent centre of civilization. As far as Russia is concerned, three-hundred-year long debates of whether Russia belongs to the Western (to be more exact, West-European) civilization or whether it should be regarded as a unique (Russian) civilization are bound to continue. Without going into details of these discussions, it should be noted that the core countries of the Western civilization have never considered the Russian State with its long history as an integral part of the Western economy. With the advent of the division of labour, Russia continued to be an appendage supplying raw materials to Western Europe.[254] No wonder that those who view Russia as a part of the Western civilization note that in spite of his efforts, Peter the Great 'failed to solve the problem of "entering the realm" of Western civilization. It took

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[253] A corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, First Deputy Director of the Institute for Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Chair of Macroeconomic Regulation at the Financial Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation.

Author and co-author of more than 70 scholarly papers, including the monographs: *Russia of 2015: An Optimistic Scenario* (Rossiya-2015: optimisticheskiy stsenariy), *Russia's Strategic Response to the New Century's Challenges* (Strategicheskiy otvet Rossiyi na vyzovy novogo veka), *Challenging Russia: Political Economy of the Response* (Rossiya pered vyzovom: politicheskaya ekonomiya otveta), *Russia in the Globalizing World* (Rossiya v globaliziruyuschemsya mire) and others.

Member of the editorial boards of the journals 'Issues of Economics' (Voprosy ekonomiki) and 'Economic Science of Modem Russia' (Ekonomicheskaya nayka sovremennoy Rossiyi), member of the editorial panel of the journals: 'Issues of the Theory and Practice of Administration' (Problemy teorii i praktiki upravleniya) and 'Journal for the Economic Theory' (Zhurnal ekonomicheskoy teoriyi).

[254] 'From the 14th century on *economic conditions* doomed Eastern Europe to be a *colonial* source of raw materials' (Braudel, F. *Civilisation materielle, economie et capitalisme, XVe—XVIIIe siecle* [Material Civilisation, Economy and Capitalism from 15th to 18th Century]. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1988. P. 259). Braudel pointed out a peculiar form of this colonization for the Moscow state.

rather long to create preliminary conditions to start the process. As a result, the country spent as much as 200 years to start on its way...'[255] But has it made it?[256]

Modern researchers argue that it is hard to say, 'when the formation of the united European market will become a reality. At that, the concerns of Russian business about the competition on the part of the European manufacturers are far from being the greatest obstacle to it, as is seen. The history of relations between the European Union and the European business makes it possible to conclude that our Western partners are much more concerned about Russian products entering their markets.'[257] Evidently, that is why independent European analysts warn that 'a new economic wall may arise at Russia's Western borders. Europe may grow wary of anything that comes from Russia, and will rear its prosperity at the expense of Russia's natural resources.'[258] A similar position is shared by American researchers who consider Russia, at best, as a partner of Western countries or a competitor of the USA, along with Europe and Japan, but not in any way as part of Europe.[259]

Thus, building a strategy for its development, Russia should start from the assumption that in the foreseeable future, it is to become an independent centre of civilization in the partnership between civilizations.[260]

2. A full-fledged partnership is only possible between the peers. The partnership of civilizations in the modern world of global economy and, hence, global competition, is no exception. In this context, when defining Russia's strategy in the partnership between civilizations, one should bear in mind that Russia finds itself in close contacts with the four world centres of civilization: European, Muslim, Chinese and Japanese. Moreover, Russia has 'stock' of resources (territorial and mineral), which the mentioned centres lack. Therefore, their struggle to occupy strategic positions in Russia's domain inevitably becomes one of the strategic objectives of these centres of civilization. It is clear that the USA cannot just sit on the fence during the clash for Russian resources with one of the contenders likely to gain a privileged geopolitical and economic position. Under the current circumstances, the USA have to seek to secure the most favourable 'start position' for the fight right off.[261]

3. Thus, it is Russia's geopolitical position that inevitably turns it into the apple of discord between major centres of civilization in the modern world. Hence, their essential interest in minimizing Russia's role as an equal participant of the partnership between civilizations. Admission of some Western and Southern 'breakaway' Russian territories to military, political and economic alliances formed by other centres of civilization, the demand for territorial concessions and 'advances *de facto'* in the East are only conspicuous illustrations of this point. To become an entity rather than an object of cross-civilizational dialogue, Russia needs to recover its full status as one of the world's great powers according to the criteria of the 21st century, and to

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[255] *Andriyevskaya, V.* The Long Road of Economic Reforms in Russia from their Inception, in the 18th Century // Economic Strategies. July-August, 2000. Pp. 81, 91.

[256] For the Western countries, as J. Schumpeter stated at the height of the Cold War, 'Russian problem is not whether Russia is a socialist country, but that it is Russia' *(Schumpeter, J.* Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Translated from English. Moscow: Economics, 1995. P. 522).

[257] *Mau, V. and Novikov, V.* Relations between Russia and the EU: Space of Choice or Choice of Space? // Voprosy ekonomiki [Issues of Economics]. 2002. No. 6. P. 142-143.

[258] *Rahr, A.* Na rasstoyaniyi ruki [At Arm's Length] // Moscow News. Nov. 12-18, 2002. No. 44. P. 13.

[259] See: *Mirsky, G I.* Russia in the Modern World: Views of American Politicians and Scientists // The World Economy and International Relations. 1999. No. 12.

[260] What is stated above retains its significance even if Russia is regarded as belonging to the so-called 'borderline civilizations', i.e. such civilizations that have not so far defined their civilizational identity: these include, besides Russia, Latin America and some areas of South-Eastem Asia (See: *Rashkovsky, E. B. and Khoros, V. G.* World Civilizations and Modernity: On Methodology of Analysis // The World Economy and International Relations. 2001. No. 12. P. 41).

[261] 'History teaches,' S. M. Rogov states, 'that it is much harder to maintain stability of a multi-polar system than of a bipolar one. <... > Such flexible balance of powers with constantly evolving number of participants and changing correlation of their possibilities tends to involve destabilization, which often resulted in armed conflicts in the past' *(Rogov, S. M.* Russia in the System of International Relations//Russia-2015: An Optimistic Scenario/Ed. L. I. Abalkin. Moscow, 1999. P. 22).

become one of the 'growth poles' of the global economy and, thus, one of its 'systemic integrative elements'.

4. Unfortunately, Russia has not yet overcome the system crisis in which it started to lapse in the last quarter of the 20th century and which assumed its crucial form in the last decade resulting in Russia's loss of the world's great power status. Moreover, the structure of economy that served as material basis of the crisis has been reproduced on a larger scale (see Table 1).

Table 1

Indices of production by economic activity (1991 = 100%)

Years	2000	2008
Mining	74,3	103,7
Including fuel-energy minerals	80,9	116,4
Manufacturing	51,0	84,4
Machinery	32,3	61,0

Source: here and further on *Rosstat* data are used if not specified otherwise.

The consequences of such dynamics are clearly seen in the 'foreign trade dialogue' between Russia and China (see Table 2).

Table 2

The Structure of Trade between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China

Product Areas	1998		2007	
	Export	Import	Export	Import
Mineral fuels, oil, oil products	3.2	—	42	—
Machinery	25.3	5.2	4.4*	54
Leather products	—	23.9	—	4

*2008

Source: Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

During the recession of 2009, the situation deteriorated even further. Oil production (including gas condensate) amounted to 101.2 per cent as compared with 2008, while manufacturing was 84.0 per cent, including production of metal-cutting tools equal to 36.6 per cent. The Ministry of Economic Development of Russia predicts that the tendency will remain steady through the 'period of recovery' of 2010-12 and within this period the share of the fuel and energy sector in total industrial output will increase while the share of manufacturing machinery and equipment will decline. The supreme political authorities, at least on words, appear to be aware of the effects of the development along such a 'raw materials' scenario.[262]

5. Assessing Russia's capability to make progressive structural changes in the economy which could ensure its national competitiveness, it is worth while asking why the efforts undertaken in this direction since 2000 have been so unsuccessful. The reason seems to lie not only (and not as much) in the justly criticized economic policy but in the established pattern of economic relations which generates the system of economic interests of major economic players – entrepreneurs –

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[262] '...It inevitably leads to the growing dependence of Russia on the import of goods and technologies, to our reputation as a raw material appendage for the world economy, and it will mean further lagging behind world leading economies, extrusion of our country out of world leaders. Following this scenario, we are going to fail to achieve necessary progress and raising quality of life of Russian people. Moreover, we will be able neither to ensure the country's security nor its regular development, and will threaten its existence, I am not exaggerating.' *(Putin, V.* Speech at the enlarged session of the State Council 'On Strategy of Russia's Development up to 2020', February 8, 2008).

who reject development through technological innovation. This, in turn, inevitably gives rise to negative trends in the development of national human resources, 'squeezing' Russia off the cultural dialogue between civilizations.

It is only possible to overcome this economic system, to transform it profoundly if social consensus on the goals and directions of such reforms is achieved. The latter implies a dialogue between its members and, above all, the bearers of knowledge about the progress of the society. However, fruit-fulness of such a dialogue is only possible if representatives of various movements and schools of social science focus on the search of ways to integrate knowledge rather than monopolize the truth.

Thus, to become an influential participant in the dialogue of cultures and in the partnership of civilizations Russia has to establish dialogue and partnership in its own society.

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Jürgen Straub[263]
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INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE: SOME THEORETICAL REMARKS AND A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE

This paper is based on a conceptual analysis of the theoretical construct "intercultural competence" (which was given at the 9th Likhachov conference in 2009; see the publication of all conference papers on the conference website). In the following, I will put two important questions concerning the quite fashionable term "intercultural competence". In the last section, I try to sketch out what one can understand as a humanistic perspective on intercultural competence in the globalized word of our times. All these reflections are made in order to give some food for thinking and discussing problems of intercultural communication, cooperation and coexistence in a culturally complex world.

I divide my remarks in three thematic sections each of which is subject to further differentiation:

1. Of an aim of scientific definitions: a plea for a domain-specific and action-theoretical differentiation of "intercultural competence"

2. Of a normative content of scientific concepts: a plea for an objectification of our good will

3. A humanistic perspective

1: Of an aim of scientific definitions: a plea for a domain-specific and action-theoretical differentiation of "intercultural competence"

Scientific definitions do not capture the "things as such". There is no "correct" definition that would correspond to the matter itself. This also holds true for "intercultural competence". In this respect, suggestions for definitions do not reflect an "essence" or "substance" of an actual phenomenon. "Intercultural competence" is more of a considerably complex theoretical construct, which we can define and deploy in one or another way for *particular aims*, either scientific or practical. As we as scientists agree on a definition, we do not do this because we know what intercultural competence is "actually" or "really" but, rather, because for some "good reasons" we consider the pertaining theoretical construct to be useful or purposive.

By this token, such a concept would help us to identify and reformulate as attributes of disposal requirements that are vital for the functioning of our life and work praxis and that we as well as other people experience in specific (*typical or standardisable*) situations. That is precisely

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what happens in all the internally differentiated psychological "models of competence" which demarcate and "integrate" people's specific facilities (indiscriminately spoken, such as attitudes, knowledge, skills and reflection; and more specifically, one may for instance distinguish between foreign languages mastery, explicit knowledge of culturally specific norms of comportment, tolerance of ambiguity, etc.). All the current constituent or component models of intercultural competence are structured in this manner (although I personally do not know a single case in which it would be specified how the "integration" of different components should be understood; which status is enjoyed by separate components [central or peripheral; especially relevant or rather irrelevant; always or only rarely pertinent]; whether they are necessary or even necessary and sufficient for an interculturally competent acting; in which [empirical or logical] relation they stand one to another; how they interact with each other, etc.; see Straub, Likhachov conference 2009).

If the outlined pragmatic approach to the aim-oriented nature of scientific definitions is acceptable, then with regard to our further work at the concept of "intercultural competence" there inevitably arise the following questions:

a. Is it (already today) useful to formulate a general valid and presumably situationally overarching definition? Or, perhaps, it would not only be more moderate but also widely more useful and productive to first construe the definitions of intercultural competence as *field-* and *domain-specific* constructs that are coined in accordance with specific situations and actual practical requirements? In this case we can preserve, concretise and grasp with regard to its consequences a perspective, which is already available in a form of the everyday intuition. Who would doubt that, for example, intercultural competence is and can only be one and the same in the case of
- Children in a multicultural class of a primary school,
- Teenagers whose first feelings of being in love lead them to a bicultural relationship,
- Partners in a long-term bicultural marriage,
- Tourist guides in all the possible regions of the world,
- Development aid workers or ethnologists in a context of creation of a indigenous museum,
- Missionaries who travel with an aim of religious conversion,
- Engineers in multicultural work groups,
- Managers in intercultural negotiations,
- Soldiers on international missions?
I guess no one.

b. Would it not be possible to develop with a help of empirical research with specific groups of persons in specific performative fields and areas of life (or through a systematic observation of the research results on hand) a domain-specific *typology* of intercultural competence on whose basis to identify general and therefore abstract determining attributes of this construct? I am of the opinion that many of the points considered in the present-day "international discussion" as established and enjoying a broad consensus in this regard are still debatable. For instance, in practically all the definitions the criteria of *adequacy* and *effectiveness* are made the central determining attributes of intercultural competence. Meant is more or less the following:
- "Adequacy": „the actions of the communicators fit the expectations and demands of the situation. Appropriate communication means that people use the symbols they are expected to use in the given context" (Lustig/Koester 2003, 64);
- "Effectiveness" is assessed according to the measure in which the "desired personal outcomes" were achieved: "Satisfaction in a relationship or the accomplishment of a specific task-related goal is an example of an outcome people might want to achieve through their communication with others" (ebd.).

By analysing these criteria, it is not hard to notice that especially the concept of "effectiveness" principally and generally connects intercultural competence to the model of purposive-rational and aim-oriented action and by this absolutises this kind of action. The interculturally competent actors are solely interested in "desired personal outcomes", "the accomplishment of a specific

task-related goal" or similar. But think once more about the above-listed examples of completely different performative fields, areas of life and groups of persons! These examples can also remind us that often it is not only the fulfilment of personal goals or a task-related determination of aims that guide our actions (intercultural constellations included). In other words: we do not always act in an aim-related and purposive-rational, instrumental or strategic, in short, efficiency-oriented way! This consideration suggests an *action-theoretically founded* differentiation of the theoretical construct we are interested in. Once again: think of children who play with each other or of an educational group game in an asilo nido, in a kindergarten or in school, think of the communication between people who address each other, of a friendly talk or of completely aimless activities of lovers! An advanced action-theoretical concept of intercultural competence must satisfy all forms of human praxis, not only actions that are related to articulated aims and objectives and based on the idea of efficiency. This requirement can be fulfilled if we dispose of a construct typologically differentiated in the above-explicated way which would allow a flexible use with regard to different types of interculturally competent action. It is also valid for this action that we abide by certain rules (e.g. socio-cultural norms) without pursuing a specific aim or interest, and with our action we sometimes perpetuate a specific, narratively structured story – also without targeting special aims or interests.

I only note here shortly that both outlined possibilities of a typological differentiation of "intercultural competence" have salient influence on our idea of *what* and *how* we actually learn as we acquire, expand and deepen this competence (in informal or instructed learning processes). Yet this is another subject which I do not touch upon today despite its great importance. And now I shall proceed to the second point.

2: Of a normative content of scientific concepts: a plea for an objectification of our good will

In my view, scientific literature fails to clearly distinguish between two concepts of intercultural competence. This leads now and then to a major confusion, which is linked to an accumulation of empirical questions and normative problems. The concept of "intercultural competence" is obviously a normative concept. This is the case for many basic concepts of social and cultural science and in itself is not bad. The situation becomes precarious when the mentioned differentiation is completely lost out of sight. One should clearly realise

- whether one speaks of intercultural competence as a bunch of information/knowledge, skills and facilities (on the cognitive, emotional or conative plane) which are strictly necessary (or necessary and sufficient) for a participation in a specific praxis, or

- whether one speaks of intercultural competence as a bunch of information/knowledge, skills and facilities, which for ethical and moral (or political) reasons are themselves regarded as valuable and desirable and therefore are appreciated and fostered.

In the first case intercultural competence is regarded as a task-related means in a form of a complex performative potential which one can acquire and "possess" if one wants to act adequately and effectively in certain situations. The second case, on the contrary, is concerned with an ethically and morally distinguished asset or a valuable disposition which represents in the multicultural world of today a generally worthwhile aim in itself.[264] (Elsewhere I wrote that such definitions are altogether aimed at an ethical-moral purpose of human existence based on the idea of an Other). One may accentually speak of an empirical-practical (e.g. psychological) and an ethical-moral (or value-normative) concept of intercultural competence.

In all the recent definition suggestions both dimensions of meaning are easily identifiable. As I have already said: it represents no problem at all as long as one is aware of this "accumulative potential" and can at any time make a clear differentiation between the two. This becomes especially important when one defines the theoretical construct from the ethical-moral stance (that is, in a manner which proclaims certain "own" values and norms to be valid and obligatory) so that numerous actions in intercultural constellations and situations get *categorically disqualified*.

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[264] In the vein of Michel Foucault's criticism of power, one could also speak of a "dispositive".

When one delimitates intercultural competence exclusively as some kind of "good will" understood as possibly unrestrained benevolence and respect towards the Different and the Other, as well as an unconditioned recognition of their world-view and their life form, and acceptance of their value, action and life system, of their principles and rules, then the following quite normal actions inevitably appear as an expression of intercultural *in*competence:

   - confrontational actions,
   - disputes with Others which include a (rather severe) criticism on their worldview and life form, as well as on their cultural language games and practices,
   - conscious violation of principles and
   - deviation from the rules which may be obligatory for Others
   are all examples of this along with
   - any form of strategic-persuasive communication.

Those who want to change the Different or the Other because they cannot fully agree with other ways of thinking, feeling, willing and acting, behaves, according to the definition, in an "interculturally incompetent way". This is what numerous normative prescriptions for the theoretical construct under discussion suggest.

It is up to us to discuss whether, and to which extent it is useful, and if certain ethical-moral ideas do not call the tune here. It would anyway be helpful to rely not only on the opinion of the often so called "leading US-American experts" (and some European experts) in the research field but also to listen to the voices of the non-Western world (and particularly to the voices which represent a growing number of "indigenous psychologies" all over the world). I am not now making a third point out of this, but also would not have to speculate on what "we" might expect from such a talk: these voices would probably tell us that confrontation, dissent, conflict and violence have long belonged to the standard baggage of those very cultures that today speak so much about intercultural competence and connect it with an idea of a harmonious and surprisingly peaceful world.

3: A Humanistic Perspective

In the third section I simply want to ask whether and how far the whole discourse on intercultural competence could be grasped and further developed in a humanistic perspective.

As Hubert Cancik (1993) argues, there is no "humanism" -not even when one confines oneself to the territory and history of Europe without considering other world regions, in which different versions of humanism have long been established and have assumed new guises. Rather, we are dealing with a heterogeneous and vastly ramified, if inwardly contradictory tradition. Cancik holds exemplary, though in many respects, incompatible strands of humanistic thinking like the following: occidental, atheistic, Christian, dialectical, ethical, evolutionary, existentialist, Hebraic, classical, critical, socialist, and secular humanism (among some others: cf. Cancik 2003: 176). Humanism is apparently very heterogeneous and even today still spawns new versions.

As far as it concerns the history of the concept, it originated with the Roman *humanitas,* which connoted humanity or humankind; resurfacing later in different variants of meaning up to the 19[UI] century, when Friedrich Niethammer (1766-1848) introduced the his theory of *humanism.* Niethammer's humanism was still aimed at reformist pedagogy and implied "general, not professionally oriented preparation for the study, and concern with 'the humanity of the pupil'" (Cancik 1993: 174). This so-called "classical humanism" was a primarily pedagogical innovation, a "modernisation" of overall edification targeting the general, encyclopaedic education of a person, which implied and integrated a study of antiquity. This innovative pedagogy craved a historically anchored self-conception as well as new endeavours for the *perfection* of the "complete person", which drew upon the most recent recognition of humanities, and up to the present day, has not become a homogeneous, clearly defined and compact system combining ethics and anthropology.

Only some decades after the declaration of the original reformist educational program, the concept was also introduced to denote the epoch of the Italian Renaissance (first employed by Georg Voigt and Jacob Burkhardt). It ended up being commonly used as a name for *all possible*

spiritual currents with a practical ambition, which drew upon certain *anthropologies* and *images of humankind* and propagated corresponding world-views and political goals, shunting further into the background the reference to Greco/Roman antiquity, then still central for the classical humanism. Therefore today we have a rich gamut of sometimes quite idiosyncratic humanisms on hand. This plurality and contradictoriness makes it difficult to connect intercultural competence to a humanistic perspective in an uncomplicated manner or to regard it as a humanistic project. One question is ineluctable: *which* humanistic perspective in particular should one assume? What does this adjective mean in this regard? What can one consider today as a humanistic perspective of intercultural competence that would make sense?

The inevitably dual meaning of humanity *(humanitas),* which has also influenced numerous humanistic projects and movements, provides the first helpful, albeit still quite general and abstract clue. As Cancik (2009) argues, humanity has always likewise implied "'education' (eruditio, litterae, scientia) and 'clemency' (mansetudo, comitas, benignitas)", as well as "(spiritual) scholarship" (eruditio), and "(active) charity" (phi-lantropia)". Roughly speaking, this concept, and thus different humanistic programs and movements, unite

- endeavours for a universal (anthropological) identification of humankind as a particular species,
- ethical and moral reflections on the questions of equality and justice, which in modernity revolve about the universal dignity of humans and general human rights,
- pedagogically and politically motivated appeal to subject the humankind, that is, every individual, to a progressive education and edification, thus pursuing gradual (and evidently non-achievable) perfection of the "complete person",
- demand to orientate human life and acting practice in accordance with *humanitarian principles,* and to bestow special attention and support on those who are in extremity and need help.

Obviously, the concept of "intercultural competence" did not surface in any of the then existent humanisms. It has been born out of the epoch in which practical and politically motivated reflections on cultural differences has lead to unprecedented levels of awareness, and has likewise attained an untapped depth. Of course, people have always distinguished between cultural forms of life, language games and performative strategies: already in Greek antiquity Herodotus wrote about them with great care and a clear awareness of difficulties which the comparative contemplation of cultures entailed. But there were no comparative anthropological studies as such until in the 18th century when the discipline first appeared from the emerging humanities and cultural and social sciences, which focused on the systematic comparison between cultures. As, for instance, the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder show, in the 18th century the relationship between separate cultures and universal commonalities of all human forms of life had to be stipulated anew due to the growth in sensibility towards difference and the radicalised awareness of Strangeness. The deepened insights into the substantial differences between forms of cultural knowledge and practices, which were by and large a result of real problems of mutual understanding and serious conflicts, fomented the necessity to search for universal anthropological foundations. Only the latter made communication, cooperation and coexistence possible in spite of all incalculable, partly incomprehensible and irreconcilable cultural differences. This insight harbingered the advent of "intercultural competence", although this currently so-fashionable expression was first coined only in the latter third of the 20th century.

This concept has come into the humanistic heritage" not only because it regarded the whole of humankind – that is -the totality of the species, against the background of the intensified and differentiated experience of cultural differences. With the insistent plea for intercultural competence, the unity of humankind has been declared *a practical, day-to-day task.* (By this token, it is no longer considered as already inherent by virtue of this or that anthropological constant!) This shining competence should establish, assert and thus to ensure the unity, intelligible relationship, and practical cohesion between people, as well as between their inevitably particular, culturally specific forms of life and language games, performative strategies, and identities.

Furthermore, humanistic legacy retains its relevance because this task is regarded as a challenge for our practical capabilities and skills, whose *development* is an imperative. Without this superordinate educational and edificatory goal, which refers to the principal possibility of amelioration and perfection of human beings, it would not be understandable why we have been speaking for so long of intercultural competence and have made it an objective of various psycho-pedagogical endeavours. As it has been stated above, the Other and the Strange have now become some kind of a "displaced entity", and a medium of perpetual learning. It is from all those other/alien cultures scattered worldwide that we can, should and *are* willing to learn. To a certain extent, we have to do it in order to find out who we are or have become ourselves, and would like to become in future. It is also important for our persistence in the fused world of "cultural competitors". The concept of "intercultural competence" encompasses all of this, although it concerns primarily the acting and learning potential of *individuals.*

The far-reaching ethical and moral claim of "intercultural competence" assimilates the so far untapped potentials of humanistic tradition and suggests their further exploration. As a concept, its share of dues must be claimed for sensitivity towards difference, respect for, and recognition of the Other and the Strange, which in the (European) history of "intercultural encounters" has often been drastically lacking for those who became victims of violence stemming from the very heart of Europe. In this respect, intercultural competence contains a self-reflective dimension and a self-critical stance, which is hard on the own past and present, and has spawned a very peculiar form of *"propriophobid",* representing some kind of fear and revulsion of the Self (especially notorious is the Nazi period in Germany, where the genocide of European Jewry, a crime against humankind, became a monument to inhumanity).

It is enough to take a brief glance at some of the well known examples (see Straub, Likhachov conference 2009) in order to ascertain that the particular values and normative basic convictions, which in the course of the critical process of remembering, and reflecting on excessive collective violence have gained a noteworthy place in collective consciousness, are also intrinsically present in the concept of intercultural competence. In this respect, too, it proves to be a child of European, and in certain respects, global humanism, which takes up its principles. It is not least true for an appeal to connect the ethical and moral self-apprehension of each individual, and of humankind on the whole with the perception of the Other and the Strange so as to develop this perception to the point of a willed forbearance, strong enough for a necessary withdrawal of the own Self – for unobtrusive and stable relations of recognition, rather than for a violent overpowering of the opponent. In the readiness and possibility of experiencing cultural exchange, intercultural communication, cooperation and coexistence as a source of educating the "complete human", one should see both an important hallmark of those contemporary endeavours for intercultural competence *and* of some tradition and future of humanism.

I am concluding this paper with this statement: that the teaching of intercultural competence will eventually represent one further step in the painstaking process of education by which individuals, particular groups, and the whole of humankind are endeavouring to learn how one can encounter the Other and the Strange without perceiving them as enemies from the very beginning. Even in his own day, Herder was thought somewhat too optimistic (although by no means naive), when he spoke of an end of the time of animosities and enmities marked by outbursts of excessive violence. Let us therefore quote him, or, rather, his question, which is perhaps not as "rhetorical" as its optimistic author meant it to be: "Where are the times when such tribes as troglodytes sat in their caves and behind their walls, and every stranger was an enemy?" (Herder 1784/1989: 659). We have to answer that these times have not ended up to the present day and, besides, are not likely to ever end. Yet they do signal an option for a future of humankind. Those with the courage to speak about intercultural competence and conceive of its achievement and furthering as a broad-spectrum "humanistic" project, must never lose sight of their goals.

V. S. Styopin[265]

GLOBALIZATION STRATEGIES AND DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Judging the present-day globalization flow we refer to the dialogue of cultures. We regard it as the most favourable and conflict-free way that globalization may take. Dialogue of cultures is defined as mutual respect and interaction of diverse cultural traditions. The dialogue opposes the one-sided action of the dominating western tradition in the globalization process.

Such dominance finds its roots in history. The present-day globalization comes from the modernization of the 19th -the second half of the 20th centuries. That modernization, in its turn, was the result of the western civilizational influence marked by 'the Project of Modernity' epoch upon the traditionalist societies. My definition for this type of civilization is 'anthropogenic', because its key boosters are scientific and technological innovations. Introduced into diverse spheres of life, they dramatically change the object environment of human life (the second nature), social links and institutions, types of human communications.

Traditionalist societies, influenced by anthropogenic civilizations, are known to have followed the anthropogenic path. This transition was preconditioned by introduction of engineering and technological innovations that called for qualified personnel and modernization of education system. Simultaneously, some fragments and values of the anthropogenic culture had to be adapted by the traditionalist culture.

The interaction of different cultural types, based on diverse and often alternative values, took cultures time to mutually adapt. The tradition was reconsidered under the influence of new cultural transplantations. It embraced new life meanings and value references that were in control of new activity types.

Such was the practice of Russia's great modernizations (Peter I's and Alexander IFs reforms and the bolshevists' modernization which transformed the country into a great industrial power). Such was the way of Japan, starting from the last third of the 19th century. Modernization in South Korea, China, India and Latin American countries was very much the same in the second half of the 20th century.

Values and achievements of the anthropogenic culture were a prerequisite for progress; they were also taken as dominant over the traditionalist values.

When, in the second half of the 20th century, modernization processes obtained its systematic features and achieved the level of globalization, the West still kept to its values dominant. Moreover, this positioning got its new dimensions due to the on-growing modern technologies. The latter include not only production, but also social and humanitarian technologies, market controlling technologies and, especially technologies of democratic governing based on the operation of modern mass media and different methods to psychologically influence the people's consciousness.

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[265] Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Scientific Head of the Institute for Philosophy (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Head of the Department of Philosophy, Sociology and Law (the Russian Academy of Sciences) of Social Sciences Branch at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Chair for Philosophical Anthropology and Human Sciences at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), professor. Mr Styopin is the author of over 400 scientific works, including 21 monographs: Filosofskaya *antropologiya i filosofiya nauki* [Philosophical Anthropology and Philosophy of Science], *Filosofiya nauki i tehniki* [Philosophy of Science and Technology], *Epoha peremen i scenariyi buduschego* [The Age of Changes and Scenarios for the Future], *Teoreticheskoye znaniye* [Theoretical Knowledge], *Filosofiya i universaliyi kul'lury* [Philosophy and Culture Universals], *Novaya filosofskaya entsiklopediya* (v 4 t.) [The New Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (4 vols.)], *Filosofiya nauki: obschiye problemy* [Philosophy of Science: Common Issues], and others. He is President of the Russian Philosophic Society. Member of the Council for the analysis of critical situations and drafts of governmental decisions under the Government of the Russian Federation. Mr Styopin is a foreign member of National Academies of Sciences of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, doctor honoris causa of the University of Karlsruhe (Germany), Professor Emeritus of the Academy of Social Sciences of the People's Republic of China (Beijing), a standing member of the International Institute (Academy) for Philosophy (Paris, 2001). Laureate of Russia's State Award in the field of science and technology.

At the same time, there is a rise of a critical attitude to the values that determined the anthropogenic achievements. It is provoked by the global crises caused by this development.

These crises make up the background for the current flow of globalization. The crises have embraced the whole planet. Environmental and anthropological crisis, the progressing alienation, and the further invention of new weapons of mass destruction that can ruin the whole mankind – these are the byproducts of the anthropogenic development.

Ecological crisis has much been spoken about. It is getting clear that it will only progress with the tendency to pursue the consumerist society ideals.

The prognosticated growth of the planet's population, with its tendency for a vaster power consumption in a growing number of world's countries and exponentially expanding pollution, will inevitably result in an unprecedented environmental disaster in the next fifteen or twenty years.

The anthropological crisis also makes a threat for the humankind. It has a great number of manifestations and tendencies. A change in a gene pool of human population is one of the major threats. The increase of mutagenic factors caused by the direct exposure to polluted environment (chemical and radioactive influence) and also by the indirect exposure, through new types of pathogenic microbes and viruses, result in hazardous changes of the human's genetic code. Biologists mention the on-growing damage in the genotypic structures established over millions of years of evolution. Natural factors that preserve the gene pool (natural selection) are dramatically limited within the human social context, and different social activities that might be interpreted as 'selecting' (wars, for example) have a totally different effect. A great number of young people with offspring are killed in wars. Besides, the contemporary genetic research shows that some wounds have a mutagenic effect on the genetic structure of a human.

The increasing stress load is yet another significant indicator of the anthropologic crisis. Life nowadays, with its rapidly changing social context, instability, intensified competition in different spheres, brings about the chain of stressful circumstances to a human. Exhaustion and overstrain result in an increase of cardio-vascular as well as oncologic diseases and mental disorders. Over the recent years depression, a serious psychic disorder, has won the leading position in the rating of the most widely-spread diseases of the late 19th – the early 20th century. To avoid depression, people tend to use different psychoactive drugs. F. Fukuyama in his book *Our Post-human Future* points out that the striking 10 per cent of the Americans use Prozak, the leading antidepressant, or Prozak analogues (if we make the sampling among the working adults only, the percentage of Prozak users will be twice as much). However, this antidepressant medicine together with the improved self-estimation and blocking of aggressive acting, may lead to such adverse reactions as abnormal thinking, decreased libido or brain damage.

The third group of factors that make the anthropological crisis even more acute includes the current tendencies to restructure the human biological essence. They are manifested in the latest achievements in genetics and new biotechnologies. The clue to a human genome provides us with ample opportunities not only to treat hereditary diseases but also to intensify human (physical and mental) potential. Today the research is targeted to boost up haemoglobin level as a hereditary feature. The thing that is now banned in sports as a blood stimulant, may become a genetically designed property of the human body (making up prospective Olympic champions). At the same time, microchip implantation, providing a better activity of the nervous system, is being worked out. Nowadays the operations to implant silicon chips into brain are performed to revive lost functions caused by Parkinson's disease.

All those experiments performed over the human's biological part have serious fallout. The concept of 'a posthuman' has already been in use for a while. Though not always clearly defined, it emphasizes the idea of change of the human's biological core as a constituent part of the whole concept. The anthropogenic civilization reveals a new risk zone. Systemic integrity of the human genetic factors does not at all guarantee against the distortion of some properties if a single gene, encoding the certain future organism's properties, is restructured. Life also has a social constituent. We should bear in mind that the human culture is fundamentally juxtaposed to human corporeal nature and primary emotions that it initiates. Imagine the famous character of Orwell's *1984* succeeding with the dreadful plot targeted at a genetic change of libido. People with no

emotions wouldn't care for Byron, or Shakespeare, or Pushkin. They would be deprived of huge chapters in human culture. Biological background is not just a neutral environment for communal being, it is the very ground from which the human culture has started, and without which the human spiritual interests are not possible.

Acute global crises brought about by the anthropogenic civilization, put a question: Can we overcome these crises without changing the fundamental value system of the anthropogenic culture?

I believe that this value system will have to be changed, and that getting through global crises we will have to change the targets of human activity and its value guide lines. And a radical value change means a transfer from the anthropogenic civilization *to a new type of civilizational development – a third one, after the traditionalist and the anthropogenic.*

This transfer reveals new dimensions of a cross-cultural dialogue. Within 'the Project of Modernity' the cross-cultural dialogue is limited to the further adaptation of traditionalist values (together with the values survived in the cultures of those societies that have been following the anthropogenic path) to the present-day western varieties of the anthropogenic values.

The idea of transfer from 'the Project of Modernity' to a new civilizational development implies a different way of intercourse. The changing western value system may open new opportunities for a particular 'roll call' of values between the preserved and the modified traditionalist values. Everything that has been interpreted throughout history (the 20th century inclusive) as alternative or incompatible may eventually find concord.

The first version of a cross-cultural dialogue is focused on the problem of how to detect the common areas in cultural traditions and determine their incompatible features. These features should be acknowledged and respected. But they should also be taken as a borderline which shouldn't be violated.

The second version introduces the very nature of the borderline as changing, and traditions as reconsidered. The analysis is targeted at the detection of tendencies for changes of traditions. The question here is the prerequisites for the development of new traditions.

These are the two key interrelated practices within the context of the present-day changes of the globalizing world. That is why it is important to reveal the tendencies of changes, connected to the transformation of fundamental values of the anthropogenic civilization.

Technological innovations change the economic setup. In the modern epoch the innovations are determined by the present stage of science. The major tenors of scientific and technological research are determined by elaboration of convergent technologies (nano-bio-informational and cognitive technologies). It is also important to find out the way the scientific rationality is changing today when new types of objects are being mastered and applied.

Within the developed scientific paradigm established in New Europe's culture, science clearly manifests its specific setups that distinguish it from other forms of cognitive activity (commonplace, artistic, philosophic etc.).

Setup number one is its focus on the exploration of targets that can actually or potentially become objects of human activity. Science is seeking for patterns that these targets follow. It is very much like King Midas remembered in Greek mythology for his ability to turn everything he touched into gold. Everything that science touches upon becomes its experimental unit. Any world's fragment or aspect or phenomenon can become an experimental unit: natural, social, human, human activity, culture or human cognition. Everything that falls within its research area is taken as an object that obeys particular laws.

This approach is far from taking into account the total variety of human existence. Therefore, with all its importance science cannot substitute for other forms of human cognition and for a total variety of culture.

The second characteristic feature of science is its ability to study not only the available practical objects. Science always goes beyond the area of production and everyday experience of a certain epoch. It is able to explore the objects that can be implemented and installed only on later stages of the civilizational development.

These two fundamental characteristics of scientific cognition predetermine the specificity of its resources, methods, its knowledge as the product of scientific activity, and also the specificity of inherent ethos of science.

It is based on the two major principles: the quest for the objective verifiable knowledge and a persistent accumulation of that knowledge (the novelty value). This is where the two ethic prohibitions that make up the core of the ethos of science come from: the ban on the intended distortion of truth in order to satisfy some social motives and the ban on plagiarism.

The development of science has long been based on the sufficiency of these ethic principles. They were taken as a manifestation of humanistic values, because scientific discoveries and the succeeding technological innovations were meant to improve human life, and, therefore, they corresponded to the humanistic ideals. But in the modern times the situation has changed. The sphere of scientific research has covered the objects that are complex and spontaneous systems. Gradually they have advanced to the forefront of science. For an illustration of such objects we may refer to biological objects, studied with respect to their evolution, social objects (society and its subsystems plus culture) in their development, modern nano-and biotechnologies, computer networks and the Internet etc.

Spontaneous systems may become more sophisticated through evolution. They acquire new levels of organization, which influence the prior levels and alter them.

Activities with complex spontaneous systems have a number of specific features. It is not a purely external factor with respect to the system. It is incorporated into it as its component, activating some of its scenarios and degrading some others. But then such systems acquire a human dimension. It is necessary to review the scenarios that may lead to fallout, in order not to get trapped. This kind of review basically means that the internal ethos of science is not enough. It is indispensable to correlate the claims of the search for truth with the humanistic ideals through adjustment of the internal ethos of science to complimentary ethic patterns. Such an adjustment is implemented today through the social and ethic expertise of scientific and technological programs and projects.

Science remains science. It sticks to its fundamental patterns: the search for truth and knowledge expansion. Social and ethic expertise cannot change this. On the contrary, it becomes the prerequisite for implementing these patterns. The new values in science within the contemporary culture start from here. It is not the denial of science, but its new humanistic dimension that makes up one of the important aspects in search for new civilizational development strategies.

I have referred to this point in my earlier papers: the changes in scientific rationality reveal new opportunities for the dialogue of cultures. Much of what has been recently denied by the New European science as unscientific delusion of traditionalist cultures starts unexpectedly to come in accord with most recent ideas of the scientific forefront.

With respect to this I usually mention the three key moments. First, the eastern cultures (as the majority of the traditionalist cultures) have always been based on the premises that natural world in which the human lives is not a depersonalized nonorganic field meant to be ploughed up and restructured, but the living organism. The newly-European science has long been taking these ideas as the survivals of myths or mysticism. However, with the modern conceptions of biosphere as a global ecosystem it has become clear that the environment around us is an integral organism, which includes the human. To some extent, these conceptions are now in accord with organismic images of nature, characteristic of ancient cultures.

Second, human-dimensional systems require particular activity strategies. Such systems are characterized by synergism, where non-power interactions, based on cooperation, become its key factors. Insignificant forces applied at bifurcation points may change the state of system dramatically, bringing about the new paths for its development.

When such systems are concerned it is not always efficient to aim at the active power restructuring of objects. When the application of external force is simply intensified, the system may only reproduce one and the same set of structures, however it does not generate new structures or organizational levels. But when instability is taken, an insignificant influence at the bifurcation points (a touch at a definite space-temporal locus) may result (due to the cooperative

effects) in new structures and organizational levels. This kind of modality bears resemblance to nonviolence strategies developed in India's cultural tradition, and also to activities in accordance with the ancient Chinese Wu-Wei principle, which involves some minimum doing based on the understanding of world's natural tempo.

Third, when applied to complex human-dimensional systems, activity strategies initiate a new-type fusion of truth and morals. Rational ground is taken as the fundamentals of ethics in the western cultural tradition. However, the eastern cultural tradition is based on the essentially different premises. Within its framework, moral perfection was made the necessary condition for understanding the truth. The hieroglyph 'dao' was interpreted as 'guide or lead', 'truth' and 'way or path' in ancient China.

A new type of rationality, which is being maintained in science and technology and which includes inherent consideration of values, is congruent with the notions of truth and morality, characteristic of the traditional eastern cultures. Some new aspects appear in the functioning of science as an agent of the contemporary cross-cultural dialogue.

The new attitude towards the nature is predetermined by the changes in scientific rationality and new dimensions of control over scientific and technological activities. The notion of the economic supremacy has its socio-cultural reasoning. It is inherently connected with the peculiarities of fundamental values of the anthropogenic civilization.

Understanding nature as a resource-holder for human activities meant to restructure the environment, understanding rationality that is linked to the self-sufficient character of scientific and technological innovations, the project to expand the human control over nature – the fundamental principles of the anthropogenic communities – defined the strategies for economy.

The industrialization epoch initiated by the first industrial revolution pursued these strategies. Diverse practices appeared that boosted economic development within the context of industry's technological update.

In this respect, I would like to note that K. Marx's materialistic understanding of history made theoretical generalizations of these practices. His theory of society was the outcome of the industrialized culture. The successful advance of the industrialized framework backed up confidence in social progress and also in the perspective steady increase of consumption in the context of scientific and technological innovations introduced into industry. This concept was developed in many diverse ways by many 20th century thinkers (Ch. Fourier, H. de Saint-Simon, his follower, the founder of the science of sociology A. Comte). K. Marx used this concept to define communism as the ultimate stage of human history that resulted naturally from the scientific and technological development of civilization.

In the second half of the 20th century there appeared a new version of capitalism – a consumer society. Its essential principle for economy is: the more we consume the better the economy is. Demand initiates supply, which stimulates a new turn of economic development. There emerges a feedback system. Supplying the demand brings about a new demand, which provides for the economic growth.

In the mid-20th century the western market economy theorists, sociologists and philosophers validated this phenomenon as the principle of justice. Bordley Rawls's well-known theory juxtaposed the concept of social and economic inequality to the increase in consumption of society's 'lower strata' and to the potential to pull them up to the middle class due to the new phase in the social capital increase.

Market economy ideologists came up with the tools to increase the customer demand. As early as the mid-20th century, Viktor Lebow, one of those who researched and promoted free market, emphasized the need for a special frame of human consciousness targeted at the customer demand increase. In the context of advertised promotion, fashion should regularly be changed. Lebow's idea was to change the promotion of market in mass media to get the people trained in buying, wearing out and changing goods in increasing progression. Economy is supposed to profit from that. Incidentally, this strategy has been carried out in practice. Many manufacturers of goods oversimplify technologies so that the goods would come out of use in a quicker mode, thus making consumers buy new ones.

It's clear that the economic system of this kind may only progress absorbing more and more recourses and increasing environmental pollution.

The second way to increase customer demand is linked to low-interest loan activities. This is 'an instalment plan' life.

Lending to corporations and states instead of lending to individuals became widely spread in the second half of the 20th century. The booming currency exchange and manipulations on stock exchange have turned money into a special commodity. There emerged a medium agency – the world currency – to exchange this commodity. It is the US dollar. And then manufacturing this commodity became a profit earner. The huge unsecured supply of money flooded the market. It was the opportunity for the USA to credit itself, increasing the currency and securities issue, thus boosting the consumption. There appeared the phenomenon of superpower that holds huge military potential and lives by instalment. At present the national dept of the USA is more than 11 billion dollars. Meanwhile, this country sticks to its policy of the progressing budgeted deficit through expansion of its expenditure, supporting the customer demand.

But living by instalment means to live at the future generations' expense. Eventually, the principle 'the more we consume, the better the economy is' isn't fair any more. It was authorized by the anthropogenic culture as a controlling device for the economic growth. Today, however, this principle is being questioned.

Ervin Laszlo, a well-known futurologist, in his book *Macroshift* [Russian edition of 2004] regards it as a way to the environmental disaster and says that new strategies for civilizational development must be based on the rejection of this principle. But here appears a new problem that should be analyzed in the framework of changes, initiated by knowledge economy, growth of information and potentials of new energy-efficient technologies. It is also important to analyze the potential of changing the structure of the financial market within the framework of international supervision on the world currency.

V. A. Tishkov[266]

THE ETHNIC FACTOR AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
OF THE STATE ETHNIC POLICY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

On the culture of the successive ethno-political thinking and the goals of historical knowledge

The contemporary period of our country's development is one of the most dramatic in the rich history of the Russian state and its people. The period at issue is the time from the beginning of Gorbachev's reforms in the late 1980s, the collapse of the USSR and the post-Soviet development of a new state, the Russian Federation. All these events took a quarter of a century. It is quite a considerable space of historical time provided that a big share of the contemporary population of

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[266] Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Miklukho-Makalai Institute for Ethnic Studies and Anthropology (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Dr. Sc. (History), professor. Mr Tishkov is the author of over 300 scholarly and popular works, including: *Strana klenovogo lista: nachalo istoriyi* [The Country of the Maple Leaf: The Beginning of History], *Osvoboditel 'noye dvizheniye v kolonial 'noy Kcrnade* [Liberation Movement in Colonial Canada], *Istoriya Kanady* [History of Canada], *Istoriya i istoriki SShA* [History and Historians of the USA], *Korennoye naseleniye Sevemoy Ameriki v sovremennom mire* [The Indigenous Population of North America in the Modem World], *Tropoyu slyoz i nadezhd: kniga o sovremennyh indeytsah SShA i Kanady* [Walking along the Path of Tears and Hopes: A Book of Modem Indians of the USA and Canada], *Russkiye kak men shinstvo: primer Estoniyi* [Russians as the Minority: The Case of Estonia] and *Russkiye v Sredney Aziyi I Kazahstane* [Russians in Central Asia and Kazakhstan], *Rossiya kak mnogonatsional'naya obshchnost' i perspekliva mezhetnicheskogo soglasiya* [Russia as a Multinational Community and the Prospect of Inter-Ethnic Consensus], *Konceptual'naya evolyutsiya natsional'noy politiki v Rossiyi* [Conceptual Evolution of Ethnic Policy in Russia], *Ocherki teoriyi i politiki etnichnosti v Rossiyi* [Sketches on Theory and Policy of Ethnicity in Russia], *Politicheskaya antropologiya. Rossiyskie issledovaniya v gumanitamyh naukah* [Political Anthropology: Russian Studies in the Humanities], *Obshchesrvo v vooruzhennom konflikte* [Society in Military Conflict] and *Etnologiya ipolitika. Nauchnaya publitsistika* [Ethnology and Politics. Scholarly Journalism], *Edinsrto v mnogoobraziyi: publikatsiyi iz zhumala 'Etnopanorama '1999-2008 gg.* [Unity in Diversity: publications from the *Ethno-Panorama* journal], *Nauka i zhizn: razgovory s etnografami* [Science and Life: Conversations with Ethnographers], and others.

the country are citizens who were born after the collapse of the USSR and who hardly remember anything about this seemingly recent past. The currently living adult and older generations remain the bearers of the Soviet historical memory; however, even among this part of the population there are contrary views on how to treat the Soviet period: some think that those were 'the best years of their lives' while it gives others a shudder to recall the crimes of Stalinism and the cruel unfreedom in the time of the total shortage of goods and services under Brezhnev's regime.

In recent years these mental fractures among the Russians have been complemented by the tendency typical of every new ruling 6lite towards a tough rejection of what was done by their predecessors, even if the new powers that be were active figures of previous governments. In this way the image of 'the chaos of the 1990s' and that of the 'bloody nineties' were born not so long ago. The aim of this image is to dignify the undoubtedly positive changes which occurred in the life of the country after the year of2000. The bad consequence of it is that the society, including the political class, is deprived of successive thinking culture and fosters intolerance and even hatred to those who were in power before. In its turn it breeds hatred to the current government among those who are willing to take its place or have lost the position of authority.

In this politico-ideological turmoil – with the lack of succession culture – a special responsibility falls on those who are professional producers of knowledge about the past, i.e. on historians. Only historians have been trained to deal with the knowledge of broad historical horizons, to apply certain methods to reliable sources and evidence, have the necessary skills for conducting test procedures and intra-professional criteria of a trustworthy interpretation of the past. With all the variety of opinions and even heated discussions there must be the required consensus as to what is reliable in the past and what is an invention or a delusion.

However, the contemporary period of history is somewhat difficult to study, which makes this research no less complicated than the study of Antiquity or the Ancient Rus. First, the historical narrative has not lost touch with the living historical memory and this memory, including the scholar's personal experience, has controversial influence on the objective reconstruction of the most reliable and complete historical picture. On the one hand, a witness or even a direct participant of the events remembers what was going on but, on the other hand, they only remember what was happening to them. Their memory is closely connected with emotions and likings which are inherent in every man. Second, the contemporary history is to a greater degree connected with the current political process and the authorities are always tempted to 'correct history' to their own advantage.

Finally, in every society there are debates over narratives of the contemporary history, i.e. of what people have experienced recently: the results of changes and reforms, the essence of the current processes, the role of politicians, parties and institutions are debated. The recent past is what the society still remembers without the help of historians, remembers and uses in politics either as a means of consolidation or as that of discord and accusations, and most often it is used for pragmatic reasons to swing an election or to come to power. In studying contemporary history there is another embarrassing circumstance: the restrictions imposed by the government on revealing archive documentary sources and purely personal motivations in interpreting events by authors of various memoirs and narrators who are not professional historians. There are too few documents and too many memories! It is a common problem for the recently experienced history, but it is quite a solvable problem.

This paper is devoted to one side of socio-historical process over the last 25 years. The matter in question is what was for a long time conventionally referred to as 'ethnic issue' or 'nationalities policy' in our science and practice. The essence of these issues lies in the issues of the state and development of ethnic diversity of the country's population (a multi-ethnic people), the system of state organization and administration in conditions of multi-ethnicity, the account and observance of the rights, demands and interests of citizens and ethnic communities connected with preservation of their culture, traditions and language in conditions of a united country and different types of settlement. Finally, here belong the issues of interethnic relations including possible conflicts and methods of their deterrence and resolution.

For the last 15 years starting from the ethno-political conflict in Chechnya the same sphere was complemented by issues of armed ethnic separatism, religious fundamentalism, terrorism which

almost always involve the ethnic factor in the indoctrination programme. Ethnic and racial aspects embrace such phenomena of the Russian life as xenophobia and extremism mainly directed against foreigners and at the same time against own citizens and our recent compatriots – natives from the regions of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

The concept of nationalities policy in its conventional notion comprises working out and realization of constitutional and normative regulations, activities of specialized institutions of state administration of different levels, state programmes and projects aimed at preservation of cultures and languages, education and information, social movements and organizations of ethno-cultural orientation, monitoring and applied scientific research.

Peculiarities of the late Soviet period of ethnic policy

What were the peculiarities of the late Soviet period of ethnic policy?

The USSR was one of the biggest multi-ethnic states where virtually all non-Russian ethnic communities (peoples, nations or nationalities) had autonomous entities of different level, the so-called ethnic-state entities. The well-known 'Soviet Matryoshka' (the union and autonomous republics, autonomous regions and districts, ethnic village councils) appeared yet in the first decades of the USSR's existence and though experiencing some changes continued to exist up to its collapse. This system was based on territorial and state-political work of the ethnic factor. Take the legal notion of 'the territory of own ethnic statehood' alone which was applied to citizens of a certain ethnic origin within the country. The Soviet ethnic policy was not so much a state-building politics as the policy of development and rapprochement of socialist nations on the basis of formulas of internationalism and friendship of peoples. This to some extent propagandist theoretical politics had its own serious risks concerning funds allocation not only to 'ethnic forms', but also to a potential isolationism, separatism and anti-Russianness.

In the USSR the situation was saved through a tough ideological dictate, repressive party-political regime, the ideology of Soviet patriotism and the conception of the Soviet people. The latter was more than real but it was not a 'new type of historical communion of people'. It was a historical continuation of the people of Russia (Russian in a broad sense of the word) which had existed for centuries despite the loss of some state territories in 1917 and the acquisition of new territories in 1940.

After the abolishment of a specialized institution in 1923 -the People's Commissariat of Nationalities – the whole range of problems in this sphere of state and social life came within the cognizance of party organs, the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, some ministries (Culture and Education) and committees (Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting), and the governments of republics, autonomous regions and districts. Any demonstrations of ethnic nationalism or even radical views and actions concerning 'the ethnic issue' were under strict control and were suppressed by the KGB. For instance, among political prisoners of the late Brezhnev period there were some activists of the Crimean-Tatar movement, Ukrainian and Georgian nationalists who were usually indicted on other charges.

It was only under M.S. Gorbachev in 1987 when in the CPSU Central Committee Apparatus there was formed a Department of Interethnic Relations which was in charge of solving issues of the escalating relations in the line of 'the centre -the periphery' and tried to resolve some insecure conflict situations in ethnic sphere.

The contemporary history of the ethnic issue in our country goes back to the epoch of liberalization of the political system, or, as it was called then, 'perestroika'. Let us remark here that the grand geopolitical collision, which took place under the government of M.S. Gorbachev, more specifically – the collapse of the USSR – was only in part connected with 'the ethnic issue' and moreover with its openness. Let us remind that the Soviet heritage in this sphere had controversial results. Along with the cruel massive repressions including forced deportation of entire peoples from their permanent places of residence and the centralization-assimilation tendencies to the advantage of the dominating Russian-speaking cultural tradition in the Soviet ethnic policy there were positive trends of small cultures and languages support and development, representatives of different nationalities being advanced to different spheres of life, including administrative bodies. Unlike tsarist Russia which was sometimes called 'the prison of peoples', the Soviet Union became to a certain extent the cradle of many nations which in the course of the

so-called nation-state building in the 1920s-1930s consolidated on the heterogeneous clannish-tribal foundation around 'their own statehood' and which in the post-war decades gained all the necessary institutions for 'national self-determination to the extent of secession' (economies, constitutions, representative bodies of power, professional culture and science, the complete education system, etc).

The extenuation of political-ideological dictate of the centre, the economic independence, the opening of the Soviet society to the outside world and the external input aimed not as much at democratization of the USSR as at its separation along ethno-national borders were unambiguously perceived by pro-nationalistic intellectuals and bureaucracy of constituent republics of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to self-determine through secession. The common slogan for all these programmes was democratization and decentralization – the goals which seemingly quite agreed with the aims of Gorbachev reforms. But the nationalistic policy on the part of periphery was of a latent phased nature: economic self-support – sovereignty – new contract relations – independence. This phasing was fully realized due to the gross errors of the central authorities and the conflict of commanding elite in the very centre. A certain role was also played by external factors of support of disintegration forces within the USSR.

The period of Gorbachev, i.e. from the early 1980s to 1991, was marked by some serious attempts to improve the situation in the sphere of ethnic policy, though the reform of political system and economy was seen as a priority task by the Kremlin. Among such attempts was the special Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee held in 1989 and devoted to interethnic relations and the discussion of these issues at the 28th CPSU congress in 1990. Work on a new Union agreement can also be rated among the most important steps taken to preserve the USSR as a multinational federation.

But opponents of the USSR reformation on the one side and supporters of a maximum sovereignty on the other did not allow rebuilding the state structure on a new, more democratic and sound basis than ethno-federalism. As can be seen from the narration of the events, lack of time and competence, political improvisations and politicians' personal ambitions gained the upper hand in settling the epoch-making historical issue.

Yet before the collapse of the USSR the central authorities encountered acute crises in some union republics caused by radical-nationalistic forces and a number of violent ethnic conflicts which the Kremlin was trying to resolve mainly by peaceful means. The first displays of ethnically-motivated massacres and other forms of violence in Sumgait, Fergana, Osh and in other places did not meet with a resounding rebuff. Neither the Supreme Soviet nor Gorbachev managed to force the hostile sides to concord in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The use of army against mass disorders in Lithuania, Georgia and Azerbaijan had opposite results, to be more specific – mobilization of radical-nationalistic forces and supporters of secession of union republics from the USSR.

The anti-centrist position of the government of the RSFSR and the direct confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin put the lid on the collapse of the state. The USSR split into 15 independent states as it would seem along the lines of the so-called 'national entities' but the 'national self-determination' was just one of the impressive arguments behind which there was a much more complicated reality. All the new states turned out to be multiethnic communities which could build their statehood only by democratic solution of their own 'ethnic issues' the overwhelming majority of which was relegated to minorities' issues.

In this paper we'll try to look into the issues of ethnic policy and interethnic relations in the Russian Federation but we do not touch upon similar problems of the structure and politics of multiethnic communities, civil rights, and preservation of culture and language of the Russian-speaking population in other post-Soviet states.

Ethnic policy in Russia in the 1990s

After 1991 in the Russian Federation a new stage in the history of the 'ethnic issue' begins. What is its essence and what were achievements and problems in the 1990s? This period – the presidency of B. Yeltsin – can be considered to be a distinctive phase for a number of reasons. First, it was the time of difficult and crucial formation of a new democratic statehood with the preservation of historical succession and taking into account the experience of other existing

major multiethnic states. The Constitution of 1993 coped with this difficult task and is still in effect quite successfully. Some important clauses of the Russian people as of the only sovereign of the new state, of the state structure and the Russian federalism with regard to the ethnic factor, of the equality of all citizens regardless of their race, ethnicity and faith, of the state support given to ethno-cultural diversity of the country's population and other clauses are of everlasting importance for our country.

The adoption of the Constitution and legalization of the federal structure through, among other things, the system of the Federal agreement concluded in March 1992 and also through separate additional agreements with some republics, whose leaders and social movements wanted greater decentralization of power and more authority in control over resources, did not allow the second round of the country's disintegration, this time at the expense of the break-up of the Russian Federation along the lines of the same ethno-territorial self-determination. Nevertheless, the country failed to evade the emergence of an open trouble spot of an armed separatist conflict in Chechnya where the power was usurped by a nationalist armed clique which proclaimed state independence from Russia and realized a mass expulsion of the 'non-titular' population (mostly Russian) from the republic. But the history of this ethno-political conflict is worth analyzing separately.

When forming the new government in 1991-1992 a positive role was played by setting up a new federal institution which was in charge of the ethnic policy – the State Committee for Ethnic Policy, which later on experienced numerous transformations in terms of the name and the content of responsibilities. But the very fact of the existence of this federal institution headed by famous political and public figures up to the year of 2000 helped to solve many problems and resolve collisions on the level of regions, separate groups and communities. This ministry had the function of foreign representation of the state in some issues of implementation of international declarations and other documents on the problem of rights of ethnic minorities', opposition to racism and xenophobia, encouraged international cooperation between ethnically related peoples and interacted with Russian Diasporas. The State Committee for Ethnic Policy together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of the complicated issue of Russian-German cooperation on the problems of Russian Germans. In the context of thi» cooperation, in particular, German national regions were created – an experiment which was taken from the experience of the first years of the Soviet power. The variant of 'a minister without portfolio' chosen after the year of2000 also had a positive impact on the sphere of interethnic relations for several years up to 2004.

In December 1994 the period of the difficult but peaceful rebuilding of the multinational state came to an end; this period was marked by two events opposite in spirit: the signing of several agreements on the division of powers between bodies of power of the Russian Federation and bodies of power of the Republic of Tatarstan, and the opening of hostilities on the territory of Chechnya. The latter event significantly changed the situation in the country and Russia's image in the world. An earlier armed conflict which took place in the autumn of 1992 in the Suburban district of North Ossetia did not have such consequences though it also caused a deep lasting collective trauma among the conflicting Ossets and Ingushs.

The historical period of 1991-1994 in the sphere of ethnic policy was also marked by a number of important phenomena and events. Before 1993 the Supreme Soviet of Russia, its Chamber of Nationalities and some field-oriented commissions, especially the Commission on the Problems of the Deported Population worked actively. In April 1991 an important law 'On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples' was adopted; this law was of great moral and political importance as it recognized mass deportations of entire peoples before and during the Great Patriotic War to have been illegal (felonious). The law provided not only for political rehabilitation but also for financial compensations allocated to the aggrieved citizens and their descendants.

The Supreme Soviet of Russia also adopted some other laws concerning the status and the borders of ethno-territori-al autonomies, which had important though controversial consequences for the history of interethnic relations and for the general situation in the country (the split-off of autonomous districts as independent subjects of the Federation, turning of Adygeya into a

republic, the separation of Chechen-Ingushetia in the conditions when it was impossible to conduct corresponding political and legal proceedings and the creation of the Ingush Republic without any clearly determined territorial basis).

In the same years in the government and in field-oriented committees of Russia's Supreme Soviet the working out of new draft laws in the sphere of ethnic policy was under way; preparation of a concept-based document on ethnic policy had also begun. Along with the project of the State Ethnic Policy Concept in the Russian Federation specialized state programmes of rendering assistance to Finno-Ugric peoples, certain ethnic movements and creative teams, mass-folklore events, etc were worked out and began to be implemented. Also in the early 1990s there appeared an All-Russia public organization 'The Assembly of Peoples of Russia' and 'The Senezh Forum' which became an authoritative ground for discussing issues of ethnic policy.

An important and remarkable strand of ethnic policy from the first years of 'perestroika' was the work of the social movement of Small Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East. By the time of the collapse of the USSR, there lived in the country 26 officially recognized peoples the aggregate number of which was about 125 thousand people (according to the 1989 census). This category of population lives in peculiar natural environment of taiga, tundra and Arctic shore still preserving many elements of traditional husbandry (fur-bearing and marine animals hunting, fishing, reindeer-breeding). In the conditions of the active industrial development of Arctic and other regions of natives' settlements, a system of protective measures for this ethnic group peculiar in its economic and cultural needs was adopted in the world a long time ago through international instruments and national legislation. In the USSR a lot was done to protect the small peoples of the North which nevertheless did not save them from serious social problems.

The first Congress of the peoples of the North took place in 1990 in the Kremlin with M.S. Gorbachev participating in it; at this Congress 'the Association of the Peoples of the North of the USSR' was formed (in 1993 it was registered as 'Association of the Small Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation'). The constitution of 1993 guaranteed the rights of small indigenous peoples according to the international law and Russia's international agreements. When the work of the Supreme Soviet of Russia began the field-oriented Commission for the Problems of the North also started to work on a corresponding law which was only adopted in 1999 as 'The Law on Guarantees of the Rights of Small Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation'. In 2000 another federal law was adopted on general principles of organizing communities of small indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia and the far Eats, and a year later – a law on territories of traditional natural resource use, which with the legislation worked out in the same sphere on the level of a number of subjects of the Federation constitute today a profound systemic protection of rights of small indigenous peoples of Siberia, the North and the Far East.

However, let us come back to the issue of the armed conflict in the North Caucasus which can be regarded as the beginning of a certain stage in the history of 'ethnic issue' in modern Russia, though the hostilities in Chechnya were not of an all-embracing nature. Why did January of 1995, especially the days of the New Year attack on the city of Grozny become the turning point in the history of Russia in terms of interethnic relations? Because it was a large-scale armed conflict when on behalf of the Chechen people illegal armed groups directly supported by international terroristic forces openly challenged the government machine and the whole Russia including other peoples of the North Caucasus. No legal proceedings of proclaiming independence were observed in Chechnya and the constitution of the Russian Federation does not provide for secession by way of accomplished fact. At the same time, the government authorities of Russia did not observe appropriate legal proceedings regulating the large-scale use of force within the country against its own citizens. Again the arrogance of force and ambitions of two leaders (this time of Yeltsin and Dudayev) led to a bloody drama two stages of which resulted in about 50 thousand casualties among the Russian military men and civilian population, at that the Russian population of the city of Grozny constituted not less than a half of this number. 'The Chechen war' was a hard defeat of Russian ethnic policy despite the heroic efforts made by some Russian politicians, military men, public figures who tried to put an end to this war. The second 'Chechen

campaign', regaining of the control by the federal Centre in this subject of the Federation, formation of legitimate intermediate authorities of the Chechen Republic and holding a constitutional referendum took place in 2000-2003 and were connected with the first term of V.V. Putin's presidency.

However, some more important moments in the history of the national politics of the late Yeltsin period are worth mentioning. It was a period when quite productive law-making activities and public efforts in the sphere of ethnic policy were going on. After the State Duma adopted the law on national-cultural autonomy (NCA) in 1996 worked out by the government there opened an opportunity of a certain inland and extra-territorial self-determination of ethnic communities, especially of those which had dispersed character of settlement or immigrant origin. Around the country there began to appear NCA of different levels – from federal to local – made up of representatives of different nationalities of the Russian Federation (Ukrainians, Russian Germans, Jews, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, etc). It was an important process of self-organization in the form of public alliances of representatives of different nationalities aimed at supporting and developing their own cultures, consolidation of group identity, protection from possible displays of discrimination, promotion of their interests and rights through administrative structures and other mechanisms. The NCA of today are an important component and institution of the civil society, with the help of which various issues of inter-ethnic relations and ethno-cultural development are realized. The leaders of the NCA have representation in community councils of ministries and institutions, in the Public Chamber of Russia; they actively set themselves up in mass media and on the international scene.

Another important moment for the ethnic policy of the late 1990s was adopting the 'State Ethnic Policy Concept' (further-Concept) in 1996 by the Decree of President of the RF. This document was of fundamental importance for its time as it was in this document where for the first time after the collapse of the USSR there were formulated aims, strands and mechanisms of state policy in the sphere of ethnic issue. The document contained innovation points in interpreting such basic categories as 'nation', 'self-determination', 'balance between individual rights and rights of ethnic groups (peoples and nationalities)' and some others. The aim of the ethnic policy was defined as ensuring citizens' rights and needs connected with their belonging to this or that ethnic, religious, linguistic tradition or community. The NCA was defined as a form of domestic self-determination of nationalities of the Russian Federation along with the form of ethno-territorial autonomies like republics and autonomous districts. Among the main strands of ethnic policy were: ensuring proper conditions of socio-cultural existence, preservation of group identity, provision of fair access to development and administration resources, ethno-cultural activities concerning the preservation of culture and language.

The Concept was confirmed by all the subjects of the Russian Federation, the parliament of Russia, it still retains the status of a document in effect. However, on this new stage of the country's development there appeared new problems and historical challenges, there were found new tasks and new opportunities, which had not been formulated in the Concept of 1996. In particular, the threat of armed separatism became more than real, as well as the growth of the spirit of xenophobia and extremism among a part of the country's population which caused tension in the relations between citizens and authorities' concern about national security protection and preservation of social stability and solidarity in the Russian society.

Finally, in the late 1990s there became apparent some underlying faults in the system of federal structure and in the domestic interethnic relations policy carried out in a number of ethno-territorial autonomies (republics). Using some of the constitutional clauses and laws adopted in republics in the early 1990s, the administrative resources and political manipulations in a number of republics the so-called 'titular nations' became the ruling groups of population minority over the majority and showed insufficient care about the situation and the needs of the non-titular population. This led, for instance, to a considerable drain of the Russian population from a number of republics, especially from the North Caucasus. Using the opportunities of the Federal law on education which was in effect and the local legislative acts in the republics of the Russian Federation along with the processes of revival of local languages and traditions there began a process of the detraction of the Russian language status and the appropriate conditions were not

provided for the languages of small minority groups which exist almost in all republics. In the sphere of mass media, in educational system, in public and scientific debates narrowly ethnic and often anti-Russian adjustments and values were established. It was becoming more and more apparent that not only the tasks of preservation of ethno-cultural distinctive character and consolidation of ethnic (ethno-national) self-awareness but also tasks of providing all-Russian solidarity and patriotism on the basis of understanding the Russian people as a civil multiethnic nation should be included in the agenda of ethnic policy.

The intensification of the mass immigration to Russia of several millions of former Soviet citizens became another new factor of ethnic policy which appeared yet in the period of the first open conflicts in the USSR and its collapse. Originally they were mostly people of the Russian origin or, in a broader sense, the Russian-speaking population who did not find a proper place and life prospects and sometimes even the elementary security in the new independent states where they were living when the USSR collapsed. Out of more than 25 million of the Russian population about 4-5 million moved to Russia, the overwhelming majority of them were admitted to the Russian citizenship and became successfully integrated in their historical homeland. A more serious problem was the immigration of reluctant refugees and asylum seekers from the zones of conflicts and due to direct or indirect forcing of certain groups of non-title population away (the Armenians from Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijanis from Armenia, the Ossets from Georgia, the Meskhetin Turks from Uzbekistan, representatives of Dagestanian and North Caucasian peoples from the states of Central Asia). The large-scale migration of the population was caused by the Ossets-Ingush conflict and the 'Chechen war': besides Chechnya the Russians in fact left Ingushetia, many Russians left Dagestan and other republics.

But the most serious problem in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations was caused by the poorly controlled labour migration of natives from the new independent countries which were formed in the former USSR. In the 1990s a total of 7 million people moved to Russia, part of them – on a temporary season basis, another part – with the aim of permanent residence. On the first stage they were mostly the Ukrainians, the Moldavians, and residents of the countries of Transcaucasia. Later in this stream migrants from Central Asia (the Tajik, the Uzbek, and the Kirghiz) began to prevail.

The mass migration to Russia caused tension on the labour market and conflicts in social sphere; this fact was made use of by ultra-radical elements and even by some political parties and public organizations to stir up hostility towards migrants and to encourage violence. The anti-immigration spirit gave rise to and grew in strength, especially among the young people, ultra-nationalistic and neo-fascist groups and separate activists who used various means of mobilization – from the Internet to organizing the so-called 'Russian marches'. At the same time the uncontrolled migration brought evident risks in the sphere of drug trafficking, human trafficking, manufacturing of counterfeit products, tax evasion, etc.

The migration factor became one of the conflict-generating ones in the sphere of ethnic policy in the early 2000. In a little Karelian town of Kondopoga there took place a mass clash between the local population residing there for a long time and migrants from regions of the Caucasus, which was accompanied by murders and massacres. In this period in the country on the whole over a hundred people died at the hands of ultranationalists and racists. It also required some reaction on the part of authorities and society, with regard to the fact that immigration from the countries of the former Soviet Union, especially in the form of organized movements of compatriots, was an extremely important factor for solving demographic problems of the country and for the development of the Russian economics. After a new law on citizenship was adopted in 2001, with some following amendments, and after the federal migration service was reformed and the content of migration politics was renewed the situation in this sphere began to improve. Reduction of immigration was also furthered by the world financial crisis of 2009.

Peculiarities of the Russian ethnic policy at the beginning of the 21st century

Reforms in the sphere of ethnic policy on the new historical stage began with the initiative of President V. Putin to bring into compliance with the federal Constitution the constitution-legislative acts of subjects of the Russian Federation and first of all the republican basic legislative norms which still retained some clauses of the epoch of 'unlimited sovereignty' and

feeble guarantees of rights of peoples of a non-titular origin. To solve this large-scale task in the year of 2000 there was introduced a system of seven federal districts headed by Plenipotentiary Representatives of President of Russia and a net of federal inspectors settled directly in the subjects of the Federation. Some years later this work was completed through proposing amendments to republic constitutions and laws, as well as through other mechanisms. Federal districts still exist in the system of state-administrative structure of the country. In January 2010 the North Caucasian Federal District with the centre in Pyatigorsk was separated from the Southern Federal District.

One more important step in the sphere of ethno-territorial system of the country was the start of the process of enlargement of subjects of the Federation at the expense of merger of autonomous national districts with larger districts and regions to which they used to belong at the Soviet time. This measure was imperatively caused first of all by economic factors, to be more specific – by the necessity to unite resources of territories for a more successful development and improvement of the population's social standards of living. This step was also aimed at making the excessively large number of subjects of the Federation smaller, thus increasing the effectiveness of management. The enlargement of the subjects in no way pursued the objective of depriving small peoples living in autonomous districts of attributes of self-determination, of supporting their traditional economy and cultural and language development. However, in a number of districts and by some public activists of small peoples, in particular, by Buryat public leaders this process was perceived in this way. Even more painful and openly confrontational was the reaction on the part of Adygh society to the possible return of the republic as a part of the Krasnodar territory. By the year of 2010 a total of six autonomous districts had been abolished and the overall number of subjects of the Federation was 83, out of them 21 republics, one autonomous region and 4 autonomous districts.

In the same tideway of optimization of public-administrative structure and increase in the effectiveness of management the election system of heads of subjects of Federation including presidents of Russian republics was changed; before they had been elected by direct election, and since 2004 they have to be confirmed by President of the country on a submission from regional legislative bodies. It is worth mentioning that the abolishment of direct elections was subject to criticism and is yet to complete one of the most important tasks – elimination of the clan structure and the corruption of regional authorities. For Russian republics the issue of quality and effective administration on democratic, open principles still remains one of the most difficult to solve.

In the context of the doctrine, fundamentally new approaches to ethnic policy were formulated in the proposals made by decree of President V.V. Putin concerning the correction of the current State Ethnic Policy Concept, though those proposals were not accepted more due to the orthodox-legal approach of executives of the state-legal division of the Presidential Executive office in Russia. Nevertheless, even without any renewal of the Concept a number of annual President's letters to the Federal Assembly and official President's speeches have recently claimed that there is a new comprehension of the nation of the Russian Federation and of the opportunity to achieve national unity while preserving ethnic and confessional diversity of the country's population at the same time. In 2004 V. Putin made the following claims: 'We have every ground to speak about the people of the Russian Federation as of an integrated nation. Representatives of different ethnic groups and faiths in Russia feel that they are a single people. We must preserve and consolidate our national historical unity.' In 2008 D. Medvedev said: 'The historical development of the Russian nation has made a considerable impact on the wealth and preservation of ethno-cultural and multi-confessional environment... Owing to it, the unity of the Russian nation has passed many tests. And nowadays it is an important factor of overcoming the extremist mood, nationalism and religious intolerance.'

These fundamental statements of the necessity to realize the formula of 'unity in variety' in Russia do not only meet the pressing need of providing civil concord in a major state; it is also the only realizable formula of a multiethnic country's structure. The new ideology of a civil nation building in no way means rejection or dissipation of nationalities of the Russian Federation (nations in the ethnic notion of the word) in some monocultural community named the Russian nation. The latter is, first of all, a form of supra-ethnic civil identity of the Russians who in terms

of their historical and cultural heritage and the modern loyalties and patriotism are representatives of the one people – the Russian people, a diversified but an integrated one. Russia is a nation of nations, and the essence of the modern ethnic policy becomes dual-purpose: on the one hand it is to ensure national interests of the Russian people within the country and on the international scene, by means of national projects, modernization economy development, the system of national education; on the other hand, it is to preserve and support the historical, cultural and religious diversity of representatives of different ethnic groups and confessions inhabiting Russia. One does not exclude the other, but, on the contrary, is only possible in a complex unity and under effective democratic administration.

The ethnic issue and the ethnic policy in this country have traversed a difficult path of progress which was full of unexpected turns over the last quarter of the century. The indisputable fact that Russia since the epoch of liberal reforms of the late 1980s and up to 2010 has been developing in a positive direction, preserving and consolidating its unity in variety, proves that on the whole this policy was successful. Despite numerous dramas, blunders and persisting problems.

Mustapha Tlili[267]
THE CASE OF EUROPE AND ISLAM

In the scenario presented by American philosopher Francis Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War was supposed to usher in the blissful .end of history[268]. Instead, we know how the intellectual arena once dominated by the ideological debate of communism versus Western liberalism witnessed the emergence of cultural categories—religion, race, civilization, identity— that proved to be at least as divisive and lethal as the ideological ones.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 provided the perfect opportunity for those in the United States and Europe who were looking for a new bogeyman against which to reaffirm the dominance of the West. Thus we entered the age of the global war on terror, and history resumed its violent cycle, much to the delight of a group of conservative intellectuals whose tradition dates back to Machiavelli. For the military-industrial establishment, as well, Iraq was a lucrative opportunity. Particularly in light of the ongoing situation in Afghanistan, the Green Scare, has paid off as much as the .Red. one, if not more. The efforts to paint Islam as the new enemy take many objectionable forms, not the least of which is the attempt by some writers, including some scholars, to delete Islam from the Western historical narrative. It is important to show how hollow these arguments truly are. If we assume that Europe is the birthplace of the West, let us then consider the shared history, identity, and destiny of Europe and Islam.

While any given country in Europe has its own historic characteristics, its national identity cannot be entirely disassociated from European identity. And European identity cannot be disassociated from its age-old connection to Islam. History teaches us that Christianity existed long before European identity took shape. For more than seven centuries, Christianity continuously interacted with the Muslim world. Sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent, this interaction gave rise to a continuum of material, intellectual, commercial, and cultural exchanges that profoundly molded Christian and Muslim psyches. The Andalusian period, so well described by Maria Rosa Menocal in her book, The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain, remains without a doubt the best illustration of the fecundity of this multi-dimensional and multi-faceted interaction[269].

European identity was forged over the course of this process, first at the level of multi-ethnic empires, then, progressively, at the level of modern nations. When this period in history is evoked in the West, we often cite specific battles – from Poitiers to Constantinople – or, in the larger

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[267] Founder and Director of the New York University Center for Dialogues. Diplomat. Author of books: *Le Bruit Dort, For Nelson Mandela, La Montagne du Lion: Roman, La Rage aux Tripes: Roman, Un Apres-midi dans le Desert:* Roman, and others.
[268] New York: Harper Perennial, 1992.
[269] New York: Bay Back Books, 2003.

context, wars -such as the Crusades or the Re-Conquest. What is too often omitted is the fact that, in Andalusia as well as in the Holy Land, there were long intervals between battles during which people talked, shared ideas, fell in love, married...all within a context that was essentially favorable to Islam (not only militarily, but also in terms of civilization.) It can be unequivocally stated that European medieval identity and, later, European national identity, were nourished by Islamic philosophical, scientific, and artistic achievements. Most notably, during the 12th century, the cities of Spain recaptured from the Muslims by the Catholics undertook the formidable task of translating masterpieces written in Arabic into Latin. These works served as the centerpieces of some of the transcendental debates that shook the Sorbonne and Oxford in following centuries.

Scholars today are increasingly aware of the foundational role that the Muslim world – and particularly the Arab Muslim world – has played in shaping what most people today consider .Western, civilization. This role was not limited to – as is sometimes stated – preserving the works of ancient Greek thinkers during Europe's .Dark Ages,' but rather included the active contributions of Muslim scientists, men of medicine, mathematicians, astronomers, artists, architects, and philosophers, among others. Their work developed in close exchange with Christian and Jewish thinkers in medieval Europe as well as in North Africa and the Arab world – three regions linked by the Muslim Spain of Al Andalus (and, to a lesser extent, points in Italy). Collectively, they helped shape the cultural identity we know today as European, and, more broadly, Western.

At the end of the Middle Ages, the balance of power between an inward-looking Islam and emerging Europe began to turn in favor of the latter. Centers of intellectual and cultural ferment moved to the European towns that were throwing off feudal bonds and embracing their new freedom. Ironically, the forging of a new world order created an odd historic amnesia: Europe's Islamic history was entirely forgotten.

The fact that few European students today can speak of al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenne), Inb Rushd (Averroes), al-Khu-warizmi or Ibn-al-Haytham is no matter of chance. This "oversight" can be explained by the fact that the emerging European nations – Spain, France, Italy, and England – denied the cultural legacy to which they owed their birth in favor of a mythic history of uninterrupted historic continuity between Antique Greece and modern Europe. This myth is reinforced by focusing on the conflicts in Islamic-Western relations – by inculcating the battles, whether won or lost – thus turning Islam into a hereditary enemy instead of the indispensable partner it has so long been.

The denial of a Muslim heritage persists in the European subconscious today, despite an abundance of historical data supporting the influence of Islam on European identity.

Fortunately, since the tragedy of September 11th, we have witnessed a new interest among historians in highlighting this shared identity, which links Islam and Europe at a much deeper level than reflected by the simplistic Clash of Civilizations theory concocted by Samuel Huntington. In addition to Professor's Menocal's The Ornament of the World, three other books should be mentioned: Michael Hamilton Morgan's Lost History: The Enduring Legacy of Muslim Scientists Thinkers and Artists[270], David Levering Lewis' God's Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe, 570-1215[271]; and George Saliba's Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance[272]. These four books brilliantly challenge the glaring ignorance of the .Clash of Civilizations, theory advanced by the neo-conservatives to justify their political and military agenda since the end of the Cold War.

But Huntington is not the only culprit. The determination to deny Muslim contributions to European identity is also evident in books such as the one written by Lyons University Professor Sylvain Guggenheim, Aristotle at Mount Saint-Michel: Greek Roots of European Christianity, which claims that Muslim scholars could not have assimilated Greek rationalism and transmitted its legacy to Europe given Islam's incapacitating submission to divine authority[273]. For Professor

[270] Washington, DC: National Geographic, 2008.
[271] New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2008.
[272] Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007.
[273] Paris: Seuil, 2008.

Guggenheim, the Renaissance owes its advent to the monks of the Norman bastion of Saint-Michel—of what is now Normandy. According to him, and contrary to the universally accepted historical record, it is the monks of Saint-Michel who restored the lost corpus of classical antiquity to the West, long before Arab scholars mastered Aristotle, Plato, Ptolemy, and Euclid. This historical debate is vastly important because it exposes the misconception that Muslim communities are somehow alien to the West, or a phenomenon of the 20th century.

Given the degree of prejudice against Islam, both today and historically, are we moving towards an inevitable global confrontation? The answer is a matter of urgency, and it is in our hands. Islam is an integral part of the West; it cannot be .cast out.. In the European Union alone, there are 20-25 million Muslim citizens. Many of them were born in Europe or have lived there for decades, yet – as recent studies attest – they are viewed as being separate from the national communities of which they are a part. Muslim Europeans contribute significantly to the economic welfare and cultural production of the Continent; they are an important asset for Europe as it competes in today's globalized economy. And Europe will need its Muslim citizens even more tomorrow, to sustain population size and fulfill growing demands for labor. It is often remarked that European Muslim communities have failed to integrate, yet no standard of successful integration has ever been determined – not by government, social science, or the media. Isn't it time for Europe to offer its Muslim population a clear definition of the rights and obligations, as well as personal freedoms, of every citizen? In several forums like this one, I have called on governments, cultural associations, employers, educational institutions, faith leaders, and others to develop a .new citizenship pact, that would reassure Europe's Muslim citizens of their right to maintain their private value systems in full agreement with the civic cultures and legal systems of their new countries. The United States has succeeded at unifying immigrant populations as a society on the basis of citizenship. Europe must look to this model to avoid the dangers of alienating and radicalizing its Muslim communities.

This process will not be easy. The gap between Muslims and the non-Muslim majority in Europe can be traced to many political, economic, and social causes as well as historical tensions that are not easily resolved. For some, Islam has always been the target of aggression by Europe; for others, Europe has always been the target of aggression by Islam. Both perspectives ignore those seven centuries during which the destinies of Europe and Islam were inseparable. To acknowledge this period of productive coexistence would not only correct a major historical omission – it would lay the foundation for a shared sense of European identity. If we succeed, European Muslims could become an inspiration for the larger Muslim world as it struggles to strike a balance between faith, tradition, and modernity. This could, in turn, lead to a more peaceful and productive relationship between the West and the Muslim world. I believe we can make this dream a reality.

Thank you.

P. P. Tolochko[274]

[274] Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine, Director of the Institute for Archaeology (the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine), Dr. Sc. (History), professor. Mr Tolochko is the author of over 300 scholarly publications, including 25 books: *Istorichna topografiya starodavn'ogo Kiyeva* [Historical Topography of Old Kiev], *Drevniy Kiev* [Old Kiev], *Drevnerusskiy feodal'nyy gorod* [An Old Russian Feudal Town], *Istorichni portreti* [Historical Portraits], *Litopisi Kiyivs'koy Rusi* [Chronicles of Kievan Rus], *Volodimir Svyatiy – Yaroslav Mudriy* [St. Vladimir – Yaroslav the Wise], *Vid Rusi do Ukrayini* [From Rus to ihe Ukraine], *Drevnerusskaya narodnost': voobrazhayemaya ili real'naya* [Old Russian Ethnos: Imaginable or Real], and others.
Mr Toclochko is Chairman of the Ukrainian society for Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, member of the Academy of Europe (London), corresponding member of the Central German Institute for Archaeology (Berlin), member of International Association of Slavonic Archaeology. He is Laureate of the State Award of the USSR in science and technology, the Ukraine State Award, Grushevsky Award of the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine.

ON A PROBLEM OF INTRACULTURAL DIALOGUE

At Likhachov's Readings in 2009 I gave a report "Dialogue or Monologue of Cultures and Civilizations" where I came to a conclusion that cultural development at all stages of human history was similar to a monologue, or if to a dialogue, than by no means a equitable one, and often also not peaceful. Naturally, this did not mean that there were no cross-impacts and inter-enriching, but everything ultimately came to expansion of one cultural tradition over another. In these collisions objectively more developed culture survived far from always; more often it was the one bearers of which obtained larger military and human resources.

As it appears, processes characterizing intercultural relationship should not take place in intracultural development. However, it appears that dynamic situation here also does not differ from intercultural. In fact, there are no political associations (states) anywhere in the world which would be multicultural formations not burdened by inner contradictions. More often they consist of several subcultural formations which contest each other for the right for the high truth.

The world history has lots of instances of the said. Ukrainian one is among them, and it represents all the discrepancy of the processes of development of our sovereign statehood and national community. Even after twenty years of independent existence it is impossible to speak about a unified spiritual and cultural identity of Ukrainian nation. In fact, it continues to be divided into three main sub-ethnic groups: Central and Northern Ukrainian, Western Ukrainian, and South-Eastern Ukrainian[275]. They were formed historically, and in circumstances of long-termed separate existence they obtained quite noticeable differences, not only cultural and historical, but also mental ones.

Central and Northern Ukrainian sub-ethnic group since The Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654) was developing in Orthodox cultural and spiritual tradition, in close unity with ethnically related Russian nation. Historical myth for that region is a heroism of Cossacks' past, which is associated by people with the protection of its national and religious identity. Pivotal event in this fight was National liberation war of Ukrainian nation under the guidance of Bohdan Khmeinytskyi.

Western Ukrainian sub-ethnic group, the beginning of development of which was laid by Union of Brest (1596) was integrated into the Western Catholic civilization world and till the World War II belonged to various European states: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Poland, Austria-Hungary, etc. Its national and patriotic myth consists of a belief in its Messianism and exclusive merits in preservation of purity of Ukrainian nation and in achievement of its state independence. One of the main symbols of this myths is the national resistance movement of the World War II period.

The third sub-ethnic group, habituating predominantly at the south and east of the country, owes with its creation as a Ukrainian one entirely to the territorial forming of Ukraine in the Soviet period. Due to the government decrees, Donbas, Novorossiya, and the Crimea, territories settled predominantly by Russians, were included to Ukraine. Historic myth here is a memory of settling of this land by the Russian empire at the end of the 18th c. and the first half of the 19th c, as well as belief that it is a natural part of Russian world. Functioning here of political parties names of which include the term "Russian", and also movements for the reconstruction (or preservation) of symbols of the Russian Empire past, which are, for instance, monuments to Kateryna the II, Potyomkin, Richelieu, etc., testifies to the living of this belief in the mentality of today's settlers of the region.

If compared, the level of mutual cultural and historic proximity undoubtedly appears to be higher between Central Ukrainian and South-Eastern Ukrainian sub-ethnic groups. It is not only because their development took part in similar historical circumstances, but also because they preserved to a greater extent than the Western Ukrainian ethnic group the memory about their common Kyiv Rus past. This is testified, for instance, by the monuments to princes Svyatoslav, St. Volodymyr, Yaroslav the Wise etc., erected in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pere-yaslav, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Zaporizzhya, Kharkiv, and Sevastopol. There is nothing of the kind in the Western

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[275] There are other ethnic and cultural formations in Ukraine, but while they belong to other cultural traditions, their analysis is not provided in this article.

Ukrainian region, sure thing. There, the depth of the historic memory does not reach further then a so called Halych-Volyn state of the second half of the 13ᵗʰ c. and Danylo of Galicia, named not the prince, but a king.

It was possible to expect that united in their own independent state these subcultural formations would find the tendencies to consolidation. However, this did not happen. Fundamentally no one is against political and cultural integration, but each side would like it to happen on the base of certain cultural tradition. This is not always declared, but permanently is present in regional behavioural stereotypes.

The most passionarious is Western Ukrainian (Halych) sub-ethnic group which later than others realized its Ukrainianhood, but for some purpose appropriated the right to consider themselves the only bearer and conveyer of a high Ukrainian truth. This ethnic group knows what is Ukrainian patriotism, what should Ukraine be like and what should not in any circumstances, where it should integrate, which language to speak and even think. When nationalists won office the streets and squares of Ukraine become decorated including slogans "Love Ukraine", "I proud I was born Ukrainian", "Think in Ukrainian".

No lesser ethnic and regional aggression was introduced also into education sphere. In essence, during the "orange" five-year period an attempt to replace the Central and Eastern Ukrainian cultural and historic traditions with the only Western Ukrainian one was made. As a more acceptable alternative a history of Western Ukraine common with the European neighbours was presented, which reflected in manuals of history for secondary and high schools. Common history of Ukraine and Russia through all it way on was announced as not ours and excommunicated.

It should not be proved that such aggressive affirmation of its truth by one of sub-ethnic groups was not possible without denying of the same truths of others. Central and Northern Ukrainian sub-ethnic group was announced as russificated, while Russian and Ukrainian South-Eastern one was called the fifth column of Russia. While the birth sin of both of them, to Western Ukrainian ethnic ideologists' mind, is their adherence to Russian culture. At the same time, they do not take into account the fact that at list for 8,5 million Ukrainian citizens this culture is native by birth and for others Russian speaking it is native by its creation.

Moscow students used the grammar of a Ukrainian Meletiy Smotrytskyi till the end of the 18ᵗʰ c. In Rostov the Great lived and worked a Kyivite Dmytro Rostovskyi (Tuptalo). In the Slavonic-Greek-Latin Academy in Moscow during the 18ᵗʰ c. lectured about a hundred professors of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. A Kyivite Feofan Prokopovych was an ideologist of forming of Russian empire, and also an initiator of the Emperor's Academy of Sciences' foundation at Petersburg. Many natives of Ukraine became famous Russian musicians (M.Berezovskyi, D.Bortnyanskyi, S.Hulak-Artemovskyi), artists (D.Levytskyi, V.Borovykovskyi, I.Martos), historians (D.Bantysh-Kamenskyi, Yu. Venelin, D.Bodyanskyi), and literati (M.Gogol, V.Korolenko). A process of integration of Ukrainian intellectuals into Russian culture continued in the Soviet period (M.Ostrovskyi, K.Paustovslyi, I.Kozlovskyi, S.Bondarchuk, and others).

Consequently, Ukrainians have all rights to affirm that they are co-creators of the great Russian culture. Only a full loss of sense of reality and responsibility towards the memory of fellow countrymen can explain the proclamation of Russian language (and literature) in Ukraine as foreign. In essence, during the years of nationalists' rule it was deprived the citizenship rights by prohibition of its usage in education and culture spheres with several acts of executive power. In their matter they were much stricter than sadly famous Valuyev's decree. The language limitations of the latter concerned only public and political literature while acts of "orange" rule forbade the usage of Russian language in spheres of culture, education, and even everyday life.

Sure thing, should Russian language be alien or colonial and imperial for Ukrainians, as the nationalists assure, there would be no need in such total attack upon it. It would have left the sovereign Ukrainian life in natural way. This does not happen because for majority of population it is as native as Ukrainian one. None of forbidding measures can change such situation.

It is striking, that the fight with the Russian language in Ukraine continued with the attack on the literary Ukrainian language. It was announced by ethnic ideologists as not Ukrainian enough, as russificated one, not expressing the linguistic completeness of the Western Ukrainian and Ukrainian diaspora's dialects. The situation was started to be corrected with the fundamental

reform of orthography, which was accepted in the Soviet period and hence as if not quite national. They failed in replacing the grammar with the new one, but quite succeeded in bringing orthographic and lexical mess into literary language. Now we have in fact two literary languages: traditional one, Central Ukrainian, developed of Kyiv and Poltava dialects, and a new one, Western Ukrainian, based on Halych dialect. I wonder why it does not particularly disturb anyone.

Another sphere of sub-cultural opposition is a religious one. Perhaps it should not be overvalued considering secular-ity of the majority of Ukrainian society, but we also should not abstract from it. Since Union of Brest times not only religious, but also civilization split begins in Ukraine, which resulted in turn to Catholicism of the Western Ukraine habitants who were orthodox since St. Volodymyr times. Today Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church being in canonical and administrative unity with the See of Rome turned from regional to All-Ukrainian one. Its sacral centre is transferred from Lviv to Kyiv.

Taking into consideration historic competitiveness of Orthodoxy and Catholicism, such rash advance of the latter to the traditional canonical territory of the former should course contradictions in Ukrainian society. All the more, "orange" ethnic ideologists place scientific base under this spread. It lays as if in the more attractiveness of catholic religion demonstrating its advantages, particularly, with economic success of the Western world. Some people even regret that Volodymyr Svyatoslavovych did not adopted Christianity from Rome, than Ukraine would have been a part of the Western world.

Unfortunately, regionalization virus affected Ukrainian Orthodox Church from which two confessions divided in sovereign period. They are not recognized by Ecumenical Orthodoxy, but they aggressively present themselves as the only national ones. One can often hear from high priests of these confessions quite dubious appeals to create united independent Orthodox Church in independent Ukraine, which they call national or local. However, they understand this independency in a very original way. It concerns only Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, they are not against being dependent from Constantinople Church. They even made real steps in that way. Former president V.A. Yushchenko worked a lot in that field, though firuitlessly. His insistent requests to Bartholomew, the Patriarch of Constantinople, to take Ukrainian Orthodox Church under his omophor were left unanswered.

No wonder that in circumstances of such confrontational opposition the Christian confession appeared to be incapable neither to consolidate Ukrainian society, nor to propose unified ethic norms of common living and sense-creating truths.

In principle, sub-cultural competitiveness should not cause a deep disturbance. This is a natural process typical for all nations of all times. However, this is when it is not complicated with the administrative preferences, when the rule does not depress other sub-cultures in favour of one, truly Ukrainian, in its opinion. This is what happened in "orange" five-year term. In such circumstances peaceful coexisting becomes impossible. Concrete communities stand behind sub-cultural phenomena, and they are not ready to give up their values. Strict confrontation between them is inevitable. This is what we can see in today's Ukraine. Objectively, processes subordinated exclusively idea of monoculture purity of Ukrainian life, despite patriotic as they should seem intensions of their inspirers, lead to impoverishment and primitiveness of culture. In fact, they weaken creative forces of society and make it unable to compete in modern world.

Are there any possibilities to consolidate poly-cultural Ukrainian society? It is practically not possible to reach this on the way which independent Ukraine has been taking by this time. Fundamentally different attitude to the historic past, as well as to the organization of public life of the state today, is needed.

First what should be made is to give back the historic dignity to Ukrainian nation which was taken away by "orange" ethnic ideologists. It was not a nation-victim, but a full-fledged object of historical process. This includes state and political process in Russia and the Soviet Union. I should remind of the fact that right arm of empress Elizabeth Petrivna was Olexiy Rozumovskyi, a Ukrainian. His brother Kyrylo was a head of the Emperor's Academy of Sciences for almost two decades. Son of Kyrylo Olexiy Rozumovskyi became a senator and a Minister of Education of Russia. Knyaz Olexandr Bezborodko took up his post as a chancellor in government of Pavel I

and Alexandr I. Knyaz V.Kochubei was a chairman of a State Council and a Committee of Ministers during the rule of Nikolai I... In the Soviet period natives of Ukraine were not only second, but also the first rulers of the country: M. S. Khrushchov and L.I. Brezhnev.

How can one who knows all that talk about any colonial status of Ukraine in times of Empire and the Soviet Union. Which else colony can boast of the fact that its emigrants were kings of metropolises? If any part of Ukraine was a colony, than this was the western one, history of which is presented to us as a pattern today.

It is also essentially to stop cultivating people's feeling of historic irresponsibility. It is a very bad service for it. Not taking responsibility for any event in the past history, common with other nations, this nation will not be able to be responsible for the ongoing events. In fact, this complex we've been experiencing all twenty years of our sovereignty. We blame anyone else, but not ourselves, for our today's failures. And thus as far as we will present ourselves to the world as a nation-victim, a nation-sufferer, and a nation which is not responsible for the past; we should not count for our success in future.

And perhaps the most important thing. We should finally understand that historic past can not be viewed exclusively through the Ukrainian ethnic prism. Looking for a Ukrainian in his today cultural and language hypostasis in far ages is not only a scientifically unfounded, but also ideologically unsafe work. It as if leads out Ukrainians outside historical regularities of ethnic and cultural genesis and gives them a position of a chosen nation which always existed.

To conclude, it should be said that the state and political form which is adopted by Ukraine after its independence does not suit its sub-ethnic and sub-cultural diversity. Utilitarian attitude in a specific Ukrainian form, when one of the regions becomes a centre of the country for the next five years, will never solve inner contradictions. The world practice a long time ago created a federal form of the state: political, administrative and territorial, which is the only one that can balance regional and nationwide interests.

Rolf Torstendahl[276]

GLOBAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CULTURE

A fundamental question for a conference on "The Making of a Global Culture" is, of course, if there is already a global culture and under which circumstances we might speak of a globalisation of culture.

It seems (to me) that undoubtedly there is already a global culture in some specific areas. They are related to a vast field that may be called economic culture and covers much more than the limited spheres of getting a salary, buying and selling things and services, and borrowing and loaning money. The economic culture in a vast sense comprises not least the rules for all types of transactions in trade and finance, in the organisation of interests (with economic implications) among employed and employers, producing and service-offering companies, etc. Rules are

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[276] Foreign member of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of Academia Europaea, member of Swedish and Norwegian Academies, professor of Uppsala University, historian, Doctor *honoris causa* of the Russian State University for the Humanities.
Author of the following books: *Origins of a Democratic Culture: Russia in the Early 20th Century* (with co-authors); *Ironworks and the Peasantry: Problems ofSocial Organization of Industry in Russia and Sweden in the Early Industrial Period* (Metallurgicheskie zavody i krest'yanctvo: problemy sostial'noi organizatsii promyshlennosti Rossiyi i Shwestii v ranneindustrial'nyi period, ed.); author of some books in English and Swedish: *Bureaucratization in Northwestern Europe: Assessment of Twentieth- Century Historiography. Professionalism, Methodologies, Writings* (ed.), some of his articles were translated into Russian, such as 'Individual and Society in History', '"Correct" and "Fruitful" as Criteria of Historical Science', 'Social History in Sweden and Western Europe', 'Dialogue with Academician ID. Koval'chenko about the Nature of History Competence', 'Professional Competence and Usage of History in Polities', 'Return of Historicism? Neo-institutionalism and "a Historic Turn" in Social Sciences' and others.

important, for they have to be upheld by some authority. In this case international organisations like the WTO and the IMF try to impose rule-obedience on states, and states are expected to do the same on organisations (such as companies or trade unions or employers' unions) as well as on the individual economic actor.

When social scientists and journalists have observed this chain of obligations within one single rule system in the world they have proclaimed an era of "global culture". It is difficult to obstruct and to show disobedience to the rules. The international system has three types of sanctions that may be imposed on states that don't want to conform to the rules: trade limitation (including extra customs duties), financial restrictions, and warfare (as a threat or actual use of arms). The importance for all countries to have an ongoing trade and credits and payments to support it make trade restrictions efficient. Punishment by arms is, even as a threat, a frightening prospect for those who do not fulfil their obligations. In most cases the advantages of international trade are so great that states find the rules to be in their interest. Otherwise the sanctions are forceful enough to make states accept the fundamental rules of this global culture, even though not all states are members of the international organisations that guarantee the system. Thus the support for the economic rule system has become very wide after World War II, though never unanimous.

This analysis has recently been challenged by George Soros in an internationally published article (I have read it translated to Swedish). Soros means that the rule system and the penalties are weak and do not support a global economic culture. This is, in his analysis, the cause of the financial crisis we have still not left and a threat of a new, impending crisis.

In the economic field there is, thus, a global rule system that almost all states give at least a lip service and most of them favour. Some may prefer something different, but it is very difficult to reform the system. Thus it is more or less enforced on the states of the world and through states also on citizens.

It is very difficult to single out any other field, where a global or wide international consensus is reigning. A fundamental reason is that most other fields are lacking the international organisations that might enforce a half-voluntary acceptance of common rules. The environmental questions are close at hand to point out, as they have quite recently been the object of international discussion at the UN conference in Copenhagen. Different opinions have been voiced and no sanctions for any behaviour exist. This has occurred in spite of the fact that many actors have underscored that environment is very close to economy in the long run. They have tried to link environmental questions to the established rule system of the economic sphere but so far in vain. At the Copenhagen conference at least three "regional cultures" turned out to be strongly upheld by state leaders: 1) USA, China, India and Brazil that want to make their own, state-bound decisions on what is needed from their point of view and don't want to be bound by international agreements; 2) EU-countries (and sympathizers with them from other parts of the world) who want clear obligations by an international treaty. Such a treaty should fix limitations on all countries, developed and developing, in order protect environment; 3) developing countries, which are not international great powers. They want an international treaty binding developed countries to limitations and to payment for the desirable environmental improvements in developing countries as well. So far, it is obvious that there is no immediate consensus close at hand regarding environmental questions. It is equally clear that it will be very difficult to establish a system of rule-obedience in this field.

If we make a close scrutiny of other fields of culture we find that they are mostly even further from a global consensus than the environmental field. This holds for "health culture", "political culture", "media culture", "literary culture", "musical culture", "educational culture", etc. I think I need not exemplify the differences within the world in these fields of culture. Even the often proclaimed unity of a specific "youth culture" (in music, dress/fashion, and socialising not least through the internet by chat-sites, Facebook, Youtube, etc.) is much more of a myth than a common culture, for there are important groups of young people who do not want to be part of this culture. A part of it is primarily a branch of a musical culture, which is diversified as it is, and the portion appealing especially to young people is marketed through media of all sorts which makes it appear more uniform and more universal than it is.

Life habits may be another field for a common global culture. There are undoubtedly new elements which have transformed habits and communication, such as the internet and the mobile phone. It is now much easier to communicate than it used to be – but it was by no means impossible earlier. Internet cafes and the rush for the latest mobile phone are striking phenomena that you can find over the whole world, but they are very bound to technologies that are apt to change. Most important is, however, that the means of communication are less important for forming a culture than the content. And the content of communication on the internet or the mobile phone is not uniform. They are used both to deepen differences and to even them out.

A very restricting element in regard to globalisation in lifestyle and habits is "identity". Without going into the shifting meanings of this concept, I want to stress its importance. Both in developed and in developing countries people have both conscious and unconscious limits in their willingness to conform to lifestyles that they feel foreign. Imported habits and lifestyles that do not conflict with or replace old native ones are easily adapted, but as soon as the native habit stands opposed to the imported innovation many people (not all) take sides with native tradition.

If this is true, and I am sure it is, what is the reason for the ongoing talk about globalisation?

With the help of history it is easy to point out one important factor, the perspective. It is tempting to think that the ideas prevailing in one's own country and/or region of the world are gaining ground and soon will be embraced by more people. Even those who do not originally think so may be persuaded to believe something of this kind through the internal propaganda in the state or through the media of the period.

The old Romans (or a vast majority of them) believed, from the time of Augustus, i.e. around the beginning of our era to the fifth century, that it was only a question of time until the culture of Rome should embrace "the whole world", let alone that their understanding of what was the whole world was determined by the Mediterranean perspective. Even though they were aware of the enemies at the borders, they saw that these enemies were eliminated by Roman armies one after the other.

The old Chinese view of the world started considerably earlier, around 1000 years before our era, and was a dominating one in China much longer, up to the end of the European Middle Ages if not longer. Like the Roman, the Chinese perspective centred on the own people and state. The outskirts of the world were inhabited by barbarians, who usually were beaten by Chinese arms and were taught to adapt to the Chinese perspective while adapting to Chinese culture.

Like the earlier *Mauryas,* who ruled most of the Indian subcontinent in the third century before our era, *The Great Moghuls of India,* during their period of dominance in India in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries of our era, looked upon the world from a perspective from the southern slopes of the Himalaya , where their culture in different fields and their rules for right and wrong, war and peace were the valid ones. Beyond were peoples who only waited for Indian culture and who eagerly grasped what missionaries disseminated of Indian wisdom.

European builders of empires from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and onwards have in the same manner regarded their culture as irresistible – at least up to World War I.

The American dream of an Americanised world is later, mainly from after World War II but with roots in the Interwar years, and has only recently been shown to be ill founded.

The Soviet idea (the dream of which the Comintern was the international organ) of a Communist world with its centre in Moscow started to grow directly after October 1917 but it had little support after the death of Stalin.

We have reasons to remind ourselves of these world perspectives, when we are talking of globalisation. All the mentioned world-views, from the Zhang dynasty onwards, were founded on the presumption that they included the whole world and that all that was important in the world was to be found in their own culture.*Only shattered barbarian peoples remained to be blessed with culture of the dominant power's shaping in their view. When looking at these efforts in the past to comprise the entire world in one cultural setting, we have to admit that their efforts were in vain and their beliefs were wrong. We assess each of these cultures as only part of the whole picture. Their convictions that they held the keys to what we may call a "global culture" were wrong in our opinion. What, then, about ours? Is the whole idea of a global cultural community a chimera without foundation?

The answer may be ***Yes, a global cultural community does not seem to be within reach***. If we analyse historical developments during the past three centuries (or even a longer period) there is no clear trend that civilizations have come closer to each other. In periods there have been approaches between adherents of different religious or political ideas but they have equally often been followed by periods of confrontation. If we confine the perspective to the present or very recent past we cannot justly say that conflicts between world-views (with or without a religious colouring) are diminishing or less acute than they were earlier. In parts of the world disagreement may be declining, usually through victorious warfare by one party, but in other parts it will seem that the opposite is the case and conflicts are aggravating.

Yet one may also answer the question if a global cultural community is a chimera with ***No, it is not***. The reasons for this answer are that actual cooperation has increased. This is true not only of such cooperation that has grown up under the force of unequal power relations but it is also true of quite voluntary cooperation and the voluntary organisation of similar institutions and associations in different countries and different cultural systems. If this is vague and abstract let me just give a few examples:

trade unions have developed into important support organisations for individual employees in different countries and different parts of the world;

insurance systems have given a security for many individual citizens in case of illness or injuries or loss of property and these insurance systems may be state sponsored or quite voluntary;

family planning and the efficient means for this purpose in the form of contraceptives have enabled families, especially women, in quite different cultural surroundings to lead a life of their own choice;

different types of legislation or voluntary collective agreements to diminish the detrimental effects of human activities on nature have existed in different forms in different parts of the world since long. The motive may not have been the same as for present-day environmental protection but rather to safeguard for coming generations the same means of maintenance, but they had similar effects.

These examples may serve as arguments for certain common traits among states and individuals. They are all based on values and evaluations, and it is also quite certain that not all peoples and not all citizens in states that are concerned share these values and evaluations. Those who do share values and evaluations often come to the same practical conclusions and start to do the same things. Even more important is that they may find it easy and convenient to cooperate for common goals. Such goals do go beyond the similarity. They are based also on a willingness to see other nations and individuals as equal in certain ambitions and equally entitled to the fruits of common efforts as they are themselves.

Agreements and cooperation between nations and ethnic groups have grown in quantity and importance during the last two centuries. At the individual level socialising and marrying across such boundaries has also been frequent, which is, of course, part of the explanation for the interconnections at the level of states and peoples. "The others" don't seem so different and "other" as they appeared earlier. These trends have undeservedly been overshadowed by counteracting, national trends, because history is most often written from a perspective set by the nation-state. From this perspective immigration of men and women of other nationalities and intermarriages between national citizens and men or women from the outside are rather seen as problems than as a contribution to a transnational understanding. For it is through small steps that a transnational community is built.

Again history gives many examples, and the recent history of Western Europe is a very telling one. Until the end of World War II Western Europe was characterised by deep-going rivalry, distrust, and conflicts. After the end of the war some far-sighted politicians saw the need for cooperation between former foes in order to eliminate recurring conflicts. The institutions that they built (within the coal and steel union) were limited but gave room for rather far-reaching cooperation in some fields. Soon the need was felt to widen the cooperation and the European Common Market was created which grew into what is now the European Union. The EU has taken on many tasks that were foreign to the initiators and it is now a union where a great

transnational transformation is taking place. India is another example. The scattered provinces of the British colony and some quasi-independent states under local rulers were gradually amalgamated into a state where initially not only Hindu-Muslim rivalry was an obstacle but also the whole caste system and the local differences that often had deepened under British rule. Gradually India has become more homogeneous (or less inhomogeneous), encouraged by a recent economic boom, even though internal differences have a long way to go in order to be replaced by common values and evaluations.

What has happened in Europe and in India is not "globalisation". Similar developments at a scale, which is less apt to attract attention, have happened in many other places during the last two centuries. They are often represented as "nation-building" from a retrospective view, but this is a dangerous terminology. All efforts at strengthening bonds and deepening out cooperation do not lead to common institutions and common policies. In such case they will seem as failures from the "nation-building" perspective. Yet they may be good examples of transnational history, where all forms of activities which transgress former borderlines are important.

Transnational history, then, is important. Within this term the history of similar institutions and associations may be analysed (I have done so with West-European bureaucracy, so I know what I am talking about at least in one field) as well as the values, the same or different values that have made possible the similarity in institutional design. Such similarities need not lead to cooperation (state bureaucracies do not normally cooperate) but they can be formed similarly with similar experiences as a background and with similar goal-setting. In this sense transnational cultures are spreading all the time, for since very long rulers have been eager to improve their government also by imitating other peoples and their forms of government. (Peter I of Russia is a very striking example, but even those who were less innovative than he was have gathered information for this purpose).

In comparison with transnational solutions, which comprise both similar developments based on similar values and evaluations and cooperative efforts in one or the other field, global cooperation spurred by a global culture is still mostly a chimera. The formation of a transnational culture in different regional areas, resulting in transnational political developments, is already at hand and has been important for a long time. It is an important field of research in the past and the present. There, rather than in globalisation, lies also an important potential for the future.

<div align="right">**A. V. Yakovenko**[277]</div>

<div align="center">**DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND UNESCO**</div>

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am greatly honoured to take part in the 10th International Likhachov Scientific Conference on 'Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations'.

I am very pleased to note that for the first time as part of Likhachov Conference there will be held a 'round table' with permanent delegates of different countries to UNESCO taking part, which will give our discussions a UNESCO-oriented vector of debate.

The goals of the current conference are directly connected with the tasks which are set to UNESCO by the world community in the conditions of the modern global development. In this

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[277] Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, LL.D., Professor, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador.

Since 1976 Mr. Yakovenko has taken various diplomatic positions in the central office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including Foreign Policy Planning Department and Permanent Mission of the USSR to the UNO in New York. At present he supervises Russia's participation in international organizations, international law issues, international economic, humanitarian cooperation, as well as human rights.

Author of monographs: "International Space Station", "Progressive Development of International Space Law", "Current Space Projects: the International Legal Problems", "Space Projects: International Legal Problems", a series of articles on international law and foreign policy, co-author of the textbook "International Space Law" and others.

connection I would like to hear your authoritative opinion concerning the priority directions in the activities of the Organization on Inter-Cultural and Inter-Religious Dialogue for Sustainable Development and working out of innovation strategies of modern cultural policy. Our thorough discussion on these topics is especially timely in the context of discussing acute problems of the mankind at the UN Millennium Development Goals Summit which is to take place in New York this autumn. In particular, the International Congress of UNESCO chairs 'Steady Development in the Conditions of Globalization' will be devoted to this range of problems; this conference is to be held in November 2010 in Moscow.

In conditions of globalization, in the face of new challenges and threats the dialogue between peoples is more urgent than ever before. With new technologies appearing, the pace of globalization is accelerating. It means that people of different cultures are getting more opportunities to exchange opinions and ideas, to get to know one another better, to get acquainted with a different way of thinking and life.

However, globalization can also have an opposite effect not causing openness but entailing the feeling of being outcast, when people begin to alienate those who are different from them, who have different values and a different culture. It happens when globalization begins to be perceived as a threat to the identity, especially in such an important constituent of it as religion, when people find themselves unprepared for new opportunities of communication due to ignorance and misunderstanding of other cultures and beliefs. It is on this ground that intolerance and conflicts emerge.

Religious differences should not become an alienation factor. In this connection we support UNESCO's approaches which in its programmes and events lays equal stress on the freedom of expression and respect for religious beliefs and symbols. Aspiration for the dialogue between civilizations, cultures and peoples underlies the mandate of this international organization; it is stated in its Statute. Development of the dialogue for the sake of peace, consolidation of the idea of peace in 'people's minds' is the cornerstone of UNESCO's mission.

For many years the idea of a dialogue between civilizations, cultures and peoples has been realized by UNESCO by way of implementing various initiatives and programmes, organizing numerous conferences and meetings all over the world. In order to implement the decisions and recommendations confirmed in the headquarters in Paris the international network of UNESCO chairs on inter-religious dialogue is being actively developed in specialized universities of the world. They conduct complex scientific research, train specialists, and carry out information-documentation activities in the sphere of cross-cultural and inter-religious dialogue.

UNESCO's mandate in the sphere of international cultural cooperation is truly unique, and the activities of our Organization aimed at consolidation of cultural diversity and cross-cultural dialogue serve as a steady basis for consolidation of the ideas of 'new humanism'.

Recognizing the topicality of the issue, the UN General Assembly declared 2010 the Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures and appointed UNESCO a leading institution to hold it in order to use its more than 60 years' valuable experience in encouraging 'mutual harmonization and understanding between the peoples'.

The Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures, fitting in the framework of UNESCO's mandate, is at the same time a sign of the successful ending of the Decade for Culture of Peace (2001-2010) and serves as a starting point for working out a new strategy. In its Medium-Term Strategy for 2008-2013 UNESCO highlights the subject area of cross-cultural interaction. The document states that 'encouragement of cultural diversity and its inevitable consequence – dialogue – is one of the most urgent tasks of the modernity and the central element to comparative advantages of the Organization'. Thus, cultural diversity is recognized to be a uniting, constructive factor of the world progress in the age of globalization.

We are impressed by the approaches of those countries-members of UNESCO which consider that the main goal of the above-mentioned International year is to demonstrate the favourable impact of cultural diversity along with the recognition of importance of cultural exchanges and links coming back to the times of the dawn of mankind. The principles of dialogue and mutual understanding should be integrated in the policy in the sphere of education, science, culture and

communication for the sake of correcting the wrong ideas and stereotypes, demonstrating the fact that diversity enriches the mankind.

It is known that the 35th session of UNESCO General Conference assigned the four main directions of activities that constitute the draft of the Plan of Actions: assistance to mutual recognition of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity; elaboration of the framework of commonly shared values; consolidation of quality education and development of cross-cultural communication skills and encouragement of dialogue in the interests of steady progress.

The success of the Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures depends to a great degree on the recognition of the fundamental principle of cultures' equal importance, mutual respect and consolidation of cooperation in the interests of providing the stable world. The cross-cultural dialogue is a process where recognition and respect for cultural diversity is inseparably combined with adherence to commonly shared values of liberty, equality, solidarity, tolerance, environmental friendliness and common responsibility. They, as the Declaration of the Millennium acknowledges, 'have proved their timelessness and their universal character'.

Within the framework of such international manifestations as the Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures, it is holding cultural festivals, religious meetings and sports events that comes to the foreground. They are the preferable directions of cultural interaction as being helpful to everybody. It is worth emphasizing a most important role of mass media, especially in the countries or regions disintegrated by inter-communal and inter-confessional conflicts.

The first event of the current Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures was the creation of the High Level Group on peace and dialogue between cultures under UNESCO Director-General. Well-known intellectuals, political and religious figures from all continents, including Russia, have become members of this group. They are given a task of comprehending the modern tendencies and offering new ways of building the world based on equitability, respect for human rights, gender equality and solidarity in the conditions of globalization and the arising problems, such as climate change, use of scarce resources, balance between ethic and economic factors. Solutions to the new challenges must be based upon the strength of collective mind and dialogue.

We positively estimate this decision of the UNESCO Director-General I. Bokova, as well as members of the above-mentioned Group joining conferences on cross-cultural dialogue 'The Power of Cultural Diversity and Dialogue' and 'Making the World: Importance of Commonly Shared Values in the Age of Globalization'. We hope that in the nearest future useful recommendations on the entire scope of the mentioned issues will be prepared.

At the same time we consider it fundamentally important that UNESCO in its activities in the sphere of establishing cross-civilizational communication and mutual understanding should to a maximum extent use the opportunities of close interaction with the Alliance of Civilizations, regional and interregional landmark fields, such as ASEM conference on inter-religious dialogue, international non-governmental organization 'The World Public Forum for Dialogue of Civilizations', and the great potential of leaders of different world confessions and religious communities.

We believe that UNESCO should also more actively use inter-religious dialogue as a means of social consolidation and stability all over the world. For all countries, the ability and the wish to generate and keep up dialogue and mutual understanding between ethnic and religious communities have the decisive importance for advancement along the way of democracy, stable development and peace. Examples are not far to seek: take, for instance, the current situation in the Middle East, a destabilizing element of which is constant tension around cultural, historical and religious places.

We note that in recommendations adopted by different UNESCO sessions on issues of cross-cultural and inter-religious dialogue the necessity to promote educational and pedagogic projects is emphasized. For the recent years understanding of the necessity of teaching cross-cultural and inter-religious dialogue skills and educating the youth in the spirit of respect for others has been growing. It is more than ever necessary for harmonious co-existence within modern societies that have become pluralistic. The Russian Federation supports such approaches.

Recognizing the importance of the religious factor and inter-religious dialogue should become a part of the toolset of modern humanistic thought because in the long run the matter in question

is the quest for commonly-shared ethic values which we should open for ourselves, exchange them and pass on to the next generations. This quest should be carried out in conditions of respect for religious and cultural differences perceived not as a separation factor leading to disruption of social unity but as a factor of mutual enrichment for the sake of the entire society.

Our conceptual view of the role of the religious factor in the world politics is connected with the need to combine approaches to acute international problems with basic values of the world's major religions, which are the spiritual and moral ground of the universal solidarity. Without taking these principles into account it is hard to reach an equitable solution to the vital problems of the world development on truly collective and legal bases, to create the atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding in the relations between the states in the age of globalization.

It is to achieve this objective that the High-Level Group of religious figures was formed under the UNESCO Director-General in July last year, and we hope that the countries-members of UNESCO will support this initiative of ours as it arose out of the comprehension of the successful centuries-old Russian experience of peaceful co-existence of different cultural and religious traditions within one state. I would like to inform you that it is not a long time ago when the regular meeting of the Group took place in Baku within the framework of the International summit of religious leaders; Special Representative of the UNESCO Director-General took part in the meeting, and we hope that such mutually beneficial contacts will be developed further.

From our point of view there are neither contradictions nor inner rivalry concerning peace and the dialogue of cultures between the Group of religious figures proposed by us and the High-Level Group. Both of them have their own objectives and tasks. So, without religious figures being involved it would turn out to be a difficult task to widen mutual knowledge of spiritual traditions and basic values of different confessions, religious youth's education in the spirit of tolerance, formation of the modern understanding of the religious factor in social life and in international communication. Complementing each other and performing the functions of consultation bodies under the UNESCO Director-General, both groups can jointly promote a more profound mutual understanding and respect between believers and nonbelievers.

In conclusion, I would like to express my confidence that the work of the current conference will be aimed at scientific and practical comprehension of the opportunities of international interaction and inter-confessional dialogue in the changing world, at the advance of ideas and principles of dialogue between representatives of different cultures and confessions, at the elaboration of recommendations focused on practical realization of the ideas of peace and concord.

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A. S. Zapesotsky[278]

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THE ISSUES OF A CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE IN ACADEMICIAN DMITRY LIKHACHOV'S SCIENTIFIC AND MORAL HERITAGE

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[278] Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Education, President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Head of Philosophy and Cultural Studies Chair, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), professor. He is Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress of St. Petersburg Intelligentsia; Deputy Chairman of the Board of Rectors of St. Petersburg universities.

Academician Zapesotsky is the author of over 1400 scholarly papers. He is a script writer and film director for more than 30 popular science films and for more than 300 shows on television. He sits on editorial boards of the journals: *Pedagogika* [Pedagogy], *Voprosy Kulturologiyi* [Issues of Culture Studies] and *Literatumaya Uchoba* [Literary Education].

He was awarded the Russian Federal Government Prize in Education. Laureate of the Gorky Literary Prize. Decorated with Leo Tolstoy Big Gold Medal of the International Association of Writers and Essayists. He is Doctor *honoris causa* of universities of the USA, Ireland and the Ukraine. Dr. Zapesotsky is *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation and *Artist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation.

Scholars know that the truth in the Humanities is verified through comparison. Indeed, comparison is neither the ultimate nor universal nor the only way in the quest for truth, however it is highly efficient when applied to the dialogue of cultures.

Nowadays the world has two major approaches to the issue of dialogue of cultures. One of them is based on the premises that 'the Anglo-Saxon civilization', 'the West' is some 'premium' culture type tHat has proved its supremacy and its right to global domination – as an etalon, a model for the rest of the world cultures – through the whole progress of the world history. In such a context the dialogue of cultures is interpreted as a teacher-student communication or as an interaction between the stronger and the weaker. Another approach views each culture as a treasury, a source for mutual cultural enrichment. Thus, the dialogue becomes an interrelation of those who are equal.

I see these approaches personified in the figures of Samuel Huntington and Dmitry Likhachov. The statement of one and the same scientific fact – diversity of national cultures -has drawn the two of them to essentially opposite conclusions, published almost simultaneously. In the book *The Clash of Civilizations,*[279] a total best-seller published in 1996, Huntington divided the world into civilizations of different cultural types, on the basis of shared language, religion and understanding of history. He was taken as an advocate of the 'historical inevitability' concept, the inevitable conflict of civilizations.

The US administration had been practicing Huntington's ideology until Barack Obama's presidency. Even now this ideology has a special significance in the life of an American society. To illustrate this we may refer to the last Oscar ceremony, where instead of *Avatar,* with its unique technological tools and its message of unity with nature and of diverse cultural values, performed at the utmost artistic level, the main awards were given to *The Hurt Locker,* a typical mass-culture product that defends the importance of a 'missionary' function of the American occupation of a 'wild' region of our planet.

In 1995 on the square, at the entrance to this very concert hall where we are holding this Conference, Dmitry Likhachov introduced to the public his *Declaration of the Rights of Culture*[280] that was created under the auspices of our University and under Likhachov's supervision. Here I would like to make a synopsis of the *Declaration's,* regulations:

culture is the major source for the humanization of the mankind;

culture of any nation, by way of defining its unique spirit, expresses its creative power and ability, and simultaneously belongs to the world's heritage;

cross-cultural dialogue provides mutual understanding between the nations and identification of their unique spirit;

preservation and development of any national culture should become the concern of the world community;

culture is the basis for social and economic development of nations, states and civilizations, for the rise of human spirit and morals;

inability for mutual cultural understanding and mutually beneficial cross-cultural dialogue has become one of the causes of conflicts and wars in the 20th century;

cultural development and cultural solidarity in the context of economic and political integration of the contemporary world community guarantee tolerance, mutual understanding and democracy, and are also the necessary condition to prevent wars and violence;

implementation of the democratic values and human rights is significantly determined by the extent of cultural development of the society;

the loss of any element of cultural heritage cannot be compensated for and results in a spiritual depletion of the human civilization;

existence of cultures of different nations is endangered in the context of the accelerating civilizational processes;

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[279] *Huntington, Samuel Phillips.* The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
[280] *Likhachov D. S.* Declaration of the Rights of Culture: A Draft. St. Petersburg: Pushkinsky Dom, 1995. [In Russian].

the originality of national cultures and cultural evolution of the humankind itself are threatened by the on-going expansion of anti-humanist phenomena of commercial mass culture;

national and international measures are needed to protect culture, to provide preservation and further development of culture of any nation, to implement cooperation and efficient dialogue between nations.

It should be mentioned that in the post-Soviet times these approaches constituted the basis of Russia's diplomacy[281]. And after the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001 the western society has also started to take them in. The establishment of the Alliance of Civilizations under the auspices of the UNO[282] and ratification of a number of documents on cultural diversity and dialogue of cultures may serve as an example of changes, inspired by these attitudes.

Our analysis of tendencies in a global cultural development shows that Dmitry Likhachov, but not Huntington, has a future. Though, the underlying principles of the Russian scientist's concept, its significance and its roots in human needs, still don't seem to be understood by many. In this context, it seems to be reasonable to appeal to the core and background of Likhachov's ideas that inspired him to crown his life with the abovementioned approaches to cross-cultural dialogue in the *Declaration.*

First of all, we should focus on Likhachov's understanding of culture: 'It is a vast holistic phenomenon that turns people inhabiting a certain territory, from merely a population into a nation. The notion of culture should cover religion, science, education, moral and ethic behavioural patterns of peoples and states. It is culture that justifies the nation's existence in the face of God.'[283] And Likhachov goes on like this: 'It seems crucial to approach culture as some organic holistic phenomenon, as a certain medium, where different cultural aspects share common trends, the laws of mutual attraction and repulsion... It seems necessary to review culture as a certain space, a sacred field, where, unlike in a game of spillikins, one cannot remove any of its elements without having other elements moved. The loss of a random element of culture may result in its general decline.'[284]

Such an attitude constitutes the basis for the modern science of culture – culturology. According to a broad approach to the definition of culture the cultural framework comprises everything that is not nature, everything that is created by man. Within such a context culture also covers economy and legal sphere, engineering and technology, etc. Unlike the Marxist approach which treated economy as the 'basis', culturological approach makes it possible to consider economic relations as one of culture's Subsystems. It enables verification of the dependence of economy on other subsystems – ideologies, modes of social life, national traditions and mentalities and others.

Working further on his concept of culture as an integral system of human activities, D. Likhachov also introduced the notion of 'culture-sphere'.[285] He points out that its integrity is stipulated by 'the dynamics and the diversity'.[286] This is the source where Likhachov's understanding of culture comes from: it is a continuous dialogue between its diverse facts, phenomena, elements, layers, subsystems and cultural sets. Of course, people are the parties of such a dialogue.

There are 1425 Likhachov's publications that we have discovered by now.[287] The most prominent of his works on culture are published by the University of the Humanities and Social

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[281] See, for example, *Yakovenko A. V.* Russia supports the observance of human rights all over the world // Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations: The 8th International Likhachov Scientific Conference, May 22-23, 2008. St. Petersburg: SPbUHSS Publishers, 2008, p. 60.

[282] *Sampaio J.* Speech at the Plenary Meeting 'Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations // Dialogue of Cultures..., p. 100; Sampaio J. Speech at the Round table 'Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations' // Dialogue of Cultures..., pp. 124-126.

[283] *Likhachov D. S.* Culture as a Holistic Medium // Selected Works on Russian and World Culture. St. Petersburg: SPbUHSS, 2006, p. 349. (Honorary doctors of SPbUHSS). [In Russian]

[284] *Likhachov D. S.* Culture as a Holistic Medium, p. 350.

[285] Ibid. p. 358.

[286] Ibid. p. 354.

[287] Bibliography of Likhachov's Works // Zapesotsky A. S. Dmitry Likhachov's Culturology. St. Petersburg: Nauka;

Sciences in the book of *Selected Works on Russian and World Culture.*[288] Acquaintance with these works presents an amazing ontology of the dialogue of cultures.

'The Word and Visual Image in Ancient Rus' approaches the dialogue in such cultural subsystems as literature and fine arts – through plots, objects and the artist's ideology. It also analyzes the ways in which the society stipulates the dialogue: 'Many cultural phenomena are simultaneous, homogenous and analogous, and they spring from the same source.'[289] With the help of icons, frescos, architecture, prayers, manuscripts, seals D. Likhachov illustrates the way literature and different types of art are governed by the social reality. They are also having a dialogue thus making 'one of the most significant features of a cultural progress'.[290] However, 'the general development of national arts and culture is stipulated by one area at a time'.[291]

'The Law of Integrity of Artistic Visual Image and Ensemble in the Aesthetics of Ancient Rus' is devoted to the author-audience dialogue.[292]

'The "Progressive Trends" in the History of Russian Literature' touches upon the inner dialogue of culture which is performed through 'stylistic codes': 'Literature obtains its matter not from the outside only, but from the inside as well.'[293] Likhachov goes on: 'A work of literature (I am using the word "work", not "author", deliberately, because this is the natural phenomenon of the art itself) serves not only for the reality and itself, but also stimulates the creation of other works. A work of literature has the inherited capacity to "foster" other works of literature. Literature is capable of self-regulation.'[294] In this work Likhachov also touches upon the dialogue between the culture and the social reality, and upon the international links of Russian literature: 'The development of national literatures has never been isolated from other literatures. Russian literature has never been isolated either. It was rooted in inner needs but with the assistance of works straight from Bulgaria, the Byzantine Empire... It included the works, shared by all European literatures... Many genres were shared as well: chronicles, hagiographies, histories, various homilies, collections of maxims, narratives, different liturgical genres, etc. But the experience of Russian literature has been limited by geography. It was the literature tightly linked to a specific European region, its Orthodox South-East. In the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries Russian literature extends its borders. New areas are introduced into its experience: the Caucasus, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland and Bohemia. In the 18th century the whole of Europe is embraced: Germany, France, England and Italy.'[295]

Likhachov's paper 'Russian Culture at the Time of Andrei Rublev and Epiphanius the Wise' reveals the way that cultural and national spheres interrelate in the life of nations. The formation of nations in Europe was managed through cultural self-determination. National cultures constituted themselves through their historic roots, appealing to their olden times.[296]

'On the one hand, Russian culture at the end of the 14th – the beginning of the 15th centuries can be characterized as a confident culture, which relies on the complex culture of old Kiev and old city of Vladimir... On the other hand, it has an apparent connection to the whole Pre-Renaissance of the Eastern Europe. Russia's cultural development in the 14th—15th centuries is marked by the reinforced intimacy with the Byzantine Empire... Bulgaria and Serbia."[297] Through the vast evidence, this work presents a detailed analysis of Russia's cultural dialogue with the Byzantine and South-Slavonic cultures. Likhachov shows that the dialogue is based on 'the

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SPbUHSS, 2007, p. 356–434. *[In Russian]*

[288] *Likhachov D. S.* Selected Works on Russian and World Culture // Scientific ed. Yu. Zobnin. St. Petersburg: SPbUHSS, 2006. (Honorary doctors of SPbUHSS). *[In Russian]*

[289] *Likhachov D. S.* The Word and the Visual Image in Ancient Rus, p. 24. *[In Russian]*

[290] Ibid.

[291] Ibid., p. 27.

[292] *Likhachov D. S.* The Law of Integrity of Artistic Visual Image and Ensemble in the Aesthetics of Ancient Rus, p. 34–43. *[In Russian]*

[293] *Likhachov D. S.* The 'Progressive Trends' in the History of Russian Literature, p. 50. *[In Russian]*

[294] Ibid.

[295] Ibid. pp. 74–75.

[296] *Likhachov D. S.* Russian Culture at the Time of Andrei Rublev and Epiphanius the Wise, pp. 87–163. *[In Russian]*

[297] Ibid., p. 103.

similar ideas, governed by similar conditions'.[298] At the same time neither of the cultures is passively experiencing the influence, on the contrary, they take an active part in the new creativity, where national features and traditions are projected: '...the Old Russian culture, being incorporated in the Eastern European Pre-Renaissance, does not lose its own tradition in imitating foreign patterns, but, on the contrary, its main aim is to revive its own national antiquity.'[299]

This work also contains one of the brilliant examples of culturological analysis of history, demonstrating the way that the situation in other culture's subsystems constitutes the borders in cross-cultural dialogue in spiritual life, in the development of literature and arts: 'Pre-Renaissance had an enormous influence on the development of Russia's culture throughout the succeeding centuries. <... > But Russian Pre-Renaissance did not develop into genuine Renaissance. Pre-Renaissance is still closely linked to religion, and that is its distinctive characteristic. <...> Religion still dominates all cultural spheres. <... > How can the fact be accounted for that Renaissance never succeeded Pre-Renaissance in Russia? The answer should be found in the peculiarities of Russia's historic development: the deficient economy at the end of the 15th – the 16th centuries, a quickened establishment of the centralized state that absorbed cultural resources, the fall of the commune cities of Novgorod and Pskov, where Pre-Renaissance unfolded, and, which is most crucial, the might of the church establishment that had repressed heresies...'[300]

'Russian Culture of the Modern Times and Ancient Rus'[301] is the key work to understand Likhachov's attitude to the dialogue of cultures and its role in the cultural dynamics. Here, Likhachov enumerates a number of principles that have the value of laws: 'History of culture develops not only through the changes inside culture, but also through the accumulation of cultural values.' Likhachov argues that 'the cultural values are not changed, but rather created, accumulated or lost'.[302] The most important for Likhachov is the connection of a certain culture to other cultures, and also the ways that the previous or foreign cultures are adopted or rejected. Likhachov illustrates 'culture's living in other cultures' by the European culture's handling of the ancient world's heritage. He distinguishes five stages – actually five types of a dialogue that have different contents and results (the 'barbarian style' of the 6th-10th centuries, the Roman style, the Gothic art, the Renaissance, the culture of the late 18th – the beginning of the 19th centuries): 'Each cultural identity handles the past in its peculiar way, it also has a particular set of cultures that feed it as its sources.'[303] Likhachov proves that the attitude to the culture of Ancient Rus was the key feature of the cultural identity of Russia in the 18th—19th centuries: 'This is, for the most part, a permanent and an enormously interesting dialogue between the modern Russia and Ancient Rus, which is not always peaceful. The culture of Ancient Rus was growing more and more significant in the course of this dialogue. Ancient Rus was getting more significant due to the growth of the new Russia's culture which needed it more and more. The call for the culture of Ancient Rus came alongside with the significance of Russia's culture for the world and its weight in the contemporary world's civilization.[304] Likhachov asserts his observations while picturing a striking panorama of the original ambiguous cross-cultural dialogue that lasted for three centuries. He criticized Peter I's activities, claiming that he had broken the connection of Russia to its traditional culture for the sake of its dialogue with the West. (In his 'Peter I's Reforms and the Advance of Russian Culture'[305] Likhachov explores that issue in detail.)

Analyzing the specificity of a cross-cultural dialogue 'through the temporal layers', D. Likhachov comes up with some basic principles which are necessary for understanding the laws of cultural development: 'It is not only the culture of the past that has an influence on the contemporary culture, joins in, takes part in a "cultural establishment". The modernity also has a certain influence on the past... on its understanding <...> there is a persistent curious and crucial

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[298] Ibid., p. 155.
[299] Ibid., p. 160.
[300] Ibid., pp. 162–163.
[301] *Likhachov D. S.* Russian Culture of the Modern Times and Ancient Rus, pp. 171–190. *[In Russian]*
[302] Ibid., p. 171.
[303] Ibid., p. 172.
[304] Ibid., p. 181.
[305] *Likhachov D. S.* Peter I's Reforms and the Advance of Russian Culture, pp. 164–170. *[In Russian]*

event, that can be defined as a certain celestial "opposition" of cultures – an old and competent one, on the one hand, and a new one with the awareness of its superiority or inferiority over the old one, on the other.[306] Both cultures get involved in the dialogue which results in a rapid advance of a new culture based on the opposition and juxtaposition with the older one.

Inadequate mutual understanding and errors are essential features of a cross-cultural dialogue. In this respect Likhachov refers to the assumption of the West that Russia has no parliamentary experience.[307] In fact, in between the pre-Mongolian Russia and the reign of Peter I our country had a profound experience of consultative bodies: 'Of course, Ivan the Terrible used cruel practices to people – but he didn't dare to officially abolish the old tradition to consult "the native land".'[308] And such examples are numerous in Likhachov's writings.

The boost of the thousand-year-old Russian culture is connected, for the most part, with its dialogic character as the initial, 'inherited' feature: 'Russia's mission is defined by... the fact that more than three hundred nations – vast, great and scanty, seeking protection – united in it. Russia's culture was formed within the multinational framework.'[309] Likhachov saw Russia as a specific bridge between the nations: 'It's not a coincidence that the golden age of Russian culture in the 18th-19th centuries had a multinational content in Moscow and, for the most part, in St. Petersburg. From the very beginning St. Petersburg had multinational population. Its main avenue -Nevsky Prospect – has become an original avenue of tolerance, where Orthodox churches were in close neighbourhood with Dutch, German, Catholic and Armenian churches, and in the vicinity there were Finnish, Swedish and French churches. It is not widely known that the Buddhist church in St. Petersburg is the biggest and the richest Buddhist church in Europe built in the 20th century. And a richest mosque was also built in Petrograd.'[310]

The original openness, regard of diverse cultures, desire to unite and preserve and, somehow, adapt them have, on a large scale, made up the character and the wealth of Russian culture: 'Let us think of the legendary beginning of Rus that was marked by mutual calling of the Varangian princes with the participation of Eastern Slavic as well as Finno-Ugric tribes... Both Ancient Rus and Russia of the 18th-20th centuries were characterized by universalism and the strong craving for different national cultures.'[311]

Likhachov perceived the attitude to diverse cultures as a rational as well as a moral issue. It is closely linked with the humanistic essence of the progress of the world community, with the notions of 'good' and 'justice'. According to Likhachov, cultural development follows the pattern that breeds humanism, humanity and evolution of the spirit, but not according to Darwin's law.

All this lets millions of his fellow countrymen regard academician Dmitry Likhachov as the 'consciousness on the nation' and 'the moral ideal' for Russia. The Declaration of the Rights of Culture says that culture of any nation has the right to contribute to the humanistic development of the mankind. Cultural cooperation, dialogue and mutual understanding between the world's nations guarantee justice and democracy, prevent international conflicts, violence and wars.

As a co-author of the Declaration, I am very glad to note that such understanding of a cross-cultural dialogue is meeting its supporters in the world community. And our International Likhachov Scientific Conference contributes to it.

Thank you for you attention.

T. A. Zhdanok[312]

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[306] *Likhachov D. S.* Russian Culture of the Modern Times and Ancient Rus, p. 180.

[307] *Likhachov D. S.* Russian Cultrure in the Contemporary World, p 193. *[In Russian]*

[308] Ibid.

[309] Ibid., p. 196.

[310] Ibid., p. 197.

[311] *Likhachov D. S.* The Fundamentals of European Culture and the Historic Experience of Russia, p. 367. *[In Russian]*

[312] Member of the European Parliament (Latvia), Dr. Sc. (Mathematics). A co-Chairperson of For *Human Rights of United Latvia* party. Author of a number of publications, including study-guides: *Zadachi-testy po vysshey matematike: Mnozhestva. Funktsiyi. Predely. Proizvodnye* [Problem-Tests on Higher Mathematics: Sets. Functions. Limits. Differential Quotient], *Zadachi pismennyh vstupitelnyh ekzamenov po matematike v 1983 i 1984 gg. (s*

THE ROLE OF PEOPLE WITH MULTIPLE ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY IN INTER-STATE COOPERATION

Phenomenology of a person's multiple ethno-cultural identity is within the sphere of academic interests of psychologists and sociologists. My speech has a different basis: the practical experience of a political figure and a human rights advocate. The political figure who has twice been entrusted by Russian-speaking residents of Latvia with the right to represent their interests in the European Parliament. The human rights advocate who is well aware of the practice of protection of their rights by different ethnic, linguistic, religious minorities, including Russian-speaking inhabitants of the EU. Finally, the political figure who has some working experience 'The European Free Alliance' party which is the lobbyist for traditional ethnic minorities and constitutional regions of the EU countries.

Basing upon this experience I can cite a number of examples of the influence made by the factor of presence in one state or another of representatives of minorities in inter-state relations between the country of residence and the country of their origin. This influence is particularly significant in cases when the matter is a large group of traditional ethnic, linguistic or religious minority.

Let us consider the following typical situations.

The first type: the state of residence is carrying out the policy that allows representatives of their minority to preserve and develop their dual identity connected with the country of residence and the country of origin. In this case representatives of a minority are a natural 'bridge' between these countries and promote good relations between them. The 'bridge' laid in Schleswig-Holstein can serve as a typical example of this model. To be more specific, there are even two such bridges. One is formed by the Danish minority of Germany, the other by the German minority of Denmark. The time period measured off from the end of the Second World War was far from being unclouded in the sphere of relations between the minority and the majority on either side of the border. Its initial stage, with regard to well-known historical events, was particularly difficult and it left its mark on the inter-state relations. But at the moments of crisis all sides were able to display wisdom and determination. Now the region is a model for other regions. Nevertheless, a Euro-deputy I know, a perfect expert in the sphere of minorities' rights, likes repeating a sacramental phrase: 'Never in my life have I encountered a minority which is quite satisfied with their situation.'

The second and, unfortunately a far more wide-spread type is when the state of residence is carrying out the policy of forced assimilation of their minorities. Let us single out two polar situations here. One extreme case: the minority voluntarily accepts this policy. In the other extreme case self-isolation of the minority, leading to the formation of the second community within the state, takes place. In practice we most often encounter a more complicated situation when the minority community is divided into 'assimilates' and 'isolationists'. In this case further development of inter-state relations depends both on the influence of one group or another on the minority and on the balance of forces between different political forces in the country of origin which differ in their attitudes to their Diaspora. Examples to this model and its varieties can be found in one small region: the Baltic States. As for the Russian-speaking minority of Lithuania we can boldly speak about the assimilation process which is advancing with rapid strides. Since it is voluntary-obligatory, the issue of the situation of 'their' minority is practically excluded from the agenda of the interstate Lithuanian-Russian relations. However, it is a corner issue both in the relations between Russia and Latvia and Russia and Estonia. In both of these countries, and to a greater degree in Latvia, the Russian-speaking population was able to organize resistance to the assimilation policy. The society contains two linguistic communities. We cannot apply the term 'a two-community state' here, of course, because this situation is not legislated (as it is in Belgium, for example). It is in the sphere of struggle for giving the Russian language an official status where the issue of reproduction of the community lies. What is the attitude to all these aspirations in Russia? In the early nineties we witnessed a complete disregard of this issue on the part of the

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President of the state and other officials. When Boris Yeltsin was paying an official visit to the Supreme Soviet of Latvia in 1990 he refused to meet the opposition deputies who were going to draw his attention to the danger of violation of the human rights of the Russian-speaking population. But later we managed to change the attitude to us on our own. Judge for yourselves, the number of Russian-speaking residents in Latvia runs to a million people. And the overwhelming majority of these people do not put up with their discriminated position. Each of us is sure to have a dozen of relatives or acquaintances in Russia. It means that ten million citizens of Russia know personally, not by hearsay, that in Latvia the Russian-speaking residents are deprived of a number of important rights. And these people are a weighty electorate for the Russian politicians. This is why today almost no party in Russia denies the situation of Russian-speaking population being discriminated against in Latvia and Estonia. But in Russia there is an influential economic lobby that finds this situation inconvenient as it hinders 'making business'. And that is why many Russian figures in these countries try to support the centrist parties of 'assimilates' and to weaken in every way possible the Russian resistance movement. We are witnessing a similar conflict between different political parties of Hungary concerning the question of attitude to their Diaspora. It has flared up particularly intensively now after Slovakia's adoption of a new Law on the State Language which discriminates against representatives of the Hungarian minority.

On the surface the examples considered allow us to make a seemingly simple conclusion that the best way of 'resolving' a possible conflict is the accelerated assimilation of the minority and the consolidation of 'the national state'. Moreover, such a conflict can be provoked with the aim of making influence on the inter-state relations; there are lots of examples of such cases. But we are living in an epoch when the existing and rapidly advancing technologies allow people to develop horizontal contacts that provide for preservation and consolidation of their language and cultural links with the country of their origin. That is, technological progress has become the barrier on the way of consolidation of a national-state identity. Building a country in a form of a big ethnographic museum, which some national romantics are still dreaming of, is a complete Utopia.

Self-determination of a modern man is becoming more and more multilevel. It leads to them becoming aware of their multiple identity: continental, federalist, national, regional, ethno-cultural, confessional, corporative and professional.

At that, we should pay attention to another phenomenon: the intensification of the role of each of these levels can change the influence of others. For instance, many representatives of constitutional regions standing for their complete national independence perceive the consolidation of federative links within the European Union as a factor helping to solve the task set by them. And while, for example, the British Tories are getting more and more Euro-sceptical, the Scottish National Party, standing for the state independence of the autonomy, considers itself to be pro-European. We can also see a similar process in some autonomous regions of Spain.

From my point of view, encouraging the development of a multiple personality identity is the only strategy adequate to the realities of the twenty-first century to achieve the task of conflict-free coexistence of cultures, peoples and civilizations.

V. Yu. Zorin[313]

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[313] Deputy Director of the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Science (History), Dr. Sc. (Political Studies), Professor.

Full Class 2 Counsellor of State of the Russian Federation.

Author of a variety of books, among which are the following: *Public Diary (Chechnya: A Flinty Path to Peace. Book I)* (Dnevnik ne dlya sebya. (Chechnya: kremnistyi pyf k miry. Kniga pervaya)); *Public Diary (The Passions of Okhotny Ryad. Book 2)* (Dnevnik ne dlya sebya. (Strasti Okhotnogo ryada. Kniga vtoraya)); *The Russian Federation: Problems of Forming Ethno-Cultural Policy* (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya: problemy formirovaniya etnocurturnoi politiki); *Ethnic Policy in Russia: History, Problems, Prospects* (Natsional'naya politika v Rossiyi: istoriya, problemy, perspektivy); *The Russian People in the Ethnic Policy: The 20th Century* (Russkiy narod v natsional'noy politike. XX vek, with coauthors); *Ethnic Problem in the State Dumas of Russia: Practices of Law-Making* (Nastional 'nyi vopros v Gosudartsvennykh Dumakh: opyt zakonotvorchestva, with co-authors) and others.

ETHNO-CULTURAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION ACCORDING TO THE POPULATION CENSUS OF 2002

Dear Alexander Sergeyevich, dear colleagues, Let me, on behalf of N. N. Miklukho-Maklai Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, thank you for the opportunity to speak at such a dignified scientific forum. The topic of the colloquium is ever timely and one of the world problems that are somehow or other connected with culture – the dialogue of cultures and civilizations.

For Russia, due to its history and the geopolitical position of the country, the issue of ethno-cultural self-identification is not just the subject of a learned discussion, but – starting from Alexander Nevsky – an issue of ever-lasting choice of the place and paradigm of further development.

The demonstration of the cultural and linguistic diversity of the huge country is almost exceptionally within the competence of a population census. The facts previously known to narrow-focused specialists become common property through the census and make a great educational and pedagogic impact on people.

It is also important to bear in mind the fact that for the effective state government in a country like Russia it is absolutely necessary to take into consideration the ethno-cultural reality.

The ethnic dimension of Russia

According to the All-Russian population census of 2002 the number of inhabitants of Russia is 145.2 million people. During the period from the 1989 Census to 2002 the population of the country decreased by 1.8 million people.

The census of 2002 clearly showed the groundlessness of talking about the 'ethnocide' that allegedly took place in the 1990s and about the dramatic changes in the ethnic structure of the population of Russia.[314] One has only to look at the table with the data on the 23 most numerous ethnicities which constitute 96 per cent of the whole population of the country.

Table 1

The ethnic structure of the population of the Russian Federation in 2002

	2002		1989		2002 against 1989, per cent
	Thousands of people	Per cent against total	Thousands of people	Per cent against total	
Total population	145164.3	100.00	147021.9	100.00	98.74
Russians	115868.5	79.82	119865.9	81.54	96.67
Tatars	5558.0	3.83	5522.1	3.76	100.65
Ukrainians	2943.5	2.03	4362.9	2.97	67.47
Bashkir	1673.8	1.15	1345.3	0.92	124.42
Chuvash	1637.2	1.13	1773.6	1.21	92.31
Chechens	1361.0	0.94	899.0	0.61	151.39
Armenians	1130.2	0.78	532.4	0.36	212.28
Mordvin	844.5	0.58	1072.9	0.73	78.71
Byelorussians	814.7	0.56	1206.2	0.82	67.54
Avar	757.1*	0.52	544.0**	0.37	139.17
Kazakhs	655.1	0.45	635.9	0.43	103.02
Udmurt	636.9	0.44	714.8	0.49	89.10
Azerbaijanis	621.5	0.43	335.9	0.23	185.03
Mari	604.8	0.42	643.7	0.44	93.96
Germans	597.1	0.41	842.3	0.57	70.89

Full member of the International Academy for Informatization, of the Academy of Pedagogical and Social Sciences. Member of the Union of Journalists of Russia.

[314] *Stepanov V. V.* The Ethnic portrait of Russia has not considerably changed [Etnicheskiy portret Rossiyi sushchestbenno ne izmenilsya] // Naseleniye Rossiyi 2003-2004. Odinnadtsatiy-dvenadtsatiy yezhegodniy demograficheskiy doklad (ed. A.G. Vishnevsky). M.: Nauka, 2006.

Kabardinians	520.1	0.36	386.1	0.26	134.71
Ossets	514.9	0.35	402.3	0.27	127.99
Dargin	510.2*	0.35	353.3**	0.24	144.41
Buryat	445.3	0.31	417.4	0.28	106.68
Yakut	444.0	0.31	380.2	0.26	116.78
Kumyk	422.5	0.29	277.2	0.19	152.42
Ingush	411.8	0.28	215.1	0.15	191.45
Lezghin	411.6	0.28	257.3	0.18	159.97
Others and non-specified	5780.0	3.98	4036.1	2.70	143.21

* For the Avar category the number given does not include the number of Andic-Tsezic groups and the Archi, and for the Dargin category the number does not include the Kajtagi and the Kubachi.

** In 1989 the Ando-Tsezes and the Archi are included in the Avar number; the Kajtagi and the Kubachi are included in the Dargin number.

With the decrease in the population the census of 2002 showed that there appeared to be much more ethnic groups than before. It was not due to migration or other demographic processes – the principle of counting results had changed. In 1989 there were 128 'nationalities' all over the USSR. Now there are much more ones only in Russia. The point is in the method.[315] When summing up the results of the census of 2002 there was made a grouping based upon 182 items, so there appeared over 60 allegedly new ethnic categories.

Table 2

New ethnic categories in the Census of 2002

	Calculated in the Census	
	separately	separately and within other categories
Adzhar		v
Ahvahi		v
Alutorians*		
Andians		V
Archi		V
Astrakhan Tatars		V
Bagulal		v
Bengali*		
Besermyans	V	
Bezhtin		v
Botlihians		v
Central Asian Arabs	V	
Central Asian Gipsies	v	
Central Asian Jews	v	
Chechens-Akkins		v
Chelkans	v	
Chemalalians		v

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[315] See: *Sokolovsky S. V.* Instrumentalization of the theoretical knowledge in working out the results of the All-Russian Population Census of 2002 [Instrumentalizatsiya teoreticheskogo znaniya v razrabotke materialov Vserossiyskoy perepisi naseleniya 2002] // Etnologiya obshchestvu. Prikladniye issledovaniya v etnologiyi (ed. S. V. Cheshko). M.: Orgservis, 2006.

Chryashians		V
Chulyms	V	
Cossacks		V
Didoyans		V
Esids	v	
Estonians-Setu		V
Finno-Ingermanlan-dians		V
Ginuhians		V
Godoberin		V
Greks-Urums		V
Gunzibs		V
Hindu Indians	v	
Ingiloins		V
Kajtaks		V
Kamchadals	v	
Karatins		V
Kereks	V	
Khemshils	V	
Khvarshins		V
Komi-Izhems		V
Kubachinians		V
Kumandians	V	
Latgaleis		V
Lazi		V
Meadow-East Mari		V
Meskhetian Turks	V	
Mingrelians		V
Mongols**	V	
Montenegrins*	V	
Mordvin-Erzya		V
Mordvin-Moksha		V
Mountain Mari		V
Nagaibaks	v	
Ossets- Irons		V
Ossets-Digors		V
Pomors		V
Portuguese*	v	
Pushtu**	V	
Rushanians*	V	
Rusinians	V	
Saamis**	V	
Shapsugians	V	
Shugnans*	V	
Siberian Tatars		V
Soiotians	V	
Svans		V
Swedes*	V	
Tazians	V	
Telengits	V	
Teleut	V	

Tindals		V
Tophalars		V
Tuvinians-Todzhin-ians		V
Ugians		V
Ulta (Oroks)**	V	
Vods	V	

Despite the obvious demographic changes which took place in Russia since the last Soviet population census of 1989 the ail-Russian Population Census of 2002 did not show any considerable ethnic transformations on the scale of the whole country.

According to the data of the census the percentage of the Russians in the country decreased insignificantly from 82 % (1989) to 80%. The decrease is also characteristic of the Mari, the Udmurt, the Chuvash, the Mordvin, the Khakassians, the Komi and many others. On the contrary, some increased in number, for instance, the Avar, the Dargin, the Kumyk, the Yakut and the Buryat. However, it did not significantly change the ethnic map of Russia.

If we consider the regional variants we can see that significant ethnic changes took place during the intercensal interval in no more than 20 (one fifth) of all the subjects of the Russian Federation. The absolute leader is Chechnya. In this republic the situation radically changed: before, the population was multi-ethnic, now it is literally mono-ethnic. Chechnya is followed by Ingushetia where the ethno-cultural diversity also significantly decreased. Among other regions which partially changed their ethnic image are Tuva, Chukot and Koryak areas, Yakutia, Tyumen region, and some Caucasian ones – North Ossetia, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. In Dagestan the dynamics of the ethnic structure turned out to be low, lower than the average in the country, though within this republic in districts dense with population the cultural patchwork became more intense. Minor changes took place in Moscow; even more insignificant changes can be traced in St. Petersburg.

In the aggregative variant in the country the picture is as follows: the greatest changes of the ethnic composition took place in the Russian part of the Caucasus, much less intensively the situation was changing in the Far East and in East Siberia. Minor changes occurred in West Siberia and the European North. Still less obvious the processes are in the Volga region and in the Urals. The changes are extremely little in the Northwest of the country, in the capital Centre and in the Central Black Earth area. Almost no changes took place in the Volgo-Vyatsky region.

The census showed the groundlessness of the fears of the disastrous decrease of the percentage of the Russians.[316] Before the census some prognoses were published according to which the number of the Russians compared to the last Soviet census fell by 15-19 million people, almost by 15%. The real decrease involved a much smaller amount by 3.3%, and the percentage in the composition of the population fell by 1.7%. It was caused by the demographic ageing of the population the majority of which are city dwellers. These factors are also the reasons for having few children and high death rate. A secondary factor of the decrease is the migration outflow. On the whole, migration played and is continuing to play a positive role making for the decrease of the number. On the whole we can speak about the numerical stagnation of the Russians tending to decrease due to thermographic ageing. An additional source of renewal is assimilation for the Russian language and the ethnic identity – a process which is not new; it took place both one hundred and three hundred years ago.

As for the most numerous ethnic categories which amount to over a million of people the census found the following tendencies. There are categories whose numerical strength rose greatly. First of all there are the Armenians, the number of who doubled (212 % in relation to the number in Russia in 1989). Earlier they amounted to 532 thousand people whereas now there are 1.1 million people. The reasons for the growth of their number are obvious – the intensive

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[316] *Maksudov S.* The population of Chechnya: is the Census correct? [Naseleniye Chechni: prava li perepis?] //Naseleniye & Obshchestvo. Informatsionniy bulluten Tsentra demographiyi i ekologiyi cheloveka Instituta narodohozyaystvennogo prognozirovaniya RAN, 2005, No. 96.

migration since the late 1980s from Armenia (the earthquake) and from Azerbaijan (the Karabakh conflict). The second reason is the positive demographic growth especially among the people born in the countryside.

The second place by the rate of the population increase is occupied by the Chechens. The data show a 50 % increase (there were 899 thousand people, now there are 1.3 million people). The overstated by the census number of the Chechens was much discussed in mass media; scientific articles, too, are devoted to it.[317] The analysis of the demographic results shows that with the relatively high retained rate of the natural reproduction a significant population increase was to take place. The death rate due to the military operations is likely to have been smaller that it is assumed.

Among the numerous peoples the census showed the numerical growth of the Bashkir which can be accounted for not only by the demographic and migration processes but also by factors of political nature. The number of the Tatars almost did not change. There were 5.52 million people, there are 5.53 million. The processes of the demographic ageing are not the only reasons for the slowdown of the increase. Partly the problem is connected with the processes of assimilation, partly – with the inaccuracy of the account of the ethnic identity.

As for the outrunning growth in the number of the Bashkir as compared to the Tatars it is not a result of only 'the demographic games' of politicians of Bashkiria. If we compare the results of several censuses we see the following picture: in 1989 the number of those who called themselves Tatars increased in relation to the number of 1979 by 110.3 %, and the number of those who called themselves Bashkir rose only by 104.2 %. If we do not take into consideration the phenomenon of the change of identity the results seem to be strange. It is common knowledge that there are more rural dwellers among the Bashkir, and the birth rate is higher. In the latest census there is a peculiar revenge: the Tatars' increase is scrap – only 0.6 % whereas the Bashkir's one is noticeable – 24.4 %. The real situation is somewhere in the middle.

The number of the Chuvash decreased insignificantly: there were 1.77 million people, there are 1.64 million. The processes of the demographic ageing take place, but the main factor is the change of ethnic identity. The second reason of the decrease of the number is also characteristic of the Ukrainians. It is known that in the first years after the collapse of the USSR a considerable number of the Ukrainians especially the ones from the Far East region moved to Ukraine. But very soon there became apparent a reverse migration aspiration from Ukraine to Russia especially in the second half of the 1990s. Up to the present day Ukraine is the main source of the Russian migration growth. Before the publication of the first results of the census mass media gave forecasts according to which the number of the Ukrainians was to rise greatly.[318] However, the census stated a dramatic and foretold by nobody decrease of the number of the Ukrainians – from 4.3 million people to 2.9 million, that is by almost a third. The influence of a factor of the change of identity in this fluctuation seems to be obvious.

Among other big ethnic categories amounting to less than a million but not less than 500 thousand people the increase is characteristic only of the Caucasian groups. The Azerbaijanis are the most noticeable group. The latest census counted 622 thousand compared to 336 thousand in 1989, i.e. there took place an 85-percent increase. In terms of the rate of growth the Azerbaijanis only a little lag behind the Armenians. The factors of the rapid increase in number are the same, mostly of migration nature. At that, the census demythologized the idea of the enormous rate of the migration of the Azerbaijanis to Russia.

The level of the population's command of the state language of the Russian Federation is high: 98%. It is much higher than in most major countries of the world with a multiethnic structure of

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[317] For instance, 'Noviye izvestiya' newspaper (05.09.2003) wrote about a 700-thousand increase in the number of the Ukrainians.

[318] See the series of sociological examinations conducted by the Institute for Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the supervision of M. K. Gorshkov. The research is devoted to the issue of the Russian identity; see also the latest work completed by the experts of the Network on Ethnological Monitoring commissioned by the Ministry of Regions of Russia: *The Russian nation: formation and the ethno-cultural development.* Edited by V. A. Tishkov. M., 2008.

the population, and can only be compared to the developed countries of Western and Eastern Europe.

The high level of knowledge of the Russian language by the population of the country is indicative of the cultural homogeny of the Russian people and of the existence of a most important component of the national commonality and its consolidation in terms of the language communicative system. These data also state the high rate of the language Russification of non-Russian population of the country as a means of socio-cultural modernization and it takes place mostly by the free choice of citizens.

Among big peoples the share of those who do not speak Russian is the highest (from 10 to 17 %) among a number of North Caucasian peoples (the Argin, the Dargin, the Chechens and the Ingush) and among the Yakut. Among the peoples of the North Caucasus the Ossets have the largest number of people knowing Russian, but all the same their share is lower than that of East Slavic peoples (the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians), of Finno-Ugric peoples and of peoples settled in a dispersed way (the Germans, the Kazakhs, the Greeks and the Jews). These three last groups have almost completely turned to using the Russian language.

The most widespread language in the country is the Tatar (5.3 million people) and the Bashkir (1.4 million people). The spread of the Ukrainian language in Russia is quite logical; 1.8 million people declared the command of it during the census. According to the number of native speakers the Ukrainian language is followed by Chechen, Chuvash, Armenian, Avar and others.

The use of languages

Preservation and development of ethnic languages in Russia is the basis of our cultural diversity. The share of the newspapers and magazines in the languages of peoples of Russia which are supported by the state constitutes over 30% of the overall number of financed editions. 400 newspapers and magazines in 59 ethnic languages are published, TV broadcasts in 56 languages, and radio stations use 69 languages.

The interest in this issue has risen of late and, consequently, the number of people who want to learn ethnic languages has increased. Today Russian schools provide education in 38 ethnic languages. It allows meeting the population's basic needs for communication in their native language regardless of the place of living. The key importance is given not only to the amount of financing of the corresponding programs, but also to getting authentic information by the bodies of power to deal more effectively with the tasks of preservation and development of ethnic languages in all the territories of the Federation.

It is necessary to point out that in areas of compact settlement of ethnic minorities there is a tendency towards the increase of the number of national state schools where the native language is the language of teaching and a subject of studying. For instance, on the territory of Russia there are 47 Armenian, 85 Kazakh, 66 Azerbaijani, 19 Turkmen and other schools. In the republic of Tatarstan there are 56 Chuvash, 18 Udmurt and 9 Mari pre-school educational establishments. There are 140 Chuvash, Chuvash-Russian and Chuvash-Tatar schools where over 8,374 Chuvash children study their native language.

Schools of the republic of Bashkortostan teach in the Russian, Bashkir, Tatar, Chuvash, Mari and Udmurt languages. As separate subjects 6 more languages are studied: they are the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, German, Hebrew, Greek and Mordvin languages. In higher education institutions of the republic teachers of the above-mentioned languages get the training.

In 664 secondary schools of the North, Siberia and the Far East 103729 children study 23 languages of small indigenous peoples of the North as a separate subject; three languages are the languages of teaching.

The data of the ethnic map of Russia and of the command of languages will be specified during the forthcoming All-Russian Population Census of 2010.

Interethnic situation in Siberia and in the North of Russia (native peoples)

An important peculiarity of the North of Russia and of Siberia is the native population. The native peoples have constituted a part of its ecosystem for thousands of years. Consuming the local resources they often become the final unit of the movement of polluting substances both of local origin and the ones which are transported long distances. Culture and traditions of the native

peoples are unique. Most of them continue to use natural resources in a traditional way preserving their cultural heritage and fighting for the right to retain their way of life.

Almost all the peoples inhabiting Russia as a whole live in Siberia and in the North of Russia. There are much fewer native peoples connected with this vast territory by their origin. Among them are the Karels, the Komi, the Buryat, the Yakut, the Tuvinians, the West Siberian Tatars, the Khakassians, the Altaic which amount from 70 thousand to almost half a million people, and also the so-called 'Small Indigenous Peoples of the North' (SIPN) whose numbers vary from several people to forty plus thousand people (according to the Russian law the number 'is not supposed' to exceed the upper threshold established on the level of 50 thousand people).

Of the native peoples only the Sami and part of the Samoyeds live in the North of European Russia (the Sami live on the Kola Peninsula), the rest live in Siberia. The Vogul settle in the Urals and behind the Urals, the Samoyeds, the Khanti, the Selkups, the Chulyms and the West Siberian Tatars settle in the north of West Siberia and in the basin of the river Ob. In the north of East Siberia there are the territories of the settlements of the Ketians (the Yenisei), the Ngasanyans, the Entsis, the Dolgans and the Samoyeds (Taimyr), further to the east and to the south there live the Yukagir (the Kolyma), the Yakut (the Lena), the Evens (the shore of the Sea of Okhotsk), in the north-east there are settlements of the Chuvans, the Chukchi, the Koryak, the Kerek, the Eskimos (the Chukchi Peninsula), in Kamchatka there are the Itelmens, the Kamchadals, on the Commander Islands there live the Aleutians. In the Far East (the Trans-Amur Territory, the Maritime Territory and Sakhalin) there are settlements of the Nivhi, the Ulchi, the Nanai, the Oroch, the Oroks (ulta), the Negidaltians and the Udegheys. Numerous peoples live mostly in the southern part of Siberia: the West Siberian Tatars – in the south of West Siberia, the Altaic and the Khakassians settle in South Siberia, in the Altai and in the Sayans, further to the east there live the Tuvinians; the Yakut occupy the basin of the river Lena and advance close to the north; in the east of Southern Siberia there live the Buryat (Transbaikalia).

On the continental part of the Russian Arctic Zone ten small indigenous peoples of the North (SIPN) belonging to the Arctic peoples live. They are the Sami, the Entsis, the Samoyeds, the Nganasanys, the Dolgans, the Evens, the Evenk, the Chukchi, the Eskimos (upic) and the Yukagir. Besides, in the same Arctic Zone there live considerable groups of northern Khanti and of the Selkup which officially refer to the number of the SIPN, the Komi and the Yakut-reindeer breeders, and also separate groups of the Russians which in some cases came to the polar latitudes before the ancestors of the present non-Russian population; the Kanin Pomors, the Yenisei Selduks, Kolyma dwellers, Russian-Ustintsy and others whose lifestyle is similar to that of the small peoples of the North mentioned above. The biggest groups of the native population in the Arctic Zone live on the territory of six subjects of the Russian Federation: in the Murmansk (the Sami – 1,769 people according to the census of 2002 and the Komi – 2177) and the Arkhangelsk Regions (the Samoyeds – 8,326 and the Komi – 5,745; including the Samoyeds – 7,754 and the Komi – 4510 in the Nenets Autonomous District), in the Yamal-Nenets (the Samoyeds – 26,435, the Komi – 6,177, the Khanti – 8,760 and the Selkup – 1,797), in the Taimyr (Dolgan-Samoyeds) (the Dolgans – 5,517, the Samoyeds – 3,054, the Nganasans – 766, the Entsis – 197) and in the Chukchi Autonomous Districts (the Chukchi – 12,622, the Eskimos – 1,534, the Evens – 1,407), also in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) (the Dolgans – 1,272, the Evenks – 18,232, the Evens – 11,657, the Yukagir – 1,097).

The peoples of the North and Siberia with the complete bi-or multilingualism in a varying degree preserve their unique ethnic languages referring to the Uralo-Yukagir (the Finno-Ugric peoples and the Samodians), Altai (the Turks and the Manchu-Tungus peoples), Chukchi-Koryak, Esko-Aleut language families; some of the local languages are considered to be isolated languages which do not bear any direct resemblance to any known languages of the peoples of the world (the Ket and the Nivh languages). The language assimilation among the small indigenous peoples of the North is quite clearly expressed. Even among village dwellers from 20 to 70 per cent of representatives of some ethnic groups consider Russian to be their 'native tongue'. Cultural assimilation is not less obvious than linguistic assimilation.

Along with linguistic assimilation, cultural assimilation and genetic blending, which changes the anthropological look of the small indigenous peoples, are intensified by a high level of mixed

marriages with the participation of the Russians, the Yakut and representatives of other ethnicities; the number of such mixed marriages amounts to a half and more of all the married couples among some of the small indigenous peoples of the North, or the birth of children after temporary alliances of women with representatives of other ethnicities.

The analysis of the results of the census showed that the thesis of the formation of the Russian common civil nation has the right to be transferred to the real political life. This is what soon happened after raising this issue in the Message from the President to the Federal Assembly, there appeared scientific works, conferences and symposiums took place, scientific journals were founded...

The two latest presidents have been clearly and logically speaking about our Russian nation as of a historic and modern phenomenon.

'Russia was, is and certainly will be the biggest European nation,' V. V. Putin declared in 2005, 'the ideals of freedom, human rights, equity and democracy achieved through suffering and fighting by the European culture have been the determining value guidelines for our society for many centuries.' 'It was at the stage of its formation when the Russian nation as well as the State system began to establish itself as a poly-ethnic one and indeed it was formed on the basis of synthesis of eastern and western traditions', President D. A. Medvedev emphasized in his Message of 2008.

The Russian identity as a dominating form of the collective self-consciousness is also pointed out in authoritative research of sociologists and ethnologists.[319]

At present statisticians and scientists are actively working preparing the regular census. What lessons taught by the census of 2002 should be accommodated in the future? Especially in the light of the terms and the content of the census as widely discussed in the society.

The necessity of conducting the population census

The purpose of the census is worth mentioning; it is no secret that owing to the spread of new information technologies we can more and more often hear a statement that the census has lost its former role, and we can choose not to hold it. This question is currently even of greater importance today under the conditions of the financial crisis and economic recession.

In fact, the technical innovations cannot become an alternative to the census as they do not substitute the overall polling of the population. Getting the answers of the population whether they are answers given to a census taker directly or on the telephone, or with the help of the newest telecommunication means does not obviate the need for a dialogue during which almost every citizen of the country can inform of unique data about themselves. Such, for instance, are the personal data of the national identity of a person or the information about the languages a person can speak and uses in everyday life.

The experience of conducting the census of 2002 showed that despite the laborious gathering and processing information about ethnicities and languages the received data are one of the most needed census materials, and after six years the need for them did not become less. It is especially important to point out that these materials are made use of today for correcting the laws at the federal and regional levels, for working out and informational support of federal national projects and federal special-purpose programmes.

Considering that the Russian statistics has lost (or almost has lost) other sources of information about the ethnic composition of the population recently the census of today has turned into a single source of knowledge in this issue which is important for this country. No other research, be it sociological, ethnographic or any other connected with sample surveys of the population on bounded territories, can compete with the data on ethnicities and languages as received by an overall census.

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[319] Here and below based on V. A. Tishkov and V. V. Stepanov's report at the All-Russian conference of statisticians (12 February 2009). Published in: Bulluten seti etnologicheskogo monitoringa i rannego preduprezhdeniya konfliktov, No. 85, 2009; *Stepanov V. V.* Possibilities of improving the ethnic statistics: the analysis of the programme of the All-Russian population census of 2010 [Vozmozhnosti sovershenstvovaniya etnicheskoi statistiki: analiz programmy Vserossiyskoy perepisi naseleniya 2010 goda] // Etnos i sreda obitaniya. Sbornik etnoekologicheskikh issledovaniy k 85-letiyu V. I. Kozlova. – Ed. by N. I. Grigulevich, N. A. Dubova, A. N. Yamskov. M.: Stariy sad, 2009.

The experience of the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences accumulated for many decades indicates that the data of censuses are unique. Therefore, no matter what some judgements of scientists and representatives of government structures may be on the questions about ethnicities allegedly making the procedure of the census too complicated (and even illegal), it is necessary to become aware of the fact that these data along with the basic demographic information are the most important results of the census of the whole country.

During a census survey it is difficult to achieve high accuracy of the register especially when it comes to ethnicities which are small in number. But it does not reduce the significance of the census. It is important to become aware of the fact that its data are a most important guideline for studying the national composition of the population of the Russian Federation.

On the necessity of registering double national identity

The opinion that in other countries during a census the statistics does not register the ethnicity and the language of the population is not quite correct. The corresponding kinds of registration are in effect in many countries, however different concepts and methods are used while registering. The most widespread approach in the world is registration of the ethnic composition of a country's population; in a number of cases inhabitants are given the right to declare their complex ethnic or racial origin.

Unfortunately the published results of the All-Russian Census of 2002 do not give us an opportunity to estimate the number of respondents with a double national identity. However, using the data of census of 1989 we can judge that their share is approximately 7-15 per cent.

It is necessary to improve the programme of the next All-Russian census. One of such steps should become allowing a person answering questions of the census to declare a complex national identity (for instance, for descendants of a mixed marriage).

At the stage of preparing the trial population census put in effect in 2008 the Federal Service of State Statistics was planning to use the method of a more detailed registration of the population's answers to the question about national identity. The essence of the new approach was that the people questioned were allowed to give an ambiguous answer if they determined their national identity as a double or a more complex one. According to ethnographic and sociological data such situations are typical of nationally-mixed families (especially in big cities) and for the population of some regions.

Results and lessons of the All-Russian Census of 2002

The dual nature of ethnic self-consciousness was not taken into consideration during the census of 2002. And thus according to the results of that census the number of the Ukrainians in Russia 'declined' considerably. At that, a previous (Soviet) census said that 76 % of the Ukrainians in Russia lived in mixed families. The same point can be made about the Byelorussians, the Mordvin, the Komi, the Jews, the Germans and many others whose number also 'declined'.

If a person's national identity is not unambiguous then, consequently, the registration of a single answer instead of a multiple one leads to errors. And then the results of a census appear to be less reliable than they could have been. We will remind: in the census of 2002 the results referring to some Dagestan ethnicities proved to be absolutely incorrect.

If the census could have registered a double national identity we could have avoided many conflict situations. For instance, the political relations in Bashkiria could have been much less heated; it was there where a great number of complaints about violation of the constitutional rights of the Bashkir Tatars who were not registered by the state census followed. After the census of 2002 Tatars in Bashkiria even made an attempt to hold a census themselves. There are some widely known scandalous examples with the Chryashians in Tatarstan, etc. If the census had been able to register a double national identity there would not have been so many people who did not declare their ethnicity in Russia – almost 1.5 million people.

Certainly, the number of people who really regard themselves as belonging to two ethnicities is relatively small in the country as a whole. But they also should have an opportunity to exercise their constitutional right for self-determination. They were deprived of this right during the census of 2002.

It is also important to mention the issue of the compulsory participation in the census. The experience of the previous census of 2002 showed that not all the population agreed to take part in it. First of all, the people in question are those living in big cities, migrant workers and foreigners who arrived from countries outside the CIS. In connection with it the Russian Federal Service of State Statistics attempted to introduce additions to the Federal Law on the Census which would provide for compulsory participation of citizens in the census. Let us remind of the fact that the census of 2002 did without such an amendment.

There are different points of view concerning the 'obligation' but there is one that dominates. According to some discussions in the Russian Federal Service of State Statistics the governing body of this establishment and many experts on migration, demography, economics and sociology are for the population's compulsory participation in the census. At that it is taken as read that the required legislative regulation will automatically make it possible for the census to completely embrace all the people living in the country. But insisting on the obligation no-one somehow bases upon any research. And then again it is considered that foreign experience is a sufficient argument for the compulsory participation.

If we speak about countries of the West there, as a rule, participation in the census is compulsory and the compulsion for participation provides for imposing considerable fines on violators. But how effective are the requirements established by law? Examples of imposing fines for evading a census in western administrative practice are difficult to find. But at the same time, for instance, in Britain where fines for evasion are among the highest ones after the end of a census the statisticians began to sound an alarm: they say almost a million of the British remained unaccounted. It was explained by the fact that a considerable number of compatriots were abroad at the time of the census. In the USA the analysis of a census is always accompanied with studying the territory distribution of the data about those questioned who did not return census forms. Hard requirements are put in on the population of Turkey during a census; according to the requirements those subjects to the census must stay at homes and are not supposed to be seen in the street; but those strict demands are also broken. Obeying the regulations of compulsory participation in a census seems dependent more on civil consciousness and on civil culture than on regulations of the law.

In this country, social commitment is regularly different in urban and in village communities, in big cities and small towns, in central regions and in peripheral ones. The differences become more obvious when considering the data about the activity of the population during elections to government bodies. According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation participation in an election is a civil right but not a duty. If we take into account the differences in election activity then we can easily suppose that in big cities the population's participation in a census cannot be complete because big city dwellers are more mobile in terms of the territory, greater individualism is more typical of them, and they are less influenced by government structures and less dependent on them. The intention of the Russian Federal Service of State Statistics to make the procedure of the census compulsory will not increase the rate of participation of big city dwellers in it, and the participation of village dwellers is quite complete even without it. But the obligation of participation can frighten off those who doubt and those who are inclined for protest behaviour because of social or everyday dissatisfaction. There is no doubt that the requirement for the compulsory participation in the census will also scare away foreigners, and first of all labour migrants.

It is important to realize that the control over the obligation of participation in a census is quite hampered in practice. The experience of the census of 2002 (though the census was not compulsory) showed that as well as during voting in elections the authorities try to use the administrative resource making the population participate by all means, often illegal ones. Such methods do not intensify the wish of those questioned to inform census takers of data about them and about people close to them. In Turkey, it is the police who are in charge of absence of people in the streets during the census. In Russian conditions, law-enforcement bodies certainly are also capable of executing a similar external control but the absence of people in the streets will not help census takers penetrate into the habitation of respondents. Methods of strict control will not

make citizens come to census stations themselves in order to go through the procedure of the census.

The question about the obligation of participation in a census is to a large extent crossed out by the development of legislative regulations about personal data in the Russian Federation. At that, we mean not only the recent Federal Law on Personal Information (2007) but the regulations of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It says:

'Everyone has the right for privacy, personal and family secret.' (Article 23).

Filling in the census forms where there is the name and the surname of a respondent and the code of the registration district (which in fact is the address) is no doubt intrusion into privacy.

Certainly, we can claim that the information gathered will be kept in 'aggregative form'. However, to generalize the information we have to process the primary sources (census schedules) and it takes time. It is known that it takes a year to accomplish the procedure and only after that the census forms are destroyed. It means that confidential information about almost every person living in the country is kept for quite a long period of time. And it contravenes the corresponding regulations of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

'Gathering, keeping, using and spreading information about a person's private life without their agreement are not allowed'. (Article 24, clause 1).

It means that no matter what the amendments to the law of the census are any regulations about compulsory participation will be unconstitutional.

What will happen if during the next census the participation of the population in it is not determined by the law as compulsory? It is obvious that as well as the census of 2002, it will be successfully conducted. The Russian Federal Service of State Statistics will no doubt express concerns that without the requirement of compulsory participation they cannot guarantee the completeness of gathering information. There is a reply to it: it should be argued that the completeness of gathering data depends on the letter of law but not on the level of preparation and the technical qualities of the census itself.

A considerable fault of the census of 2002 was that census takers did not visit all inhabitants though the inhabitants were ready to give answers to the questions of the census schedule. The more competent census takers and the better organized the census procedure, the higher the quality of the census results. Basing upon the experience of participation of employees of the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the previous census it seems obvious that the involvement of the population in the census is directly dependent on how census takers and other executing officers interact with the inhabitants of the house, street or a block of houses they are in charge of. If this interaction was slack or there was no interaction at all the level of awareness of the inhabitants about the census turns out to be extremely low. It turned out that TV and newspaper advertisements and outdoor posters play an insignificant role in preparing the public opinion. It is the personal contact of the census 'team' with the population during the preliminary round that provides the necessary level of trust relations which lead to the completeness of gathering information and finally to the success of the whole event.

So, how intense is the potential wish of the population to take part in the census? Is police supervision on the Turkish pattern necessary? In March 2009 the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences held research, the survey»was all-Russian and the correct sampling embraced the inhabitants of city centres in all subjects of the Federation. We thought it necessary to inform the respondents that the law does not require their compulsory participation in the future census and then we asked if the respondents would take part in that census. The question of the sociological questionnaire was put in the following way: 'According to the law it is your free choice to give answers in the census. You do not have to show any documents. Will you take part in the census?' The results were as follows: 'positive', i.e. they will participate – 92 % of respondents, 'negative' – 3 %, and 5 % of the respondents were undecided. Let us remark that there was no preliminary discussion of the importance of the census. We should point out that the survey was held during an unfavourable period when the most important topic in the Russian society was the topic of the global economic crisis. As well as while preparing for the previous census the executives of the Russian Federal Service of State Statistics are especially concerned about a low rate of participation of inhabitants in big cities, first of all in

Moscow and St. Petersburg. Indeed, the participation of the inhabitants of megalopolises in mass events tends to be relatively low. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of the two capitals showed a considerable interest in the future census. In Moscow 86 % claimed that they would take part and only 5 % said they would not. In St. Petersburg 89 % are 'for' and 4 % are 'against'. Certainly, we should bear in mind that the real participation in the census can be lower than the intentions claimed, and still the results of the survey are quite eloquent of a high readiness of the population, it is even higher than in trouble-free western countries.

What has been said does not mean that the law should require compulsory participation in the census. This requirement should be addressed not to the population but to different government and municipal bodies whose inactivity often acts as a stumbling block. The experience of the census of2002 showed that it was this kind of cooperation that was often lacking for effective work of census takers. It is common knowledge that in Moscow census takers spent a lot of time not asking questions but trying to get an opportunity to receive the telephone numbers of those who they were to visit with census schedules. A lot of time and efforts were spent on finding out the door codes to enter the front doors of Moscow blocks of flats. So, it is the participation of officials in the census which should be made not voluntary but compulsory.

How many ethnic groups are there in Russia?

After the census of2002 the notorious Soviet slogan about 100 nations and peoples gave place to a new cliche: they say that in Russia there live over 160 peoples and ethnic groups. This cliche has extensive use among the political figures and even in scientific circles. The phrase first appeared in the preliminary results which were revealed a few months after the end of the All-Russian Census. Only a year later when the results had been processed did it become known that the list included not' 160+' but exactly 182 items. However by that time the phrase from the preliminary report had found way into mass media and even into some laws and, in fact, had gained certain social and political significance.

The final list published after the census, no matter who had worked it out and what idea had been put into it, is not actually a list of peoples or ethnic groups. People just answered the question about their ethnicity and, consequently, the list contains the sums of received answers and nothing more. And interpretation of the data received is the task of scientists, politicians and other 'users'.

We should separately mention a phased variant of registration of ethnicities. This was an innovation of the census of 2002. In Soviet censuses the phased way of registration of ethnic categories was almost never used. The phased nature of the list of ethnicities allows registering the forms of ethnic identity in a more varied way. And this is a great achievement of the census of2002. On the other hand, the further fate of such a list is not clear. Whether its two-tier structure will be retained in all publications of the materials of the census or the so-called second tier will disappear from further statistic data depends on the attitude to the 'second tier' of executives, scientists and public figures. After the publication of the results of the census leaders of a number of social organizations (the Cossacks, for instance) aired discontent to the authorities and the Russian Federal Service of State Statistics about the fact that their ethnicity was not registered adequately and they said that the statistic bodies violated constitutional regulations.

However, to make a consistent (satisfying science and society) final list of answers about the ethnicity appeared to be a difficult task. During the census there was made the first attempt to reflect not only the diversity of the population of Russia but to show the realities of cultural-integrative and assimilation processes. The example with Dagestan is typical.

According to the linguistic data, in Dagestan there have been in use 26 different languages and also about 100 dialects from the time immemorial; at least two of the dialects are so particular that they can even be called languages. Ethnography says that in this mountainous republic live about three dozens of ethnic groups. Some of the groups include several hundreds of thousands of people (the Avar, the Lezghin, the Dargin), others are very small in number, there are even groups existing only within one village. In the USSR starting from 1937 linguistic and ethnic diversity became to some extent unnecessary. Soviet censuses ignored diversity bringing 'to grass' a deliberately cut list of ethnicities. Even in the age of the decline of socialism when conducting quite a fair census the official list of the 'peoples of Dagestan' included less than a half of the

really existing ethnic names; others, following the established practice, were registered under different names. For instance, different groups of the population, native speakers of 14 unique languages, were registered as the 'Avar' and thus the Avar population which was, as it is, the biggest group in Dagestan was presented to be even bigger by the statistics.

The new Russian census broke the 'tradition'. Now there is no impersonal category of 'the peoples of Dagestan' and along with the numerous Avar on the scroll of statistics there appeared the Andians, the Ahvahians, the Bagulal, the Bezh-tin and many others. Alas, scientists, politicians, public figures are still arguing about the question who is hidden under these names – separate peoples or the same Avar. On the one hand there are put forward some arguments that these groups have absolutely different languages. Others claim that these Dag-estanis sometimes speak Avar better than their 'home' languages and under certain circumstances name themselves the Avar. One way or the other, let us give the debaters an opportunity to solve this problem. The census statistics look wiser in this case. 'The debatable' groups of Dagestanis are counted twice: once among the Avar and for the second time as ten plus separate ethnic names.

Avoiding a possible ethnic unrest in the questions of access to power the government of Dagestan demanded that the Russian State Statistics Committee present these groups of the Dagestanis in the final materials not only as separate categories, but add them to the overall number of the Avar as well. The working committee which was preparing the results of the census decided to meet these needs. It caused the reduction of names in the list of ethnicities of the first tier and increased the number of names of the second tier. Though due to it the overall number of ethnic categories did not decrease and the specification of the statistic data did not become worse, the public and some scientists treated it as 'arbitrary regulation of the real number of peoples in order to please politicians...' Due to similar reasons in the census of 2002 there are no statistically 'independent' categories of the 'Chryashians' and the 'Siberian Tatars'. They are"indicated as subgroups of the Tatars. It also caused an outburst of social and political emotions.

In cases when there is no noticeable political pressure on the public, new ethnic categories 'appeared' painlessly. The point is, for instance, the Besermyans amounting to 3.2 thousand people. The authorities of Udmurtia did not oppose their 'statistical independence'. The same factor also affected the Kumandians, the Telengit, the Teleut and others that were registered independently from the Altaic. The census separated the Shapsugs from the Adygh, the Rusinians from the Ukrainians and the Sojot from the Tuvinians.

Thus, the purpose and the task of the state national policy in the Russian Federation is preserving the Russian society in the diversity of cultures and languages, creating conditions for further development of a multi-culture. The bases of true self-identification and free development of peoples in the Russian Federation consist in enlightening, educating and providing civil rights. To achieve these goals, it is necessary to develop and seriously improve the legal framework based upon the experience and responsibility of government bodies of all levels. The state national policy in the Russian Federation is formed according to widely-recognized principles and international laws and it creates new mechanisms to support the unity of ethno-cultural development.

The forthcoming All-Russian Population Census will help to specify and solve the problem, and that is why it is being looked forward to by government bodies, scientists and the public.